¶1Petitioner Randy Lee Royal, a juvenile, seeks review of an order of the Court of Appeals, Division One, denying his motion to modify the ruling of a commissioner of the Court of Appeals granting the court's own motion on the merits affirming his King County Juvenile Court conviction for robbery in the first degree. This comí granted review on February 4, 1993. We affirm the Comí of Appeals.
¶2Statement of Facts
¶3On September 17, 1990, Judge Dale B. Ramerman, King County Superior Court, sitting in juvenile court, found Petitioner Randy Lee Royal (Petitioner)
¶4On July 1, 1991, Petitioner filed his opening brief in the Comí of Appeals, Division One. He claimed that the information failed to identify all elements of the crime of robbery in the first degree and that the State had not filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law in the trial court as required under JuCR 7.11(d). He argued that his conviction *415for robbery should be reversed and remanded for dismissal under State v. Witherspoon.
¶5The information, in a single count, charged that Petitioner Royal had committed the crime of robbery in the first degree in the following manner:
That the respondent Randy Lee Royal, in Kong County, Washington, on or about 19 May 1990, did unlawfully take personal property, to-wit: beer, from the person and in the presence of Mushtegeli Suleman, against his will, by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence and fear of injury to such person or his property and and [sic] in the commission of and in immediate flight therefrom the respondent was armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife;
Contrary to RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a) and 9A.56.190, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Washington.
¶6On August 12, 1991, the King County Prosecuting Attorney (State) presented findings of facts and conclusions of law to Judge Ramerman, who signed them that day. On August 16,1991, the State filed the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Court of Appeals. On December 6, 1991, the State filed its opening brief in the Court of Appeals. It claimed that the information was sufficient to place Petitioner on notice of the charges against him and that the late filing of written findings of fact and conclusions of law had not prejudiced him. It argued that the conviction should be affirmed.
¶7On February 12, 1992, under RAP 18.14(a), the Court of Appeals set a hearing on its own motion to affirm on the merits for April 17, 1992. Both parties waived the hearing. On June 24, 1992, Court of Appeals Commissioner William H. Ellis, Jr., granted the motion on the merits. He concluded that Petitioner's claim on the insufficiency of the information was "clearly" without merit under State v. Kjorsvik
¶8On July 27, 1992, Petitioner filed a motion to modify the commissioner's ruling. He argued that dismissal is the proper remedy for the State's failure to timely file written findings of fact and conclusions of law under JuCR 7.11(d), State v. Witherspoon, supra, and State v. Pena
¶9On October 12, 1992, Petitioner filed in this court a petition for discretionary review under RAP 13.4(b)(2) and (4). He claims the Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion to modify the commissioner's ruling because the appropriate remedy for late filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the State is reversal and remand for dismissal of the charge. On February 4, 1993, this court granted review.
¶10Question Presented
¶11The sole question presented in this case is whether aútomatic dismissal of charges is the remedy for failure by the State to file written findings of fact and conclusions of law within 21 days of the filing of a notice of appeal in a juvenile case as required by JuCR 7.11(d).
¶12Discussion
¶13In 1987, this court adopted JuCR 7.11(d)
(d) Written Findings and Conclusions on Appeal. The court shall enter written findings and conclusions in a case that is *417appealed. The findings shall state the ultimate facts as to each element of the crime and the evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision. The findings and conclusions may be entered after the notice of appeal is filed. The prosecution must submit such findings and conclusions within 21 days after receiving the juvenile's notice of appeal.
¶14(Italics ours.)
¶15In this case Petitioner Royal filed a notice of appeal on October 18, 1990. The King County Prosecuting Attorney did not file written findings of fact and conclusions of law until August 16, 1991, almost 10 months after the notice of appeal was filed and over 9 months beyond the 21-day deadline under JuCR 7.11(d).
¶16The rule, JuCR 7.11(d), does not provide a remedy for late filing. Petitioner argues that the intrusion upon his constitutional liberty interest is so great that the remedy should be automatic dismissal of the charges. The State argues that Petitioner must show that extreme prejudice resulted from the late filing before the charges should be dismissed.
¶17According to Petitioner, the problem of late filings by the State is an old one and continues to be widespread in the juvenile justice system. On April 27, 1993, Petitioner filed a motion for this court to take judicial notice of statistics compiled by the King County Clerk. Under ER 201(b)(2), (d) and (f ),
¶18In this case Petitioner's counsel requested that the King County Clerk generate the statistical data and provide copies of the report to him and to the King County Prosecuting Attorney. This was done. The State does not dispute the data and does not object to our court's taking judicial notice of it.
¶19We therefore grant Petitioner's judicial notice motion under ER 201. The computerized report lists all cases tried in the King County Juvenile Court in 1992. According to the report, 491 cases were tried and 119 were appealed; the State filed findings of fact and conclusions of law within 21 days of receipt of the notice of appeal in only 8 of those cases. The State did not file findings and conclusions within 21 days of receipt of notice of appeal in 94 of the cases appealed; and the State filed no findings and conclusions in 17 of the cases appealed.
¶20Petitioner cites State v. Commodore
[T]he better way... to insure efficient and accurate appellate review is to require written findings and conclusions in those juvenile cases which are appealed. We are aware of the burden this could create if applied to all cases decided by the heavily burdened juvenile court. Accordingly, we suggest that the prose*419cutor's office prepare the documents only after receipt of the notice of appeal, and then within 30 days.[17 ]
¶21(Italics ours.)
¶22Since adoption of JuCR 7.11(d), the three divisions of the Court of Appeals have announced different and inconsistent remedies for late filings. In fact, Division One has announced two inconsistent remedies. This court has not spoken directly on the issue, although it denied review of a 1991 Division One case — State v. Bennett.
Although the practice of entering late findings and conclusions with no apparent reason is unacceptable, this court has previously held that there must be a showing of prejudice for a reversal of the case based upon tardiness of the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.[19 ]
¶23Although Bennett was decided after the effective date of JuCR 7.11(d), both cases cited by the court in that case antedate the rule. Also, the facts in Bennett are distinguishable from the facts in this case. In Bennett, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 21 days' confinement, while in this case Petitioner Royal was sentenced to 103 to 129 weeks of confinement. The Court of Appeals in Bennett stated that
Appellant would have already served his 21-day sentence even if the findings of fact and conclusions of law had been entered in the required time period. . . . This court has previously held that the concept of prejudice in the speedy trial context is concerned with a prisoner's liberty. . . . Since appellant’s liberty interest was not altered by the delayed entry, no prejudice resulted.[20 ]
¶24(Italics ours.)
¶25*420Petitioner argues that in Bennett no liberty interest was involved because the sentence was 21 days and the rule required 21 days. In this case, he asserts, his constitutional liberty interest was affected by the State's late filing because it caused delays in processing his appeal while he remained incarcerated. Petitioner also claims that he has an interest in finality which he argues was violated by unnecessary delays in the appellate process caused by failure of the State to timely file findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by JuCR 7.11(d).
¶26Petitioner also argues that late filing by the State prevents appellate counsel from promptly addressing the merits on appeal, requires appellate counsel to file motions to compel production, and wastes the appellate court's limited time by requiring issuance of "reminder" letters, setting hearings and having commissioners issue rulings.
¶27Stephen D. Akerman was the paralegal responsible for appellate support functions in the Juvenile Division of the King County Prosecuting Attorney's office at the time he certified that he was familiar with the procedures followed by that division to ensure timely entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. He stated that his office relies upon a "30 day letter" sent by the court to the prosecutor as a "tickler" to initiate their procedures; and that their procedures are *421designed to check and recheck to assure that findings are filed within the 30-day deadline imposed by the court, rather than the 21-day deadline imposed by JuCR 7.11(d).
¶28The State has not directly responded to this claim relating to the Akerman document, but merely argues that the Court of Appeals, Division One, has adopted its own procedures which the Kong County Prosecuting Attorney prefers over the requirements of JuCR 7.11(d).
¶29Petitioner claims that the procedure followed by the King County Prosecuting Attorney and the Court of Appeals, Division One, violates not only JuCR 7.11(d), but also GR 9(a)(1), (2), (f) and (g). He argues that their actions in fact have changed the substance of JuCR 7.11(d) in violation of GR 9(a)(1), (2), (f) and (g), under which proposed changes to court rules are published for comment before final rule changes are approved by the court and become effective.
¶30Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals, Division Three, has adopted in State v. Pena
The result is development of an uncertain case-by-case remedial approach to violation of a clearly stated rule. Hereafter, a failure to file findings of ultimate facts as to each element of the crime 21 days after receiving a juvenile appellant's notice of appeal will subject the State to a motion to reverse on the merits and dismissal of the case. RAP 18.14(e)(2).[27 ] No longer will we remand the case to remedy the defect.[28 ]
¶31(Italics ours.)
¶32*422The State claims that JuCR 7.11(d) is a rule intended merely to streamline appellate proceedings and is not intended to confer a substantive right upon a petitioner.
The Pena decision does not purport to rest on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds, but instead arises from the court's inherent power to assure the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction. ... This court has adopted its own procedure to assure prompt entry of findings of fact. When this court receives a juvenile's notice of appeal, the clerk's office notifies the State that a court's motion to reverse and dismiss and/or to impose sanctions will be heard on a specified date unless the findings are filed before that date. The State is thus given an opportunity to explain the delay and the appellant given the chance to apprise the court of any particular circumstances of the case. After being fully informed, the court determines whether to reverse and dismiss, impose sanctions and/or accept the tardy findings.[31 ]
¶33The court in Cowgill then declined to require the State to file findings of fact and conclusions of law within 21 days and declined to reverse in every case where the State fails to comply with JuCR 7.11(d). It concluded that neither the juvenile's interest in prompt appellate review nor the public's interest in proper law enforcement would be served by such a policy.
¶34We find no inconsistency between State v. Pena, supra, in Division Three and State v. Cowgill, supra, in Division One. Under Pena, "a failure to file findings of ultimate facts as to each element of the crime 21 days after receiving a juvenile appellant's notice of appeal will subject the State to a motion to reverse on the merits and dismissal of the case."
¶35Summary and Conclusions
¶36The State argues that it should not be held responsible under JuCR 7.11(d), which mandates that the prosecutor submit written findings and conclusions within 21 days of a notice of appeal, because Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. Counsel for Petitioner, in oral argument before this court, conceded that Petitioner suffered no prejudice. Indeed even the more than 9-month delay in filing the written findings of fact and conclusions of law, albeit beyond the 21-day period under JuCR 7.11(d), in no manner prejudiced Petitioner. Petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals related only to the adequacy of language in the information. Nothing in that appeal was dependent upon written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
¶37We take judicial notice of the computerized report of 1992 juvenile cases submitted by the King County Clerk, and the certification of Stephen D. Akerman, both presented by Petitioner Royal trader ER 201. But we nevertheless affirm the Court of Appeals which affirmed the King County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, in its conviction of Petitioner Randy Lee Royal for robbery in the first degree because Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by the delay of more than 9 months in filing written findings of fact and conclusions of law trader JuCR 7.11(d).
¶38Andersen, C.J., and Dolliver, Durham, and Guy, JJ., concur.
¶39Petitioner was bom on June 26, 1973; see Petition for Review app. B.
¶40Clerk's Papers, at 6-10. The standard range for a "serious offender" under option "A" is 103 to 129 weeks for a youth 17 years of age convicted of this offense with 375+ points. RCW 13.40.0357. The nature of the sentence is not an issue.
¶4160 Wn. App. 569, 805 P.2d 248 (1991), a Division Two case.
¶42Clerk's Papers, at 1.
¶43Brief of Respondent.
¶44117 Wn.2d 93, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).
¶4564 Wn. App. 305, 824 P.2d 502 (1992).
¶4662 Wn. App. 702, 711, 814 P.2d 1171 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1017 (1992).
¶4764 Wn. App. 831, 836-37, 827 P.2d 304 (1992).
¶4865 Wn. App. 711, 829 P.2d 256 (1992).
¶49108 Wn.2d 1134 (effective Sept. 1, 1987).
¶50ER 201 (Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts) provides in part:
¶51"(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
¶52"(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
¶53"(f) Time of Taking Judicial Notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
¶54"Comment 201
¶55"The rule is the same as Federal Rule 201(a) through (f). . . .
¶56"Section (f). ... it seems beyond dispute that judicial notice may, under appropriate circumstances, be taken by appellate courts."
¶57634 F.2d 639, 642 (1st Cir. 1980).
¶58631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).
¶59Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, at 12-13.
¶6038 Wn. App. 244, 684 P.2d 1364, review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1005 (1984).
¶61Commodore, at 249-50.
¶6262 Wn. App. 702, 814 P.2d 1171 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1017 (1992).
¶63Bennett, at 711 (citing State v. Royster, 43 Wn. App. 613, 621, 719 P.2d 149 (1986) and State v. McGary, 37 Wn. App. 856, 861, 683 P.2d 1125, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984)). The court in McGaryalso stated that "[t]he practice of entering findings after the appellant has framed the issues in the opening brief has the appearance of unfairness and burdens the court with motions to supplement the record."
¶64Bennett, at 711.
¶65Brief of Appellant, at 5-6.
¶66Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, at 17-18.
¶67Supplemental Brief of Petitioner app. E, second document. See ER 201; United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d at 642; United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d at 119.
¶68Supplemental Brief of Respondent, at 6 (quoting State v. Cowgill, 67 Wn. App. 239, 241, 834 P.2d 677 (1992)).
¶69Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, at 14-15.
¶7065 Wn. App. 711, 829 P.2d 256 (1992).
¶71RAP 18.14(e)(2) provides for motion to reverse on the merits.
¶72Pena, at 714-15.
¶73Supplemental Brief of Respondent, at 3, 7-11.
¶7467 Wn. App. 239, 834 P.2d 677 (1992).
¶75Cowgill, at 241.
¶76Cowgill, at 241-42.
¶77Pena, at 714-15.
¶78Cowgill, at 241.
¶79See Brief of Appellant (Petitioner here) in Court of Appeals.