Volume 123 — Washington Reports

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered May 5,1922, upon a trial and conviction of grand larceny..</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Askren, J., entered December 30, 1921, upon findings in favor of defendant upon his counterclaim, in an action in replevin, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Card, J., entered April 22, 1922, dismissing an action for damages sustained through an automobile collision.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Askren, J., entered March 4, 1922, in favor of the plaintiff as to one tract of land, hut denying foreclosure as to a deficiency judgment upon the other tract, in an action to foreclose a mortgage.</p>

, entered May 24, 1922, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action on contract, tried to the court.

<p>Municipal Corporations (315, 325) — Police Power — Protection Against Fire — Building Permits — Violation op Ordinance — Vested Rights. A building permit issued under a mistake of fact, in violation of a city ordinance, and “subject to compliance” therewith, is void, and the fact that officials suffered the building to be erected confers no vested right to maintain it, or estop the city from removing it.</p> <p>Same (315) — Fire Hazard — Provisions op Ordinance — Review by Courts. Where an ordinance prescribes what shall constitute a fire hazard, the courts have no power to find that a building within the restriction is not a fire hazard or to prescribe a different rule.</p> <p>Same (331) — Violation op Ordinance — Removal op Buildings— Powers op Oppicers. Seattle Charter, § 18, giving the city council power to establish fire limits and prohibiting the erection of certain buildings therein, is sufficiently complied with by an ordinance authorizing the superintendent of buildings to remove buildings whenever he finds they have been erected in violation of the ordinance, without any special ordinance to check violations.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered June 22, 1921, in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Eminent Domain (126) — Proceedings—Value op Land — Evidence —Admissibility. In eminent domain proceedings to condemn the right to maintain a dam raising the height of the “water table” affecting agricultural land, where a witness, testifying that the proper height of a permanent water table should not be closer.than three feet, explanatory evidence as to the formation of the subsoil is not material; since the “water table” means the upper limit of the water, influenced by capillarity.</p>

<p>Bills and Notes (90) — Payment-Rights and Liabilities on Payment — Collateral. Where one of the makers or endorsers of a note signed the same in reliance on collateral security pledged to the payee, and thereafter tendered payment of the note, he is entitled to a surrender of the collateral.</p> <p>Pledges (11) — Recovery of Property by Pledger on Payment. Where the payee of a note knew that one of the makers had signed in reliance upon collateral security pledged to the payee, and without such maker’s consent, diverted the collateral and could •not deliver it on payment of the note, it was guilty of a conversion.</p>

, entered February 14, 1922, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in proceedings to subject property to the state inheritance tax, tried to the court.

<p>Witnesses (52) — Competency—Privileged Communications— Attorney and Client. Rem. Comp. Stat., § 1214, disqualifying an attorney from testifying without the consent of his client as to communications or advice in the course of his employment, cannot be invoked by a corporation which he helped to organize to take over the assets of another, where he was consulted by two trustees, acting individually, and was employed and paid by such other corporation, notwithstanding they had the same trustees.</p> <p>Corporations (156) — Representation of Different Corporations by Same Person — Evidence of Fraud — Admissibility. Upon an issue as to the fairness of a transaction whereby the assets of one corporation were transferred to another, organized for the purpose, evidence is admissible of false representations made by the trustees to prospective stockholders in the new corporation, notwithstanding the suit was brought by the new corporation rather than by the individual stockholders.</p> <p>Same (130, 156) — Representation of Different Corporations by Same Person — Fraud—Burden of Proof — Evidence — Sufficiency. Under the rule that contracts between corporations having the same trustees will be closely scanned, and that the burden of proving fairness and good faith rests upon the party asserting it, findings that a corporation sold its property to another promoted for the purpose, at an unfair and excessive price of $36,000, are sustained, where the company had title to only about one-third of the real estate which the trustees pointed out to prospective stockholders in the new corporation, resulting in an overvaluation of more than $10,000 although there was little to indicate actual fraud.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Pierce county, Askren, J., entered September 6, 1922, denying the modification of a judgment, after a hearing before the court.</p>

, entered May 9, 1922, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in consolidated actions for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Sessions, J., entered April 17, 1922, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort.</p>