Volume 124 — Washington Reports

<p>Appeal (23)—Decisions Reviewable—Suits in Equity—Amount in Controversy. The constitutional limitation upon the amount involved does not apply to an equitable case to enforce the specific performance of a contract.</p> <p>Judgment (84)—Modification—Powers op Court. After the time for serving a notice of motion for a new trial, as provided by Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 235, 313, and 464, the court is without power to modify a decree for specific performance to relieve defendants from the obligation of furnishing an abstract, which the court had not intended to include.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for King county, Smith, J., entered March 13, 1922, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action to quiet title, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Contracts (12)—Evidence op Agreement—Suppigiency. .Findings that an architect’s contract for plans for buildings did not undertake to limit the cost are sustained where no such assurance was made, because of the owner’s assurances that he could obtain building material at less than usual cost, and his insistence upon expensive changes and additions to the plans.</p>

<p>Evidence (168, 175) — Parol to Vary Writing — Separate Oral Agreement — Ambiguity. A contract for the sale of logs, which the seller agreed “to log continuously on said claim until done, unless breakdowns or labor trouble prevent” is not ambiguous; and it is inadmissible to show by parol that the parties had agreed that delivery should be made at a specified rate and within certain time.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Dykeman, J., entered June 1, 1922, upon sustaining a demurrer to the petition, dismissing an action to set aside certain provisions of a will.</p>

<p>Frauds, Statute oe (11) — Oral Agreement to Make Lease. An oral agreement or promise to make a lease of real estate is void, unless the lessee is put in possession and part performance is had.</p> <p>Landlord and Tenant (6, 15-1) — Oral Agreement to Lease— Breach — Damages—Evidence—Sufficiency. Damages cannot be recovered for breach of an oral contract to lease land to one of two joint purchasers from the lessor, upon their releasing their interest in the land contract, in consideration of which the lessor agreed to spend the $600 he had received on the purchase price in seeding the land and purchasing stock, where there was no agreement to return the $600, which belonged to the lessor, or any enforcible contract to make the lease.</p>

<p>Pleading (28) — Complaint—Separate Causes oe Action. In an action upon an assigned account, the complaint states hut a single cause of action, notwithstanding in addition to alleging the assignment to plaintiff and defendant’s acceptance thereof, it further states that, at the time of the acceptance, defendant represented to plaintiff that it was indebted to the assignor in more than the amount of the account assigned, and that plaintiff relied thereon; and defendant is estopped to dispute the same.</p> <p>Estoppel (45) — Representations. Where, on accepting an assignment of an account, the debtor represented to the assignee that it was indebted to the assignor in more than the amount of the account assigned, the debtor is estopped to dispute the fact, in an action brought upon the assigned account.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Carey, J., entered July 21, 1921, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action in replevin, tried to the court.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court February 2, 1923, for a writ of mandamus to compel tbe director of public works and supervisor of highways to certify acceptance of work done under a highway contract, and to compel the state auditor to issue a warrant in payment thereof.

<p>Appeals from judgments of the superior court for Spokane county, Lindsley, J., entered September 13, 1922, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in consolidated actions to foreclose mortgages, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus (11) — Jurisdiction—-Appeelate Courts — Discretion. Under Const., Art. 4, § 6, conferring jurisdiction upon tlie superior court in habeas corpus proceedings, the supreme court may, in its discretion, relegate an application for a writ to the superior court, and will do so where it appears that the questions of law and fact had already been presented to the superior court in a similar petition, and the petition denied.</p>

<p>Deeds (12) — Validity—Acknowledgment. An unacknowledged deed is good as between the parties.</p> <p>Same (21-2) — Mistake—Means of Knowledge. A grantor cannot question her deeds because she did not know their contents, when the means of knowledge were at hand when executed.</p> <p>Husband and Wife (25-31) — Wife’s Separate Estate — Liabilities and Char.ges — Deeds—Consideration. An indebtedness due from a husband is a sufficient consideration for the wife’s deed of her separate property in payment of or security for the debt.</p>

<p>Sheriffs and Constables (14) — Wrongful Levy — Liability— Property of Third Person. A sheriff being liable for the wrongful acts of his deputy, he is a trespasser if his deputy levies upon property of a third person as the property of the defendant.</p> <p>Same (20) — Wrongful Levy — Right of Action — Election. Upon a wrongful levy upon property not belonging to the defendant, plaintiff has a choice of remedies and may sue the sheriff for a conversion without resorting to the proceeding of claim and delivery under Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 707-717.</p> <p>Same (22) — Wrongful Levy — Action Against Officer — Pleading — Liability. In an action against a sheriff for a wrongful levy on property not belonging to the defendant, the complaint need not allege that he is a sheriff, but may be sued in his individual capacity.</p> <p>Same (14, 24) — Wrongful Levy — Ownership—Evidence—Sufficiency. In an action against a sheriff for a wrongful levy upon an automobile as the property of plaintiff’s husband, plaintiff’s own-, ership is a question for the jury, where it appears that the car Was purchased in Minnesota by the husband for $650 and his personal note, secured by mortgage, for a balance of $500, and the plaintiff testified that the $650 was her money, that her money paid off the chattel mortgage, which was released and a bill of sale taken in her name, she having purchased the car for her own use on the advice of a physician, and that she notified the officers of her ownership when it was attached.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chelan county, Grimshaw, J., entered October 29,1921, in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Yakima county, Nichoson, J., entered December 21, 1921, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for wrongful death.</p>

<p>Sales (78, 155) — Performance of Contract-tTime — Extension— Damages — Purchase of Goods Elsewhere. Where the buyer of' lumber extended the time for the delivery to a certain date, and the seller already in default made no reply thereto and failed to deliver the lumber, the breach of the contract occurred on that day; so that the measure of damages would be governed by the market price at that time, and not at an earlier date when the buyer had purchased lumber in anticipation of the seller’s continued failúré to perforin the contract. . ' .</p>

<p>Injunction (39) — Trade Unions — Picketing—Scope of Relief— Equity — Powers oe Court. Since injunction in industrial disputes calls for flexible remedial eguity powers depending on the circumstances of each case, it will not be held an arbitrary exercise. of the power for the trial court to prohibit picketing within a fixed radius of 100 feet from the- front entrances of the places of business in guestion. ' 1</p> <p>Appeal (388)- — Review—Trial De Novo — Error Alleged by Respondent — Cross-Appeal. In the absence pf a cross-appeal, respondents cannot ask the court to review their exception to the decree for the purpose of having the judgment against them set aside, as could be done if necessary to sustain the judgment entered.</p>