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127 Ill. 449

Clark v. Wilson

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided January 25, 1889

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1889-01-25

'Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. The facts in this case are sufficiently stated in the following opinion of the Appellate C8urt: Lacey, J.: “This was a bill brought by the plaintiffs in error, judgment creditors of defendant in error, Osman J. Wilson, in aid of the assignee, for the benefit of the creditors of said Wilson, the assignee neglecting and refusing to bring the suit.

Relies on Rust v. Mansfield · Marston v. Brashaw

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-01-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently August 1940

2 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

301889189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Per Curiam :

¶1We have thoroughly examined the record in this ease, and carefully considered the printed arguments filed on behalf of the different parties, and have thereupon determined that the judgment of the Appellate Court shall be affirmed. The foregoing opinion is approved and adopted as a sufficiently accurate expression of our views upon the questions arising upon the record.

¶2Our statute gives the form of an acknowledgment of deeds, which it declares shall be sufficient, and it requires the officer to subscribe his name to the certificate, (Rev. Stat. 1874, chap. 30, sec. 26, entitled “Conveyances,”) and the only safe rule is to require this in all cases of statutory acknowledgments. Marston v. Bradshaw, 18 Mich. 81, and same case in 100 Am. Dec. 152. See, also, Freeman’s note to Livingston v. Kettle, 41 Am. Dec. 173, under the head of “Signing and sealing by officer. ”

¶3Under the facts of this case, even the answer of Abram Wilson, made under oath, pursuant to a prayer of the bill, could not be read in evidence against his co-defendant, Boozel. (Rust et al. v. Mansfield et al. 25 Ill. 336.) To allow his default to have an effect which his answer under oath cbuld not have, would be contrary to all principle. The decree pro confesso against him can affect no one else, because it is not alleged in the bill, that, in any view, he has a present interest in the property that can be affected by the decree. The theory of the bill is, that, in equity, the property is that of O. J. Wilson, while the answer of Boozel claims that it is his. Abram Wilson was a mere conduit through which the title passed.

¶4The fact that the evidence as to the consideration of the $1000 note given by 0. J. Wilson to John T. Wilson was given orally before the trial court, is a material circumstance to be considered in a case like the present. The court can determine much, from the appearance and manner of the witness While testifying, as to his candor; and if John T. Wilson testified the truth, his note is bona fide, and he stands on an equal footing with other creditors.

¶5The judgment is affirmed.

¶6Judgment affirmed.

¶7Mr. Justice Baker, having passed upon this case in the Appellate Court, took no part in its decision here.

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