Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

128 N.J. 608

608 A.2d 895

Phillips v. Curiale

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Decided July 13, 1992

Supreme Court of New Jersey · decided 1992-07-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“accrue,” and construed “occur” to refer to the filing of complaints after the effective date of the amendment, as opposed to accrual of the underlying cause of action. Whether we agree or disagree with this analysis, the amendments to N.J.S.A. 59:8-3 and N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 contain no comparable language. We view Comblatt as an effort, rightly or wrongly, to avoid the “slippery doctrine of retroactivity” and simply determine “whether by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature itself applied the legislation to a given situation____” thus, not”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Serrano v. Gibson

“The problem is not one of applying today's legislation to cases that antedate the effective date of the legislation [which in fact it was]; rather the question is whether by the every terms of its enactment, the Legislature itself applied the legislation to a given situation — here, plaintiff's case. I would not muddy the waters of the already — murky waters of retroactivity analysis.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 286 N.J. Super. 549 - KEMP BY WRIGHT v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1992-07-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 151 later decisions — most recently August 2018 · most notably Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson (1994), Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (1996)

4 district · 147 state decisions

650199220002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

CLIFFORD, J.,

¶1dissenting in part.

¶2Only from so much of the Court’s otherwise straightforward and eminently sensible opinion as attempts to come to grips with the slippery doctrine of retroactivity do I dissent. See Part IV, ante at 620-628, 608 A.2d 901-905. I join in the judgment because I agree that the Legislature did not intend that N.J.S.A. 38A:13-1.2 apply to plaintiff’s claim. See ante at 619, 608 A. 2d 901.

¶3Not only is the discussion of retroactivity in Part IV unnecessary to the Court’s disposition of the appeal, as the opinion readily acknowledges, ante at 620, 608 A. 2d 901, it is entirely irrelevant. “Retroactivity” has nothing to do with this case. The problem is not one of applying today’s legislation to cases that antedate the effective date of the legislation; rather, the question is whether, by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature has itself applied the statute to a given situation— here, plaintiff’s case. The Court has correctly decided that the statute does not apply. I would not further muddy the already-murky waters of retroactivity analysis.

For reversal and, remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7,

¶4Opposed — None.

/128/nj/608 · .json · Public domain