¶1I concur in the order reversing the judgment as to Komstheoft. I dissent from the order affirming the judgment as to Day. The evidence, including the tire marks left on the highway by the automobile driven by Day, would support a finding that Day in broad daylight with the approaching automobile driven by Komstheoft in full view turned rather sharply across the path of the Komstheoft vehicle at a time when it was obviously impossible to avoid being struck by it. If the jury found these facts, as it reasonably could from the evidence, they would satisfy the definition of wilful misconduct: “the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result.” (Meek v. Fowler, 3 Cal.2d 420, 426 [45 P.2d 194].)
¶2The jury could certainly infer from the circumstances that Day’s conduct was intentional. (Wright v. Sellers, 25 Cal.App.2d 603, 613 [78 P.2d 209].) One who intentionally turns into the path of an oncoming vehicle has been held guilty of wilful misconduct where the probability of serious injury is or should be apparent. (Hoffart v. Southern Pac. Co., 33 Cal.App.2d 591 [92 P.2d 436]; Hagglund v. Nelson, 23 Cal.App.2d 348 [73 P.2d 265]; Francesconi v. Balluomini, 28 Cal.App.2d 701 [83 P.2d 298].)
¶3Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 18, 1955. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.