Volume 132 — United States Reports

<p>The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, having a right to sue and be sued, and is subject to the ordinary rules that govern the law of procedure between private persons.</p> <p>The Maryland statute of limitations of 1715, which is in force in the District of Columbia, embraces municipal corporations.</p> <p>The sovereign power of the District of Columbia is lodged in the government of the United States, and not in the corporation of the District.</p> <p>This court expresses no opinion upon the question whether, when the right of property in highways and public places is vested in a municipality, .an assertion of that right against purprestures or public nuisances is subject to the law of limitations.</p> <p>An action by a municipal corporation to recover from a street railroad company the cost of maintaining pavements in a street, which the company is, by its charter, bound to maintain, is not an action upon the statute, but one in assumpsit.</p>

George W. Harshman, on the 28th day of March, 1881, recovered a judgment by default in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Eastern Judicial-District of Missouri against the county of Knox, in the State of Missouri, for the sum of $77,374.46 and costs, and on the 25th day of January, 1882, sued out an alternative writ of mandamus in the usual form, directed to the county court of said county and the judges thereof, for the levy of taxes to…

This was an action to recover duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Yerdict for the plaintiff, and judgment on the verdict. The defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

This action was commenced June 7, 1884, in the Civil District Court, parish of Orleans, Louisiana, by petition as follows: “ The petition of Allen, West and Bush, a commercial firm doing business in the city of New Orleans and - composed of James H. Allen, Thomas H. West, and John C. Bush, respectfully shows — “ That your petitioners sold to Alfred F. Jones, to be paid for cash on delivery, and delivered to him on the 4th day of June, 1884, certain two hundred and…

The case was thus stated by the court in its opinion: This case comes from the Supreme Court of Texas, and arises upon the following facts': By an act of that State, passed on the 14th of July, 1879, the sale of a portion of its vacant and unappropriated public lands within certain counties and what was known as the Pacific Bailway reservation was authorized.

Held: that- the first claim does not include the adjustable stop of the third claim, but includes only the combination of the-clamp and core and rod, with the described elements which are necessary to cause an angular impingement upon the rod and an intermittent downward feeding of the rod.

This was a suit in equity originally brought in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, on the 10th of December, 1881, by the appellees, heirs-at-law of Alexander M. Ferguson, deceased, against the appellants, heirs-at-law and legal representatives of Henry G. Dent, deceased. Upon application of the complainants, the case was removed into the United States Circuit Court for the "Western District of Tennessee on the ground of the diverse citizenship of the parties.

This suit was brought by holders of obligations of the Indiana, Cincinnati and Lafayette Railroad Company, and on behalf of other holders similarly situated, to enforce an alleged lien claimed by them upon earnings of a section of the road of the White Water Yalley Railroad Company, against the claim to priority of bondholders secured by an earlier mortgage.

Held: that the defendant did not derive its authority to build the branch road in question, from the western side of the Schuylkill River, through Filbert Street, from the act of 1846, because that act embraced only the power to build and operate a road from Harrisburg to Pitts-burg ; but that it derived such authority from the act of May, 1857, in the 11th section thereof, before quoted; and that the convention which…

<p>The first five claims of letters patent No. 288,494, granted to Jo'seph Aron, as assignee of William W. Rosenfield, the inventor, November 13, 1883, for an “ improvement in railway car "gates,” are-invalid, because what Rosenfield did" did not require invention.</p> <p>The same devices employed by him existed in earlier patents; all that he did was to adapt them to -the special purpose to which he contemplated their application, by making modifications which did not require invention, but only the exercise of ordinary mechanical skill; and his right to a patent must rest upon the novelty of the means he contrived to carry his idea into practical application.</p>

Held: that the decree was not final or appealable. In equity. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. U. M. Rose and Mr. G. B. Rose, for appellant, submitted on their brief. Mr. G. JT. Tillman for appellee. Mr. J. M. Moore filed a brief for same.

In equity for the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The case is stated . in the opinion.

This was a bill in equity for the infringement of letters patent No. 208,541, granted to the plaintiff September 1,1878, for improvements in locks for satchels, with the following specification and claims: “Be it known that I, William Roemér, of Newark, county of Essex, and State of New Jersey, have invented a new and improved lock for satchels, travelling-bags, &c., of which the following is a specification : “ This invention relates to certain improvements in the…

This action was comménced in the year 1876 to recover on coupons issued by the county of Scotland, in Missouri, in payment of a subscription to the stock of the Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Eailway Company. Answer was made. ■ In 1879 an amended complaint was filed, and, issue being joined, such proceedings were had in the cause that judgment was entered for the plaintiff. To this judgment the defendant sued out a writ of error.

In contract. Yerdict for the plaintiff, and judgment on the verdict. The defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated; in the opinion.

Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125 (1889), was an action to recover out-of-pocket damages for alleged fraudulent representations in the sale of shares of mining stock. The plaintiff was denied benefit of the bargain damages. The case is important in contract law, specifically legal remedies and compensating expectancies.

<p>A State is not deprived of jurisdiction over a person who criminally forges a bill of exchange or promissory note with intent to defraud, in violation of its statutes, or of its power to punish the offender committing such offence, by the fact that he follows this crime up by committing against the United States the further crime of making false entries concerning such bill or note on the books of a national bank, with intent to deceive the agent of the United States designated to examine the affairs of the bank, and in violation of the statute of the United States in that behalf.</p> <p>The false making or forging of a promissory note in a State, purporting to be executed by an individual, and made payable at a national bank, is not a fraud upon the United States, or an offence described in Eev. Stat. § 5418.</p> <p>The same act or series of acts may constitute an offence equally against the United States and against a State, and subject the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each government.</p> <p>If, in a trial in a state court of a person accused of crime, the jury is brought into court; and, on being polled it is disclosed that they were agreed upon á verdict of guilty under two counts m the indictment, but could not agree as to the other counts; and, in the presence of the jury, the prosecuting attorney proposes to enter a nolle prosequi as to those counts; and, the jury having retired, the court permits this to be done; and the jury, being then instructed to pass only upon the remaining counts, return a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment; all this, however irregular, does not amount to a deprivation of the liberty of the defendant without due process of law.</p>

Held: that, although the complaint might have been more specific, enough was alleged to sustain the judgment. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William E. Earle for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joseph B. Batchelor for- defendant in error.

<p>ERROR TO. THE • CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>This was an action of assumpsit against a railroad corporartion by a person who, after taking passage on one of its trains, was forcibly expelled by the conductor.</p> <p>At the trial in the Circuit Court, the plaintiff testified that on March 18, 1882, he purchased at the office of the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company in Chicago a ticket for a passage to Hot Springs and back, (which is copied in the margin,1 and which, as was alleged in the declaration and appeared upon the face of the ticket, was then signed by him as well as by the ticket agent, and witnessed by a third person,) and upon this ticket travelled on the defendant’s- railroad to Hot Springs.</p> <p>He was asked by his counsel when he first actually knew that the ticket required him to have it- stamped at Hot Springs. The question was objected to by the defendant, and ruled out by the court.</p> <p>lie further testified that on April 19, 1882, when leaving Hot Springs on his return to Chicago, he went to the baggage-office and requested the baggage-master to check his baggage, and, on his asking to see the ticket, showed it to him, and he thereupon punched the ticket, checked the baggage, and gave him the checks for it; and also that the gateman asked to see the ticket, and he showed it to him, and then passed through the gate, and took his seat in the cars. This testimony was objected to by the defendant, on the ground that no statement or action of the baggage-master, or of the gateman, would constitute a waiver of any of the written conditions of the contract; and it was admitted by the court, subject to the objection.</p> <p>The plaintiff then testified that soon after leaving' Hot Springs the conductor, in taking the tickets of passengers, came to him, and, upon being shown his ticket, said it was not good, because he had failed-to have it stamped at Hot Springs; the plaintiff replied that the baggage-master, when checking his baggage, had said nothing to him about it, and he did not know it was necessary ; the conductor answered that he must either go back to Hot Springs and have the ticket stamped, or else pay full fare, but did not demand any specific sum of fare, or tell him what the fare was, and. upon his refusing to pay another fare or to leave the train, forcibly put him off at the next station, notwithstanding he resisted as much as he could, and in so doing injured him in body and health.</p> <p>On motion of the defendant, upon the grounds, among others, that this was an action of assumpsit for breach of contract, and that the plaintiff failed to produce to the conductor a ticket or voucher which entitled him to be carried on the train, and that until the plaintiff identified himself at the office at Hot Springs and had the ticket stamped and signed by the agent there, he had no subsisting contract between himself and the defendant for a return passage to Chicago, the court declined to permit the plaintiff to testify to the consequent injury to his business and to his ability to earn money, excluded all evidence offered as to the. force used in removing him from the train, and as to his expulsion from the train, (although corresponding to allegations inserted in the declaration,) and directed a verdict for the defendant.</p> <p>The plaintiff excepted to the rulings of the court, and, after verdict and judgment for the defendant, sued out this writ of error.</p>

This was an action brought November 16, 1S83, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina by John Glenn, as trustee of the National Express and Transportation Company, against Thomas J. Sumner to recover $7500 for an assessment on shares held by him in that company.

<p>The “ professional productions of a statuary or of a sculptor only,” as that phrase is used in the tariff act, (§ 2504 Rev. Stat. 2d ed. p. 478,) embraces such works of art as are the result of the artist’s own creation, or are copies of them, made under his direction and - supervision, or copies of works of other artists, made under the like direction and supervision, as' distinguished from the productions of the manufacturer or mechanic.</p>

<p>An exception to the refusal of the presiding judge at a jury trial to instruct the jury in language prayed for by counsel is of no avail, if the refusal be followed by instructions in the general charge, substantially to the same effect, but in the language of the court.</p> <p>A general exception to the whole of a charge to the jury will not avail a plaintiff in error if the charge contains distinct propositions and any one of them is free from objections.</p>

Held: that the exemption was intended to commence from and after the completion of a railroad to the Mississippi River', and was to continue thereafter for twenty years if the road was completed to the river in five years from the date of the approval of the act, but liable to be diminished by whatever time beyond five year’s was consumed by the completion of the road to the river.

<p>Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, ante, 174, affirmed and applied.</p>

This was- an action by a citizen of Mississippi against a parish in Louisiana upon certain bonds and coupons, amounting with interest to more than $5000 in value, alleged in the petition and denied in the answer to have been issued in accordance with the statute of Louisiana of March 23, 1814, c. 14, and to have been purchased by the plaintiff in good faith and before maturity.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>In equity for the infringement of letters patent. Decree' dismissing the bill. Plaintiff appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

In equity for the infringement of letters patent- Decree dismissing the bill, from which plaintiff appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: The judgment was not final or appealable; (2) It made no difference that the judgment dismissed the cross complaint.

Held: Although there was no ground for contending that this court had no jurisdiction, yet the reasons assigned for taking the writ of error were frivolous, and it was taken for delay only; (2) The principal of the bonds was payable to bearer; (3) The judgment ought to be affirmed; (4) The proceeding by mandamus being in the nature of execution, if the prosecution of writs of error to the execution of process to enforce…

Held: that the final judgment was one dismissing the action at law, and was not a judgment in the exercise of chancery jurisdiction. *217 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Leo/nder Holmes, for appellants, submitted on his brief. Mr. W. W.- Upton and Mr. A. H. Garland, for appellee, submitted on their brief. Me.

On the filing of a bill in equity, in October, 1884, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, by The Bankers ’ and Merchants ’ Telegraph Company of Indiana, an Indiana corporation, against The Bankers’ and Merchants’ Telegraph Company of New York, a New York corporation, praying for an accounting between the defendant and the plaintiff as to moneys due by the former to the latter, and for a determination of the relative rights of the parties to…

This cause was submitted April 15, 1889, at the last term, the briefs of counsel for both parties having been filed in due course with the clerk- of this court. The court thereupon refused to consider the case on its, merits for the reason that the record did not contain copies of the pleadings, and leave was granted to the plaintiff in error to sue out a writ of certiorari to bring into this court the papers omitted from the transcript. Redfield v. Parks, 130 U. S. 623.

<p>Dyes or colors called naphthylamine red, orange II, orange IV, and resorcine red J, imported in 1879, were liable to a duty of fifty cents per pound and thirty-five per cent ad valorem under the provision of schedule M of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes, 2d ed. p. 479, imposing that rate of duty on “ Paints and dyes — aniline dyes and colors, by whatever name known,” although none of them were known in commerce before 1875; if, according to the understanding of commercial men, dealers in and importers of them, they would, when imported, be included in the class of articles known as aniline dyes, by whatever name they had come to be known; or if, under § 2499 of the Revised Statutes, they bore a similitude, either in material, quality, or the use to which they might be applied, to what were known as aniline dyes at the time the Revised Statutes were enacted, in 1874.</p>

At law, to quiet title. Verdict for the plaintiff and judgment on the verdict. The defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated- in the opinion. Mr. William IL De Witt, for plaintiff in error, submitted on his brief.

This case was argued with Dahl v. Raunheim, ante, 260. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. WilUam H. De Witt, for plaintiff in error, submitted on his brief.

<p>On the facts stated in the opinion it is IJeld, that there is no separable controversy in'this, case; but that if there were, the provision as to the removal of such a controversy has no application to a removal on the ground of local- prejudice.</p> <p>In order to the removal of a cause from a state court on the ground of local prejudice, under Eev. Stat. § 639, it is essential, where there are several plaintiffs or 'several defendants, that ¿11 the necessary parties on one side be citizens of the State where the suit is brought, and all on the other side be citizens of another State or other States; and the proper citizenship must exist when the action is commenced as well as when the petition for removal is filed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That perhaps the reasonable interpretation of the statute was that a foreign corporation should not purchase or hold real estate in Colorado until it should acquire, in the mode prescribed by the local law, the right to do business in that State; (2) That these constitutional and statutory provisions were valid so far as they did not directly affect foreign or interstate commerce; (3) That the company violated the…

The case as stated by the court in- its opinion was as follows : This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries which the defendant in errgr, who was the plaintiff below, alleges were sustained by him in consequence of the failure of the city of Cleveland, by its officers and servants, to exercise due care in keeping one of its streets in proper and safe condition for use by the public.

<p>The claim of letters patent No. 195,233, granted to William Roemer, September 18, 1877, for an improvement in a combined lock and handle for travelling-bags, namely, “ The lock-case made with the notched sides a a, near its ends to receive and hold the handle-rings B, substantially as herein shown and described,” having been inserted by amendment, after his application ior a broader claim was rejected, and after he had amended his specification by stating that he dispensed with an extended . bottom plate, cannot be so construed as to cover a construction which has an extended bottom plate.</p> <p>When a patentee, on the rejection of his application, inserts in his specification, in consequence, limitations and restrictions for the purpose of . obtaining his patent, he cannot, after he has obtained it, claim that it shall be construed as it would have been construed if such limitations and restrictions were not contained in it.</p>

Held: that he could not recover because — (1) There was no breach of good faith on the part' of the debtor, and no misrepresentation as to his assets, and no false answer made by him to any question; (2) The payment of more than sixty per cent to another creditor having been made when the latter had an attachment suit against the debtor, which was about to be tried, was not a voluntary payment within the meaning of the…

<p>A regulation by the President to fix the length of service and compensation of special deputy marshals, or supervisors of elections, appointed in pursuance of the provisions in Rev. Stat. §§ 2012, 2016 and 2021, if it has any validity, cannot have a retroactive effect.</p>

Held: that there is nothing in the sixth section of the act, directing the assignee’s bond to be filed with the county clerk of “his” county, to indicate a legislative intent that an assignee under such an assignment must necessarily be a citizen or resident of the State. Mr. H. G. Robertson and Mr. Scmnie Robertson, for plaintiff in error, submitted on their brief. Mr. D. A. MoKnight for defendant in error.

Held: (]) That the municipal authorities had no power to deliver the bonds, after their execution, except to the state treasurer, .and that the word “ deliver” as used in the statute with reference to this act, was used in its ordinary and popular sense, and not in its technical sense; (2) That to the governor alone was given the power to determine whether the bonds should ever in fact issue, and, if issued, when they…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in, the opinion.</p>

Held: (1), that the garnishee was bound to establish, as against the pursuing creditor, that his claim against the debtor was just, and that he will receive from the assets no more than is reasonably necessary to pay it; and, (2), if he is found liable at all as garnishee, he is liable to account not only for the money collected on the notes, accounts, etc., but also for the value of those which remain in his hands, at…

<p>APPEAL EBOM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion. '</p>

Thjs is the same cause brought here and heard at October term, 1884, and reported 113 U. S. 594. The case now made is thus 'stated in the opinion of the court: This is an action of ejectment brought by Watson, the’original plaintiff, in the District Court for the county of Bell, in the State of Texas, and afterwards removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of that State.

Held: that he could only recover the market value of the shucks.

' The court, in its opinion, stated the case aá follows: Oh the 1st of April, 1871, Nathan S. Grow, of Chicago, Illinois, executed a trust deed to Benjamin E. Gallup, of the same place, to secure the payment of a. promissory note for $35,000, payable in five years from that date, with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, payable half-yearly on October 1 and April 1, as evidenced by 10 interest coupons, bearing the same date, for $1575 each.

<p>EBBOB TO THE CIECUIT COUBT OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE NOETHEBN DISTBICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that this was error; and that the articles, as imported, were manufactures of ivory. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistamt Attorney General Maury for plaintiff in error. Mr. E. B. Smith for defendant in error. Mr. Stephen G. Clarice filed a brief for the same. *455

The' case as stated by the court in the opinion was as follows : . This was an action brought to recover duty alleged to have been illegally exacted by the defendant, as collector of the port of New York, upon certain merchandise imported by the plaintiffs.

Held: that the statute of Alabama thus construed was a regulation of commerce, and that the tax imposed upon the messages comprised in the second return was unconstitutional. The facts which raised the federal question are stated in the opinion. Mr.. Gaylord B. Glarh and Mr. Thomas G. Jones for plaintiff in error. Mr. John T. Morgan for defendants in error.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action against a collector of. customs to recover duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Verdict for the plaintiff and judgment on the verdict.' The defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

This was- an action of trespass brought in the' court below . by Frederick 'Muller and Adolph Jacobs, assignees of the firm of Louis Goldsal & Company, of Denison, Texas, against Anthony W-, Norton, the United States marshal for the Northern District of Texas, and the sureties on his official bond, for levying upon and seizing, under certain attachment suits in that court, the goods, wares and merchandise of said firm which had been assigned to the plaintiffs.

<p>ERROR TO AND APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF IDAHO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion..</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE TEXAS.</p> <p>Motions to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That by this agreement I,., W. and H. became partners and as between themselves established a community of property as well as of profits and losses in respect to said goods and the business of the L. and W. Company; (2) That in the absence of L. this power of attorney authorized H. to represent him in a general assignment of the property of the L. and W. Company for the benefit of its creditors.

<p>Where the Supreme Court of a State decides a Federal question, in rendering a judgment, and also decides against the plaintiff in error on an independent ground not involving a Federal question, .and broad enough to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dismissed, without considering the Federal question.</p>

<p>The evidence in this case fails to establish any fraud in the making of the notes and mortgage which are the subject of controversy, or in the use ■ afterwards made of the notes.</p>

<p>APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES .FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>In equity. The cause was argued in full on the merits. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that he was a “ banker” within the meaning of that term as used in Rev. Stat. § 3407, and subject to taxation as such under the provisions of § 3408. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr'. Henry F. Tremain (with whom was Mr. Mason W. Tyler on the brief) for plaintiff in error. Mr. Alphonso Hart, Solicitor of Internal Revenue (with whom was Mr. Solicitor General on the brief) for defendant in error.

. The original action was trespass, .brought in a court of the State of Illinois on May 10, 1883, by Lucinda "Wangelin, a citizen of Illinois, against the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad Company, a corporation of Kentucky, and the Southeast and St. Louis Eailway Company,. a corporation of Illinois, for breaking and entering her close, and tearing up and carrying away a railroad switch, and thereby destroying the connection between a coal mine of the plaintiff and the St.…

Held: that this suit is one between an assignee in bankruptcy and one claiming an adverse interest touching the property which is the subject of controversy, within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 5057, prescribing a limitation for the commencement of such an action.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 'FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Bibbons, composed of silk and cotton, in which, silk is the component material of chief value, used exclusively as trimmings for ornamenting hats and bonnets, and having a commercial value only for that purpose, are liable to only 20 per cent duty, under the following provision in , “ Schedule N. — Sundries,”T.n § 2502 of Title 33 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 512: “Hats, and so forth, materials for: Braids, .plaits, flats, laces, trimmings, tissues, willow-sheets and squares, used for making or ornamenting, hats, bonnets and hoods, composed of straw, chip, grass, palm-leaf, willow, hair, whalebone, or any other substance or material, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, twenty per centum ad valorem; ” and are not liable to 50 per cent duty, under the following clause in “ Schedule L.— Silk and Siik Goods,” in the same section, Id. 510: “All goods, wares and merchandise, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, ■ made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, fifty per centum ad valorem.”,</p> <p>The present case is controlled, by that of Hartranft v. Langfeld, 125 U. S. 128. It was proper for the Circuit Court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff.</p>

Held: that it was properly rejected. The evidence of a person who did not personally know about the amount of ore taken from the mine was properly rejected at the trial of such action, and cannot be held to be admissible under a stipulation which does not form part of the record.

<p>This court has jurisdiction to hear and determine,, irrespective of the amount involved, an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, in which the power of the governor of the Territory, under the organic act, to appoint a person to be the auditor of public accounts is'drawn in question.</p> <p>Under the organic act of that Territory the power to appoint an auditor of public accounts is.vested exclusively in the governor and council.</p> <p>Under the power of Congress, reserved in the organic acts of the Territories, to annul the acts of their legislatures, the absence of any action by Congress is not to bo construed to be a recognition of the power of the legislature to pass laws in conflict with the act of Congress under which they were created.</p> <p>So much of the acts of the legislature of Utah of January 20, 1852, and February 22, 1878, as relates to the mode of appointing an auditor of public accounts, is in conflict with the organic act and is invalid; but so much as relatés to the creation of the office is valid.</p>

<p>Clayton v. Utah, ante, 632, affirmed and applied to this ease.</p>

. Carr filed his petition against the United States in the Court of Claims on the 17th of February, 1885, averring that the Postmaster General entered into a contract in writing with him in April, 1878, for carrying the mails of the United States from Salinas City, in the State of California, to Gabilan, in that State, and back from Gabilan to Salinas City for the annual sum of $796, a copy of which contract he attached to his petition; that at the time of the' letting of…

Held: that they were subject to a duty of 45 per. cent ad valorem as manufactures, etc., not specially enumerated or. provided for, composed wholly or in part of iron, ujader the last paragraph of Schedule C, Rev. Stat. § 2502, as enacted March. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 501 , c. 121; and not as printed matter not specially enumerated or provided for, under the first paragraph of Schedule M in the same amending act.

Held: That the devise to the children of M. was a contingent remainder, to vest only in case of the death of the testator’s wife without offspring by him, and limited after the fee which was primarily given to the testator’s child; .

Held: that this court must consider the question of the patentability of the inventions covered by the claims, and that, as they were not patentable, the decree must be reversed, and the bill be dismissed. In equity. The suit was brought under section 4915 of the Revised Statutes of the United States to determine to whom a certain patent, yet to be issued, covering certain improvements in milk-setting apparatus, belonged.