Volume 133 — United States Reports

This was an information, filed November 18, 1884-, under §§ 3258 and 3305 of the Revised Statutes, and § 16 of the act of February 8,1875, c. 36, (the material parts of which are printed in the margin,1) for the- forfeiture of property particularly described in the information, and- seized by the collector of internal revenue on November 14, 1884, and including: 1st. All the right, title and interest of Thomas Dixon; Eli B. Bellows and William Stone in a lot of land in the…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The case, as stated by the court, was- as follows:</p> <p>The Green Bay and Minnesota Kailroad Company being in the hands of a receiver, namely, Timothy Case, in the Circuit. Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in a suit by the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, to foreclose a mortgage on said railroad, said receiver was directed by the court to take- possession of all the property,real and personal, of said company, namely, its road-bed, lands, right of way and all its other property and rights whatsoever, with authority to bring suits in the name of the railroad company as he should be advised by counsel to be necessary. Under this order Mr. Case,- as receiver, brotight the present suit, stating that he sues in behalf of said.railroad company, and as receiver, the defendants David M. Kelly, Henry Ketchum and George Hiles and the Arcadia Mineral Spring Company,' a corporation created by the laws- of the State of Wisconsin.</p> <p>The allegations of the bill are, that the defendants’ Kelly, Ketchum and Hiles, who were officers of the railroad company during its period of construction, had procured numerous donations of land from citizens who were interested in the construction of the road, along its line, intended to be for the use and benefit of the railroad company, and to assist it in such construction. The fundamental allegation of the bill is, that these defendants, representing to the persons who. made the donations that they were officers of the road, and soliciting these grants for the benefit of the road, took the conveyances to themselves individually; that they did this in a fraudulent manner, by making the grantors in the conveyances believe that they, as the officers of the company, could receive the conveyances for the benefit of the road; and. that either the grantors did not really know to whom the conveyances were made, or were induced to believe that when made the grantees held the lands as a trust for the benefit of the road. These defendants not recognizing this trust, and-the conveyances on their faces being merely conveyances to the individuals, either separately or collectively, to wit: to Ketchum, Kelly and Hiles, who now refuse to convey to the company or to admit its right to the lands, this suit is brought to have • a declaration of the trust made by the court and a decreé ordering conveyances by the defendants of the land to the corporation.</p> <p>It is further alleged that the mortgage in process of foreclosure in the court under which Case is acting as receiver covered all the lands of the corporation, and would cover these lands if the title of the corporation in them was established.</p> <p>The defendants Kelly, Ketchum and Hiles filed answers, in which they denied all fraud or deception, denied that they held the lands in trust for the railroad company, and denied the right of plaintiff to any relief; A decree for want of ari answer was taken fro confesso against the Arcadia Mineral Spring Company; replications were filed to the answers, the case was put at issue as regards the three 'principal defendants, and an immense mass of testimony, documentary and otherwise, was taken.</p> <p>The Circuit Court on the hearing was of opinion that the conveyances made by various persons to Kelly and Ketchum and Hiles of the lands described in the bill were made by the grantors and received by the defendants as contributions to the •railroad company to aid in the construction of its road; and that if the railroad company had authority by law to receive such grants and to hold such real estate, it would be entitled to the relief sought in the bill in this case. But being also of opinion that, by the laws of Wisconsin, and under its charter, it could only receive and hold .lands for the defined purposes of the road, it held that only such lands as were necessary and proper for the immediate use of the road could be repovered in this suit. Case v. Kelly, 13 Am. and Eng. Railroad Cas., 70. It therefore entered the following interlocutory decree:</p> <p>“This day came the parties, by their counsel, and, on consideration of the pleadings and proofs in' this cause and the arguments of counsel thereon, it is ordered, adjudged and dpcreed by the court that the complainant is entitled to recover from the defendants the title and possession of all' such lands mentioned in the bill of complaint as are required by the railroad company for right of way, depot buildings and other necessary railroad purposes, as described and limited in the charter of the company, and that the -bill of complaint as to all other portions of the lands described ther ein be dismissed.</p> <p>“Eor the purpose of ascertaining what lands are required for right of way, depot grounds and other railroad purposes, as above stated, and also the extent and value of any improvements made by defendants, this cause is referred. to Hon. James H. Howe, as special master of this court, who will take siich additional proof as either party may offer upon reasonable notice, the evidence to: close by the first day of October next, and the report of the' master to be filed herein' by the 20th day of October next. The master will accompany his report with such reasons as he may deem proper in support of the conclusions reached by him. Eor that purpose he may visit the premises and report the result of his personal examination.”</p> <p>The master made his report, accompanied by the testimony, to which, exception's were taken both by Case, the receiver, and by the defendants Hiles and Kelly, which exceptions were overruled by the court, and a final decree entered. From this the present appeal is taken.</p> <p>That decree, after specifying .certain pieces of land which the court considered as necessary and proper to the road for its use in the way of track, right of way, depots and other similar, proper and necessary uses, ordered the conveyance of these pieces of land by Kelly, and by Ketchum and by Hiles and by the Arcadia Mineral Spring Company to the railroad company. . It also directed a master to ascertain and report the value of certain improvements made by Hiles upon, a portion of this property, and report the same,to the court, for which. Hiles -was to be paid in case complainant should elect to take such improvements.</p>

Held: it follows that the unissued bonds were not subject to attachment or to execution as valid and binding obligations against the company, and that Richardson's purchase at the sheriff's sale vested in him no title or ownership in them.

•In equity. The court, iu its opinion, stated the case as follows: These are an appeal and a cross-appeal from a decree of the. Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. On March 31st, 1884, there was filed in the Circuit Court for that district the bill of complaint of Thomas G-.

The original action was ejectment, brought in the Superior Court of San Francisco by the city and county of San Francisco to recover a tract of land in San Francisco, of which the plaintiff alleged that it was seized- in fee, and entitled td the possession, in trust for the use of the State of California and of the people of the city and coqnty as a public plaza, park, common or square, and commonly known as Hamilton.. square or plaza.

Held: It was proper to regxamine the claim; (2) The judgment against the bank was not binding on the stockholders, in the sense that it could not be reexamined; (3) The guaranty of the bank was released as to the stockholders by the release of the maker of the notes; (4) The rights of the stockholders could not be, affected by the acts of the president done after the bank had gone into liquidation. *68 In equity.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA.</p> <p>Motions to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: and decided, that this pardon relieved him of so much of the penalty as accrued to the United States, without any expression of opinion as to the rights of the informer. The citations now made are sufficient to show the true bearing and effect of the pardon granted to Bosworth, and of the general proclamation of amnesty as applied to him.

Held: and a committee appointed to investigate his affairs and make a report. On the 20th of March a second meeting of Bird’s creditors was held, at which a report was submitted by the committee. April 23, 1885, a proposal for composition under, the statutes of Massachusetts in that behalf was filed by . Bird, returnable May 1th.

<p>After the passage of the act of June 30, 1876, 19 Stat.- 63, savings banks organized in the District of Columbia under an act of Congress, and having a capital stock paid upln whole or in part, were entitled to become national banking associations in the mode prescribed by Rev. Stat. § 5151.</p> <p>A certificate signed by the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency as “ Acting Comptroller of the Currency,” is a sufficient certificate by the Comptroller of the Currency within the requirements of Rev. Stat. § 5151.</p> <p>The record from the trial court must be taken in this court as it was presented to the appellate court below, and an objection to it, not made there, will not be considered here. '</p> <p>A transfer of stock in a bank to a person without his or her knowledge or consent, does not of itself impose upon the transferee the liability attached by law to the position- of a shareholder in the association; but if, after the transfer, the transferee approves or acquiesces in it, or in any way ratifies it, (as, for instance, by joining in an ap- . plication to convert the bank into a national bank,) or accepts any benefit arising from the ownership of such stock, he or she becomes liable to be treated as a shareholder, with such responsibility as the law imposes in such case; and this liability-is the same whether new certificates have or have not been-issued to the transferee after the transfer.</p> <p>The endorsement, by the payee, of a check which appears on its face to be drawn by the cashier of a bank in payment of a dividend due the payee as a stockholder, estops him from denying knowledge of its contents of ownership of the shares.</p> <p>A married woman in the District of Columbia may become a holder of stock in a national banking association, and assume all the liabilities of such a shareholder, although the consideration may have proceeded wholly from the husband.</p> <p>The coverture of a married woman, who is a shareholder in a national bank, does not prevent the receiver of the bank from recovering judgment against her for the amount of an assessment levied upon the shareholders equally and ratably under the statute; but no opinion is expressed as to what property may be reached in the enforcement of such judgment.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity by the County of Knox, in the State of Missouri, against Harshman,,a citizen of Ohio, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri, for a perpetual injunction against the prosecution of the peremptory writ of mandamus issued by that court, pursuant to the judgment and mandate of this court in Ilcwshtna/n v. Know Oounty, 122 U. S. 30Q, to compel the judges of the county court to levy a tax sufficient to pay a judgment recovered by .Harshman in the .Circuit Court of the United States for $77,37446,. on bonds issued by the county for a subscription to the capital stock of the Missouri and Mississippi Kailroad Company.</p> <p>The bill set forth that this judgment was rendered on .default, upon a petition alleging that the subscription- was authorized by a vote of two-thirds of the qualified voters of the county at a special election held under § 17 of c. 63 of the General Statutes of Missouri of 1866; and upon a return of the marshal that -fifteen days before the return day he had made service upon the county by delivering a copy of the petition and summons to Erank P. Hall, the clerk of the county court, at Edina in the county and .district aforesaid.</p> <p>The bill averred that the allegations of the petition were false; and that the bonds were in fact issued without the assent-of two-thirds of the voters, and under § 13 of the charter of the railroad company, by which the tax 'to ■ be levied .in payment of the bonds was limited to one-twentieth of one per cent upon the assessed value of taxable property for each year.</p> <p>The bill further alleged that neither the county court, nor any of the judges thereof, nor the county'attorney, had any notice or knowledge of the- commencement of the suit until after the end of the term at which the judgment was rendered, when they were informed thereof by Harshman’s attorney; that Hall, the county clerk, after the pretended service' upon him, never handed to the county court the copy of the petition and summons, or called the attention of the county court or its judges, or of the county attorney, to the fact of service, or said anything about it until, upon being inquired of by them after they had been informed of it as aforesaid, he denied that a copy ■of the petition or summons had been served upon him, or that he had any knowledge or notice thereof; and the bill alleged, and charged the fact to be, “ that neither a copy of said summons and petition, nor either of them, was served upon said Frank P. Hall, as stated by the marshal in his return to said summons, and that said return was and is false.”</p> <p>The bill also alleged that “said judgment on default was rendered on a false allegation of facts, and as the record stands it is a gross fraud upon your orator. to the extent and in the particulars herein mentioned.”</p> <p>The answer averred that the allegations of the petition and the statements in the return were true, and that the county had full notice of the commencement of the action; and denied that the judgment was rendered upon a false allegation of facts, or was a fraud upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a . general replication.</p> <p>At a hearing upon pleadings and proofs, the bill was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.</p>

Held: The supply of water was not in compliance with the contract, in quantity or quality; (2) The taking possession by the city of the old mains was necessary for the protection of the city from fire; (3) The contract of the city for the' sale of the old mains was conditional and was not executed; (4) The city was not estopped, as against the bondholders, from refusing to pay the rent for the hydrants, which, by the…

Held: that as, under the amendment of 1875, the salary was to be $10,000, “ unless where a different compensation is prescribed by law,” and the office did not exist- before July 1, 1882, and the first provision made by Congress for a salary for it was made bythe act of July 1, 1882, and was for $7500, and the same provision was continued while the claimant thereafter held the office, and he was paid the $7500, he had no…

Held: that a decision by the state court that tlie Court of Alabama Claims was legally organized and did act judicially in that matter, denied to the plaintiff no title, right, privilege or immunity claimed by him under the Constitution, or under a treaty or statute of tlie United States, or under a commission held or authority exercised under tlie United States.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>■This was a bill filed to. set aside a patent. The facts were these:’ ■</p> <p>In'1843 Michael White petitioned for a tract of land at the month of the Cajon de los Mejicanos. This petition was sustained and a grant made by Governor Manuel Micheltorena, the, Mexican governor of the Californias, which read :</p> <p>“ Whereas Don Michael White, a Mexican by naturalization, has^ petitioned for his own benefit and that of his family for the place known by the name of ‘Muscupiabe,’ bounded on the north by .the foot of the mountain,, on the south by Agua Caliente, and on the.west by the ‘Alisos,’ (sycamores,) <which are on the other side of the creek called ‘ He los Negros,’ having practised the proceedings and. relative observation, according to the direction of the laws and regulations; exercising the authority conferred upon me in the name of the Mexican nation, 1. have concluded to grant him the aforesaid' land, declaring it to be his property, by.the present letters, subject to the approval of the most excellent departmental assembly, in and under the following conditions.</p> <p>* -x- -x- ■ , -x- x-</p> <p>“3d. The land of-which grant is hereby made consists of one league, (un sitio de ganado may or i) a little more or less, according to the explanation of the diagram which is attached to the respective ‘ expediente.’</p> <p>The judge that shall give the possession shall cause it to be measured in conformity with the ordinance, reserving the overplus that may result to the nation for convenient uses.”</p> <p>Oh February 8, 1853, a petition for confirmation was pre'sented in the name of the original grantee to the board of commissioners appointed to ascertain, and settle private land claims, and on March 6, 1855, the grant was confirmed by an order in these words : , .</p> <p>.. “ In this case, on hearing- the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by the commission that the claim of the petitioner is valid, and it is therefore decreed'that his application for a confirmation be allowed,. With the following boundaries, to wit: On north and east by the foot of- the mountains, on" the south by the Agua Caliente, and on the west by the cottonwoods, which are on the other side pf the creek, reference being had to the map accompanying the expediente.”</p> <p>An appeal was taken, from this order of confirmation, but was dismissed on J une 8, 1857. This confirmation' was not challenged.</p> <p>In 1857 instructions were issued by the surveyor general of California for the survey; and the survey as made, and returned to the surveyor general’s office was by him approved, and, on July 11, 1858, forwarded to Washington. , This survey in ■January, 1871, was disapproved by- the Secretary of the Interior as not conforming to the decree of confirmation, and a new survey ordered. On June 10, 1872, the surveyor general reported that ho had examined the original title papers and had compared them with the calls of the decree of con firmation, and had caused an examination to be made of the' premises, and that therefrom he found that a survey made in strict accordance with the boundary calls of the decree of confirmation would include something like a league more of land than the present survey, and that the owners of the grant were satisfied with the present survey, and therefore suggested the propriety of accepting it. This report was returned to the Secretary of the Interior, by him approved, and, on June 22, 1812, the patent was issued. This bill was filed on May 29, T885. The bill charged that the surveyor, Henry Hancock, who made the survey was the real owner of a large interest in the grant, although the title was nominally in another party; that concealing his interest he secured his appointment as deputy surveyor, and in making the survey fraudulently included within its limits about twenty-six thousand acres more of land than justly belonged therein; that without any’ knowledge of the fraudulent acts of Hancock in the premises the surveyor general thereafter published the required notice of the survey in a newspaper published in the city of Los Angeles, a city of another county and over, fifty miles from ■the land; whereas, at the time, there was a newspaper published within the county' and within two miles of the land. It also charged that after the survey had been disapproved by the Secretary of the Interior, Hancock fraudulently represented to the surveyor general that a correct survey would include about one league, in addition to whatr was embraced within ■the present survey, but that the owners were content to take the survey as it stood; and that, induced by-and relying^ upon these fraudulent, representations, the surveyor general made the report and recommendation heretofore mentioned. The Circuit Court, on final hearing, dismissed the bilí, and the United States appealed to this court.</p>

Held: therefor on the 31st day of January, 1884 [1874].” . *206 The act referred to therein gave to counties full power to issue bonds for the building.of bridges and prescribed the proceedings, including therein a vote of the people, essential to the vesting of authority in the county commissioners.

, that “ the allowance of costs to a district attorney is altogether in the jurisdiction of' the judge, and not within the power of the officers of the Treasury.” In harmony with those decisions, and in accordance with the practical construction placed by the courts, by the Attorney General himself, and by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, upon the act of February 26, 1853, (now sections 823 and 824, Revised Statutes,) the judge before whom the case was…

Held: that the court was at liberty to adopt • the construction which was in accordance with its own judgment, and that it was not obliged to follow the construction given to it by the Supreme Court of California.

Held: that, as the State was an indispensable party to the suit, the bill must be dismissed. . -In EQurcjr. Decree dismissing the bill, from which the complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion. ■ Mr. Joseph B. Batchelor and Mr. Samuel F. Phillips, (with whom were Mr. W. H. Lamar and Mr. J. G. Zachry on the brief,) for appellants,; cited: Beale v. White, 94 U. S. 382 ; Wilson v. Boyce, 92 Ü.

Held: that there was no' error in this decree,. but that it Was eminently judicious and proper. *247 This was a suit by way of third opposition, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, by-Caesar Philippi, syndic of the. creditors of Gilbert H. Green individually, and as' a member of the late commercial firm and partnership of Gilbert II.

Held: that the act of Congress in providing for controversies between citizens' of different States in the Circuit Courts, referred to that term as used in the Constitution, and therefore ■'to’one of the States composing the United States.

These were appeals from a judgment in the Court of Claims in favor of Mosby against the United States. The case is stated in the opinion.

This was a suit in equity by Beals, a citizen of New York, against the- Illinois, Missouri and Texas Railway Company, the Cape Girardeau and State Line Railroad, and the Cape Girardeau Southwestern Railway Company, all three corporations of Missourij and Thilenius and Blow, trustees of the Cape Girardeau and State Line Railroad, and Fletcher, all three citizens of Missouri.

Held: that, in the exercise of the power thus conferred, an order made on the 2d day ’of January, 1871, was valid. ' The executive action, under the army appropriation act of July 15, 1870,-reducing the army, was recognized by Congress in 18 Stat. 497 , c. 159, § 2; 20 Stat. 35 , c. 50; 20 Stat. 321 , c. 100; 20' Stat. 354, c. 175; 21 Stat. 510 , c. 151, and was thereby validated, even if otherwise invalid.

This, was a suit in equity brought in the court below by Calvin R. Corbin and Horatio N. May, copartners as Corbin, May & Company, doing business in Chicago, against Walter J. Gould, Edward Telfer, David D. Cady and L. F. Thompson, copartners as W. J. Gould & Company, doing business in 'Detroit, for the alleged infringement of a trade-mark.

This action was dismissed by tbe court below for want of. jurisdiction, to which judgment the plaintiffs below sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH.</p> <p>^ In equity. The bill was dismissed and the plaintiffs appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), was a United States Supreme Court case affirming, by a 9–0 vote, that federal laws against polygamy did not conflict with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>In EQuifr to restrain an infringement of letters patent. Decree in complainants’ favor. Defendants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF INDIANA.</p> <p>In equity to restrain infringements of letters patent.</p> <p>The ease is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: error, and that the court ought to have directed the jury, as requested, to find for the defendant, on the ground that the negligence was that of a fellow-servant, either the porter or the carpenter.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the draft was a foreign bill of exchange; that W. did not act as the agent of the. Cincinnati Bank; and that in a suit by the Chi *434 cago- Bank against the receiver of the Cincinnati Bank, which had failed, to recover the ámount of the draft, the Chicago Bank was a bona fide holder and owner of it for value, and want of consideration could not be shown by the receiver.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>In equity. The defendant demurred to the bill. The’demurrer being overruled he elected to stand on the demurrer, and a decree was entered for the complainant, from which’the defendant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

In April, 1884, the plaintiff in this suit, the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of Wisconsin, was the owner of certain lands situated in the town of Worcester, in the county of Price, in that State, and, hád a patent for them from the State bearing date on the 25th of February, T884, upon-which taxes had, in the year 1883, been assessed by that county, although, as claimed by the plaintiff, the title to a part of these lands was at…

Held: . *515 (X) That this court had jurisdiction to review the judgment of - the. statq court; (2) That'the Trench legatees only were entitled to be represented before the commission, and they o’nly were entitled to participate in the distribution; - .

In eoNTEfAXJT, to recover on bonds issued by a municipal corporation. Judgment. for the plaintiff, to review which this writ of error was sued. out.. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution does not operate to prevent counties in a State from being sued' in a Federal Court.</p> <p>No state statute exempting a county in the State from liability to suit except. in the courts of the county can defeat the jurisdiction of suits given by the Constitution to the Federal courts.</p> <p>This court follows the Supreme Court of Nevada in holding that the statute under which the bonds in controversy were issued was not in conflict with the Constitution of of that State.</p> <p>County of Greene v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187, followed.</p> <p>When, after default by a municipal corporation in the payment .of interest upon its bonds the legislature provides for the creation of a special fund-by the debtor, out of which the creditor is to be paid, the debtor cannot set up the statute of limitations to an action on the bonds and coupons, without showing that the fund has been provided.</p>

■ On the 16th of February, 1867, the St. Louis' and Keokulc Railroad Company was incorporated by the legislature of Missouri to construct and operate a railroad from some suitable point on the North Missouri Railroad,, not exceeding thirty miles west of St. Charles, in St. Charles County, to some point near the mouth of the Des Moines River, on the northern boundary of the State.' Under its charter the company lobated its road between the points designated and ponstructed a…

This suit was Commenced by Daniel Sturr -against Charles "W. Beck by a complaint filed in a district court of the Territory of Dakota, seeking an injunction against the defendant from interfering with an alleged water- right and ditch of the complainant and the use of the water of a certain creek •through the same, and for damages alleged to have been sustained by interference which had already taken place.

Held: that they were necessary parties to the bill and that no decree could be'made by the court in their absence.

Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a Mississippi law that required railroads to racially segregate their passengers. The Court in Hall v. Decuir (1878) had struck down a similar Louisiana law on the grounds that it unreasonably interfered with Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. A railroad challenged the Mississippi law on the same ground, arguing that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, dividing 7 to 2, disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice David Josiah Brewer distinguished Hall on the basis that Mississippi's law, unlike Louisiana's, applied solely to intrastate commerce.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

.This was a bill in equity by Henrietta c! Keller, the holder of á promissory ■ note for $2000, made by one Thompson,; secured by his mortgage of 'land in Washington, against Francis A. Ashford as grantee- of the land subject to this -mortgage, and. who by the terms of the deed to him assumed payment of incumbrances on the land'. The bill prayed for a decree in-the plaintiff’s favor against Ashford for the amount of that.' note, and for general relief.

Held: It was the intention of both S. and P. that the first two deeds of trust should include the rear land as well as the front lot; (2) The decree in the first suit by P. was so uncertain as to be practically void, and there was no effective appointment of' a trustee and no effective sale to P.; (3) P. was not estopped by that sale from having the property sold. again; (4) P. was not required, as a condition of the sale…

Held: when so int iduced in evidence, to be of the same validity as if the names of the officers signing and countersigning the same had' been fully inserted in such record.” • There is therefore no error in the admission of this transcript in evidence. ' .' .As regards its effect upon the rights of the parties, it seéms to us it shows that under an act of Congress which authorized it toffie done, Uthe, by directing his…

Held: That this court was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeals as to P.’s failure to comply with the state statute in relation to' the method of procedure, form of assessment, etc.; (2) That the assessment was not made in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States,-and was, therefore, not void for that reason; . ' ' (3) That the mode provided by the statute of New York for the collection of…

Held: that the deed was not void in law because of the insertion of this provision.

Held: that the transfer was absolute, subject to be defeated by failure to perform the condition subsequent.