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134 F.2d 225

Docket No. 10429.

Lamar Hotel Corp. v. Fly

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided March 10, 1943.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1943-03-10

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently May 1974

2 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Relies on Edwards v. Chile Copper Co. · Magruder v. Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Realty Corp. · Pierce v. Barker

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1943-03-10

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¶1J. C. Floyd, of Meridian, Miss., for appellant.

¶2Arthur Manella and Sewall Key, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Toxey Hall, U. S. Atty., of Jackson, Miss., for appellee.

¶3Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

¶4HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

¶5The suit was to recover as overpaid $135.00 capital stock tax assessed against and paid by appellant for the taxable year ending June 30, 1939. The claim in general was that within exception 43(b) (1) of Treasury Regulation. 64,1 plaintiff was not doing business within the meaning of Sec. 1200(a) 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code.2 In particular it was: that plaintiff was incorporated for the purpose of succeeding, and it did succeed, in reorganization proceedings, to all of the assets of the Meyer-Florida Hotel Company, including the Lamar Hotel; that as such successor it assumed the hotel management contract3 that company had made with Interstate *226Hotel Company to manage and operate the hotel; and that being thus a mere holding company, it was not' doing business and not subject to the capital stock tax.

¶6The district judge, of the opinion that, upon the agreed facts,4 plaintiff was doing business within the act, rejected plaintiff’s claim and gave judgment for defendant. We agree with the district judge. Indeed, unless it can be said that plaintiff died a horning, it is difficult to understand how it can be said of a corporation organized for the very purpose of taking over and conducting the business of anjother corporation, fhat within the meaning of the invoked regulation, it has retired from the business for which it was organized.

¶7Organized to enter, it immediately entered, upon the operation of the Lamar Hotel. Through the medium of the management contract which it had assumed, it made the necessary arrangements to receive and disburse that part of the earnings which it was to receive directly under the contract. Also, by advancing funds to the Interstate Hotel Co. and authorizing it to make necessary expenditures for it and on its behalf, it actively participated with and through that company in the management of the business. In the light of all of the things that plaintiff was incorporated to and did do, to hold that, because plaintiff employed a corporation as manager and gave it, as manager, large powers, it was not itself doing the business it had just been incorporated to do would be to construe the statute so narrowly as almost to nullify it. It is not subject to such construction. On the contrary, with complete uniformity, the statute has been broadly, the exception from it narrowly, construed, Edwards v. Chile Copper Co., 270 U.S. 452, 46 S.Ct. 345, 70 L.Ed. 678; Phillips v. International Salt Co., 274 U.S. 718, 47 S.Ct. 589, 71 L.Ed. 1323; Magruder v. Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Realty Corp., 316 U.S. 69, 62 S.Ct. 922, 86 L.Ed. 1278; Page v. M. Rich & Bros. Co., 5 Cir., 99 F.2d 607; United States v. Peabody Co., 6 Cir., 104 F.2d 267; Harmar Coal Co. v. Heiner, 3 Cir., 34 F.2d 725; United States v. Hercules Mining Co., 9 Cir., 119 F.2d 288.

¶8The judgment was right. It is affirmed.

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