Volume 134 — Louisiana Reports

<p> (Syllables by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 627%*) — Conduct of Trial —Demand for Sample of Liquor.</p> <p>In a prosecution for selling intoxicants without a license, where accused claimed that the liquors sold by him were nonintoxicating, the refusal of his request for the prosecution to furnish him a sample for analysis is error, when made in good faith, but not where he sold a liquor manufactured by a brewery and had quantities of the same kind on hand or could easily have obtained some.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1431, 1434, 1435; Dec. Dig. § 627%.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law ('§ Í131*) —Appeal — Dismissal.</p> <p>Where a defendant, who has appealed from a conviction and sentence, in a criminal prosecution, escapes, and is shown to be a fugitive from justice, he is not to be heard in this court, through counsel, and his appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2971-2979, 2985; Dec. Dig. § 1131.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Courts (§ 224*) — Supreme Court — JurisnicTioN — Homestead Exemption.</p> <p>While this court has no jurisdiction of a claim for a moneyed judgment of less than $2,-000, it does have jurisdiction of a claim to a homestead exemption.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p> <p>2. Homestead (§ 18*) — Exemptions.</p> <p>Defendant has no right to a homestead exemption.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 22-27; Dee. Dig. § 18.*]</p>

Action by Mrs. F. P. Dance and others against D. S. Craighead and others. A judgment for defendants in the District Court was affirmed' by the Court of Appeals, and plaintiffs apply for. certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Statutes (§ 106*) — Municipal Ordinances — Subjects — Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>Const, art. 31, requiring every law to have but one subject expressed in the title, applies only to the Legislature, and not to town councils.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 119, 120; Dee. Dig. § 106.*]</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law (§ 197*) — Ex Post Facto Law.</p> <p>Under the rule that an ex post facto law is a law which retrospectively makes an act criminal, one engaged in rebuilding of wood after a fire, while the municipal council meets and enacts an ordinance establishing fire limits, including the building in question, may not attack the ordinance as ex post facto when suit is brought against him to enjoin his further work on the building.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 550; Dec. Dig. § 197.*]</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law (§ 154*) — Obligation of Contracts — Violations.</p> <p>An ordinance of a town council establishing fire limits, enacted while one is engaged in rebuilding of wood a building destroyed by fire, is not invalid as violating the obligation of. any contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 426-428, 442-444, 447-455, 458, 459, 461-473; Dec. Dig. § 154.*]</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations (§ 63*) — Fire Limits — Ordinances—Validity.</p> <p>The adoption by a town council of an ordinance establishing fire limits is an exercise of the police power, and the courts will not adjudge the ordinance unreasonable and discriminatory unless it is clearly arbitrary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 155, 1378, 1879; Dee. Dig. § 63.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 1159*) — Appeal—Questions of Fact.</p> <p>Unless no evidence whatsoever has been introduced by the state to sustain its charge, this court will not interfere with the action of the lower court in refusing to acquit an accused, because to so interfere this court would have to go into a consideration of the evidence, and determine the question of fact as to whether or not the accused was guilty, which it has no authority to do.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074^3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 1156*) — Appeal—Discretionary Ruling — Refusal of New Trial.</p> <p>The granting of a new trial is a matter largely vested in the discretion of the trial judge, who has had an opportunity to hear and weigh the evidence, and it is only in cases that it is clear that there is newly discovered evidence that will change the result that a new trial is granted on appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3067-3071; Dec. Dig. § 1156.*]</p> <p>3. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 242*) — Criminal Prosecution — Punishment.</p> <p>Act No. 66 of 1902 authorizes the court to impose a fine, and in addition thereto, and not in the alternative, to also sentence the accused to prison.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 356-361; Dec. Dig. § 242.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>4. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 221*) — Indictment — Sufficiency.</p> <p>Where an indictment under Act No. 66 of 1902 charged that defendant “did retail intoxicating liquor without first obtaining' a license,” it was sufficient, though it did not specifically allege that defendant did not have a city license.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 240-248; Dec. Dig.. § 221.*]</p>

King, Judge. Action by Doris Ingersol for use and benefit of minor son, Edward Ingersol, against the National Sash & Door Factory. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

O. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by Frederick N. Oertling against the Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Plaintiff moves to dismiss appeal, 'in which the civil sheriff and John H. Fulton and others, as creditors, join.

<p> (Syllabus by the Gowrt.) </p> <p>1.Gas (§ 14*) — Regulation by Ordinance-Enforcement.</p> <p>A city ordinance, which is a contract between the city and a quasi public corporation, and which fixes terms upon which the said corporation shall supply gas and electricity to inhabitants of the city, will be enforced in favor of the inhabitants of that city.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Gas, Cent. Dig. §§ 10-11; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]</p> <p>2. Gas (§ 14*) — Regulation by Ordinance-Construction.</p> <p>Where such ordinance undertakes to divide the inhabitants into three different classes, terming the first “domestic consumption,” the second for “public institutions,” and the third “manufacturers,” and the business of a certain inhabitant does not technically fall within any one of the three classes, it is a question for the court, when appealed to, to construe the contract and to determine within which class said inhabitant and his business shall be placed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Gas, Cent. Dig. §§ 10-11; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]</p> <p>3. Gas (§ 14*) — Regulation by Ordinance-Construction.</p> <p>A person who owns and conducts an automobile garage, in which he uses a gas engine for the purpose of generating an electric current to supply light for a large building in which he carries on his business, to charge electric automobiles and storage batteries, to run lathes and emery wheels, to make parts for cars, to put other parts of automobiles into good condition, to grind valves of cars, and do other work in that connection, will be placed in the class denominated “manufacturers,” rather than in either of the classes denominated “domestic consumption” or “for public institutions,” and be held obligated to pay the rate fixed for “manufacturers.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note: — For other cases, see Gas, Cent. Dig. §§ 10-11; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>4. Words and Phrases — “Manufacture.”</p> <p>The primary meaning of the word “manufacture” is something made by hand, as distinguished from a natural growth; but, as machinery has largely supplanted this primitive method, the word is now ordinarily used to denote an artieje upon the material of which labor has been expended to make it a finished product. Ordinarily the article so manufactured takes a different form, or at least sub-serves a different purpose from the original materials, and usually it is given a different name. Raw materials may be, and often are, subjected to successive processes of manufacture, each one of which is complete in itself, but several of which may be required to make the final product (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 5, p. 4348. See, also, vol. 5, pp. 4344-4346; vol. 8, p. 7716).</p> <p>5. Words and Phrases — “Domestic.”</p> <p>“Domestic” means a thing of or pertaining to one’s house or home, or one’s household or family, and excludes the idea of business, unless one pursues his vocation or calling within Ms home (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 3, p. 2164).</p> <p>6. Words and Phrases — “Public Institution.”</p> <p>A “public institution” is one which is created and exists by law or pnblic authority, e. g., an asylum, charity, college, university, schoolhouse, etc.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, p. 5793.]</p>

<p>Certiorari to Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans.</p> <p>Action by the Etta Contracting Company against Charles Bruning, and Bruning called Mrs. A. S. McBurney, his vendor in warranty, and judgment was rendered for plaintiff against defendant, and for defendant against Mrs. A. S. McBurney, and she applies for certiorari or writ of review.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Divorce (§ 78*) — Separation from Bed and Board — Appointment of Curator Ad Hoc — Verification >of Petition.</p> <p>In an action for separation from bed and board against an alleged absent defendant, though the defendant must in fact be absent in order to warrant the appointment of a curator ad hoc, it is not necessary, under Act No. 296 of 1910, to the validity of such appointment or of the citation served upon the appointee, that the petition alleging such absence should be sworn to.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 256, 257; Dec. Dig. § 78.*].</p> <p>'2. Divorce (§ 37*) — Action for Separation —Defense.</p> <p>Where a wife, defendant in a suit for separation from bed and board, has abandoned the common domicile for a cause wholly insufficient, and adheres to the view that the cause, still existing, was, and is, sufficient to justify the abandonment and its continuance it would seem to be immaterial, for the purposes of the suit, what course the husband may have pursued in order to induce her to return, since, no matter what the course may have been, she would still remain away, for the original supposed cause. But, in any event, where, in such case, the plaintiff, endeavoring, in good faith, and for their common welfare and that of the family, to bring about the return of the defendant, commits an error of judgment in the matter of the course pursued, the fault, or misfortune, should be attributed to the defendant, who had brought about a situation in which it was difficult to determine what was best to be done, and she should not be allowed to make use of such error as justification for the continued abandonment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, •Cent. Dig. §§ 27, 107-134, 136-138; Dec. Dig. § 37.*]</p>

In the Matter of the Succession of J. C. Segura, deceased. Ellis Segura applies for administration, Raphael Segura and others oppose, and St. Clair Segura and others intervene. From judgment for applicant and interveners, opponents appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court. </p> <p>1. Ejectment (§ 13*) — Title oe Realty — Necessity oe Whiting.</p> <p>Where a petition, for the recovery of an immovable, alleges that the plaintiffs are seeking to recover the property by virtue of a verbal agreement, by which the defendant acquired the property as the agent of the plaintiffs’ mother, it states no cause of action, because it is well settled that title to real estate cannot be proved by parol, and the fact that the property was acquired at a sheriff’s sale instead of at private sale cannot affect the law relating to proof of title by parol.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Ejectment, Cent. Dig. §§ 56-58; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]</p> <p>2. Estoppel (§ 68*) — Trial—Change oe Contention.</p> <p>Where plaintiffs base their title to an immovable on a verbal agreement^ they cannot subsequently change their position and base their title on pleadings filed by the defendant after an exception of no cause of action has been improperly overruled, even though the defendant did not especially reserve_ the benefit of his exception of no cause of action when he filed the pleadings upon which plaintiffs now ■seek to rely.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 165-169; Dec. Dig. § 68.*]</p> <p>3. Issues Not Within Exception.</p> <p>Issues which may not fall within grasp of exception of no cause of action considered.</p> <p>4. Partnership (§ 93*) — Accounting—Debt Due Partner — Payment from Partnership Funds.</p> <p>Where an alleged partnership is indebted to one of the individual members of the alleged partnership for goods sold to the alleged partnership, there is no impropriety in the creditor paying himself out of the proceeds of the partnership, particularly as there was assent from the first in the management.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. §§ 285, 286; Dec. Dig. § 93.*]</p> <p>5. Money Lent (§ 7*) — Documentary Evidence — Probative Effect.</p> <p>Where one writes to another asking for money, and' saying that it will be returned when the borrower sells her property, the letter would show that the lender is certainly not -a debtor of the prospective borrower.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Money Lent, ■Cent. Dig. §§ 11-13; Dec. Dig. § 7.*]</p>

Action by J. T. Huckaby against Bryant Huckaby and others. Judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and Minnie Huckaby and others apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Malicious Prosecution (§ 7*) — Probable Cause.</p> <p>Where one who has maliciously destroyed the property of another is liable to prosecution, the mere fact that the owner of the property has him arrested before an affidavit has been made and warrant issued will not entitle the person so arrested to damages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. §§ 7, 9, 10; Dec. Dig. I 7.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant (§ 238*) — Death of Railroad Bridgeman — Liability of Employer.</p> <p>Where an experienced railroad bridgeman, engaged in the work of rigging a scaffold in a' manner of his own selection, fell from a cap of the bridge into the stream below, and was drowned, and the evidence tends to show that the fall was due to the mode in -which the bridgeman handled a plank, held, that the railroad company was not responsible for the accident.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 681, 743-748; Dec. Dig. § 238.*]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant (§ 107*) — Death oe Bridgeman — Negligence—Railroads.</p> <p>The contention that it is the duty of a railroad company to maintain life-saving boats and appliances under every bridge on its line, where the water below is deep enough to drown persons who may fall from the superstructure, is supported neither by statute nor by authority.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 199-202, 212, 254, 255; Dec. Dig. § 107.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Courts (§ 224*) — Appellate Jurisdiction-Supreme Court.</p> <p>An appeal by plaintiff from the denial of an injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance imposing a license of $1,000, in which plaintiff pleaded that his gross sales would not exceed $2,000, did not involve an amount exceeding $2,000, and will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, .614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p>

<p> (iSyllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. False Imprisonjient (§ 15*) — Liability ob Corporation — Torts ob Servant.</p> <p>A corporation is liable in damages for an unlawful arrest instigated by one of its employés acting in the pursuit of an object relating to the business of his employer, and designed to be of benefit to it.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For other cases, see False Imprisonment, Cent. Dig. §§ 5-67; Dec. Dig. § 15.*]</p> <p>2. False Imprisonment (§ 15*) — Liability ob Corporation — Acts ob Employé.</p> <p>Where the electric bulbs of a corporation had been broken by unknown persons, and a watchman in the employ of the corporation causes the arrest of a person whom he suspects of having- broken some of them, he is acting for the benefit of the corporation, and, if the arrest is illegal', and without probable cause, the corporation is liable to the person illegally arrested, and the fact that the arrest is actually made by some one other than the watchman, but at his instigation, does not shift the liability of the corporation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see False Imprisonment, Cent. Dig. §§ 5-67; Dec. Dig. § 15.*]</p> <p>3. False Imprisonment (§ 7*) — Arrest Without Warrant — Liabilities.</p> <p>An arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the officer arresting should not be made without an affidavit and warrant, and, where this is done without a sufficient inquiry as to the guilt of the party arrested, the person or corporation responsible for the arrest is liable in damages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.' — For other eases, see False Imprisonment, Cent. Dig. §§ 5-61, 79; Dec. Dig. § 7.*]</p> <p>4. False Imprisonment (§ 36*) — Damages.</p> <p>Where the person illegally arrested for an offense was at the time of its commission with the culprit, the court will consider that fact in awarding damages, and, as the conduct of the plaintiff does not recommend him to the court, an award of $100 damages will be held sufficient for his illegal arrest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see False Imprisonment, Cent. Dig. §§ 110, 113-115; Dec. Dig. § 36.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Joseph Toussaint was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Trespass (§ 19*) — Action eor Damages— Title.</p> <p>Where a plaintiff sets up title to real property and seeks damages from a trespasser, who. in turn does not set up' title in himself, or in his alleged cotrespassers, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show a title perfect in all respects ; and, even if there be defects in the plaintiffs’ title, they are not available as a defense to the trespasser. Jamison v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 609; Stille v. Shull, 41 La. Ann. 816, 6 South. 634; Railway Co. v. Sledge, 41 La. Ann. 896, 901, 6 South. 725.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trespass, Cent. Dig. §§ 18-31; Dec. Dig. § 19.*]</p> <p>2. Evidence (§ 106*) — Admissibility—Character.</p> <p>“It is to-day generally said that (subject to specific exceptions, some of them doubtful) that the character of a party in a civil cause is inadmissible; i. e., that it cannot be used, as it is for or against a defendant in a criminal case, to indicate the likelihood that the act in issue was or was not done.” Wig-more, § 64, p. 134.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other case, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 177-187; Dec. Dig. § 106.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Parish of Cad-do; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Arthur Stanley was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Slaves (§ 14*) — Maternal Descent — Evidence — Inheritance.</p> <p>Under the law, as changed by the legislation of 1870, an illegitimate child, born of unmarried negro slave parents, may prove acknowledgment of his maternal descent by any legal evidence, and is not restricted; with respect thereto,_ to the notarial act of acknowledgment provided by C. C. art. 203; the proof otherwise made being equivalent to such “acknowledgment” and being sufficient to establish the status of the party as the natural child and heir of his mother, entitled to inherit her estate to the exclusion of a collateral relative.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Slaves, Cent. Dig. § 60; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>2. Bastards (§ 1*) — “Illegitimate Child”— “Bastard” — “Natural Child.”</p> <p>“Illegitimate children” are those born out of wedlock; and, unless they have been acknowledged by their parents, they are called “bastards.” Those who are so acknowledged by both or either of their parents are called “natural children.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Bastards, Cent. Dig. §§ 1-3; Dec. Dig. § 1.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 3390; vol. 1. pp. 717, 718; vol. 8, p. 7588; vol. 5, p. 4665a</p>

Action by the Dance-Jones Lumber Company against Jacob Katzenstein and others. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>N. Maroun was convicted of maintaining a blind tiger, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>Robert Miles was convicted of violating a city ordinance, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>K. Galgoul was convicted of violating an order of the City of Shreveport, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Watkins was convicted of violating a city ordinance, and appeals.</p>

Thgard, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Thomas F. Scullin, deceased, in which the Cosmopolitan Bank & Trust Company filed an opposition to the final account of the executor. From a judgment granting relief, the party •aggrieved appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Courts (§ 224*) — Jurisdiction oe Supreme Court — Amount Involved — Estoppel.</p> <p>Where the state sues for licenses amounting to less than the minimum jurisdictional amount of this court and the defendant sets up that the state is estopped from collecting the licenses, this court cannot take jurisdiction of the question of estoppel, as it has jurisdiction, under the circumstances, only where it is claimed that'the law under which it is sought to collect the license is unconstitutional.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p> <p>2. Statutes (§ 107*) — Title—Licenses.</p> <p>An act whose title states one object and a number of other things germane to this object and connected therewith is not a violation of articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution, requiring that the title of an act shall state only one object.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 121-134; Dec. Dig. § 107.*]</p> <p>3. Statutes (§ 107*) — Object—Licenses.</p> <p>Act No. 148 of 1906 deals only with the subject of licenses and the things germane to their imposition and coEection and is therefore not violative of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 121-134; Dec. Dig. § 107.*]</p> <p>4. Statutes (§ 141*) — Amendments — Licenses.</p> <p>Act No. 148 of 1906 fully reproduces all that was necessary for the amendment of the acts which it was intended to amend and is therefore constitutional.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.' — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 48, 198, 209; Dee. Dig. § 141.*]</p> <p>5. Case Tbanseeebed.</p> <p>In so far as relates to issues over which this court has no jurisdiction, case transferred to Court of Appeal, parish of Orleans.</p>

F. Blackman, Judge. Two actions between the Rapides Lumber Company, Limited, and Elisha Wright, defendant in one, and plaintiff in the other, consolidated for trial. From the judgment, Elisha Wright appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation (§ 790*) — Tax Titles — Confirmation.</p> <p>Article 233 of the Constitution of 1898 does not contemplate, and Act No. 101 of 1898 does not provide for, the confirmation of any other titles than tax titles; and the scope and purpose of an action brought under their authority is to have it determined, not whether, by reason of estoppels or other matters applicable to titles in general, a conventional or other form of title, acquired directly or through mesne conveyances from a tax purchaser, should be confirmed,, but whether under the law, constitutional and statutory, relating thereto the tax title should be confirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1570, 1572, 1573; Dec. Dig. § 790.*]</p> <p>2. Taxation (§ 793*) — Tax Titles — Confirmation — Parties.</p> <p>Where, contemporaneously with an instrument purporting to be an act of sale, the parties thereto execute another instrument, in which they declare that it is not their intention that the sale shall he consummated, that the vendee, named in the act, shall have a year, in which to perfect the title to the property, and that the vendor shall pay the expense, and which imposes no obligation upon the vendee with respect to perfecting the title, and no penalty for his failure to take action in the matter, and where the party purporting to be the vendee comes into court in that capacity, praying for confirmation of a tax sale to his apparent author, and the contemporaneous agreement is developed on the trial, held- it is doubtful whether plaintiff has any standing to prosecute the suit; but, in any event, he is in no better position than the tax purchaser whose battle he has undertaken to fight.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1575; Dec. Dig. § 793.*]</p> <p>3. Taxation (§§ 674, 794, 805*) — Tax Sale-Rights of Purchaser — Confirmation of Title — Defense.</p> <p>Where the husband of one of the heirs to an undivided half interest in a tract of land appears as 'a bidder at a tax sale, and by reason of the impression, created' to his knowledge if not by him, that he is acting for the heirs, is allowed to buy in the property, without competition, he will be considered, as between him and one of the heirs, to have so bought it, and to have so'held it thereafter; and, in such case, the prescription of three years, established by article 233 of the Constitution, has no application, in so far as the interest of such heirs 'in the property is concerned; and, in such case, too, the heir may set up the condition under which the property was acquired, by way of defense, to an action by the adjudicatee to confirm the tax title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1367-1360, 1576, 1593-1597; Dec. Dig. §§ 674, 794, 805.-]</p>

<p> (Syllabus hy the Court.) </p> <p>Indictment and Information (§ 125*) — Indictment — Duplicity.</p> <p>Where an indictment follows the words of a statute, and charges one with illegally selling “spirituous or intoxicating” liquors, the use of the disjunctive “or” does not make the indictment bad for duplicity, as the lawmaking power has the right to make the sale of “spirituous” and “intoxicating” drinks one crime chargeable in one indictment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent; Dig. §§ 334-400; Dec. Dig. § 125.*]</p>

Action by the Colorado Southern, New Orleans & Pacific Railroad Company, now the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad Company, against the City of Crowley and others. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Arthur Wilson was convicted of crime, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; J. B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Alfred Jenkins and another were convicted of manslaughter, and appeal.</p>

<p>Action by Ivy Watson against Frank W. Lawrence, administrator, and Mrs. Athelia A. W. Serbian and another intervene. From the judgment, interveners apply for certiorari, or writ of review.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>Constitutional Law (§§ 146, 206, 238, 275*) —Master and Servant (§ 69*) — Due Process-Impairment of Contracts — Redemption of Pay Checks.</p> <p>Act No. 228 of 1908, providing that checks, punch-outs, tickets, etc., issued to laborers and employés for their services shall be redeemed in current money, does not violate any provisions of the Constitution of the United States. See Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1, 46 L. Ed. 55.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 456, 457, 495, 625-648, 68S-690, 695, 706-708, 830, 835, 839, 843-846; Dec. Dig. §§ 146, 206, 238, 275;* Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 78-81; Dec. Dig. § 69.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Mortgages (I 37*) — Nature oe Transaction — Evidence.</p> <p>An authentic act of sale of a plantation for a certain price, as between the parties and their heirs, cannot be shown to be an antichresis or pledge, except by a counter letter or answers to interrogatories on facts and articles.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 97-107; Dec. Dig. § 37.*]</p> <p>2. Mortgages (§ 40*) — Antichresis—What Constitutes.</p> <p>A so-called counter letter written by the purchaser a year and a half after the sale, in which he proposed to transfer the plantation, with warranty of title, to his former vendors, on their payment to him of all the debts due by them, with interest as stipulated, bears none of the earmarks of an antichresis, which requires the creditor to account for fruits and revenues, and to apply them first to the payment of interest, and thereafter to the payment of the principal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 114; Dec. Dig. § 40.*]</p> <p>3. Contracts (§ 10*) — Mutuality.</p> <p>A written instrument signed by the record owner, proposing to transfer to his vendors a certain plantation on certain conditions, becomes a nudum pactum, if not signed or accepted in writing by them within a reasonable time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-40; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>4. Mortgages (§ 1*) — “Antichresis.”</p> <p>The “antichresis” is an antiquated contract, requiring the creditor to take possession of and administer the property, to pay the taxes, and to keep up the improvements, and has been resorted to in this state in but a few instances.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 51; Dec. Dig. § 1.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, p. 411.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard; A. M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State against Otis Cobb and others. From the judgment, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>W. C. Banning was convicted of embezzlement, and he appeals.</p>

Action by Ferdinand Francois against the Maison Blanche Realty Company and another. From judgment for plaintiff, one defendant appeals, and plaintiff prays that the amount of the judgment be increased.

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District ■Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, •Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Leila Boyd, wife, against John J. Bradley, husband.</p>

<p> (Syllabtis by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 1207*) — Remand-Subsequent Proceedings — Jactitation Suit.</p> <p>Where, in a jactitation suit, the issue of possession in the plaintiff and the alternative issue of title in the defendant were tried at the same time and submitted on the evidence, and the trial judge dismissed the suit on the issue of possession, and on appeal it was held that the evidence showed possession in the plaintiff sufficient to maintain the action, and the decree leversed the judgment, overruled the plea of want of possession, and remanded the case for further proceedings according to law, held, that the case was not remanded for a trial de novo but for judgment on the question of title on-the record as made up.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4696-4699; Dec. Dig. § 1207.*]</p> <p>2. Adverse Possession (§ 13*) — Acquisition oe Title — Prescription—Computation oe Period.</p> <p>Where, in a jactitation suit, the defendant set up title to the property, and the plaintiff thereupon pleaded the prescription of ten years’ acquirendi causa, and the evidence showed that the plaintiff took actual possession of the premises under a patent from the state of Louisiana and for six or seven years continued to perform acts of ownership thereon by cutting and removing trees, and also paid taxes on the property, held that the civil possession of the plaintiff was sufficient to complete the period of ten years. Such civil possession continues until ousted by actual adverse possession.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 65, 67-76; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>3.Libel and Slander (§ 139*) — “Slander oe Title” — Nature of Action.</p> <p>An action of slander of title is founded exclusively on possession and is a form of possessory action.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 393-396; Dec. Dig. § 139.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6528, 6529.]</p>

Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge. Application of the South Bend Company for injunction in an action by William Kyle against the Bayou Salé Planting & Drainage Company. Judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action to the petition was sustained, and petitioner appeals.

F. Blackman, Judge. Action by Mrs. Dora D. Strickland, individually and as tutrix against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

<p> (Syllabits by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Master and Servant (§ 107*) — Master’s Liability — Safe Place eor Work.</p> <p>A servant, operating an engine which ran a hoisting, elevator to the roof of a shed in course of construction, stood 12 feet away from the elevator shaft, and a plank belonging to another contractor fell through a hole in the roof and in its fall struck the side of the shaft, rebounded, struck the ground, and again rebounded, striking plaintiff. Held, that his place of work was reasonably safe; that the contingency of the falling material taking such a circuitous course was too remote for defendant to have been required to foresee and provide against it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 199-202, 212, 254, 255; Dec. Dig.. § 107.*)</p>

<p>Appeal from Twentieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne; R. B. Butler, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by William B. Sharp against James M. McBride. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 162*) — Grounds for Dismissal — Acquiescence in Judgment-Payment of Uncontested Claim.</p> <p>Plaintiff had consented to deduct the item pleaded subsequently in _ reconvention. There was no contest about this sum.</p> <p>Payment made of an uncontested amount does not have the effect of acquiescence in the judgment.</p> <p>The testimony is that the claim would have been allowed, as plaintiff always made deduction of merchandise that was not what it was represented if the statement of the amount had been forwarded before the suit was brought.</p> <p>If there was acquiescence, it will be considered in deciding the merits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 179, 981, 982, 984-990; Dec. Dig. § 162.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Sales (§ 179*) — Action fob Price — Defense.</p> <p>In a suit by a manufacturer on an open account against a vendee of articles manufactured by the plaintiff, there will be judgment for the full amount of the balance due plaintiff as prayed for, where the only defense is that in some few instances the goods sold by plaintiff to defendant, and by the latter sold to its customers, had not been fully up to the grade represented by plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 456-468; Dec. Dig. § 179.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John A. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Robert Payne was convicted of selling liquor without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabubs by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Guardian and Ward (§ 42*) — Minors — Sale oe Ward’s Property — Private Sale —Validity.</p> <p>A sale of a minor’s property at private sale, though authorized by a family meeting, is null, except when made to effect a partition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 173-185, 191; Dec. Dig. § 42.*]</p> <p>2. Guardian and Ward (§ 70*) — Invalid Sales — Ratification.</p> <p>The acceptance by minors, on attaining their majority, of the proceeds of a private sale by their tutor of their property does not amount to a ratification where they receive the proceeds without being informed that the proceeds were in settlement of the amount due them from their father’s estate, and without knowing that the proceeds were from the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 308-315; Dec. Dig. § 70.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension; Paul Leche, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Cora M. Barton against J. J. Hickson. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Witnesses (§ 351*) — Cross-Examination— Foundation for Impeachment.</p> <p>A question asked accused, on cross-examination on his trial for incest with his sister, .whether he had not tried to persuade her to place the blame on some one else is at most asked to lay a foundation for impeaching him by showing that he testified falsely if he answered in the negative.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1150, 1151; Dec. Dig. § 351;*]</p> <p>2. Witnesses (§ 388*) — Cross-Examination —Foundation fob Impeachment.</p> <p>Where accused, on trial for incest with his sister, .testified that he had not committed the crime, a question on cross-examination whether he had riot tried to persuade her to place the blame on some one else was proper to contradict his testimony by his own statement or to impeach him if he answered in the negative.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1233-1242, 1246; Dec. Dig. § 388.*]</p> <p>3.Criminal Law (§ 683*) — Evidence—Order of Proof.</p> <p>Where the state proved accused guilty of incest with his sister by her testimony, it could rest and reserve for rebuttal any evidence to contradict accused in case he denied committing the crime.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1615-1617; Dec. Dig. § 683.*]</p>

E. Blackman, Judge. Action by the Iatt Lumber Company, Limited, against the Hartbehrens Lumber Company, Limited, and others. Thad W. Young intervenes. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendants and intervener appeal.

M. Wallace, Judge. Action by John Patterson against the Ger-main Boyd Lumber Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. The following is the sketch referred to in the opinion:

<p>Appeal from • Pifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the People’s Bank of Elton against Aides Arceneaux and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Thos. M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Tony Cavido was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Minors — Rescission of Sale — Tender of Consideration.</p> <p>Where a plantation was sold at private sale for the purpose of effecting a partition between the co-owners, some of whom were minors, and the latter, after their emancipation, received in cash most of their respective portions of the price, held, that they could not maintain an action to annul the sale and recover the property without first offering to restore the price received by them.</p> <p>lEd. Note. — Eor other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. §§ 41, 46, 50-63; Dec. Dig. § 31.*]</p>

Action by the People’s National Bank of New Iberia against Andre F. Voorhies and others. Judgment for plaintiff against the defendant Voorhies and in favor of other defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine; Don E. Sorelle, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Rust Lumber Company against the General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Limited. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllables by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Courts (§ 224*) — Appellate Jurisdiction —Amount Involved.</p> <p>Where the matter in dispute, or the fund to be distributed, does not exceed $2,000, exclusive of interest, the Supreme^ Court is without appellate jurisdiction. Article 85, Constitution ; Rausch v. Barrere, 109 ■ La. 563, 33 South. 602; State ex rel. Town of Jennings v. Miller, 109 La. 704, 33 South. 739.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p> <p>2. Courts (§ 224*) — Appellate Jurisdiction —Amount Involved.</p> <p>The business of carrying on a “blind tiger” is an obnoxious use of property, which inflicts injury upon a community. It is a public nuisance. It has no legal pecuniary value.</p> <p>I Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p>

<p> /'Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Execution (§ 171*) — Judgment (§§ 43, 52*)— Confession of Judgment — Evidence.</p> <p>Under the law, as it stood prior to the passage of the statute, No. 67 of 1908, the two witnesses to an authentic act, importing confession of judgment, were required to be “free, male, and aged at least fourteen years,” hence, where one of the witnesses was a female, the act was not authentic, did not import confession of judgment, and executory process could not lawfully issue thereon, nor could, or can, such writ issue to enforce payment of a note ' purporting to be secured by an act, otherwise authentic, in case of a discrepancy between the note, as described in the act, and the note sued on; and, still less, where such discrepancy existed, or exists, and the act was, or is, not authentic in form. In such cases, where the writ has issued (improvidently) and the property of a nonresident, represented by a curator ad hoc, has been seized and sold, the defendant is not confined to the remedy by appeal, but may resort to the remedy by injunction and action in nullity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 497-518; Dec. Dig. § 171;* Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 58, 61-72, 85-88; Dec. Dig-. §§ 43, 52.*]</p>

M. Wallace, Judge. Action by the Layne & Bowler Company against the Town of Winnfield and others. From a judgment dismissing the suit as to A. Wyckoff & Sons Company, and dissolving the injunction, plaintiff appeals.

H. Couvillon, Judge. Action by the A. V. Neilson Company, Limited, against Mrs. Mina Siess and others. Judgment for defendants dismissing the action, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Andrew Phenix and Drake Taylor were convicted of larceny, and appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Tenancy in Common (§ 30*) — Mutual Liabilities-Purchase of Judicial Mortgage — Oo-Owners.</p> <p>Where a vendee, co-owner, and agent purchased a prior judicial mortgage on the common property, he cannot charge his vendor with more than one-half of the cost of removing the ineumbrancé.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 95, 96, 98, 99; Dec. Dig. § 30.*]</p> <p>2. Work and Labor (§ 4*) — Presumption-Persons in Family Relation.</p> <p>The provision of the Civil Code, art. 2991, that “the procuration is gratuitous unless there had been a contrary agreement” is peculiarly applicable to family transactions.</p> <p>■ [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Work and Labor, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-7; Dec. Dig. § 4.*]</p> <p>3. Parent and Child (§ 4*) — Support op Parent by Child — Right to Reimbursement.</p> <p>The claim of a son-in-law against one of seven children for alimony furnished to the father will be denied when it appears that the father had enjoyed the usufruct of the estate by common consent, and no call had been made on the plaintiff for a contribution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Parent and Child, Cent. Dig. §§ 63-69; Dec. Dig. § 4.*]</p>

H. Pavy, Judge. Action by Arthur Latour and others against Dr. Emile Arthur Latour and others. From judgment for plaintiffs, the defendant named and plaintiffs appeal.

In the matter of the succession of Kate McDermott. On an order on the presentation of a second alleged will of the decedent, Thomas Gilmore and others apply for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 10*) — Ordinances — Validity.</p> <p>•The law which authorizes parishes, municipalities, or wards to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, on a vote to that effect by the inhabitants thereof, does not authorize the parochial, municipal, or ward officers to make it a misdemeanor or crime to have or keep in one’s possession intoxicating liquors in “any quantity whatever, or for any purpose whatever, except on a physician’s prescription for medicinal purposes.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-12; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 10*) — Ordinances — Validity.</p> <p>The council of the city of Shreveport may be authorized to regulate and to close houses ■of prostitution; but an ordinance which makes it a misdemeanor or crime for an inmate of such house to have “intoxicating liquors in such house, in any quantity whatever, or' for any purpose whatever, except on a physician’s prescription for medicinal purposes,” is ultra vires, null, and void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-12; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.'</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Alexandria; L. L. Hooe, Judge.</p> <p>Action by E. F. Hunter, Tax Collector of City of Alexandria, against the Wells Fargo Express Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Mditonal Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 147*) — Limitations Applicable — Sale or Liquor — Statutes — Prescriptions.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 986, providing that no person shall be prosecuted for any fine or forfeiture unless the prosecution shall be instituted within six months from the time of incurring such fine or forfeiture, applies only to cases where imprisonment cannot be inflicted as a punishment, and not to cases where it may be in the discretion of the court, and hence was inapplicable to a prosecution for retailing spirituous liquors without a license, in violation of section 910, as amended by Acts 1902, No. 66, providing that whoever shall retail spirituous liquors without a license shall, on conviction, be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500, and, in default of fine and costs, shall be imprisoned for a term within the discretion of the court, or shall suffer a fine and imprisonment as the court may deem proper.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 271, 272; Dec. Dig. § 147.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Sylvain Dedebant against Natale Maestri. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Insurance (§ 618*) — Action on Policy-Jurisdiction.</p> <p>An insurance company which undertakes to indemnify an employer for damages recovered by an employé does not come within the purview of Act No. 44 of 1910, providing that an insurance company may be sued in the parish “where the loss occurred,” because that statute has no application to any insurance policy other than “life, fix-e, or marine.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1536-1539; Dec. Dig. § 618.*]</p> <p>2. Statutes (§ 208*) — Construction—Transposition oe Words.</p> <p>Where it is necessary to transpose the words of a statute in order to make clear the meaning and intent of the Legislature, that may be done to a very limited extent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 285; Dec. Dig. § 208.*]</p> <p>3. Venue (§ 21*) — General and Special Law —Construction oe Statute.</p> <p>Where there is a general law which provides that one must be sued before his own judge, one seeking to escape its effect by invoking a special statute must show clearly that the exception to the general law was intended and that it undoubtedly applies to the one against whom it is invoked.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Venue, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. § 21.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>4. Words and Phrases — “Social Insurance.”</p> <p>“Social insurance” covers insurance referred to under the head: Unemployment, old age pensions, mothers’ and orphans’ pensions, sickness, etc.</p>

Action by the St. Tammany Lumber Manufacturing Company against the creditors of A. W. Stewart. Judgment for plaintiff, and Louis F. Pechón and others, defendants, apply for certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 1182*) — Appeal—Affirmance.</p> <p>Where the transcript of appeal in a criminal case contains no bill of exception or assignment of error and there is no error patent on its face, it presents nothing' for this court to act on, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3203-3214; Dec. Dig. § 1182.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Pirst Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. T. Ingram and wife against the Kansas City, Shreveport & Gulf Railway Company and others. Prom judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by R. E. Jacobs and others against the Kansas City, Shreveport & Gulf Railway Company. From judgment for defendant, both parties appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Alfred W. Bell, Sr., against the Germain Boyd Lumber Company. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Bankruptcy (§ 419*) — Discharge—Action to Set Aside — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where a United States District Court has granted a discharge to .a bankrupt, an action to set aside the discharge on the ground that the bankrupt concealed some of his property must be a direct action brought in the court that granted it, and it is only where the discharge is an absolute nullity that any other court has a right to so declare it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 843-S52; Dec. Dig. § 419.*]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy (§ 418*) — Res Judicata.</p> <p>Where the trustee of a bankrupt opposes his discharge on the ground that he has failed to turn over property belonging to him, but standing in his wife’s name, and the United States court, wherein the bankruptcy is pending, holds that the property is not that of the bankrupt, but that the paraphernal property of the wife, the judgment concludes the trustee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 764-771; Dec. Dig. § 418.*]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy (§ 417*) — Discharge—Action to Set Aside — Limitation.</p> <p>An action to set aside the discharge of a bankrupt must be a direct action and must be brought within a year of the discharge, and, even if this court had jurisdiction of an action to set aside the judgment of discharge of the United States Court, it could not do so, as more than a year has elapsed since the judgment of discharge was rendered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 867-871; Dec. Dig. § 417.*]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

F. Blackman, Judge. Proceedings by Succession of Lund against Baccicb & De Montluzin, adjudieatees, on rule to show cause why they should not be ordered to accept title and make payment. Erom a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts (§ 224*) — Supreme Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Article 85 of the Constitution of 1898 vests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction in all cases where the constitutionality or legality of “any fine, forfeiture or penalty imposed by a municipal corporation shall be in contestation, whatever be the amount thereof.” Under this clause, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to the constitutionality or legality of the ordinance under which the fine, forfeiture, or penalty was imposed, and does not extend to other issues, such as the jurisdiction of the court below or the legality of the proceedings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Charles; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the L. A. Blouin Company, Limited, against Odessi Hebert. From dismissal of plaintiff’s suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Webster; John N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. J. Holliday against It. H. Logan. From an order of seizure and sale issued at the instance of plaintiff, Sam L. Mims appeals.</p>

Action by Fannie Clark against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff applies for writs of certiorari and mandamus.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Railroads (§ 326*) — Passing Between Standing Caes — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>It is negligence for one to attempt to pass between two cars of a train coupled to an engine which is standing still, and may move at any moment, and one who has been, injured while so doing will not be allowed to" recover on the ground that the train was blocking a street or passageway for an unreasonable length of time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1037-1042; Dec. Dig. § 326.*]</p> <p>2. Railroads (§ 381*) — Passing Between Standing Cars — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>A plaintiff attempting to cross between cars of a train standing still cannot escape the legal effects of his negligence by asserting that there was no danger in crossing while the train was still, but there was danger only when it moved, because it was his failure' to anticipate that the train would move that constituted negligence on his part.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1285-1293; Dec. Dig. § 381.*]</p> <p>3. Railroads (§ 304*) — Passing Between Standing Cars — Personal Injuries — Negligence.</p> <p>There is no obligation resting on a train crew to assume that some one will take the risk of crossing between the cars of the train, and unless it can be shown that the crew knew that some one was doing so, and moved the train in spite of that fact, the railroad company will not be liable to one so injured.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 964; Dec. Dig. § 304.*]</p> <p>4. Railroads (§ 335*) — Passing Between Standing Cars — Negligence.</p> <p>The fact that a signal to start a train is given by the fireman, instead of the conductor, who should have given it, does not justify one in crossing between two cars that might be moved at any moment, and certainly cannot be said to be the proximate cause of the accident.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1028, 1084, 1086-1088; Dec. Dig. § 335.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 755*) — Obstruction oe Streets — Liability eor Damages.</p> <p>Section 14 of Act No. 45 of 1896, requires the city of New Orleans, “to keep open and free from obstructions all streets.” The right of the citizen to recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of the failure of a municipal corporation to discharge the mandatory duty thus imposed is beyond question. McCormack v. Robin et al., 126 La. 598, 52 South. 779, 139 Am. St. Rep. 549.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1587, 1589, 1590; Dec. Dig. § 755.*]</p> <p>2. Municipal Ordinances — Warning oe Obstructions.</p> <p>The ordinances of the city of New Orleans require excavations and obstructions in public streets to be indicated by red lights during the night, in order to prevent accidents liable to otherwise happen.</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations (§ 794*) —Obstruction oe Streets — Duty to Warn.</p> <p>The stretching of wire ropes along a public thoroughfare a few feet above the level of the pavement creates, especially at night, a dangerous obstruction, of which the public should have timely notice and warning by proper danger signals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1653; Dec. Dig. § 794.*]</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations (§ 821*) — Obstruction oe Streets — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>A citizen has the right to assume that the street is in a reasonably safe condition for travel, and is not, as a matter of law, guilty of negligence in attempting to run across the street, in the usual manner in order to catch a car.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1745-1757; Dec. Dig. § 821.*]</p> <p>5. Municipal Corporations (§ 775*) —Obstruction oe Streets — Personal Injuries —Liability oe Oity.</p> <p>The city of New Orleans is responsible in damages for a death of a citizen, who, at night, without notice or knowledge of the existence of the obstruction, ran against a wire rope placed in the street by direction of the municipal authorities, and was thereby mortally injured.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1630; Dec. Dig. § 775.*]</p> <p>6. Municipal Corporations (§ 821*) — Obstruction oe Streets — Death oe Pedestrian-Contributory Negligence — Question eor Jury.</p> <p>In such a case, the question of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased is one peculiarly within the province of the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1745-1757; Dec. Dig. § 821.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Goiwt.) </p> <p>1. Corporations (§ 553*) — Appointment oe Receiver — Application by Stockholder— Condition Precedent.</p> <p>A stockholder may apply for the appointment of a receiver to a corporation when the directors or other officers of the corporation are jeopardizing the rights of stockholders or creditors by grossly mismanaging, or by committing acts ultra vires, or by wasting, misusing, or by misapplying the funds of the corporation. Section 1, par. 2, Act No. 159 of 1S98, p. 312; Van Vleet v. Evang-eline Oil Go., 127 La. 919, 54 South. 286; s. c., 129 La. 406, 56 South. 343.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2201-2216; Dec. Dig. § 553.*]</p> <p>2. Corporations (§ 554*) — Appointment op Receiver — Application by Stockholder-Condition Precedent.</p> <p>It is unnecessary for a stockholder to make a principal demand against a corporation in order to maintain an action for the appointment of a receiver to that corporation. Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., 127 La. 919, 54 South. 286. It is different with an alleged creditor. Saxon, v. S. W. Brick Co., 113 La. 637, 37 South. 540; Arent v. Liquidating Commissioners, 133 La. 134, 62 South. 602.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 2220; Dec. Dig. § 554.*]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>3. Appeal and Error (§ 339*) — Time eor Appeal — Appointment oe Receiver.</p> <p>Acts No. 106 of 1908, which is a general statute fixing the return day in the order granting an appeal at not less than 15 or more than 60 days from the date of the order except by consent, does not apply to appeals from orders appointing receivers; such appeals being governed by Act No. 159 of 1898, § 4, providing that the “appeal shall be returnable in ten days from the date of such order.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1883-1887; Dec. Dig. §</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 640*) — Dismissal-Transcript.</p> <p>It is the duty of the clerk of the district court to make up the transcript, and where counsel for the appellant does not interfere with him in any way, or give instructions as to what shall be included therein, and the clerk fails to make up the transcript properly, the appeal will not be dismissed, but the clerk will be ordered to make and forward to this court a proper transcript.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2788, 2829; Dec. Dig. § 640.*]</p> <p>2.Appeal and Error (§ 640*) — Dismissaj>INCOMPLETE TRANSCRIPT.</p> <p>If the clerk of the lower court certifies that the transcript is complete, the appeal will not be dismissed, if it should turn out that it is not complete, because to do so would penalize the appellant for the error of the clerk.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2788, 2829; Dec. Dig. § 640.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Minors — Property—Private Sale.</p> <p>The purposes of Act No. 25, 1878, p. 47, are to authorize the sale of a minor’s property, held in indivisión with another, at private sale, and to dispense with the judicial partition provided for in the Code. Duruty v. Musacchia, 42 La. Ann. 357, 7 South. 555; Bruhn v. Association, 42 La. Ann. 481, 7 South. 556.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. § 84; Dec. Dig. § 38.*]</p> <p>4. Minors — Property — Family Meeting — Private Sale — Homologation.</p> <p>It is the duty of the family meeting, convoked to deliberate upon the proposed private sale of a minor’s property held in indivisión with another, to consider all questions touching the advantage of such sale; and the homologation thereof by the court is conclusive. Carrollton Land Co. v. Eureka Homestead, 119 La. 692, 44 South. 434; Dauterive v. Shaw, 47 La. Ann. 882, 17 South. 345.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. §§ 85-89; Dec. Dig. § 39.*]</p> <p>5.Tutors — Undertutor—Vacation oe Office.</p> <p>An undertutor who removes from one parish to another does not. vacate his office by such removal. Civ. Code, art. 306.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 78-85; Dec. Dig. § 24.*]</p> <p>6.Minors — Property—Private Sale — Right to Purchase.</p> <p>Under Act No. 25, 1878, p. 47, the whole of the property had to be sold. Each co-owner, including the tutor of the minor, had to appear as a party to the act. The tutor could only sell the minor’s interest. Act No. 50, 1912, p. 59, authorizes a co-owner to purchase the minor’s interest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. §§ 85-91; Dec. Dig. §§ 39, 40.*]</p> <p>7. Tutors — Sale oe Property.</p> <p>A tutor may, on his- own responsibility, act by an attorney in fact, in places distant from his residence. Civ. Code, art. 351.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 99, 100; Dec. Dig. § 28.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>8. Minors — Property—Sale—Rights oe Purchaser.</p> <p>It is not incumbent upon the purchaser of property at private sale, under an order of court homologating the proceedings had pursuant to Act No. 25 of 1878, authorizing the sale of property of minors to effect a partition on recommendation of a family meeting, that he follow the purchase price paid by him and see that the tutrix pays it over to the minors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. § 92; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 854*) — New Trial — Separation oe Jury — Homicide.</p> <p>A motion for a new trial, based on an alleged separation of the jury during the progress of the trial, where it is shown by affirmative evidence that the jury were retired under the orders of the court to two rooms in a hotel, where they were kept during the night, six in one room, and six in the other, under and in charge of deputy sheriffs, and that the jury were not tampered with or influenced, and that 'the defendant was not prejudiced thereby, is properly overruled.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2039-2047; Dec. Dig. § 854.*]</p> <p>Monroe, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>Philip Maroun was convicted of maintaining a public nuisance in violation of an ordinance of the city of Shreveport, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors (§ 10*) — Regulation by Municipality — Right.</p> <p>The council of the city of Shreveport may by ordinance declare a “blind tiger” to be a nuisance and order it to be abated, with penalty.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-12; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James; Charles S. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William Johnson, for the use, etc., against Jules J. Jacob, Sr. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

P. Edwards, Judge. Action by J. E. Reynolds and another, receivers, against the Globe Eire Underwriters of St. Louis, Mo., and others. From a judgment for certain defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

In the matter of the liquidation of the Mitchell-Borne Construction Company. A judgment was entered appointing a receiver to the company to succeed the original receiver, who had absconded, and William F. Kelly, one of the partners, applies for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

<p>Suit by William Stiles against James Bruton. Erom dismissal, Prentice E. Edrington, Jr., applies for wilts of certiorari and prohibition.</p>

<p>Transferred from the Court of Appeals, First Circuit.</p> <p>Action by Frederick Rogge against Mrs. Harry D. Close and husband. The district court sustained defendants’ exception of no cause of action, and plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was transferred to the Supreme Court.</p>

F. Blackman, Judge. Petitory action by the Big Pine Lumber Company, Limited-, against C. L. Arbuthnot, and action by O. L. Arbuthnot against the Big Pine Lumber Company, Limited. S. G. Hester was cited as defendant’s warrantor. The actions were consolidated. From judgment for plaintiff and for defendant against his warrantor, an appeal is taken.

M. B. Kelly was convicted of resisting and assaulting an officer while attempting to serve and execute a process, and appeals.

King, Judge. Jactitation suit by the Interstate Land Company, Limited, against Mrs. B. Fellman. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. The following is a plat of the premises in controversy:

Charles; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge. Action by Mrs. W. H. Tinney against Mrs. A. Vittur. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and from a judgment on defendant’s petition to enjoin the sale of certain property seized, which judgment held one lot exempt and one riot exempt, defendant (plaintiff in injunction) appeals.

Foster, Judge ad hoc. J. J. Hollingsworth was convicted of having sold, retailed, and bartered intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§§ 632, 1148*) — Appeal-Order of Trial — Discretion of Court.</p> <p>The Supreme Court will not interfere with the order in which cases are set for trial in the district courts' where it is not shown that some law has been violated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1447-1449, 3050-3052; Dec. Dig. §§ 632, 1148.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 1152*) — Appeau—Discretionary Ruling — Competency of Jurors.</p> <p>Act No. 135 of 1898, p. 216, gives to the district judges discretion to decide upon the competency of jurors in particular cases, and this discretion will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court. State v. Kennedy, 133 La. 945, 63 South. 476; State v. Thompson, 116 La. 829, 41 South. 107; State v. Hobgood, 46 La. Ann. 855, 15 South. 406.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3053-3057; Dec. Dig. § 1152.*]</p> <p>3. Homicide (§ 300*) — Self-Defense—Refusal to Instruct — Evidence.</p> <p>The refusal of the trial judge to specially charge the jury on the matter of self-defense will not be reviewed where the per curiam of the judge shows that the evidence disclosed a case of willful murder, and self-defense was not involved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614, 616-620, 622-630; Dec. Dig. § 300.*]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law (§§ S71, 875*) — Verdict-Sufficiency.</p> <p>A verdict of a jury may be oral or in writing, and, if in writing, it need not be signed by the foreman, or by any one else. It must be recorded by the clerk, and read to the jury as recorded, who are then asked if that is their verdict, and, if the answer is “yea,” the finding, rendering and recording is complete. Faulty spelling and surplus words in a verdict are not causes for setting it aside when the intent and meaning are clear. Marr’s Crim. Juris. § 467, p. 108.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2079-2081, 2089, 2090; Dec. Dig. §§ 871, 875.*]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law (§ 894*) — Verdict—Objection — Waiver.</p> <p>Failure to object to a defective verdict when it is rendered waives the right to move for a venire de novo. State v. Jeanisse, 126 La. 360, 51 South. 290; 12 Cyc. 701.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2115; Dec. Dig. § 894.*]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>6. Criminal Law (§ 875*) — “Verdict.”</p> <p>The word “verdict” is derived from the Latin “veredictum,” meaning a true declaration. It is the answer of the jury made upon any cause, civil or criminal, committed by the court to their examination. It is a very important act; it is the culmination of the trial, and embodies the conclusion of the jury upon the questions of fact litigated on the trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2089, 2090; Dec. Dig. § 875.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7293-7295, 7827.]</p> <p>7. Criminal Law (§ 798%*) — “As”—Form of Verdict — Instructions.</p> <p>As applied to a direction to the foreman of a jury to sign the verdict “as foreman,” the word “as” is used in its ordinary sense, meaning in the character or under the name of.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1801, 1938; Dec. Dig. § 798%.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 518-521.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 429*) — Paving Assessment — Property Subject — “Abutting” Property.</p> <p>Land held in private ownership, running through the middle of a street, with a roadway on either side, in a city having a population exceeding 10,000 (New Orleans excepted) is subject to local assessments for paving as “abutting” property, under Act No. 10 of 1896.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1039; Dec. Dig. § 429.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 50, 51.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations (§§ 437, 472*)— Paving Assessment — Objection by Property Owner — Grounds.</p> <p>The question of the right of the owner of “abutting” property to contest a local assessment for the paving of the street upon which his property abuts, upon the ground that the property is not benefited, or that the benefit is not as great as that derived by other property, has been settled adversely to that contention by repeated decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court of the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1051, 1120; Dec. Dig. §§ 437, 472.*)</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors (§ 52*) — Licenses — Construction of Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 176 of 1908, p. 236, is a police statute, which regulates barrooms and other places where liquors are sold in less quantities than five gallons; and its terms do not cover a brewery which sells in the original and unbroken packages in quantities over five gallons.</p> <p>[Ed. Ñote. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 53; Dec. Dig. § 52.*)</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Parent and Child (§ 17*) — Prosecution bob Nonsupport — Jurisdiction—Juvenile Court.</p> <p>“The juvenile court shall also have jurisdiction of all cases of desertion or nonsupport of children by either parent.” Section 3, Act No. 48, of 1910, p. 72.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Parent and Ohild, Cent. Dig. §§ 176-181; Dec. Dig. § 17.*]</p>

Bernard; A. Em-met Hingle, Judge. Action by John Hutter against the Indian’ Oil Refining Company for damages for malicious prosecution. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine; James G. Palmer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Silas D. Ponder against J. H. Boone and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Juvenile Court, Parish of Orleans; A. H. Wilson, Judge.</p> <p>Frederick J. Brewer was convicted of crime, and appeals, and the State moves to dismiss appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Madison; F. X. Ransdell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Singer Manufacturing Company against Joel F. Johnson & Son. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of La Salle; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>George Jackson was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>Master and Servant (§ 217*) — Injury to Brakeman Uncoupling Cars — Assumption of Risk.</p> <p>Where a brakeman, knowing that it" is dangerous to go between moving ears for the purpose of uncoupling them, and that a rule of the company by which he is employed prohibits it, nevertheless, upon finding that the lever whereby he undertakes to uncouple such cars from the outside is disconnected from the coupling pin, goes between the cars, in order to uncouple them by hand, instead of waiting until his stop signal has been made effective, and the cars have been stopped, he unnecessarily assumes a known risk, the consequences of which cannot be visited upon his employer, and he cannot recover damages for an injury thereby sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 574-600; Dec. Dig. § 217.*]</p>

Action by A. J. Cahill and another against Widow Miho Bianki and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs for less than claimed, they appeal.

<p>Appeal from Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles; G. I-I. Couvillon, Judge.</p> <p>Action by A; Adler & Co. against W. D. Haas & Co. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Estoppel (§ 78*) — Existence op Contracts —Logs and Logging.</p> <p>Where one who has been given the right, for a consideration, to enter upon land and cut and remove timber fails to attach his signature to the contract, but enters upon the land and cuts the timber, he would be estopped from denying the existence of the contract, so likewise the other party will be estopped from denying its existence after he had stood by and permitted it to be partially performed; besides he had the price.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 204-210; Dec. Dig. § 78.*]</p> <p>2. Logs and Logging (§ 3*) — Contract — Construction.</p> <p>A contract, providing that one of the parties shall have the right to remove timber during 10 years, but shall have further time by payment of the taxes on the land, gives the obligee the right by paying the taxes, to remove timber for a reasonable time after the lapse of 10 years, but he cannot claim this right during an indefinite period.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Logs and Logging, Cent. Dig. §§ 6-12; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Eabius Euselier was convicted of burglary and larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Eeboe (§ 396*) — Citation op Appeal-Dismissal.</p> <p>The omission of appellant to ask for a citation of appeal, and to have the same served on the appellee, when the order of appeal was granted on motion in open court, at a term subsequent to that at which the judgment was rendered and signed, is fatal to the appeal, which must be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2099, 2102, 2104, 2150; Dec. Dig. § 396.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Death (§§ 58. 75*) — Negligence—Sueeiciency oe Evidence — Burden oe Pbooe.</p> <p>In a suit sounding in damages, plaintiff must show fault on the part of the' defendant. C. C. 2315; Act No. 71, 1884, p. 94; Act No. 120, 1908, p. 178.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 75-78, 93, 95; Dec. Dig. §§ 58, 75.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District •Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State National Bank against I-Iezekiah Winn on promissory note. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant takes devolutive appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Bribery (§ 1*) — Municipal Oeeicer — Police Juror.</p> <p>In any contingency in which a police juror may be called on to act, in his capacity as such, whether with respect to a legal ordinance or one that is illegal, an ordinance that is pending or one that is in contemplation, he has a duty to perform, and he is under the dominion of Act No. 78 of 1890, which declares that any officer, state, parochial, or municipal, who shall receive any money, bribe, present, reward, promise, contract, obligation, or security with the intent to be induced or influenced to vote or exercise any power in him vested, or to perform any duty of him required, with partiality or favor, shall be guilty of the crime of bribery.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Bribery, Cent. Dig. §§ 2, 3; Dec. Dig. § 1.*]</p> <p>2. Juey (§§ 85, 103*) — Disqualification — Opinion — Discretion.</p> <p>The fact that, upon his voir dire, a person called to servo on a jury answers that he has received an impression, or has formed an opinion about the case, from what he has heard and read, will not of necessity disqualify him, where, upon further examination, he states that his impression or opinion will readily yield, to evidence that may be adduced on the trial, and that he feels that he can find a verdict upon such evidence and the law as he may hear it on the trial. The question presented in such cases is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, who is in a better position to decide it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Oent. Dig. §§ 405, 444, 456, 460, 461-479, 497; Dec. Dig. §§ 85, 103.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 1166%*) — Appeal — Ground for Reversal — Disqualification of Juror.</p> <p>A bill of exception to the overruling of defendant’s challenge, for cause, of a person presented as a juror, should show that defendant was compelled to accept the juror by reason of the previous exhaustion of his peremptory challenges, or that he was thereafter compelled to accept an objectionable juror because of the exhaustion of such challenges.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3123; Dec. Dig, § 1166%.*]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law (§ 829*) — Refusal op Instructions Covered.</p> <p>Special instructions to the jury are properly refused when they have been covered by the general charge given by the trial judge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829.*]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law (§ 1158*) — Appeal—Denial of New Trial — Disqualification of Juror-Evidence.</p> <p>An attack upon a verdict of conviction, upon the ground that, since its rendition, defendant has discovered that one of the jurors had, before being selected, given utterance to expressions indicating prejudice against defendant and the intention to vote for his conviction, should be sustained by satisfactory evidence, and where the evidence is conflicting, and the trial judge refuses the new trial, this court will not readily reverse his ruling.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3061-3066, 3070, 3071, 3074; Dec. Dig. § 1158.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Dorothy Vincent, widow of Edward Vincent, against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company for personal injuries. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Action by the Vermilion Sugar Company against Louis Vallee. A judgment in the district court dismissing plaintiff’s demand was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.</p>

Action by the Vermilion Sugar Company against John Stelly. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for defendant, and he applies for certiorari or writ of review.

Action by the Vermilion Sugar Company against R. J. Montagne. Judgment of district court for defendant was reversed by Court of Appeals, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Action by the Vermilion Sugar Company ■against F. Despane Lege. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for defendant, and he •applies for certiorari or writ of review.</p>

Sutherlin, Judge. Action by Mrs. Annie E. Brown and others against the Producers’ Oil Company, to cancel a mineral lease or contract, and for damages. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

Action by the Vermilion Sugar Company against Joseph Immergluck. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for defendant, and he applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Assumption ; Paul Leche, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Alleman Planting & Manufacturing Company, Limited, against the Baker-Wakefield Cypress Company, Limited. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Clemile Gauthreaux was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Thos. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William E. Huger against C. Arthur Ransom and M. C. and N. C. Baker. From a judgment against Ransom and M. C. Baker, they appeal.</p>

W. Sutherlin, Judge. Action by the Caddo Oil & Mining Company against the Producers’ Oil Company to annul a gas and oil lease. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Thos. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the E. A. Sammons Company, Limited, against the People’s Bank & Trust Company and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Pred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Miss Mary L. Egan against the Hotel Grünewald Company, Limited, and an-1 other. Prom judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank, receiver, against George J. Jurgens. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Josephine Miller, testamentary executrix against Stanislava Gallia, widow of Miho Bianki, and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Poiute CoupSe; C. K. Schwing, Judge.</p> <p>Telesfort Major and another were convicted of stealing, and appeal.</p>

Mixon, Judge ad hoc. A. P. Malone was indicted and placed on trial for murder and excepted to the jurisdiction. Exceptions sustained, and the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 213*) — Rights or Purchaser — Ownership or Buildings— Unrecorded Contract.</p> <p>An unrecorded claim or title to buildings on the land of another is “utterly null and void” as against third persons. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 2266.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 440; Dec. Dig. § 213.*]-</p> <p>2. Mortgages (§ 133*) — Property Subject-Future Improvements.</p> <p>A conventional mortgage on a tract of land includes future improvements thereon. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 3310.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 260, 264, 265; Dec. Dig. § 133.*)</p> <p>3. Fixtures (§ 35*) — Presumptions — Construction or Improvements.</p> <p>All buildings and improvements on the soil are presumed to have been constructed by the owner. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 506.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 67-79; Dec. Dig. § 35.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Indemnity (§ 11*) — Construction of Contract — Accrual of Liability.</p> <p>Where two defendants are condemned in solido, one of them cannot obtain a judgment against the other, based on a contract wherein it is agreed that the one free from fault shall be held harmless by the other, until the one claiming the judgment against the other shows that it has paid the judgment in the other suit, or that it has suffered some actual damage by the judgment rendered against it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indemnity, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-25; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 840*) — Matters Reviewable — Moot Question.</p> <p>As the plaintiff in this suit has not shown that it has suffered any loss by being condemned by the judgment in the former suit, this court will not now undertake to determine whose fault caused the accident that was the basis of the ’other suit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3301, 3303-3314; Dec. Dig. § 840.*]</p> <p>3. Attorney and Client (§ 133*) — Contribution — Contract.</p> <p>A corporation employing an attorney by the year is not entitled to recover from another corporation for his services in defending a suit brought against both corporations for a judgment in solido, without showing that there was some agreement to pay for his services.</p> <p>[Ed.' Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 305, 317-327; Dec. Dig. § 133.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Albert McNeely Dean against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company, for personal injuries. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by tlve Court.) </p> <p>Divorce (§ 129*) — Evidence — Weight and Probative Effect.</p> <p>In actions for divorce, courts must take such evidence as the nature of the case permits, circumstantial, direct, or positive, and bring to bear upon it the experiences and observations of life, and thus weighing it with prudence and care give effect to its just preponderance. Siebert v. Klapper, 49 La. Ann. 241, 21 South. 259; Mehle v. Lapeyrollerie, 16 La. Ann. 4; 14 Cyc. 684, 698; Holier v. Holler, 115 N. X. 466, 22 N. E. 169; Baudry-Lacantinerie, vol. 1, p. 413.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 411-441, 454; Dec. Dig. § 129.*]</p>

McIntosh, Judge. Succession of Mary J. Templeman, ' The administrator filed his final account proposing distribution, and Thomas J. Christian and others filed opposition. Oppositions allowed, and administrator appeals.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the City of Shreveport against Sam Weiner, Jr., and another. Judgment for defendants, and the City appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabuis by the Court.) </p> <p>Hawkers and Peddlers (§ 3*) — Licenses— “Wholesaler.”</p> <p>A wholesale fruit dealer of the city of New Orleans who sent a car load of bananas to the town of Franklin, and there, through an agent accompanying the car, sold bunches of bananas for resale, using the car as a storehouse, thereby engaged in a wholesale business, and subjected himself to the payment of a wholesale license to the town.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Hawkers and Peddlers, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-6; Dec. Dig. § 3.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, p. 7451.]</p>

. Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; Thomas C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by the State against the Continental Casualty Company, for an additional license. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

J. J. Whitbeck was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and W. A. Mabry; District Attorney, applies for writ of mandamus .commanding the Judge of the District Court to impose sentence.

<p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p> <p>Frauds, Statute oe (§ 118*) — Sale oe Standing Timber — Contract by -Correspondence.</p> <p>Under Act No. 188 of 1904, a sale or agreement to sell standing timber must be in writing as in case of sales of real estate. Held, that the correspondence between the parties did not evidence a sale or a promise of salfe.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. §§ 199, 262-265; Dec. Dig. § 118.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mattie A. Goodwyn against the City of Shreveport. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Jury (§ 116*) — Mode of Objection — Motion to Quash Venire.</p> <p>The proper method of objecting that the venire list served upon accused did not conform with the general venire list is by motion to quash the venire.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 542, 543; Dec. Dig. § 116.*]</p> <p>2. Juey (§ 82*) — Venibe—Cobeection of Irregularity.</p> <p>That the name of G. H. J. appeared incorrectly in the general venire list as J. II. J. was an irregularity which might be corrected by the jury commissioners when they drew the venire and placed the corrected name in the venire list.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 282, 307-309, 331, 332, 348, 359, 367, 380; Dec. Dig. § 82.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 1171*) — Afpeal—Harmless Error — Conduct of Prosecutor.</p> <p>In a trial for murder, where defendant during the impaneling of the jury, and after 11 jurors had been accepted, asked a juror as to his. understanding of circumstantial evidence, the remark of the district attorney, while addressing the court, that defendant had no case, made on the ground that it could be no possible concern to him whether the juror would convict on circumstantial evidence, and intending to state that it was the state’s case, and that it had the burden of proving it, with an explanation that he did not mean to insinuate that accused had no defense, was harmless.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3126, 3127; Dec. Dig. ‘ 1171.*]</p> <p>4. Witnesses (§ 269*) — Cross-examination-Statements before Grand Jury.</p> <p>In a trial for murder, it was error, upon cross-examination of the state’s witness, to exclude a question as to what he told the grand jury when a witness before it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 949-954; Dec. Dig. § 269.*]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law (§ 1163*) — Appeal—Harmless Error.</p> <p>Upon a bill of exceptions failing to advise of the bearing of the testimony of a witness erroneously excluded, the Supreme Court cannot say that the ruling caused injury, and unless injury is shown cannot set the verdict aside.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3090-3099; Dec. Dig. § 1163.*]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law (§ 855*) — New Triai>-Misconduct of Jury — Intoxicating Liquors.</p> <p>That the jury, after retiring for consultation, were furnished with “a small half pint flask of cocktail, not full,” and were given beer with their meals, less than one pint to each man, without any showing that they were deranged thereby, did not vitiate the verdict.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2048-2053; Dec. Dig. § 855.*]</p> <p>7. Criminal Law (§ 855*) — New Trial — Misconduct of Jury — Play Cards.</p> <p>That after the jury was locked up for the night they played a game of cards did not vitiate the verdict.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 2048-2053; Dec. Dig. § 855.*]</p>

Action by Nathan Abramson and others against Charles <3. Larrabee, in which Charles G. Larrabee and his wife, Fannie M. Smith, intervene as third opponents. From a judgment setting aside an exception to the petition, interveners appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts (§ 224*) — Appellate Jurisdiction-Supreme Court.</p> <p>The appellate jurisdiction of this court extends to cases in which “the matters in dispute, or the fund to be distributed, whatever may be the amount therein claimed, shall exceed two' thousand dollars, exclusive of interest.” Const, art. 85. Hence, where the amount claimed is $2,0p0, with interest, the court is without jurisdiction, and the case will be transferred to the Court of Appeal, agreeably to the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1912.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 838-843; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Charles R. Bissell against.the Bodcaw Lumber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by P. W. Holliday & Sons, Limited, against Hunter Joffrion and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant the Schwing Lumber & Shingle Company, Limited, applies for a writ of prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Arthur Hauch against A. Bonnabel. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the .City of New Orleans against the Pontchartrain Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Juvenile Court, Parish of Orleans; A. H. Wilson, Judge.</p> <p>John Belas was convicted of selling liquor to a minor, and he appeals.</p>

Campbell, Judge. Edward George was convicted of burglary and larceny, and, from the overruling of his motion for a new trial, he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Damages (§ 132*) — Personal Injuries — Excessive Damages.</p> <p>The only question presented being the quantum of damages to be allowed for personal injuries, resulting from the overturning of a transfer omnibus, the amount awarded by the district court is found to, be somewhat excessive, and is reduced.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 372-385, 396; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; T. M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. J. E.* Lassus against Mrs. Lillian L. Clarke. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations (§ 122*) — 'Violation of Ordinance — Proof.</p> <p>Where a municipality is prosecuting one for a failure to comply with a sanitary ordinance, it must first show, by introducing its charter, or showing a compliance with Act No. 136 of 1898, that it had the power to pass the ordinance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ .281-289; Dec. Dig. § 122.*]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations (§ 642*) — Violation of Ordinance — Disposition on Appeal.</p> <p>Where a municipality, in a prosecution for a .violation of a sanitary ordinance, fails to show that it had the power to pass the ordinance, the case will be remanded to permit the municipality to show that it had the necessary power to enact the ordinance in question.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1412-1415; Dee. Dig. § 642.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 365*) — -Devolutive Appeal — Bond.</p> <p>An appeal granted as suspensive may be maintained as devolutive, where bond has been given by the appellant in the sum fixed by the court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1784, 1977-1988; Dec. Dig. § 365.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 337*) — Dismissal— Premature Filins oe Transcript.</p> <p>The filing of the transcript in the Supreme Court two days before the return day is no ground for the dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1877, 1878; Dec. Dig. § 337.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3.Appeal and Error (§ 753*) — Dismissal oe Appeal.</p> <p>“The appellant, who does not rely wholly or in part on a statement of facts, an exception to the judges’ opinion, or special verdict to sustain his appeal, but on an error of law appearing on the face of the record, shall be allowed to allege such error, if, within ten days after the record is brought up, he files in the Supreme Court a written paper, stating especially such errors as he alleges; otherwise his appeal shall be rejected.” Code of Practice, art. 897.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3086-3089; Dec. Dig. § 753.*]</p>

Théard, Judge. The Teutonia Bank & Trust Company was placed in the hands of Wm. L. Young, State Bank Examiner, for liquidation, and to the first provisional account filed by him the Kansas Plour Mills Company and others filed oppositions. Certain oppositions were dismissed and others sustained, a decree was rendered homologating the account as amended, and the Kansas Plour Mills Company and others appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Judgment (§ 427*) — 'Vacation—Grounds.</p> <p>The insufficiency of the evidence is not a ground for annulling a judgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 805-807; Dec. Dig. § 427.*]</p> <p>2. Divorce (§ 167*) — Action to Annul Judgment oe Separation — Burden oe Proof— Husband and Wife.</p> <p>Where a wife sues for the annulment óf a judgment for separation from bed and board on the ground of abandonment, alleging fraud on the part of her husband, she must show that she was really prevented or dissuaded from returning home in answer to the legal summons, and it will not be sufficient for her to show that her return home was not marked by a cordial reception.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 533-548; Dec. Dig. .§ 167.*]</p> <p>3. Divorce (§ 167*) — Judgment of Separation-Action to Annul — Extent, of Inquiry.</p> <p>In a suit to set aside a judgment of separation from bed and board on the ground that the conduct of the husband constituted fraud, the court will not inquire with the same degree of particularity as it would if it were merely reviewing the judgment granting the separation, especially in the instant case where the plaintiff failed to obey one of the summons sent her to return to her husband.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 533-548; Dec. Dig. § 167.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oowrt.) </p> <p>1. Limitation of Actions (§ 16*) — Prescription — Pleadings—Determinative Effect.</p> <p>The character plaintiff gives his action by his pleadings determines its prescription. Wilson v. McGreal, 12 La. Ann. 357; Lutz v Forbes, 13 La. Ann. 609; Burch v. Willis, 21 La. Ann 492; Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 89, 16 South. 507.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 66-68; Dec. Dig. §</p> <p>2. Limitation of Actions (§§ 30, 31*) — Prescription — Damages from Offense — Application of Statute.</p> <p>The prescription provided in article 3536, Civil Code, of one year for damages arising from offenses and quasi offenses, applies to damages arising from the infringement of some right personal to the individual, or relating to his property, or the violation of some duty imposed by law. If these ingredients are not present, it is not a quasi offense. Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 89, 16 South. 507.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 141, 142; Dec. Dig. §§ 30,31.*] ■</p>

Peter Lacrouts was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and, admission to bail being denied pending refusal of writ of habeas corpus, he applies for a writ of habeas corpus.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Drains (§ 14*) — Drainage District — Setting Aside — Grounds.</p> <p>A property owner, whose property has been included within a drainage district, cannot, without alleging fraud in the formation of the district, maintain a suit to have the district set aside on the mere allegation that his property will not be benefited by the expenditure of the drainage district tax fund, to which he is made to contribute.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Gent. Dig. §§ 5, 6; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Acting' Judge.'</p> <p>Action by Paul Vasquez against the Metropolitan Building Company. From an order appointing a receiver, Benjamin C. Rea appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by George Rohm against Peter J. Jallans and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant National Surety Company appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Corporations (§ 398*) — Actions op Individuals — Binding Effect — Stock Subscription.</p> <p>In the matter of the subscription by a corporation to the capital stock of another corporation, the former cannot be bound by the individual actions, or promises, of its directors ■or stockholders.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Gent. Dig. §§ 1592-1594; Dec. Dig. § 398.*]</p>

Action by William B. Bloomfield and another against W. B. Thompson, Commissioner of Public Utilities, and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs apply for writ of certiorari.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Acting Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Louise Melcher against the New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Company, to compel specific performance. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Wortham, Judge. Condemnation proceeding by the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company against Mrs. Noemie Teissier, wife of Charles V. Frey. Judgment for plaintiff condemning the land and for defendant for damages, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Charles Carroll and Avie Fontenot were convicted of manslaughter, and Fontenot alone appeals.</p>

Mary; Charles A. O’Neill, Judge. In the matter of the receivership of the Augusta Sugar Company, Limited, upon intervention and third opposition of Payne & Joubert Machine & Foundry Company. From- a judgment for the third opponent, the receiver appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred T. King, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Joseph Henry Blache against Gas-par Greco and another. From an order dissolving an injunction, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; John Dale, Judge.</p> <p>Y. B. Hawthorn was convicted of stealing a bull of the cow kind, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the J. A. Bel Lumber Company, Limited, against J. C. Stout. From judgment for defendant,' plaintiff! appeals.</p>

tAppeal from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberville; L. B. Claiborne, Judge. Action by L. Enomie Pourciau against Arthur H. Angelloz, wherein the L. Baist Cooperage Company, Limited, filed intervention and third opposition. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Emily A. Hudspeth and others against the Producers’ Oil Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Quaker Realty Company, Limited, against Edward H. Purcell, to confirm title to property. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Eeeoe (§ 169*) — Peesentation Below — Necessity.</p> <p>An appellee, in his answer to an appeal taken by the appellant, cannot plead matters and things not previously pleaded in the trial court and disposed of by the judgment appealed from. Code of Practice, arts. 592, 887, 888.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1018-1034; Dec. Dig. § 169.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Eeeoe (§ 169*) — Pbesentation Below — Necessity.</p> <p>Matters pleaded for the first time in the Supreme Court will not be considered by that court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other oases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1018-1034; Dee. Dig. § 169.*]</p> <p>3. Judgment (§ 660%*) — Res Judicata — Void Judgment.</p> <p>An absolutely void judgment cannot be made the basis of a plea of res adjudicata.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1171; Dee. Dig. § 660%.'*]</p> <p>4. Limitation oe Actions (§ 11*) — Opeeation Against State.</p> <p>Prescription does not run against the state in civil matters. Const, art. 193.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 35-39; Dec. Dig. §</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Succession of Mrs. Eugene S. Reems. Disinherited children of testatrix filed an opposition to the account of executrices, and, from judgment in their favor, the executrices and the heirs appeal. Motion to dismiss appeal by executrices overruled, and motion to dismiss appeal by heirs sustained.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John Wallace and others against Jan Koster. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Ellen Brown against the Orleans Gravel & Sand Company. Prom judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Petitory action by Olivier Deshotels and others against Merante Lalleur and others. Judgment for defendants in the district court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and plaintiffs apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations (§§ 693, 697*)— Obstruction op Streets — Public Nuisance —Manbatory Injunction.</p> <p>An embankment of earth placed in the streets of a town or city, which obstruct the passage and view along same, constitutes a public nuisance; and the persons immediately affected may cause the same to be removed. It would be different if the embankment was placed there temporarily.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1494, 1502-1505; Dec. Dig. §§ 693, 697.*].</p> <p>2. Municipal-Corporations (§§ 680, 681*)— Powers — Maintenance op Public Nuisance.</p> <p>The common council of a town has not the right to authorize the establishment or maintenance of a public nuisance. Civil Code, art. 861; Bell v. Edwards, 37 La. Ann. 475; La. Construction Co. v. I. C. R. R., 49 La. Ann. 527, 21 South. 891, 37 L. R. A. 661; Shepherd v. Third Municipality, 6 Rob. 349, 41 Am. Dec. 269; Pickles v. Dry Dock Co., 38 La. Ann. 412.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1459-1466; Dec. Dig. §§ 680, 681.*]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations (§ 691*) — Powers — Vacation op Streets — Application op Statutes. ,</p> <p>The common council of a municipality may set aside dedications of streets, roads, and alleyways which have been abandoned and are no longer used. Act No. 151, of 1910, p. 231; section 15, subd. 20, p. 231, Act No. 136, of 1898.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1492-1508; Dec. Dig. § 691.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court., </p> <p>1. Homestead (§§ 169, 192*) — Exemption — •Right to Claim — Waives.</p> <p>The right to claim a homestead exemption is a personal right, and may be waived for the benefit of a particular creditor, or a particular debt, and the waiver may be made to apply either to obligations already contracted or to those to be contracted after the waiver.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 335, 363; Dec. Dig. §§ 169, 192.*]</p> <p>2. Homestead (§ 175*) — Exemption—Waiver.</p> <p>The waiver in this ease was made to apply by the homesteader to “any debt I may owe hereafter to J. M. Wade,” while the evidence shows that the defendant in injunction is trying to apply the waiver to a debt contracted prior to the waiver, which, of course, cannot be done.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 341, 343; Dec. Dig. § 175.*]</p> <p>3. Execution (§ 172*) — Seizure op Homestead-Damages.</p> <p>The facts of this case do not justify an allowance of attorneys’ fees and damages claimed by plaintiff in injunction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 519-539; Dec. Dig. § 172.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; Thos. Ml Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John F. Oeschner and others against -Henry Keller. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>