Volume 135 — Louisiana Reports

Action by Myrtle J. O’Reilly and another against Gaspar Pietri, and action by Gaspar Pietri against John Wells. The cases were consolidated, and James J. McLoughlin, trustee of James J. Woulfe, filed intervention and third opposition, and secured an injunction against sale of property. Injunction dismissed, and trustee takes devolutive appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish bf Washington; Thos. M. Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Sam E. Rees against D. E. Sheridan and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Thos. M. Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by R. T. and Lonie Manning against the New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Company, for death of plaintiffs’ daughter. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Mandamus (§ 132*) — Right on Action — Street Obstructions — Railroads.</p> <p>A mandamus will lie to compel a railroad Company to make the necessary repairs to its road running through the streets of a city or town, so as to keep the same free for the use of the public,' and clear of all obstructions. Rev. St. § 691, as amended by Acts No. 204 of 1902, p. 395, and No. 157 of 1910, p. 236; Act No. 193 of 1912, p. 381.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. §§ 266, 267; Dec. Dig. § 132.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error (§ 1178*) — Disposition op Cause — Remand for Further Testimony.</p> <p>As the court is not in full possession of all the facts of the case, it is remanded to take further evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4604-4620; Dec. Dig. § 1178.*]</p>

Action by the Yazoo & Mississippi Yalley Railroad Company against Mrs. Noemie Teissier, wife of Charley V. Frey. Plaintiff applies to the Supreme Court for writ of prohibition against the trial judge and defendant from proceeding on a rule, pending plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment in the action.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Petitory action by Harry A. Thompson against Don F. Watts. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Action by J. N. White against J. E. Mc-Clanahan for personal injuries. A motion to vacate an order permitting plaintiff to prosecute his suit in forma pauperis, under Act No. 156 of 1912, was overruled, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.</p>

Minerva Lemon was convicted of cutting and stabbing with intent to murder, and of willfully and maliciously inflicting a wound less than mayhem, and appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-First Judie ial District Court, Parish of Pointe CoupSe; Joseph E. Le Blanc, Jr., Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State against Jos. Griffin. From a judgment of forfeiture of an appearance bond’ in a criminal case, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Divorce (§ 184*) — Separation prom Bed and Board — Appeal—Review.</p> <p>A decree for the plaintiff in a suit for a separation from bed and board, which is sustained by the preponderance of the evidence, will be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 570-573; Dec. Dig. § 184.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh District Court, Parish of Red River; W. S. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Serepta A. Loftin against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Narcisse P. Meraux against the Kenilworth Sugar Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Guardian and Ward (§ 70*) — Illegal Sale by Tutrix — Estoppel by Ratification.</p> <p>Where a party, after attaining his majority, enters into a contract and settlement with parties who had bought his real property from his tutrix in an alleged illegal manner, whereby and wherein he makes a full settlement with said parties, ratifying the sale made by his tutrix, and accepts the purchase price of said property from said parties, he is estopped from setting up the illegal acts of his tutrix, and claiming ownership of, or interest in, the property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 308-315; Dee. Dig. § 70.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Insurance (§ 22*) — Service on Foreign Insurance Company — Agency oe Secretary oe State — Duration.</p> <p>The mandate of the Secretary of State to represent foreign insurance companies in the state of Louisiana for the purpose of the service of citation or other lawful process continues in force so long as any policy, or other liability, remains outstanding against the corporation in this state. Act No. 105 of 1898.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 26; Dec. Dig. § 22.*]</p>

King, Judge. Succession of Leonce Desforges. Suit by Mrs. Angela Sicard and another attacking the will. Demands of the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company, ^dative tutor of Alma Desforges, a minor, and of Lester Desforges, were rejected in a judgment compelling them to collate certain sums, and the bequest to Mrs. Marie Oleptie Maxent, widow of Leonce Desforges, was reduced, and they appeal.

Théard, Judge. The Teutonia Bank & Trust Company was placed in the hands of William L. Young, State Bank Examiner, for liquidation. To the first provisional account filed, Edward Earle Curtis filed opposition, and, from a judgment rejecting his demand, he appeals.

Théard, Judge. The Teutonia Bank & Trust Company was placed in the hands of William L. Young, State Bank Examiner, for liquidation. To the first provisional account filed by him, the Southern Commercial Savings Bank of St. Louis filed opposition and from a judgment rejecting its demand, it appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company against the State Board of Appraisers to cancel assessment on property. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twentieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne; W. P. Martin, Judge.</p> <p>Injunction by the J. B. Levert Company, Limited, against the John T. Moore Planting Company, Limited. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Application for writs of certiorari and prohibition by the State, on relation of Lawrence J. Cassidy, Clerk of Criminal District Court, against Hon. Joshua G. Baker, Judge of the Criminal District Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Gus Lewy against J. D. Wilkinson. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Morehouse; B. G. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>.Theodore King was convicted of murder “without capital punishment” and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>• Action by Evelina La Casse against the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant (§§ 101, 102*) — Satte Appliances — Automatic Couplers — Injury to Brakeman.</p> <p>The master must furnish the servant with reasonably safe tools with which to _ do_ his work, and where he fails to do so he is liable to the servant for any injury that arises from his failure. Where a railroad, by furnishing its cars with automatic couplers, can avoid a brakeman the necessity of going between the cars, in a position of danger, to couple them, and fails to do so, it is liable to a brakeman injured while between cars m an effort to couple them, after he had ascertained by a trial that the automatic couplers will not work.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 135, 171, 174, 178-184, 192; Dec. Dig. §§ 101, 102.*]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant (§§ 87, 111*) — Interstate Commerce — Federal Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>The mere fact that a railroad is engaged in interstate commerce does not bring an employs within the protection of the federal Employers’ Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1322]), without showing that he was actually engaged in interstate commerce.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant. Cent. Dig. §§ 138, 235-217, 25o; Dec. Dig. §§ '87, 111.*]</p>

Action by the Texas & Pacific Railway Company against Chatwito Bros. The plaintiff company’s exception to a plea in reconven tion was overruled, and it applies for prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari.

ThSard, Judge. Succession of Thomas Magruder, or Mc-Gruder. Emily Magruder filed a petition to annul the will, and, from a judgment in her favor, Bessie Washington, wife of Scott Jackson, and another, proponents of the will, appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph R. Carter against the Now Orleans Railway & Light Company. From judgment for plaintiff for less than claimed, he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Municipal Corporations (§ 113*) — Ordinances — Repeal.</p> <p>Certain ordinances of the city of New Orleans, of somewhat ancient date, having been, in effect, repealed or annulled by an act of the Legislature, a petition, which, though failing to allege that any action was ever taken under complaints of injury resulting from them, on the ground • that they are discriminating, tend to create a monopoly in a particular business, deprive the petitioner of its property without due process of law, and deny it the equal protection of the law, discloses no obligation resting on the city of New Orleans to repeal the ordinances and no sufficient ground for invoking the action of the courts to annul them, since neither the city nor the courts can repeal or annul a law, municipal or state, which has already been repealed or annulled by the lawmaking power. An exception of no cause of action was therefore properly sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 266; Dec. Dig. § 113*1</p>

Action by Emile Gajan and another against Patout & Burguieres, in which the L. P. Pa-tout Company, Limited, and also the liquidators of the State National Bank of New Orleans, filed third interventions and oppositions. A rule for contempt was filed by the liquidators, upon which an order was made directed to the L. P. Patout Company, Limited, and its president. Buie made absolute la certain particulars.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>ment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>Action by the City of Shreveport against the Wells Fargo Express Company. From judg-</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Pratt Engineering & Machine Company against the Cecelia Sugar Company, Limited. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant receiver appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Helena; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Partition by the Amito Bank & Trust Company against Fred Singleton and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Case Certified from Court of Appeal, Parish of Acadia.</p> <p>Action by Elsie Duvall against the Louisiana Western Railroad Company. On certificate from the Court of Appeal of Acadia parish.</p>

Théard, Judge. Succession of Mrs. Maria Anna Riebel, widow of Henry Brand. Suit by Chauncey B. Cline to annul a nuncupative will of the deceased. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Courts (§ 224*) — Jurisdiction—Supreme Court — Legality oe License Tax.</p> <p>This court has jurisdiction of a case in which, under the pleadings, the legality of a license tax is in contestation, without regard to the amount involved. Article 85 of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 55*) — Licenses— Nonintoxicating Beverages.</p> <p>Section 4 of Act No. 178 of 1912 declares that malt liquors containing less than 2 per cent, of alcohol are not to be regarded as intoxicating liquors.</p> <p>Under the provisions of Act No. 178 of 1912, tax collectors are required to collect for and issue licenses for the sale of malt liquors containing less than 2 per cent, of alcohol, even in the parishes in which the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited, and even though the parochial authorities have not levied a license tax for the sale of malt liquors containing less than 2 per cent, of alcohol.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ .55, 56; Dec. Dig. § 55.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law (§ 1026*) — Appeal—Dismissal.</p> <p>An appeal will be dismissed where it is shown that the order of the court appealed from has been acquiesced in by the appellant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2615-2618; Dec. Dig. § 1026.*]</p>

W. Ellis, Judge. Action by J. E- Levert against the Shirley Planting Company. Erom an order of seizure and sale, Chester E. Knoll and another were granted a devolutive appeal.

Schwing, Judge. Action by Jacob McWilliams against R. G. Comeaux, wherein interventions and third oppositions were filed by the Iberville Bank & Trust Company, C. M. Roth, and J. McWilliams. From the judgment, the Bank appeals.

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John P. Burgin against John Simon and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>■ Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Winston Overton, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Harry Foreman and another against Taylor Fryerson and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Divorce (§§ 37, 298*) — Decree of Separation —Grounds.</p> <p>It is no doubt true, as a rule, that the wife must follow the husband and accept the home that he offers her, but, where the condition of a wife’s health'is such that she is unable to assume the charge of a home, to provide therein for the needs and comfort of her husband, her child, or herself, and her husband, by reason of the inadequacy of his means, is unable to provide for her the care and assistance that she needs, there is no law, human or divine, which justifies him in requiring her to attempt the impossible, or which imposes upon her the obligation to leave a home in which her mother is able and willing to_afford her such care and assistance; and her failure to follow her husband, under such circumstances, is an insufficient ground upon which to predicate a judgment in his favor of separation from bed and board, or a judgment giving to him the unqualified custody of the minor child, a girl of tender years.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 27, 107-134, 136-138, 781-787; Dee. Dig. §§ 37, 298.“]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Carriers (§ 283*) — Misconduct oe Conductor-Liability oe Employer.</p> <p>Objectionable remarks, addressed by a street car conductor to a patron of the road, referring to her personal appearance, while on the car, which mortify and humiliate her, are actionable, and the car company will ,be held in damages therefor. Lawson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 114 Minn. 182, 130 N. W. 945, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 15.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1119-1124, 1140, 1141; Dec. Dig. § 283.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jackson; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Louisiana Stave Company, Limited, for the use and benefit of the Confie Stave Company, against the South Arkansas Lumber Company, Limited. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Luke Rigmaiden was convicted of practicing medicine without a certificate, or license, and he appeals. On motion to dismiss.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error (§ 1177*) — Insufficient Record — Reversal.</p> <p>The district judge having stated, in a bill of exceptions taken by the appellant to the refusal to reopen the case to permit the witnesses to correct their testimony, that only one-fourth of the testimony taken was transcribed, and that the transcript of this portion is erroneous and inaccurate, the case must be remanded for a new trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4597-4604, 4606-4610; Dec. Dig. § 1177.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Thomas C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Succession of Marie Amanda Barrios, widow of Thomas L. Bertrand. From, the judgment in proceedings by the executor to sell property, the Carriere Company appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth. Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; Thos. M. Burns, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Emanuel Estrade and others against P. L. Vergez and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

In the matter of the succession of George Dionne. Action by the heirs against the widow for a judgment forfeiting the right of usufruct and a judgment of partition by licitation. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; P. E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mary Beatty against Hugh I-I. Sharp. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Husband and Wife (§ 201*) — Married Woman — Separate Real Estate — Conveyances — Mortgage—Vacation.</p> <p>Where a married woman, authorized by her husband, made an absolute sale of her paraphernal real estate, as shown by a notarial act duly recorded, and her vendee conveyed the property to a corporation, in which the wife was the largest shareholder, and the company mortgaged the premises to a bank to secure money for the purposes of its business, held, that the wife cannot assail the mortgage held by the bank on the grounds of marital coercion, error, or fraud in the original sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. § 735; Dec. Dig. § 201.*]</p> <p>2. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 233’?) — Failure to Record Instrument — Effect.</p> <p>Under codal law unrecorded agreements and contracts are “utterly null and void except between the parties thereto,” and the jurisprudence is well settled that notice is not equivalent to registry.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 563-566; Dec. Dig. § 233.*]</p>

King, Acting Judge. Action by Marie Cecellia Lacroix, administratrix, 'etc., and others, against the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company, trustee. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.

C. Blanchard, Judge. Sam Fulco was convicted on two affidavits, one of unlawfully retailing intoxicating liquors without a license from the police jury of Caddo parish and the other of unlawfully retailing intoxicating liquor without first having obtained a license from the city of Shreveport, in violation of the city ordinances, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State of Louisiana and the City of Shreveport against Frank Fulco. From a judgment of conviction, Fulco appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Executors and Administrators (§ 20*)— Appointment — Confirmation — Presumptions.</p> <p>Where the probate record shows a preliminary order for an inventory, and for notice by publication of an application for administration, and it is admitted that the applicant qualified, and that it is shown that he for many years administered the succession without objection from any quarter, held, that the existence of a final order confirming the appointment will be presumed, in the absence of positive and convincing evidence to the contrary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 83-105; Dec. Dig. § 20.*]</p> <p>2. Descent and Distribution (§ 69*) — Guardian and Ward (§ 165*) — Homologation oe tutor’s Account — Action by Forced Heirs.</p> <p>Where a judgment, based on an inventory in a tutorship, was rendered, homologating a tutor’s final account, showing a certain balance due his ward, the tutor and his heirs are concluded by said judgment, and an action to annul the same on the ground of error or fraud was prescribed by one year from the date of the judgment. The action of forced heirs to annul contracts of those from whom they inherit is restricted to “simulated contracts.” Civ. Code, art. 2239.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Descent and Distribution, Cent. Dig. §§ 208-212; Dec. Dig. § 69; Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 531-537; Dec. Dig. § 165.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge. .</p> <p>Sam Gullo was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Shreveport, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus- by the Court.) -</p> <p>1. Sales (§ 266*) — Implied Warranty.</p> <p>A contract for the purchase of sugar cane, at a sound price, entitles the purchaser to a sound article.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 743, 746, 747, 754^-759; Dec. Dig. § 266.*]</p> <p>2. Sales (§§ 284, 288*.) — Implied Warranty —Breach—Remedy oe Buyer — Estoppel.</p> <p>There seem to be three ways of determining whether sugar cane which has been frozen has become sour; the one, by splitting and tasting it, another by chemical analysis of the juice, and the third, by attempting to make sugar of it, and the fact that cane offered, under contract, may stand the test first mentioned, which is, at best, uncertain, does not preclude the purchaser from invoking the other tests¡ or disentitle him to have his rights determined thereby; nor does the fact that he offers a reduced price for cane, instead of rejecting it entirely as unsound, justify the conclusion that it is sound, and should be accepted at the contract price for sound cane.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 803-805, 817-823; Dee. Dig. §§ 284, 288.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James; Charles T. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the First Natchez Bank against the Malarcher-Damare Company, Limited, and others. From judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Wills (§§ 115, 740*) — Validity—Witnesses — Ratification or Void Will.</p> <p>A last will, not subscribed by the number of witnesses required by. law, is a nullity. Where the heir at law treated such a will as without effect, and was recognized as sole heir and as such was sent into possession of the estate by the decree of a competent court, and subsequently partially executed several of the legacies contained in the void will, held, that the ratification was only to the extent of the execution of each disposition, and the only legal effect of such ratification was to prevent the recovery by the heir of what had been paid or given.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 280-283, 1888-1895; Dec. Dig. §§ 115, 740.*]</p> <p>2. Wills (§ 740*) — Ratification — Yerbal Promises.</p> <p>Where a last will is a nullity for defects of form, it cannot be confirmed or ratified by the verbal promises of the heir at law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1888-1895; Dec. Dig. § 740.*]</p> <p>3. Wills (§ 740*) — Ratification—Effect.</p> <p>Ratification as to one legatee does not profit other legatees.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1888-1895; Dec. Dig. § 740.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. AVills (§ 136*) — Validity—Form.</p> <p>It suffices, for the validity of a nuncupative testament, that it be valid under any one of the forms prescribed by law, however defective it may be in the form under which the testator may have intended to make it. C. C. art. 1590; Graves v. Graves, 10 La. Ann. 212.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see AVills, CeDt. Dig. §§ 347, 349; Dec. Dig. § 136.*]</p> <p>2. AVills (§ 149*) — Validity.</p> <p>An instrument, although invalid as a nuncupative will by public act, may be good as a nuncupative testament under private signature. Arerdun v. Verdun, 15 La. 28; Graves v. Graves, 10 La. Ann. 212.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see AVills, Cent. Dig. §§ 358-366; Dec. Dig. § 149.*]</p> <p>3. AVills (§ 149*) — Requisites—Proof Aliunde.</p> <p>All the requisites of such a will are specified in the articles 1581 and 1582 of the Civil Code; but express mention of the fulfillment of these requisites is not demanded, as in the case of a will by authentic act; proof aliunde may be received. Falkner v. Friend. 1 Rob. 48; Sophie v. Duplessis, 2 La. Ann. 724; Vernon v. Vernon, 6 La. Ann. 242; Graves v. Graves, 10 La. Ann. 212.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see AVills, Cent. Dig. §§ 358-366; Dec. Dig. § 149.*]</p> <p>4. AVills (§ 149*) — Presentation — Sueet-OIENCY.</p> <p>The presentation of a will under private signature need not be a manual presentation; the acknowledgment of the testator that the paper contains his last will implies the presentation provided by law, even when that acknowledgment is in response to a question. Pfarr v. Belmont, 39 La. Ann. 294, 1 South. 681; Succession of Reems, 115 La. 102, 38 South. 930.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see AVills, Cent. Dig. §§ 358-366; Dec. Dig. § 149.*]</p> <p>5. Wills (§ 149*) — Validity—Witnesses.</p> <p>A nuncupative will by private act is not null for the reason that all the formalities were carried on in the presence of the witnesses. Prendergast v. Prendergast, 16 La. Ann. 219, 79 Am. Dec. 575; Succession of Morales, 16 La. Ann. 267; Frith v. Pearce, 105 La. 186, 29 South. 809; Succession of Reems, 115 La. 102, 38 South. 930.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 358-366; Dec. Dig. § 149.*]</p> <p>Provosty, X, dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Wills (§ 148*) — Nuncupative Testament-Validity.</p> <p>The nuncupative testament by public act must be dictated by the testator, and, if he is unable to sign it, he must declare his inability to sign. Therefore, when it is shown that he only assented to what the notary suggested and wrote, but that, on account of his mental and physical weakness, the so-called testator could not dictate anything, could not sign his name, or declare his inability to sign, or state the cause which hindered him from signing, the document so written by the notary is not a valid testament.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Gent. Dig. §§ 358-366; Dec. Dig. § 148.*]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Daw (§ 202*) — Former Acquittal — Dieeerent Sales oe Liquor.</p> <p>Defendant was charged in two separate informations with unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, on the same day, without having previously obtained a license from the proper authorities. Held, that he was properly convicted in both'cases on evidence showing that the sales were made at different hours, at different prices, and to different parties.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 386-403, 408, 409; Dec. Dig. § 202.*]</p> <p>2. Witnesses (§ 337*) — Defendant as Witness-Right to Impeach.</p> <p>Where a defendant testifies in his qwn behalf, the state has the right to impeach his reputation for truth and veracity.</p> <p>[IOd. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113, 1129-1132, 1140-1142, 1146-1148; Dec. Dig. § 337.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 589*) — Witnesses (§ 355*) — Continuance—Competency of Impeaching Witness.</p> <p>A witness who, after the arrest of the 'defendant, heard his reputation for truth and veracity discussed in the community in which he resided is competent to testify whether the same was good or bad. The bare fact that the prosecution summoned a greater number of witnesses than it was entitled to, without an order of court, furnishes no ground for a continuance of -the case on the application of the defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1315, 1319; Dec. Dig. § 589;* Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1154-1156; Dee. Dig. § 355.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Dr. J. A. Sampite and others against Mrs. Maria Deslouche and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

Case Certified from Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Action by Douglas Sullivan against the Minden Lumber Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certifies the case to the Supreme Court, propounding certain questions and asking for instructions.

Quo warranto by the State, on the relation of John M. Duffy, against Thomas P. Goff and others. Writs of injunction were refused, but a writ of quo warranto was issued and recalled after trial, and relator appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. S. E. Cleneay and others against N. S. Dougherty. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tensas; George H. Clinton, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by N. B. Hunter against S. W. Martien and wife. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>Action by E. W. Hanchey against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Leblanc, Jr., Judge. Action by Albin Major against M. T. Hewes. Executory process was issued on judgment for plaintiff, and return made showing sale to plaintiff, whereupon the sheriff and plaintiff ruled defendant to show cause why he should not deliver possession of the property seized and sold. Rule made absolute, and defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Injunction (§ 119*) — Trespass—Pleading —Answer.</p> <p>Where, in a suit to enjoin defendant from trespassing on complainant’s game preserve, the latter’s title rested on patents obtained from the state, which were annexed to the petition by certified copies, defendant’s answer, denying complainant’s title, and failing to admit that complainant had title to any part of the area, though his real defense was that a part of the land embraced within the boundaries assigned to the preserve in the petition was not covered by the patents, was improper, and not a compliance with the Practice Act (Act No. 157 of 1912). . ■</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 243-250; Dec. Dig. § 119.*]</p> <p>2. Corporations (§ 387*) — Ownership of Land — Grant from State — Objections— Who may Raise.</p> <p>• Whether a corporation organized to maintain a game preserve had acquired land therefor from the state of greater value than $300,-000, in violation of Acts 1882, p. 162, No. 112, whether the land was being held by complainant in violation of Const, art. 265, and whether in selling the land to complainant and its lessors the state observed the requirements of Act No. 215 of 1908, were questions which could not be raised by a trespasser, but only by the state acting through her Attorney General.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases,’see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1548-1553; Dec. Dig. § 387.*]</p> <p>3. Navigable Waters (§ 1*) — “Navigable.” . A “navigable” water which the public is entitled to use as a highway is such an one as in its natural state affords a channel for useful commerce, and not such as is only sufficient to float a hunter’s canoe.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. §§ 5-16; Dec. Dig. § 1.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4675-4684; vol. 8, p. 7728.]</p> <p>4. Injunction (§ 208*) — Decree — Specifying Boundaries of Land.</p> <p>A decree, enjoining a person from going on a tract of land, must specify the boundaries of the land with precision.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 427, 431; Dec. Dig. § 208.*]</p> <p>5. Injunction (§ 46*) — Trespass — Boundaries of Land.</p> <p>Where land constituting a game preserve was marked by water courses having defined banks, and by a fence and posted signs, the lines were sufficiently definite to sustain an injunction restraining defendant from trespassing thereon.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 98, 99, 107; Dec. Dig. § 46.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines; R. Emmet Hingle, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Delta Duck Club against Norbert Burns. From a decree in favor of defendant, complainant appeals.</p>

Holstead, Judge. W. A. Jackson was convicted of unlawfully keeping a grog and tippling shop without a license, and appeals.

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; W. L. Bagwell, Special Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Bodcaw Lumber Company against Arthur Bonnette. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon; James R. Monk, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by Joseph H. Beeson against the Pickering Land & Timber Company and others. Prom a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Burglary (§ 28*) — Indictment—Evidence-Necessity.</p> <p>Under an indictment charging a breaking and entry into a railroad car of a specified railroad company, a corporation, with intent to commit larceny, the state need not prove that the company is a corporation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 67-78; Dec. Dig. § 28.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Embezzlement (§ 38*) — Evidence—Oeeeb to Settle.</p> <p>Evidence'going to show that a defendant, charged with embezzlement, offered to make a settlement with his principal before the bill against him was found is immaterial on the trial of the cause.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Embezzlement, Cent. Dig. §§ 61, 65, 66; Dec. Dig. § 38.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Assault and Battery (§ 13*) — Civil Action —Right to Recover Damages.</p> <p>Damages were not recoverable for injuries to IL, a young man nearly 20 years old, from his skull being fractured by a blow delivered with an ax handle by M., proprietor of a store in which was located a post office of which M. was postmaster, where the blow was delivered by M. to ward off an assault by H., who was intoxicated, abusive, and disorderly, and had been ordered by M. to leave the store; there being no right of recovery for an assault on one who is himself in the wrong.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. § 28; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]</p>

<p>Walton Cruse was convicted of trespass, and applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Mathilde Riggio against John H. McNeely and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Licenses (§ 19*) — License Tax — “Manufactukek.”</p> <p>A manufacturing company with a large capital, extensive buildings, much machinery, employing many hands, and making bags out of burlap in large quantities, is a manufacturer Of bag's, and exempt from license taxation under' article 229 of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Bd. Note. — For 'other cases, see- Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 48-54; Dee. Dig. § 19*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4346-4358.]</p>

King, Judge. Succession of Gladys Desina, deceased wife of Walter S. Maestri. From a judgment confirming Walter S. Maestri as tutor and appointing Csosar Maestri as undertutor, and a judgment dismissing petition by Marco Desina and discharging John B. Sbisa as tutor ad hoc, Marco Desina and John B. Sbisa appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error. (§ 799*) — Motion to. Dismiss — Affidavits.</p> <p>Where the affidavit of the stenographer, in support of a motion to dismiss an appeal because the transcript was not filed in time, states positively that he was directed by appellant’s attorney to not transcribe the testimony until further notice, and that this notice was not given until the day on which the appeal was returnable, and the affidavit of appellant’s counsel states merely that “to the best of his knowledge and belief” a notice to the stenographer was given at least six days before the return day, the stenographer’s affidavit will be accepted as true.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3158-3160; Dec. Dig. ' 799.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error (§ 627*) — Motion to Dismiss — Failure to File Transcript in Time.</p> <p>A motion to dismiss an appeal, where the transcript was not filed within the time originally allowed, will be granted where appellant by failing to file an appeal bond has voluntarily lost 16 days out of the 21 allowed him, and the preparation of the transcript could have taken very little time, and no reason is shown why the clerk himself could not have prepared it between the fíate of the execution of the bond and the return day, though the affidavit of the deputy clerk on which an extension of time was obtained states that, by reason of the large amount of work in the clerk’s office, it would have been physically impossible to prepare and complete the transcript in time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2744-2749, 3126; Dec. Dig. § 627.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.- Mandamus (§ 64*) — Governor—Performance of Official Duty — Discretion.</p> <p>A mandamus will not lie to the Governor of the state to compel him to perform an alleged duty which depends upon his discretion.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Mandamus, Gent. Dig. §§ 128, 129; Dec. Dig. § 64.*]</p> <p>2. Mandamus (§ 154*) — Right of Action-Petition.</p> <p>A petition which does not allege that the 'auditor and treasurer have failed to perform an alleged duty does not disclose a cause of action.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. §§ 296-316; Dec. Dig. § 154.*]</p>

Certiorari from Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Jackson. Injunction by the Tremont Lumber Company against the Haynes Lumber Company. A judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Enoch Smith was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 1166%*) — Discretionary Ruling — Competency oe Juror.</p> <p>The trial judge is given so much discretion by section 1 of the Act No. 135 of 1898 to decide upon the competency of a juror to serve in any particular ease that his rulings will not be disturbed unless it is shown that the defendant was compelled to accept an objectionable juror.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 31LU3123; Dec. Dig. § 1166%.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 671*) — Witnesses (§• 269*) — Cross-Examination — Presentation eor Review.</p> <p>The defendant has no right to cross-examine a state witness upon irrelevant and immaterial matter not referred to by,the witness in his examination in chief. When such an objection is sustained, the cross-examination should be had and reduced to writing out of the presence of the jury to enable this court to review it and decide whether it was properly excluded.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1591, 1592; Dec. Dig. § 671 ;* Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 949-954; Dec. Dig. § 269.*]-</p> <p>8. Homicide (§§ 203, 205*) — Dying Declarations — Admissibility.</p> <p>Whether a wounded man’s statement is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration is to be determined by the circumstances in each case. There is no rule requiring that his statement that he fears he is about to die must be made at the same time when he makes the dying: declaration, to render the latter admissible as such.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see- Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 430 — 437, 443; Dec. Dig. §§ 203, 205.*]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law (§ 338*) — Evidence—Conversation.</p> <p>Since the defendant in a criminal case is a competent witness in his own behalf, a state witness, who has heard only a part'of a conversation between the accused party and a third party, should be permitted to relate the portion of the conversation which he heard, and leave it to the defendant to prove the balance of the conversation. The testimony of the state witness should not be excluded upon the grounid that he did not hear all of the conversation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 752, 753, 755, 756, 787, 788, 801, 855; Dec. Dig. § 338.*]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law (§ 656*) — Remarks of Court — Comment on Evidence.</p> <p>When the defendant’s attorney persists in arguing upon facts which were excluded from the evidence, in violation of the ruling of the trial judge and over the objections of the district attorney, it is not a comment upon the evidence for the judge to say: “I have already ruled that counsel is out of the record.” This is no more a comment upon the facts than was the ruling made in the presence of the jury, excluding the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1524-1533; Dec. Dig. § 656.*]</p> <p>6. Homicide (§§ 18, 62*) — Elements of Crime —Conspiracy to Kill.</p> <p>As the intention to take human life is not an essential element in the crime of murder or manslaughter, all of the parties to a conspiracy are guilty of murder if a homicide be committed in carrying out a conspiracy to commit any felony, and all of the conspirators are guilty of manslaughter if a felonious homicide be committed in carrying out a conspiracy to commit a less serious offense, not naturally tending to the destruction of human life.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 24-31, 85; Dec. Dig. §§ 18, 62.*]</p> <p>7. Criminal Law (§ 1156*) — Appeal—Discretionary Ruling — Denial of New Trial.</p> <p>A motion for a new trial, based upon the alleged misconduct of the jury, is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge to such an extent that his refusal to set aside the verdict will be affirmed, unless manifest error and probable injury are shown.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3067-3071; Dec. Dig. § 1156.*]</p>

Dawkins, Judge. Action by Alex N. Williams and others to enjoin the Police Jury of Morehouse Parish from carrying into effect certain ordinances. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Police Jury of Acadia Parish against the First National Bank and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

R. E. Gainey was convicted of unlawfully cutting timber, making it into staves, and hauling it away, and he applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermillion; John Nugier, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by the Interstate Trust & Banking Company against F. F. Young and others. Frond a judgment granting insufficient relief, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans.</p> <p>Succession of Thomas Finegan. From a judgment holding certain claims entitled to a privilege, Sadie Ellis Maguire, a mortgage creditor of the succession, appeals.</p>

Foreclosure proceeding by the J..B. Levert Company, Limited, against the John T. Moore Planting Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

Dan Foggin and Garfield Ashley were charged with keeping a blind tiger. .Exception to the jurisdiction of the court overruled, and they apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fourth. Judicial District Court, Parish of East Feliciana; Joseph F. Golsan, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State against the Centenary College of Louisiana. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Jackson; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Usrey Lumber Company against the Huie-Hodge Lumber Company* Limited. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Joshua G. Baker, Judge.</p> <p>Augusta Agnes Edwards was convicted of murder, and she appeals.</p>

James; C. T. Wortham, Judge. Action by the Yazoo & Mississippi Talley Railroad Company against the Longview Sugar Company. From judgment for each party in part, plaintiff appeals, and defendant takes a devolutive appeal.

Land, Judge. Charley Zagone was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license. From a judgment denying a new trial, he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Joseph B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>William Johns. was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error (§ 801*) — Motion to Dismiss — Determination.</p> <p>On a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of acquiescence in the judgment, based on a telegram sent by the appellant, which the latter avers was sent under a misapprehension of the facts, the court will not pass on the motion without being fully advised as to all the facts connected with the case, but will refer the motion to dismiss to the merits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3161-3164; Dec. Dig. § 801.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Corporations (§§ 556, 557*) — Receivers— Appointment.</p> <p>The matter of the appointment of receivers for corporations is governed by act No. 159 of 1898, and there is nothing in that act which confers upon a board of directors the authority to provoke, or upon a court to make such appointment at the instance of a board of directors. The only authority which such a board possesses in that connection is to declare, “by resolution, that the corporation is unable to meet its obligations as they mature, and that a _ receiver is xxecessax’y to preserve and administer the assets, for the benefit of all,” in which case, “at the instance of a creditor,” whether the resolution be adopted before or after the filing of his petition, a receiver may be appointed. The application for the appointment must, however, be made by petition to the court, verified by the affidavit of the creditor or his attorney, and a copy of the. petition must be served on the corporation, together with the order of court requiring it to show cause, on a day fixed, and the delay allowed must not be less than 10 days, unless, in the judgment of the court,'a shorter delay is required.</p> <p>• [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations,’ Cent. Dig. §§ 2219-2228, 2230-2236; Dec. Dig. §§ 550, 557.*]</p> <p>3. Corporations (§ 557*) — Receivers—Appointment.</p> <p>The effect of appointing a receiver being to take the property of the corporation out of the hands of those to whom the stockholders have intrusted it, the courts proceed with extreme caution in the exercise of that power, and the statutes under which it is exercised are strictly construed, and the methods prescribed required to be strictly followed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2227, 222S, 2230-2236; Dec. Dig. § 557.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>Ernest Sweeney was convicted and sentenced for burglary, and appeals.</p>

Mandamus by the State, on the relation of the Louisiana Trust & Savings Bank against the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt and others. Judgment for relator, and defendants apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Judgment (§ 589*) — Res Judicata — Disbarment Proceedings — Judgment in Criminal Prosecution.</p> <p>In no criminal prosecution could the object or thing demanded have been the same, nor could the demand have been formed between the parties “in the same qualities” as in this case, which is a proceeding for the disbarment of an attorney, in the nature of a civil action, having for its object neither the punishment of the defendant nor the advantage of any particular individual, but the protection of the courts, and of the legal profession, the members of which are officers of the courts; hence no judgment which may have been rendered for or against the defendant in any criminal prosecution could be tere successfully invoked as a basis for the plea of res judicata.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §| 1062-1065, 1100, 1101; Dec. Dig. § 589.*]</p> <p>2.Attorney and Client (§ 51*) — Disbarment Proceedings —Exception oe No Cause op Action.</p> <p>Save as a possible witness, an individual, upon whose charges of misconduct against an attorney at law an action to disbar such attorney is predicated, has nothing to do with the action, and an exception of no cause of action, or no standing in court, léveled at him, is misdirected.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 67; Dec. Dig. § 51.*]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Attorney and Client (§§ 38, 117*) — Disbarment Proceedings — Defense — Probable Cause.</p> <p>The law requires that the funds of a succession administered by an executrix shall be deposited in bank to the credit of her official account, and that they shall not be withdrawn, save under certain conditions; it is therefore unlawful for the attorney of the executrix to retain such funds in his possession or under his control, though he may do so from the best of motives and because he knows his client to be ignorant and irresponsible; and, when he does so, and the executrix employs another attorney, who demands that the funds be surrendered, the refusal of the attorney first employed to surrender them, and his persistence in holding them, may give rise to misconstruction, and establish a probable cause for an imputation of conversion which will protect the attorney by whom it is made from disbarment, on a charge of “recklessly and wantonly attacking the character of a member of the bar in good standing.” [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 51, 61, 232, 234, 235; Dec. Dig. §§ 38, 117.*]</p> <p>4. Attorney and Client (§ 38*)— Disbarment — Grounds.</p> <p>A member of the bar cannot be said to be attempting to undermine and displace another member of the bar, or to be fomenting litigation, because, being employed by a legatee and by an executrix to protect their interests in a succession, he proceeds against the former attorney of the executrix, by rule, to compel him to turn over to her the funds of the succession; and this is true even though such attorney should be holding such funds because of the irresponsible character of the executrix, and for their better security. Such funds may be kept quite safely if deposited in bank, as the law requires, to the credit of the official account of the executrix, since no bank, properly advised, will pay them out, unless the court has authorized them to be withdrawn.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 51, 61; Dec. Dig. § 38*J</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension; Chas. T. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Louis Seals was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. M. L. Cooke against the Gulf Refining Company. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by Harry H. Converse against John Fitzpatrick, State Tax Collector. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and he applies for certiorari on writ of review.

E. Reynolds, Special Judge. Action by D. M. Atkins and another, receivers of the Gibsland State Bank, against the Dixie Fair Company, Limited, and others. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant J. L. Baker appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 680*) — Reception of Evidence — Condition Precedent — Proof of Corpus Delicti.</p> <p>In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, it is not necessary for the state to prove the corpus delicti at the beginning of the trial, and as a condition precedent to the introduction of evidence to connect the party charged with the commission of the crime.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1609, 1610, 1613; Dec. Dig. § 680.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 959*) — New Trial — Discretion.</p> <p>The trial judge may, in his discretion, take into account his belief that false swearing has been resorted to by a convicted defendant in an effort to set aside the verdict and obtain a new trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2406-2411; Dec. Dig. § 959.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 942*) — New Triai^-Impeachíng Evidence.</p> <p>As a rule, the trial judge should -not set aside a conviction and grant a new trial to hear newly discovered impeaching testimony.</p> <p>'[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §g 2316, 2331, 2332; Dec. Dig. g 942.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Mines and Minerals (§ 99*)— Mining Partnerships — Individual Transactions by Partner — Rights of Copartner.</p> <p>Under an agreement between plaintiff and defendant by which plaintiff advanced money to defendant for his expenses in procuring oil leases and options and was to have an equal interest in such leases and options, even though defendant was to give all of his time to such business, this did not prevent him from joining in the organization of a corporation, organized to develop oil property, where this to'ok no part of his time and did not conflict with the partnership business; plaintiff having refused to put any money into any drilling proposition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Miñes and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 223, 224; Dec. Dig. § 99.*]</p> <p>2. Mines and Minerals (§ 99*) — Partnership Agreement — Evidence.</p> <p>Where defendant, whose expenses in procuring oil leases and options were paid by plaintiff under an agreement by which plaintiff was to have an equal interest in such leases and options, accepted employment with an oil company, by which all of his time was to .be given to that company, and plaintiff, when informed thereof, made no demur or suggestion that such employment was in conflict with the existing agreement, the facts showed that the agreement between plaintiff and defendant did not require defendant to give all his time to the business of the partnership.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 223, 224; Dec. Dig. § 99.*]</p> <p>3. Mines and Minerals (§ 99*) — Mining Partnerships — Termination of Relation by Mutual Consent.</p> <p>Where plaintiff advanced money to defendant for expenses in procuring oil leases and options under an agreement by which he was to have an equal interest therein, but it was subsequently agreed that plaintiff need no longer furnish money, this ipso facto terminated the original agreement, and plaintiff had no interest in a corporation which defendant subsequently joined in organizing to develop oil property, even though defendant’s interest in the corporation would have been partnership property if acquired prior to the termination of the partnership agreement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§' 223, 224; Dec. Dig. § 99.*]</p> <p>4. Trial (§ 68*) — Reception of Evidence-Reopening Case for Further Evidence.</p> <p>In an action to dissolve a partnership and to have defendant’s interest in a corporation decreed to belong to the partnership, the court did not ferr, after the case had been tried and continued for argument, in refusing to reopen it to receive alleged newly; discovered evidence touching an interest acquired by defendant for the partnership in a certain oil lease, as, the suit being only for the interest in the corporation, this evidence would merely have served to discredit defendant and his testimony.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-163; Dec. Dig. § 68.*]</p>

<p>-Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>W. Y. Tullos was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>

Edrington, Judge. Action by the State, upon the relation of L. H. Marrero, Jr., District Attorney, against John Ehret and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

McIntosh, Judge. ' Action by Hazel Vivian Abell against Archie A. Abell for separation from bed and board, and defendant, reconvening, prays for like relief. Judgment of nonsuit against both parties, and defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; .Thos. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Alice J. Miller and others against J. Edward Crusel. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Taxation (§ 734*) — Tax Sale — Suittciency oí? Description.</p> <p>Where the description, according to which land has been advertised and sold for taxes, is sufficient “to furnish the means of reasonable identification,” the sale will be sustained, though the number of the township in which the land is located be erroneously stated in such description.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1408, 1470-1473; Dec. Dig. § 734.*]</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Proceedings for forfeiture of bail bond by the State against J. R. Williamson and his surety. From judgment for the State, the surety appeals.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>J. R. Williamson and others were convicted of crime, and they appeal.</p>

F. Brunot, Judge. Mandamus by the State, on the relation of William L. Young, against Paul Capdevielle, Auditor, and others. From judgment for relator, the respondent named appeals.

Halstead, Judge. W. J. Nelson was charged with practicing medicine without a license, and from an order granting a motion to quash the information, the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln; J. B. Holstead, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Williams was convicted of perjury, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. M. W. McQueen and others against the Flasdick-Black Land & Lumber Company, Limited. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>James Duvall was convicted of murder, Dora Murff convicted of manslaughter, and they appeal. Allie Murff was acquitted.</p>

Action by the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad Company against the State Board of Appraisers. The petition of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Crowley for a devolutive appeal from the judgment was refused, and they apply for a writ of mandamus.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; A. M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>John Hill was convicted of robbery, and appeals.</p>

Action by Edgar Landry and others against Michael Poirrier and others. A judgment for defendants was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and the defendant Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank applies for certiorari or writ of review.

K. Skinner, Judge. Suit by Carrie Smith, widow of Julian D. Payne, against I-ienry Frohlich. From a judgment dissolving an injunction sued out by an intervener, the German Savings Bank & Trust Company, tutor of Boder minors, it appeals.

Tammany; J. B. Lancaster, Judge. Action by the New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Company against the State Board of Appraisers and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff .appeals.. The following is a map of the property in question:

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Just (§ 131*) — Examination — Cboss-Ex-AMINATION.</p> <p>Where a proposed juror is asked, on his voir dire, by the state’s attorney, whether, if the state proved its case_, beyond a reasonable doubt, he would bring in a verdict of guilty as charged, the question by defendant’s counsel whether he understood the question that had been asked is legitimate cross-examination, and there is no sufficient reason for excluding it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 561-582; Dec. Dig. § 131.*]</p> <p>2. Witnesses (§ 330*) — Cross-Examination.</p> <p>Where the prosecuting witness, in a murder case, testifies that deceased was a lumberman (skidderman) by profession, and was employed by a particular company, the defendant, on trial for the killing, has the right, with a view of discrediting the witness, to ask him, on cross-examination, whether he did not know that deceased was a professional poker player; and the denial of such right is reversible error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§• 1106-1108; Dec. Dig. § 330.*]</p> <p>3. Witnesses (§ 260*) — Cross-Examination.</p> <p>Where a litigant is surprised by the testimony of his witness, he may interrogate him as to previous declarations, in order to refresh Ms memory; but, if he have reason to believe that his witness will not confirm statements previously made by him, he has no right to call him to the stand, in order, on pretext of refreshing his memory, upon his failure to confirm them, to get such statements before the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 897, 898; Dec. Dig. § 260.*]</p> <p>4. Witnesses (§ 380*) — Impeachment—Previous Statements.</p> <p>Where an adverse witness has been asked whether he did not, at a specified time and place, make a particular statement, to a named person, nothing further is necessary to put him on his guard and lay the foundation for his impeachment; and it is reversible error thereafter to exclude impeaching testimony, on the ground that no foundation has been laid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1210-1219; Dec. Dig. § 380.*]</p> <p>5. Witnesses (§ 262*) — Impeachment — Recalling Witness.</p> <p>It is within the discretion of a trial court to permit a witness to be recalled in order to lay the foundation for his impeachment, and a request to that effect is usually granted, unless so to do would result in too great delay.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 797, 899, 904, 1165; Dec. Dig. § 262.*}</p> <p>6. Witnesses' (§ 355*) — Impeachment — General Reputation.</p> <p>If a witness, called to testify as to the general reputation for veracity of another witness, be instructed as to the difference between such general reputation and his private opinion, and he thereupon testifies that be does not know the general reputation of the witness under consideration, because he has heard it discussed by but two or three persons, his testimony should be excluded; but the question of the exact number and character of discussions that, he must have heard, in order to enable him testify as to the general reputation of such other witness, is one which primarily he is to determine, and the question of the value of the testimony is for the jury. It is not, however, within the province of the judge to instruct a witness that if he has acquired the knowledge, which he says he possesses, of the general reputation of another, living in the same community, of 10,000, from conversations with but two or three persons, he is incompetent to testify to such general reputation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1154-1156; Dec. Dig. § 355.*]</p> <p>7. Witnesses (§ 269*) — Criminal Law — Cross-Examination.</p> <p>The rule that the state, in cross-examining a witness, called by the defendant in a criminal prosecution, must confine itself to matters testified to in the examination in chief does not preclude cross-examination oh other matters, where the purpose is to test the credibility of the witness.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 949-954; Dec. Dig. § 269.*]</p> <p>8. Criminal Law (§ 1092*) — Bill oe Exceptions — Refusal -to Sign — Mandamus to Compel Signing.</p> <p>A bill of exception, which the judge has refused to sign, is no bill, and the remedy is by way of the writ of mandamus to compel the signing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2829, 2834-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. § 1092.*]</p> <p>9. Criminal Law (§ 829*) — Instructions.</p> <p>Where the general charge to the jury covers the law of the case, special charges cannot be required.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; D'ec. Dig! § 829.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Records (§ 6*)— Registration of Patents —Necessity.</p> <p>■ It is not necessary that a state patent be recorded in the conveyance records of the parish in which the property conveyed is situated, in order to give public notice of the issuance of the patent. The registry of the patent in the state land office is sufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Records, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. § 6.*]</p> <p>2. Dedication (§ 19*) — What Constitutes— Proof — Streets.</p> <p>The fact that a plan made by a survey- or shows that certain property is intersected by streets is not sufficient proof of a dedication to the public use, especially in the absence of any showing that the property was so used with the assent of the owner or that he consented to the laying out of the streets..</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Dedication, Cent. Dig. §§ 35, 37-47; Dec. Dig. § 19.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermilion; W. P. Edwards, Judge.,</p> <p>Action by the Board of Commissioners, Seventh Ward Drainage District, against the Bank of Abbeville. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Martin; James Simon, Judge. L. C. Vauthier was indicted for unlawfully harboring a dog, and from a judgment of not guilty, the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 46*) — Licenses —What Constitutes Intoxicants — “Malt Liquor” — “Alcoholic Liquor.”</p> <p>Near beer, containing less than 2 per cent, of alcohol, is not a malt or alcoholic liquor, within Const, art. 229, prohibiting any political corporation from imposing a greater license tax than imposed by the General Assembly for state purposes, save in the case of dealers in alcoholic or malt liquors, and hence a municipal corporation cannot impose a license tax for the’ selling of near beer in an amount greater than that imposed by the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 48; Dec. Dig. § 46.*</p> <p>Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4314, 4315; vol. 4, pp. 3736-3746; vol. 8, p. 7692.]</p> <p>-2. Municipal Corporations (§ 96*)— Licenses— Ordinances — Enactment.</p> <p>As Act No. 136 of 1898, § 33, under which the city of Marthaville was incorporated, required the corporate powers of the town council to be exercised by ordinance adopted by yea and nay votes entered upon the minutes, a license tax for the sale of near beer cannot be imposed by a resolution adopted by a viva voce vote.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 206; Dec. Dig. § 96.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Municipal Corporations (§ 29*) — Extension of Limits — Taxation.</p> <p>The fact that the police jury has issued bonds to pay the cost of a model highway from one city or town to another city or town in the parish, and has dedicated a portion of the annual revenues of the parish to pay the bonds, does not prevent such city or town from extending its corporate limits, as provided by section 3 of the Act No. 136 of 1898, so as to include a portion of the model highway and to subject to municipal taxation, and relieve from parochial taxation, the property situated between the original and extended corporate limits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 66-75; Dec. Dig.'§ 29.*].</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Grand Jury (§ 8*) — .Jury—Jury Commissioner-Selection of Jurors.</p> <p>The office of jury commissioner is ipso facto vacated when the incumbent accepts another office, state, parish, or municipal; and the subsequent selections, by the members of the commission and the clerk, with the participation of the person who has thus ceased to be a commissioner, of persons to serve as jurors, are illegal, and vest in the persons selected no authority to sit, as jurors, in judgment upon questions involving the lives, liberty, and property of others.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Grand Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 16-20; Deo. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>2. Grand Jury (§ 8*) — Selection of Jurors —“Irregularity.”</p> <p>Where a person who has ceased to be a jury commissioner has nevertheless participated in the selection of persons to serve as jurors and in the placing of names on the general venire list and in the general venire box, and thereafter, upon the appointment of his successor, the jury commission, as thus completed, takes no action whatever in regard to such names, but merely leaves them as it finds.them, and supplements the list and box by the addition of the names of persons to take the places of those who have served, died, removed from the parish, or become otherwise disqualified, a grand jury, constituted in part of persons whose names were thus left and found, is illegally constituted, and an indictment brought in by it should be quashed on motion; the cause of complaint not being an “irregularity,” within the meaning of section 15 of Act No. 135 of 1898, but being a jurisdictional matter affecting the legal composition, existence, and power of the tribunal before which the complainant is prosecuted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Grand Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 16-20; Dee. Dig. § 8.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3768-3771; vol. 8, p. 7693.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Alibe Lewis was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Application by I. H. Teat for writs of mandamus and prohibition to John R. Land, Judge of the First Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Caddo.</p>

Théard, Judge. Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank and another caused executory process to issue against James B. Sinnott. An injunction obtained by the third opponents, J. B. Sinnott, Jr., and another, arresting the sale, was dissolved, and the third opponents appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 742*)— Evidence — Probative Effect — Question for Jury.</p> <p>The ability of a witness to remember an act about which he is testifying' is a matter exclusively within the province of the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1098, 1138,1719-1721; Dec. Dig. § 742.*)</p> <p>2. Witnesses (§§ 379, 389*) — Impeachment— Contradictory Statements.</p> <p>Statements made by a witness may be introduced for the purpose of impeaching said witness. But where the witness admits on direct and cross-examination that she made such statements, and asserts that they are false, there is nothing to impeach, and her statements are properly excluded when offered in evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1209,1220-1222, 1243-1245, 1247-1256; Dec. Dig. §§ 379, 389.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law (§ 814*) — Instructions— Evidence.</p> <p>Special charges requested by the defense are properly refused, when they are not applicable to the facts disclosed on the trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1821, 1833, 1839, 1860,1865, 1883, 1890, 1924, 1979-1985, 1987; Dee. Dig. § 814.*]</p> <p>4. Rape (§ 6*) — Proof—Necessity.</p> <p>Under an indictment charging the accused with willfully, maliciously, and feloniously assaulting and ravishing a female against her will, it is not necessary to prove that the accused used force, where the evidence shows that the female is a child under twelve years of age, and that she was persuaded by the accused, who assaulted and ravished her. The assault was against her will, as she was not able to consent thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Rape, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 6.*]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law (§§ 938, 1124*) — New Trial —Appeai^-Cumulative Evidence.</p> <p>A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly refused when such evidence is merely cumulative and would not change the result. And where the evidence is not in the record, the Supreme Court cannot review the ruling- of the trial judge as to whether it is cumulative or not.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2306-2315, 2317, 2939, 2946-2948; Dec. Dig. §§ 938, 1124.*]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law (§ 942*) — New TriauNewly Discovered Evidence.</p> <p>Where the avowed object of newly discovered evidence is to discredit a prosecuting witness, the general rule is a new trial will not be granted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2316, 2331, 2332; Dec. Dig. § 942.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Ceetiobaei (§ 42*) — -Weit of Review — 'Verification of Application.</p> <p>An application for a writ of review, under article 101 of the Constitution and Act No. 191 of 1S98, must be verified by the oath of the applicant, or his attorney, if the applicant be absent from the parish, or is incapable of making the affidavit. Where the applicant is shown to' reside in the parish where the court to which the application is to be presented holds its sessions, and is not shown to be absent, or incapable of making such affidavit, an affidavit by his attorney, made in a distant parish, does not meet the legal requirements, and the order for a writ of review, improvidently granted, will be rescinded and the writ recalled.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Certiorari, Cent. Dig. §§ 64-73, 75-79, 81-S4, 87; Dec. Dig. § 42.*]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Action by Louis G. Laiche and others against Camille Martin and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Harry W. Bull against the Hotel Grünewald Company, Limited, for personal injuries. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>1. Injunction (§ IDO — Expropriation—Enjoining Exercise of Right.</p> <p>Whore a railroad company had made no attempt and had expressed no intention of making any attempt to expropriate land, the landowner could not maintain an action to have it judicially determined that the railroad company had no right to exercise the powef of expropriation and to enjoin it from exercising such power.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 9-11; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]</p> <p>2. Injunction (§ 11*) — Grounds — Moot Question.</p> <p>In an injunction suit brought before a railroad company had sought to exercise the riaht of expropriation, whether it had such right could not be determined, even with the consent of the railroad comjJany, as the courts do not sit to pass upon moot questions, or to give advice to the litigants.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 9-11; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]</p>

<p>Disbarment proceedings by the State against John D. Nix, Jr., and others.</p>

The application of Mrs. Josephine Boyle to be appointed administratrix of the succession of Catherine Housknecht was opposed by Edward Boyle and others. Erom a dismissal of their opposition and of their rule to turn over moneys to the succession, opponents appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Petitory action by the City of New Orleans and others against the Salmen Brick & Lumber Company and II. O. Stark, administrator of the succession of T. O. Stark. Union Lumber Company intervenes. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs and intervener appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Drains (§ 75*) — Drainage Districts — Authorization or Levy — Qualiried Voters.</p> <p>Under article 281 of the Constitution of 1898 as amended (see Act No. 197 of 1910), the question of levying acreage taxes in a drainage district was properly left to the vote of all the taxpayers of the district. The contention that the question should have been left to the vote of the landowners alone is in the teeth of the plain text of the article.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. § 72; Dec. Dig. § 75.*]</p> <p>2. Drains (§ 75*) — Drainage Districts — Authorization or Levy — Qualified Voters.</p> <p>In elections under article 281 of the Constitution women taxpayers who are not residents of the district have no right to vote.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. § 72; Dec. Dig. § 75.*]</p> <p>3. Elections (§ 71*) — Qualifications or V oters — Residence.</p> <p>Under the Constitution of 1898, actual bona fide residence in the precinct where the election is held is required of all voters.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. §§ 67-74; Dec. Dig. § 71.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Quieting Title (§ 19*) — Statutory Proceedings — Recorded Title.</p> <p>In an action by two cities, to whom an unoccupied tract of land had been devised, against a grantee of a portion of tbe tract from one of them, to determine the ownership of land claimed by the grantee to be included within his grant, both parties claim by recorded title, although the notarial acts by which each recognized the other as an owner of an untitled one-half interest in the disputed tract were void, because executed without authority, and although the cities claim that the conveyance to defendant did not include the land in controversy, and therefore the action is one under Act No. 38 of 1908, providing that where two or more parties claim land by recorded title, and neither is in actual possession thereof, either may bring an action to establish the title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Quieting Title, Cent. Dig. § 48; Dec. Dig. § 19.*]</p> <p>2. Deeds (§ 114*) — Construction—Description — Reference to Government Survey.</p> <p>Where a conveyance by a city, to whom a certain tract of vacant land had been devised, described the property conveyed as a tract belonging lately to the testator, but now to the city, situated in certain townships in range 5, said land having been recently adjudicated £o the city by the Department of the Interior, and after the conveyance the city had exercised no dominion over any of the devised land, and had not included it in reports of property .owned by that fund, the intention was to convey the entire tract, and a small portion thereof which was located in range 6 passed by the conveyance, since the error in reference to the government survey is immaterial, where the description is otherwise sufficient to identify the land.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 316-322, 326-329, 388; Dec. Dig. § 114.*]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error (§ 172*) — Review — Theory of the Case.</p> <p>On an appeal in an action to determine the title to certain land, which defendant claimed was embraced in the conveyance made to him by plaintiff, where plaintiff did not contend that the conveyance was a nullity, but that it did not convey the land in controversy, a contention raised by the supplemental brief of plaintiff that the city did not have power to convey will not be considered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1070-1078; Dec. Dig. § 172.*]</p>

Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Expropriation proceedings by the Town of Eunice against the Louisiana Western Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. The following is a copy of the plat referred to in the opinion:

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law (§ 261*) — Indictment — Amendment — Rearraignment.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. § 1047, authorizing a change of name of the person killed in an indictment for murder, and providing that after such amendment the trial shall proceed in the same manner as if no such variance had occurred or amendment been made, where an indictment for murder is amended so as to change the name of the person alleged to have been killed, a failure to rearraign accused is not a fatal defect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 612, 613; Dec. Dig. § 261.*]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law (§ 1092*) — Bill oe Exceptions — Reservation of Bill.</p> <p>A mere reserving of a bill of exceptions to the court’s denial of a motion for a new trial on the minutes does not relieve accused of the necessity of writing out the bill and having it signed, and, in the absence thereof, the order will not be reviewed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2829, 2834-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. § 1092.*]</p> <p>3. Criminal, Law (§ 918*) — New Trial-Grounds — Absence of Leading Counsel. ■</p> <p>That leading counsel for,accused was not present in court when additional instructions were given was not ground for a new trial, especially in the absence of any showing that a request was made to the court to postpone the giving of the instructions until leading counsel could be called; the grade or rank of counsel of record in a criminal case not being a matter of which the court can take cognizance, at least in the absence of timely objection or request.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2163-2192, 2195, 2196, 2219-2224; Dee. Dig. § 918.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Mandamus by John W. Monroe and others against the Colored Screwmen’s Benevolent Association No. 1 of Louisiana. Judgment for the respondents, and the relators appeal.</p>

B. Holstead, Judge. Suit by the Union Ice & Coal Company against the Town of Ruston, to. annul an ordinance providing for the purchase, installation, and operation of a municipal ice plant. From a .judgment denying such relief, complainant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Taxation (§ 710*) — Sale—Redemption-Sufficiency of Tendee.'</p> <p>A deposit with the sheriff of money to redeem land from a tax sale was insufficient to effect a redemption.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1436, 1437; Dec. Dig. § 710.*]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Ereor (§ 173*) — Scope of Review-Matters not in Issue Below.</p> <p>On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in a suit to confirm a tax title, grounds of nullity of the tax sale, which were not put in issue below, could not be considered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1079-1089, 1091-1093, 1095-1098, 1101-1120; Dee. Dig. § 173.*]</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by J. B. Levert against the Shirley Planting Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the stockholders of the company personally appealed.

Action by John T. Michel, as Secretary of State, against the Southern Insurance Company. From a judgment awarding the proceeds of a fire insurance policy to James E. Alexander and another, B. M. McMahan appeals.

Action by W. H. Festivan and others against O. P. Clement and others. A judgment for plaintiffs in the district court was reversed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the suit dismissed; and plaintiffs apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. P. Elder against the Sun Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals: Cause transferred to the Court of Appeals for the Parish of -Caddo.</p>

The prosecution of Arnold J. Loyacano for desertion and nonsupport of his wife was stayed, during the pendency of a suit to annul the marriage, and Chandler C. Luzenberg, District Attorney, applies for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermillion; W. P. Edwards, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the People’s Bank & Trust Company against the Fenwick Sanitarium, Limited, wherein Conrad ICoeniger and others intervened. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Commerce (§ 8*)— Power to Regulate— Employers’' Liability Act — Effect of State Law.</p> <p>It is settled jurisprudence that the act of. Congress known as the Employers’ Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, as amended by Act April 5, 1910, e. 143, 36 Stat.' 291 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, §§ 8657-8665]), supersedes the laws of the several states so far as the latter cover the same field; and that any state laws which impose upon a carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce a liability, in damages, to “any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employs, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employs, and, if none, then, * * * ” cover the same field as said Employers’ Liability Act, and are therefore superseded by it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dee. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>2. Death (§ 31*) — Action under Federal Employers’ Liability Act — Parties—“Personal Representative.”</p> <p>It is settled jurisprudence that, though, in the event of the death of the employé, under the conditions contemplated by the federal Employers’ Liability Act, the claim for damages may, of right, be prosecuted in a state, as well as a federal, court, it must be prosecuted by the “personal representative” of the decedent — meaning the executor or administrator — and can be prosecuted by no one else, not even by the sole beneficiary, save in the capacity of personal representative.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. .Dig. §§ 35, 37-46, 48; Dec. Dig. § 31.*</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Personal Representative.]</p> <p>3. Death (§ 31*) — Right to Recover — Election of Remedies.</p> <p>This is an action brought by a widow, as such, and as tutrix of minor children, for the recovery of damages resulting from the death of the husband and father, through the alleged negligence of defendant. The petition sets forth a case falling under the federal Employers’ Liability Act; but plaintiffs, at the inception of the trial, upon being called on, elected to proceed under the state law. Defendant interposed no exception to the capacity of the widow and tutrix to prosecute the suit, but, on the propounding of the first question to the first witness, objected to “any evidence on the part of plaintiffs,” on the ground that the state law had been superseded by the federal law, which objection having been overruled, defendant excepted, and reserved a bill; but the objection was not at any time renewed, though the trial proceeded, and a number of witnesses, called by both litigants, subsequently testified as to the existence vel non of the facts essential, under either law, to .a recovery; the result being a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, from which defendant prosecutes the appeal.</p> <p>Held, that the verdict and judgment must be set aside, for plaintiffs are obliged to show the law entitling them to recover, and as the state law under which they elected to proceed has been superseded, and the federal law, by which it was superseded, confers no such right upon them, they have failed to discharge that obligation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 35, 37 — 46, 48; Dec. Dig. § 31.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Receivers (§ 198*) — Compensation—Corporations.</p> <p>The compensation of a receiver who has been authorized to conduct the business of the corporation as a going concern must be fixed by the court at such reasonable sum as the nature of the case justifies. The compensation of a receiver who has not been authorized to conduct the business of the corporation as a going concern is fixed by section 1818, Rev. St., the same as the compensation of a syndic of an insolvent estate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receivers. Cent. Dig. §§ 392-396; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]</p> <p>2. Receivers (§ 145*) — Liability for Fees— Proceeds of Sale of Mortgaged Property.</p> <p>When a mortgage creditor of a corporation permits a receiver to administer and sell the mortgaged property under the orders of court in a receivership proceeding, the proceeds of the sale must bear their proportionate share of the fees of the receiver and his attorney.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receivers, Dec. Dig. § 145.*]</p>

Action by J. K. Saucier against F. M. Saucier. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts (§ 224*) — Appellate Jurisdiction— -Amount Involved.</p> <p>Where, in a suit for less than $2,000, a judgment for au amount exceeding $2,000 has been sequestered and released on a bond for less than $2,000, there is no fund to be distributed, and the amount in dispute is below the jurisdiction of this court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. § 224.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation (§ 809*) — Quieting Tax Title-Deed Exhibited.</p> <p>Where a plaintiff, in a suit brought under Act No. 101 of 1898, seeks to confirm title to a lot in one square by exhibiting an auditor’s deed to a lot, of different dimensions and differently situated, in another square, the confirmation is properly denied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1385, 1600-1604; Dec. Dig. § 809.*]</p> <p>2. Names (§ 16*) — Idem Sonans.</p> <p>Title will not be confirmed against John Buhler, when John Butler is cited, through a curator ad hoc, as the former owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Names, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 12-14; Dec. Dig. § 16.*]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Elizabeth Smith against the City of New Orleans. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Petitory action by Jay. Vestal against the Producers’ Oil Company and others. A judgment for defendants in the district court was reversed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Mary Lewis Elder against Clarence Ellerbe and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Negligence (§ 93*) — Imputed Negligence —Collision on Street.</p> <p>Where a person is riding in a vehicle, driven by another, but of which, and of the driver of which, he has entire control, the negligence and inexperience of the driver are imputable to him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 147-150; Dec. Dig. § 93.*]</p> <p>2. Street Railroads (§§ 9S, 99*) — Railroads —Collision—Liability.</p> <p>The recognized rule is that, before attempting to cross a railroad track, a person should stop, look, and listen, and, where it appears that a police patrol wagon was driven, at a brisk speed and without stopping, from one narrow street into another narrow' and intersecting street, upon a railroad track, on which the driver might have expected to see, and did see, an electrically propelled car approaching; and it further appears that, notwithstanding that the motorman in charge of the car did all that could be done to avert it, there was a collision, in which the officer in charge of the wagon was injured, there can he no recovery from the owner of the car on account of such injury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 204-208, 209-216; Dec. Dig. §§ 98, 99.*]</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Succession of Jean Serres. John B. Hall’s application to be qualified as executor, being opposed by the widow and heirs, was refused, and he prosecutes a suspensive appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the People’s Bank against the De Soto Hardware Company. From an order appointing a receiver, the Shreveport Saddlery Company, Limited, a creditor of defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Benjamin Rice Forman against the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. From judgment for defendant, the executor of plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Insurance Company of Phoenix, Ariz., against Hampden Reynolds and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Guardian and Ward (§ 49*) — Compensation of Attorney.</p> <p>Where a tutrix, acting on behalf of her ward, employs an attorney, without the advice of a family meeting, upon a contingent fee which exceeds the revenue of the minor, actual or prospective, the contract being unauthorized by law, the claim of such attorney for compensation rests, not upon the contract, but upon the equitable principle that no one can enrich himself at the expense of another, and that a minor 'may ex aequo et bono be held liable, within certain limits, for benefits actually received. The principie thus mentioned does not, however, cover the case of an attorney who, having contrived an unlawful scheme to the prejudice of another, claims compensation for the undoing of his own ■ work.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. § 227; Dee. Dig. § 49.*]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1.Judgment (§ 461*)— Real Actions (§ v8*) —Action to Annul Judgment — Burden of Proof — Petitory Action.</p> <p>In an action to annul a judgment, cumulated with a petitory action, the burden rests upon plaintiff to allege and prove the matters relied on as causes of nullity, and to show a better title than that under which the defendant claims and holds possession.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 892, 893, 895; Dec. Dig. § 461;* Real Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 26-35; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]</p> <p>2. Evidence (§ 82*) — Execution (§ 319*)— Sheriff’s Deed — Judicial Proceedings— Presumption.</p> <p>Judicial proceedings are presumed to have been regular until the contrary is shown; and a sheriff’s deed constitutes prima facie evidence and full proof, until rebutted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 104; Dec. Dig. § 82;* Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 935-939; Dec. Dig. § 319.*]</p> <p>3. Execution (§ 317*) — Sheriff’s Deed — Effect as Evidence — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Where a sheriff’s deed recites that he made the sale evidenced thereby under a judgment and fi. fa., plaintiff, who attacks the title of the adjudicatee upon the ground that no fi. fa. was issued, or that it did not authorize the sale, must so allege and prove, though it involves the allegation and proof of a negative proposition; otherwise, the deed will be accepted as full proof of what it contains.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. § 934; Dec. Dig. § 317.*]</p> <p>4. Execution (p 245, 256*) — Limitation of Actions (§ 19*) — Action to Annul Sheriff’s Sale — Burden of Proof — Estoppel— Prescription.</p> <p>A corporation acquired a body of land, subject to a mortgage upon an undivided half interest therein, to secure the purchase price, due by those who created it and who owned nearly all, if not all, of its stock, and thereafter for a consideration imposed an independent mortgage upon the entire tract to secure the same debt. At the maturity of the debt it allowed judgment to be rendered, upon issue joined by default, recognizing both mortgages, and ordering the enforcement of the rights of the mortgagee by sale of the property. Being present in the parish, and through its president (owner of two-thirds of its stock) present at the sale, it suffered the sale to be made without objection, and the mortgagee, as adjudicatee, to be put in possession and so remain for more than five years, within which period the original debtors, being its principal stockholders, ratified the sale as made, settled with the seizing creditor, and obtained full discharge quoad the personal judgment rendered against them. After the expiration of the five years, the corporation, of which one of the said original debtors appears still to be the president, owning or controlling the larger proportion of the stock, brings suit to annul the judgment so rendered and the sale so made, with respect to one 'undivided half interest in the property, upon the grounds “that petitioner was never legally served with a legal citation by an officer authorized by law to serve process,” and that the “sheriff, in executing said deed and in conducting the proceeding upon which said deed was based, did so without any authority whatever, in so far as petitioner’s said interest in said property is concerned.” Held: (1) That the burden rests on plaintiff to prove the alleged illegality in the citation, or in the service thereof, and the alleged want of authority in the sheriff; and, until such proof is made, the judgment is accepted as having been properly rendered, and the sheriff’s deed and the proceedings leading thereto as having been properly authorized. (2) That the plaintiff corporation, having been present in the parish when the sale was made, and present, through its president, at the sale, and having interposed no objection thereto, has no standing to attack said sale. (3) That the action of nullity, not having been brought within uve years, is barred by prescription.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 681-686, 723-733; Dec. Dig. §§ 245, 256;* Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 73-S5; Dec. Dig. § 19.*].</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Title and Subject-Mattee oe Statutes —Kidnapping.</p> <p>Act No. 271 of 1910, relative to the crime of kidnapping, is unconstitutional, because its purpose to amend and re-enact Act No. 86 of 190S is not expressed in its title, and because it amends section 806 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, relative to the kidnapping of children of tender age, without mention of such a purpose either in the body or title of the act.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>2. Statutes (§§ 118, 135*) — Title and Subject-Matter — Amendment.</p> <p>Under the provisions of article 32 of the Constitution of Louisiana, the Legislature may amend a repealed statute by the same act in which the repealed law is revived and re-enacted, provided the object of the amending and reenacting statute be expressed in its tide.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-160, 202, 203; Dec. Dig. §§ 118, 135.*]</p> <p>3. Witnesses (§ 331%*), — Cross-Examination of Accused.</p> <p>As the issues in a criminal trial must be confined within reasonable bounds, the state’s attorney has no right to cross-examine the defendant on irrelevant matters, for the purpose of impeaching him or contradicting his testimony as to such immaterial facts. But this rule does not forbid the prosecuting attorney to introduce evidence to contradict the testimony given by the defendant voluntarily upon any issue which he has brought into the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Dec. Dig. § 331%.*]</p> <p>4. Witnesses (§ 267*) — Cross-Examination —Limitation. •</p> <p>It is the right and duty of the district judge to put some limit upon a defendant’s right of cross-examination of the state’s witnesses in a criminal trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 923-930; Dec. Dig. § 267.*]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law (§§ 59, 792*) — Indictment and Information (§ 174*) — “Principal”— Instructions — Variance.</p> <p>One who is indicted as a principal cannot be legally convicted as an accessory before the fact. Persons who are not actually or constructively present at the commission of a crime are not principals. Therefore it is an error for the district judge to instruct the jury that all persons aiding or abetting the commission of a crime are principals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 71, 73, 74, 76-81, 1818-1820; Dee. Dig. §§ 59, 792;* Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 540-543; Dec. Dig. § 174.*]</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Principal.]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law (§ 854*) — Jury—Deliberations in Capital Case — Separation.</p> <p>To take the jurors from the courthouse to a hotel and lodge them in six separate rooms all night, two in each room, while the deputy sheriff sleeps in the hall, is not a compliance with the requirement of the law that the jurors must not be separated at any time during the trial of a capital case, or after the judge has delivered his charge in any criminal trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other' cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2039-2047; Dec. Dig. § 854.*]</p> <p>Land, X, dissenting.</p>