Case: 24-60215 Document: 88-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-60215 April 18, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
W. Blake Vanderlan, Medical Doctor, Relator, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Jackson HMA, L.L.C., doing business as Central Mississippi
Medical Center, also known as Merit Health Central -
Jackson,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:15-CV-767
______________________________
Before Wiener, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
Not every fight is ours to finish. This case concerns power—who
holds it and how it is exercised. Under the False Claims Act (the “FCA”),
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Congress deputized private individuals—relators—to aid in the fight against
fraud. The government, however, retains the right to commandeer a relator’s
case and, if it so chooses, dismiss it. That is what happened here. And the
district court found no reason to stand in its way.
Dr. Blake Vanderlan, the relator in this case, insisted that he was owed
an evidentiary hearing. The district court disagreed, relying on United States
ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023), where
the Supreme Court confirmed the government’s broad discretion to dismiss
qui tam actions. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment.
I.
A.
In 1863, congressional investigations exposed rampant fraud in
military contracting. War profiteers billed the federal government for
phantom goods, overcharged for supplies, and exploited wartime
procurement. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958)
(explaining that congressional testimony “painted a sordid picture of how the
United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged
exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the
necessities of war”). Congress responded with the FCA to stop the plunder
and “protect the funds and property of the [g]overnment.” Rainwater v.
United States,
356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958). That statute empowers relators to
enforce its terms by suing “for the person and for the United States
Government.”
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). Such suits were a staple of early
American law. See Adams v. Woods,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805) (noting
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that “[a]lmost every” penal statute could have been enforced this way). 1
They are known as qui tam actions, named for the Latin phrase meaning
“who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Qui Tam Action,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
The injury, a relator asserts in a qui tam action, belongs exclusively to
the government. Polansky, 599 U.S. at 425 (internal citation omitted). The
government, moreover, is the “real party in interest” in a qui tam suit. United
States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York,
556 U.S. 928, 930 (2009). A qui
tam suit alleges both an injury to the government’s “sovereignty arising from
violation of its laws” and an injury to its “proprietary [interest] resulting
from [an] alleged fraud.” Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). A relator more or less acts as the
“statutorily designated agent of the United States . . . and [] the relator’s
bounty is simply the fee he receives out of the United States’ recovery for filing
and/or prosecuting a successful action on behalf of the [g]overnment.”
Id. at
772 (emphasis in original); see also § 3730(d) (declaring that if successful, a
relator receives a bounty, but the government takes the larger share).
The statutory framework confirms the government’s control over qui
tam litigation. Under § 3730(c)(1), when the government proceeds with the
action, it “shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action”
and is “not [] bound by an act of the [relator].” The relator may continue as
a party—filing motions and conducting discovery—but only “subject to the
limitations set forth in [§ 3730(c)(2)].” § 3730(c)(1).
_____________________
1
Senator Jacob M. Howard, the senator from Michigan who introduced the bill,
explained that the qui tam provision was based on the “old-fashioned idea of holding out a
temptation . . . which is the safest and most expeditious way ever discovered of bringing
rogues to justice.” Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956 (Feb 14, 1863).
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Section 3730(c)(2) defines those limitations. Subsection (c)(2)(A)
gives the government the right to dismiss the action over the relator’s
objection after notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Subsection (c)(2)(B)
allows the government to settle the case, despite the relator’s objections, so
long as the court finds the settlement fair and reasonable. Subsections
(c)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(D) further restrict the relator’s participation if it
interferes with the government’s case or imposes an undue burden on the
defendant. Section 3730(c)(4) applies “[w]hether or not the Government
proceeds.” It allows the government to stay discovery if it would interfere
with a related investigation or prosecution. In sum, the statutory scheme
evinces that the government retains ultimate authority over qui tam litigation.
B.
Vanderlan, a physician at a hospital operated by Jackson HMA, LLC
(“Jackson HMA”) alleged that the hospital systematically violated the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”). He reported
these violations to the Department of Health and Human Services,
prompting an investigation by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”). CMS confirmed that Jackson HMA had violated
EMTALA, citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 489.20 and 489.24, and referred the matter
to the Office of Inspector General (the “OIG”) to assess potential civil
monetary penalties. CMS also notified Vanderlan of the violation with a
form letter that suggested he consider EMTALA’s civil enforcement
provisions. EMTALA, however, authorizes private civil actions only for
personal injury or financial losses suffered by other medical facilities. 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)–(B).
The OIG and Jackson HMA engaged in settlement discussions over
potential civil monetary penalties. No penalties were imposed, no settlement
was reached, and administrative enforcement proceedings were stayed
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pending this litigation. The government informed Vanderlan that any
potential settlement with Jackson HMA would be narrow in scope.
Vanderlan sued Jackson HMA, alleging five FCA violations,
including a retaliation claim under § 3130(h). He sought injunctive relief to
block any settlement between Jackson HMA and the government. The
government investigated his qui tam claims and declined to intervene.
The case dragged on for six and a half years. After unsealing the case,
Vanderlan moved to involuntarily join the United States as a party and sought
a preliminary injunction against settlement. He later withdrew the joinder
motion, and the district court denied his injunction request. He then moved
for partial summary judgment, leading to extended discovery, which he
reopened at least five times. During these proceedings, the district court
severed Vanderlan’s retaliation claims.
The government eventually moved to dismiss the qui tam claims with
prejudice as they related to Vanderlan but without prejudice as to itself. In
support of its motion to dismiss, the government offered several exhibits,
including Vanderlan’s and Jackson HMA’s initial disclosures and a
September 27, 2018 letter from counsel for Jackson HMA, Jack Selden (the
“Selden Letter”). The government cited the Selden Letter as support for its
position that Jackson HMA was hesitant to settle the administrative
EMTALA investigation with the OIG while the qui tam suit was still
pending because an administrative settlement could disadvantage Jackson
HMA in the qui tam litigation.
The government argued that Vanderlan’s suit would interfere with
administrative settlement negotiations and lacked merit. The district court
granted dismissal based on written filings but did not specify whether it did
so with or without prejudice. After reconsidering in light of intervening
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precedent, the court reaffirmed its decision post-hearing but again failed to
specify the nature of the dismissal. The court entered a separate Rule 58
judgment, which similarly omitted any mention of prejudice. Vanderlan then
appealed.
II.
We review a motion for voluntary dismissal for an abuse of discretion.
See Hyde v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2007); see
also Polansky, Inc.,
599 U.S. at 438 (noting that a “district court’s Rule 41
order is generally reviewable under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” but
declining to decide a standard of review). We review de novo the district
court’s statutory interpretation of the FCA. See United States v. Eli Lilly &
Co., Inc.,
4 F.4th 255, 264 (5th Cir. 2021); Dresser v. Meba Med. & Benefits
Plan,
628 F.3d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 2010).
III.
Several issues are raised on appeal. In turn, we address (A) whether
we have appellate jurisdiction, (B) whether the district court erred in denying
Vanderlan an evidentiary hearing, (C) whether the district court had
discretion in denying or granting the government’s § 3730(c)(2)(A) motion,
and (D) whether the district court appropriately applied the standard for
dismissing, rather than for approving settlement of, a qui tam action.
A.
In Polansky, the Supreme Court held that district courts must apply
the legal standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 when ruling on a
§ 3730(c)(2)(A) motion. See 599 U.S. at 437. But the Court did not address
how these standards affect appellate jurisdiction. The parties here do not
exactly raise the issue, either. To ensure ourselves of our jurisdiction, we take
it up sua sponte. See Ashley v. Clay Cnty.,
125 F.4th 654, 659 (5th Cir. 2025).
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“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,
the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. 506, 514
(1868)). Without jurisdiction, we “cannot proceed at all in any cause.”
Id.
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)). We
have jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision “ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute judgment.” Cunningham
v. Hamilton Cnty.,
527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard,
486 U.S. 517, 521–22 (1988)).
A voluntary dismissal may change our jurisdictional analysis. Under
Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff may dismiss an action “without a court order” by
filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an answer or a
motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Such dismissals
are presumed to be without prejudice unless the notice states otherwise. Id.
“[T]here is no final decision if a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a defendant
without prejudice, because the plaintiff ‘is entitled to bring a later suit on the
same cause of action.’” Williams v. Seidenbach,
958 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir.
2020) (en banc) (quoting Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
577 F.2d 298,
302 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also CBX Res., LLC v. ACE Am. Ins. Co.,
959 F.3d
175, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that because the plaintiff dismissed its
claims without prejudice and those claims were not resolved on the merits, it
was “entitled to bring a later suit on the same cause of action,” and thus,
“there [was] not yet a final appealable judgment” (quoting Ryan, 577 F.3d at
302 and then citing Marshall v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co.,
378 F.3d 495, 500 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
Here, Vanderlan suggests that the district court acted under Rule
41(a)(2). But the government’s voluntary dismissal falls under Rule 41(a)(1),
as it moved to dismiss before Jackson HMA answered or sought summary
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judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). In its § 3730(c)(2)(A) motion, the
government moved to dismiss the claims with prejudice as to Vanderlan but
without prejudice as to itself. 2 Because under Rule 41(a)(1), we look to the
government’s notice of dismissal to determine finality, we conclude that the
dismissal was with prejudice as to Vanderlan. See id. That resolves the
jurisdictional question. The dismissal was final, and we have appellate
jurisdiction under § 1291.
B.
Having ensured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we now address whether
the district court erred in denying Vanderlan an evidentiary hearing.
Vanderlan argues that the FCA requires an evidentiary hearing when the
government seeks voluntary dismissal of a relator’s claim. In his view, the
district court lacked discretion to interpret the Selden Letter without first
holding such a hearing. He says that the government must offer “something
more” before terminating the action. He next argues that Rule 41(a)(2)
affords him procedural protections such as an evidentiary hearing. For his
due process theory, he asserts that the government conceded a relator’s
property interest in qui tam litigation and, by extension, acknowledged that
any motion to dismiss must satisfy a “constitutional baseline.” Vanderlan
_____________________
2
Even under the presumption for silent district court orders or the government’s
motion, the dismissal was without prejudice as to the government. Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(B), (2). But because the statute of limitations has run, it is effectively with
prejudice for jurisdictional purposes. See Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 452 F.3d 415,
417 (5th Cir. 2006). Though we have not explicitly held that a time-barred withoutprejudice dismissal qualifies as final, our unpublished decisions and an en banc concurrence
have recognized as much. See McGrew v. McQueen,
415 F. App’x 592, 594 (5th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished); Williams v. Seidenbach,
958 F.3d 341, 359 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, J.,
concurring). The rule holds unless the parties collusively agree to waive the statute of
limitations upon appeal. No such agreement exists here. See In re Mun. Stormwater Pond
Coordinated Litig.,
73 F.4th 975, 979–81 (8th Cir. 2023) (holding that collusive waiver
destroys appellate jurisdiction).
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frames his due process theory through the lens of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976), contending that each factor supports his demand for
an evidentiary hearing. We reject his arguments.
Courts of appeals, since Polansky, have routinely read subparagraph
(c)(2)(A) in the same way: “hearing” only requires a hearing on the briefs.
See United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG, 117 F.4th 155, 162 (4th Cir.
2024); Brutus Trading, LLC v. Standard Chartered Bank, No. 20-2578,
2023
WL 5344973, at *2–3 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) (unpublished). When Congress
wants a live hearing, it says so. See, e.g., United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co.,
410 U.S. 224, 239 (1973) (explaining that agencies may conduct “hearings”
through written submissions unless Congress expressly requires a hearing
“on the record”). Congress said nothing like that here. See § 3730(c)(2)(A).
We see no reason to split from our sister circuits without persuasive grounds.
See United States v. Graves,
908 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 2018). None exist
here. 3 Thus, subparagraph (c)(2)(A) only requires a hearing on the briefs.
Here, the district court reconsidered its ruling, allowed multiple
rounds of briefing, held a live hearing where Vanderlan presented his
argument, and gave him the chance to submit evidence. Section
3730(c)(2)(A) and relevant precedent require no more. Credit Suisse and
Brutus Trading upheld far less, requiring only written submissions to satisfy
the hearing requirements. See 117 F.4th at 162; 2023 WL 5344973, at *2–3.
_____________________
3
Vanderlan thinks otherwise. He relies on our decision in Eli Lilly, 4 F.4th at 255.
But that decision predates Polansky and does not carry the weight that he assigns it. There,
the court did not address the then-entrenched circuit split over the § 3730(c)(2)(A)
dismissal standard. It assumed without deciding that the more stringent standard applied
and held that the government satisfied it. See id. at 267. The court also found that the
relator’s chance to present evidence at a live hearing was sufficient to meet any hearing
requirement that might apply, without defining what such a hearing must entail. See id. at
266–67. Simply put, Eli Lilly does not support Vanderlan’s position that an evidentiary
hearing is required here.
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The district court’s process exceeded what those cases required. We,
therefore, hold that the district court did not err in denying Vanderlan an
evidentiary hearing under § 3730(c)(2)(A).
Vanderlan also posits that he was entitled to Rule 41(a)(2)’s
safeguards, as the district court applied that standard. But the legal standard
does not shift based on how the district court analyzed the motion. The
government’s § 3730(c)(2)(A) motion falls under Rule 41(a)(1), not Rule
41(a)(2). See supra Part III.A. The district court made that explicit:
“Vanderlan’s case falls under Rule 41(a)(1).” True, the court observed that
“a straight-up Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal procedure would not satisfy
§ 3730(c)(2)(A).” But it applied Rule 41(a)(2)’s higher standard only
because the government met it—not because it was required to do so.
Nothing in precedent supports transforming a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal into a
Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal simply because the court applied a stricter standard
voluntarily.
Because the government’s motion was a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary
dismissal, Vanderlan was not entitled to Rule 41(a)(2)’s safeguards,
assuming any exist in this context. His reliance on Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging,
Inc., 279 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) is misplaced. In Elbaor, we held that when
“faced with a Rule 41(a)(2) motion the district court should first ask whether
an unconditional dismissal will cause the non-movant to suffer plain legal
prejudice.”
Id. at 317. That case involved Rule 41(a)(2), which requires a
court order. Rule 41(a)(1) does not. Elbaor is inapposite here.
That brings us to due process. Vanderlan argues that the district court
erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing because it did not consider
whether the Due Process Clause required one. Specifically, he argued that
the district court failed to apply the Mathews factors. But Vanderlan never
argued in the district court that those factors weighed in favor of an
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evidentiary hearing. He instead argued the following in his Supplemental
Motion to Reconsider:
[sic] Due process under the Federal Constitution has a
procedural component. Procedural due process “considers not
the justice of a deprivation, but only the means by which the
deprivation was effected.” Bowlby v City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d
215, 222 (5th Cir 2012) (quoting Caine v Hardy,
943 F.2d 1406,
1411 (5th Cir 1991)). Therefore, the injury “is not the liberty or
property that was taken from the plaintiff, but the fact that it
was taken without sufficient process.” Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 222.
The “fundamental requirement” of procedural due process is
“the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 332–33
(1976) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As
discussed above, in Polansky, the Government conceded a
relator’s right to procedural due process, i.e., a hearing to
determine whether the Government could dismiss a qui tam
case and, thereby, extinguish the relator’s property interest.
That is all. His principal Motion to Reconsider is similarly lacking. There, he
never invoked the Mathews factors or explained how they warranted an
evidentiary hearing. Thus, we consider the argument forfeited. See Rollins v.
Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an
argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district court—thus
raising it for the first time on appeal—or by failing to adequately brief the
argument on appeal.” (internal citation omitted)).
For these reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in denying
an evidentiary hearing. Thus, it did not abuse its discretion. See Hyde, 511
F.3d at 509.
C.
We now consider whether the district court erred in granting the
government’s § 3730(c)(2)(A) motion. Vanderlan says it did. The
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government disagrees, arguing that the court, under Rule 41(a)(1), had no
adjudicatory role in disposing of a pre-answer (c)(2)(A) motion and no
discretion to deny dismissal absent a claim that the Constitution forbids it.
We agree with the government.
The FCA permits the government to dismiss a qui tam action
“notwithstanding the objections” of the relator, so long as it provides notice
and an opportunity for a hearing. See § 3730(c)(2)(A). Polansky confirmed
that district courts apply Rule 41’s standards in addressing these motions. See
599 U.S. at 437. The Court further emphasized that even post-answer, postmotion for summary judgment (c)(2)(A) motions “will satisfy Rule 41 in all
but the most exceptional cases,” and courts should afford “substantial
deference” to the government’s decision.
Id. Given that qui tam actions exist
“on behalf of and in the name of the [g]overnment” and allege injury solely
to the government, the Court made clear that district courts “should think
several times over before denying” dismissal.
Id. at 437–38. Still, Polansky
dealt with Rule 41(a)(2), which applies after an answer or motion for
summary judgment and requires a court order. In dicta, the Court addressed
pre-answer and pre-motion for summary judgment dismissals under Rule
41(a)(1):
The Court of Appeals briefly addressed the purpose of a
hearing when dismissal is sought before an answer is filed. In
that context, Rule 41 entitles the movant to a dismissal; the
district court has no adjudicatory role. So what is the court
supposed to do at the hearing the FCA requires? The Third
Circuit suggested that Rule 41’s standards “rest atop the
foundation of bedrock constitutional constraints on
Government action.” So a hearing, whether pre- or post-answer, might inquire into allegations that a dismissal
“violate[s] the relator’s rights to due process or equal
protection.” But because Polansky has not raised a claim of
that sort, we do not consider the circumstances in which, or
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procedures by which, a court should find the Constitution to
prevent the Government from dismissing a qui tam action.
Id. at 436 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit—the only court of appeals to have issued a
published opinion on this issue—embraced this language in Credit Suisse, 117
F.4th at 161. It reasoned that because Polansky required district courts to
afford substantial deference to Rule 41(a)(2) motions, an even greater degree
of deference applies to Rule 41(a)(1) motions. See id. As we have said before,
we do not create an unnecessary circuit split absent compelling reasons. See
Graves, 908 F.3d at 142. No such reasons exist here.
Our sister circuit properly adhered to Polansky’s dicta, which “is
entitled to great weight.” Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616, 650 (5th Cir.
2023) (en banc) (Southwick, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans,
46 F.4th 317, 330 n.21 (5th Cir. 2022)). It also
acknowledged the fundamental distinction between Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule
41(a)(2). The former allows dismissal without a court order. See Credit Suisse,
117 F.4th at 161. “We find the reasoning of the [Credit Suisse] [c]ourt
persuasive and see no need to create a circuit split on this issue.” Carranza-De Salinas v. Gonzales,
477 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the
government’s § 3730(c)(2)(A) motion falls under Rule 41(a)(1), see supra
Part III.A, it warrants even greater deference than if brought under Rule
41(a)(2). See Credit Suisse, 117 F.4th at 161.
Vanderlan’s core argument is that the district court erred because he
believes his claims have merit. The purpose, however, of a qui tam action is
to “vindicate the [g]overnment’s interests.” Polansky, 599 U.S. at 438. The
government needed only to show that continued litigation would not do so.
It did. The government explained that further litigation would interfere with
the OIG’s efforts to resolve its claims against Jackson HMA for civil
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monetary penalties. Vanderlan, meanwhile, sought to enjoin any alternative
administrative resolution between the government and Jackson HMA. And
Jackson HMA refused to resolve the EMTALA investigation while facing
potential FCA treble damages and civil penalties. This more than justifies
the government’s decision to dismiss. Because of these reasons, we hold that
the district court did not err in granting the government’s § 3730(c)(2)(A)
motion.
D.
We last consider whether the district court applied the proper
standard—dismissal under § 3730(c)(2)(A) rather than settlement under
§ 3730(c)(2)(B). Vanderlan asserts that he is entitled to a fairness hearing
under § 3730(c)(2)(B) but concedes that “there is no language in the FCA
that appears to guarantee these legal rights in a [g]overnment settlement that
occurs after the FCA case is dismissed.”
“When interpreting a statute, we start with the text.” Lackey v.
Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659, 666 (2025). If it is unambiguous, we apply it as written.
See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC,
720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013). We
also “give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision Congress
used.”
Id. If the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry starts and ends there.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,
583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018). Article III
does not license federal courts to “rewrite the language enacted by
[Congress].” United States v. Monsanto,
491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989).
The provision at issue here, § 3730(c)(2)(B), declares that:
The [g]overnment may settle the action with the defendant
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the
action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the
proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all
the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, such
hearing may be held in camera.
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Section 3730(c)(2)(B) then establishes two conditions for its operation: (1)
the government must propose a settlement for court approval, and (2) the
relator must object. If neither occurs, § 3730(c)(2)(B) does not apply. See
United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Océ N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (holding that the provision applies only when “the government and the
defendant agree to settle the case” and “the relator objects”); see also United
States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc.,
848 F.3d 330, 339–40 (4th
Cir. 2017) (noting in dicta that the government may settle over a relator’s
objection “only if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
All that said, Vanderlan forfeited this issue on appeal by failing to raise
it adequately in his opening brief. See Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th
743, 751 (5th Cir. 2023). To preserve an argument, an appellant “must
address the district court’s analysis and explain how it erred.”
Id. (quoting
SEC v. Hallam,
42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022)). Vanderlan did neither. He
merely noted that he raised the argument below and suggested that the
district court’s rejection of it “raises an interesting point.” That is not
enough. Because he failed to engage with the issue, we hold that he forfeited
any argument that the district court should have applied the § 3730(c)(2)(B)
standard. See id. Thus, we do not address the issue.
IV.
For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment.
15
