¶1The sole point presented in this case is as to whether the jury was kept free from contact with the public and from improper influences, the case being capital.
¶2The circumstances of the crime were of a nature to arouse strong public sentiment against the two accused. They had gone to their homes and armed themselves, one with a rifle and the other with a shotgun, and sought out the decedent, and set upon him unawares, and, while one of them was beating him on the head with the rifle, the other had shot him dead. The reputation of the accused having been already not of the best, considerable public excitement attended the trial, which lasted from the morning of Tuesday, July 14th, to some time during the day of Tuesday, July 21st; and, as we gather, the courthouse was crowded during its progress.
¶3While it .was going on, a stranger stood near the jury and had conversed with one of the jurors before his presence was discovered. The jury were marched several times to and from the hotel and to and from the picture shows along the more or less crowded sidewalks, with no precaution taken against their contact with the public, except their being accompanied by two officers. At their meals at the hotel they seem to have been allowed to converse freely with the waitresses; and the situation was such that conversation at the other tables, even in an ordinary tone of voice, could easily be heard by them. Packages and valises with no, or *591simply more or less perfunctory, examination of their, contents,. were allowed to be given in to them. All this, of itself, leaves the impartial mind in doubt whether the rule for the segregation and isolation of the jury was not lost sight of fatally to the verdict, in a case of this kind, when the heinousness of the crime and aroused public sentiment against the accused made a strict and careful observance of the rule doubly to be desired; but one other imprudence which we now proceed to mention leaves no doubt that the said rule was fatally departed from. The jury were taken to the picture shows on two occasions at night, and sat there in ,the ordinary rows of chairs with the rows in front and back of them occupied, in the obscurity which usually prevails in places of that kind. Thereby an opportunity was afforded to the public for access to them, and this is fatal to the verdict. “They were accessible; misconduct is presumed.” State v. Warren, 43 La. Ann. 828, 9 South. 559; State v. Moss, 47 La. Ann. 1514, 18 South. 507. See, also, State v. Craighead, 114 La. 84, 38 South. 28.
¶4The verdict and sentence are therefore set aside, and the case is remanded for trial according to law.
¶5On Rehearing.
¶6The defendants were indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter.
¶7Counsel for the defendants admitted in his argument on rehearing that the jury was composed of intelligent and high-minded men, and that there was no separation of the jury.
¶8The facts stated in the second paragraph of our original opinion in this case show that the verdict of manslaughter was favorable to the accused.
¶9The third paragraph of the opinion states in general terms the defendants’ numerous objections to the conduct of the jury and the bailiffs who had them in charge.
¶10
¶11In State v. Oteri, 128 La. 939, 55 South. 582, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 878, this court held that a verdict and sentence would not be reversed because the court permitted the jury to attend a theatrical exhibition in charge of a bailiff, where the facts affirmatively established the absence of misconduct and prejudice.
¶12The judge a quo in his per curiam carefully reviewed the evidence and found that the irregularities complained of in the motion for a new trial worked no injury or prejudice to the defendants.
¶13The verdict of manslaughter tends to support the conclusion that the jury was not swayed by the alleged hostile public sentiment against the accused.
¶14' There was no separation of the jury, and' *593in such a case, “as a general rule, a new trial will not he granted where it clearly appears that the defendant has not been injured or prejudiced by the misconduct.” See State v. Oteri, supra,128 La. 947, 55 South. 585, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 878, citing State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. 590, where the court said that the presumption of misconduct does not arise where the jurors have been kept together, and the means thus provided for proving the precise nature of their irregularities, from which courts may determine whether the tendency of the acts has .been to influence their verdict. See, also, 12 Cyc. 717, where it is said:
“On the other hand, as a general rule, a new trial will not be granted where it clearly appears that the defendant has not been injured or prejudiced by the misconduct.”
¶15In State v. Garig, 43 La. Ann. 371, 8 South. 936, the court said:
“It is not every irregularity that will vitiate a verdict; it .must appear to have resulted injuriously.”
¶16See, also, State v. Wiggins, 45 La. Ann. 416, 12 South. 630.
¶17In the instant case we concur in the opinion of the trial judge that none of the acts of the jurors, and none of the communications made to them, had a tendency to influence their verdict.
¶18
¶19The verdict of the jury is the best answer to that argument.
¶20The case of State v. Warren, 43 La. Ann. 828, 9 South. 559, cited in our original opinion, was one where eight of the jury were allowed to remain in the jury room, with no deputy in charge. The court said:
“They were accessible; misconduct is presumed.”
¶21In State v. Moss, 47 La. Ann. 1514, 18 South. 507, cited in the same opinion “there was at least one well-defined separation <5f the jury,” to quote the language of the court. In State v. Craighead, 114 La. 84, 38 South. 28, also cited, five jurors who had been accepted and sworn were locked up with seven jurors unaccepted and unsworn.
¶22
¶23It is therefore ordered that our former decree herein be vacated, and it is now ordered that the verdict and sentence below be affirmed.