Volume 136 — Louisiana Reports

Habeas corpus by the State, on relation of Francis O. Lanng, against M. J. Long, Criminal Sheriff. Judgment for defendant, and relator applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Allan J. Harris, against M. J. Long, Criminal Sheriff. Judgment for defendant, and relator applies for certiorari or writ of prohibition.

Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Edward De Russy, against M. J. Long, Criminal Sheriff. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of prohibition.

Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Roger Larue, against M. J. Long, Criminal Sheriff. Judgment for defendant, and relator applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Action by J. Sully Martel against Wilson T. Peterman, Sheriff, and others. Euzebe Robichaux applies for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action, by Mrs. Elizabeth D. Murphy, wife of Arthur Rolfs, and another, against Marcus T. Murphy. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Theaters and Snows <&wkey;5 — Manager — Rights and Duties — Maintenance op Order.</p> <p>The superintendent of a theater owes a duty to its patrons to maintain order and quiet during a performance. If he believes — and has good reason to believe — that a certain man in the audience is guilty of an improper disturbance, the superintendent is justified in requesting him to be quiet, provided it is done politely and without causing unnecessary humiliation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Theaters and Shows, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. <§=d5J</p> <p>2. Theaters and Shows <&wkey;5 — Rights and Duties oe Manager — Maintenance oe Order.</p> <p>When, under the foregoing circumstances, the person requested to he quiet follows the superintendent back to the latter’s place in the foyer, provokes a disturbance with him, and persists in loud talking, the superintendent — especially after politely endeavoring to persuade the man to be quiet and return to his seat — is justified in summoning a police officer to quiet him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Theaters and Shows, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. >&wkey;>5.]</p> <p>S. Theaters and Shows <@=>5 — Humiliation oe Disturber — Liability oe Proprietor.</p> <p>When a policeman, summoned under the circumstances above stated, finds the man complaining so loudly as to disturb the audience, the officer is justified in demanding that he be quiet or go out of the theater; and, if the disturber thereupon walks out, the proprietor of the theater will not be held liable in damages to him for humiliation or injury to his reputation, even though the superintendent may have been mistaken as to who was guilty of the original, disturbance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Theaters and Shows, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;5.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Quaker. Realty Company, Limited, against Charles T. Starkey. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Application in the Supreme Court by Dora Murff for bail.</p>

<p>Action by Dr. Charles F. Boagni against J. F. Schell. Applications for writs of mandamus and prohibition by H. P. Dart and William Edenborn, third opponents.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Improvements <&wkey;4 — Compensation — Recovery — Third Possessors.</p> <p>Where an irrigation company went into possession of land and dug a canal thereon, with an understanding that the holder of such land, who was the purchaser, subject to a vendor’s lien, would rent it to the company at a fail-rental value, the company may not, as third possessor, recover in foreclosure proceedings for the improvements made, as the canal was inseparable from the soil, and the company did not have such title as would make a possessor in good faith, under Civ. Code, arts. 503, 3451, 3452.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.' — Eor other cases, see Improvements, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 7-26; Dee. Dig. <i&wkey;4.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Corporations <&wkey;554, 557 — Proceedings by Stockholder and Creditor — Appointment op Receiver — Judgment.</p> <p>Where a person, who is at once a stockholder and creditor of a corporation, applies for the appointment of a receiver, he is not required, under section 1, pars. 2 and 11, of Act No. 159 of ÍS98, to proceed upon a judgment, previously obtained, or to pray for any other judgment than that making the appointment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2220, 2227, 2228, 2230-2236; Dec. Dig. &wkey;554, 557.]</p> <p>2. Corporations <&wkey;553 — Appointment op Receiver — Grounds — Mismanagement op Funds.</p> <p>Where it appears that the majority stockholders and directors of a corporation are permitting the president to handle its funds in a manner equally irregular and unauthorized, and that not even an intelligible account is kept by him of his operations, a receiver may be appointed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2201-2216; Dec. Dig. &wkey;553.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Louise Bartlett against Fred E. Lee. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Insane Persons <&wkey;8 — Proceedings—Nonresidents.</p> <p>Act No. 253 of 1910_, to provide proper proceedings relative to the insane, etc., has no application to nonresidents temporarily within.the limits of this state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. &wkey;j8.]</p>

N. Sandlin, Judge. A judgment of forfeiture on an appearance bond given by Thomas Reames, conditioned for his appearance to answer an indictment for shooting with intent to kill and murder, was rendered in solido against accused and his sureties, and they appeal.

N. Sandlin,'Judge. An appearance bond given by Thomas Reames, conditioned for his appearance to answer an information charging him with carrying concealed weapons, was forfeited and a judgment rendered in solido against him and his sureties, and, from the overruling of motion to set aside the judgment, they appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation <&wkey;764t — Tax Deed — Desceiftion of Property — Sufficiency.</p> <p>A tax deed which does not describe city lots so as to identify them conveys no title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1519-1522; Dec. Dig. &wkey;764.]</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;764 — Tax Deed — Sufficiency of Description.</p> <p>The name of a third person, different from the name of the tax debtor, cannot be used for the purpose of identifying lots sold at a tax sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1519-1522; Dec. Dig. &wkey;764.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal Law &wkey;>322, 446 — Presumptions — Official Action — Documentary Evidence.</p> <p>In a prosecution for selling liquors without a license, the recital in an ordinance of a police jury establishing prohibition is sufficient proof, in the absence of contrary evidence, of an election having been held; since a presumption of correctness attaches to official acts, and since the recital was in the nature of a finding of fact made by a high, public functionary in the regular course of the administration of the local government after investigation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 728, 1032; Dec. Dig. <§=> 322, 446.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Pointe Coupee; G. K. Schwing, Judge.</p> <p>William Bradley, alias Bud Bradley, was convicted of arson and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines; R. E. Ilingle, Judge.</p> <p>Injunction by Linn C. Tompkins against the Henry Lochte Company, Limited. Prom judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by the C. T. Patterson Company, Limited, against the Port Barre Lumber Company. From a judgment homologating the account of the receiver, Joseph Dubourdieu, lessor, whose opposition was maintained in part only, and Gustave G. Labarre, whose opposition to the allowance to 'the attorney for the receiver was dismissed, appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans ; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the succession of George J. Morris. Appeal from a consent judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Bernard J. Walle against William H. Douglas. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1170% — Appeal — Ground por Reversáis-Exclusión of Evidence.</p> <p>The exclusion of evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of contradicting and impeaching a leading state witness,' where the proper foundation has been laid, is the 'denial of a legal right which may have been materially injurous to the defendant, and justifies a reversal of the conviction and the remanding of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3129-3135; Dee. Dig. &wkey;> 1170%.]</p> <p>2. Witnesses <&wkey;268 — Cross-Examination —Declarations of Accused.</p> <p>If it be relevant for the state to prove the declarations of the accused at the time of the homicide, a cross-examination on the same subject-matter is equally relevant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 931-948, 959; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;268J</p> <p>3. Jury <&wkey;117 — Motion to Quash Venire —Time.</p> <p>A motion to quash the jury venire comes too late after entering on the trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 544; Dec. Dig. <@=»117.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;693 — Reception oe Evidence-Time fob Objection.</p> <p>An objection to the admissibility of testimony comes too late after the testimony has gone to the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1630; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>693.]</p>

King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Miss Kate McDermott. Action, by Miss Alice Clohecy and another to annul four wills made by Miss Kate McDermott, now deceased, wherein Henry B. McCloskey and another, executors, were cited as defendants. From a judgment adverse to plaintiffs, they appeal.

James; C. T. Wortham, Judge. Action by Firmin Reynaud, receiver of the Uncle Sam Planting & Manufacturing Company, against C. J. Walton & Son, Incorporated. From a judgment dissolving the injunction, the receiver appeals, and appellee asks for amendment of the judgment.

On motion for filing of mandate of the United States Supreme Court (233 U. S. 362, 34 Sup. Ct. 627, 58 L. Ed. 1001) reversing a former judgment of this court (120 La. 279, 56 South. 137) and remanding the cause.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Fraudulent Conveyances <&wkey;304.— Injunction <&wkey;44 — Grounds — Transfer of Property.</p> <p>An ordinary creditor, in a suit to have a transfer made by his debtor decreed a mere simulation, or, in the alternative, to have the act declared fraudulent and annulled, has no right in law or equity to enjoin the debtor from transferring other property in which the creditor has no proprietary interest and on which he has no lien or privilege; nor has such creditor a right to enjoin his debtor’s vendee from disposing of the property acquired by the act complained of.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 910-916; Dec. Dig. &wkey;5304; Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 92, 94; Dec. Dig. &wkey;44J</p> <p>2. Injunction <&wkey;187 — Dissolution — Award of Damages — Proof.</p> <p>In dissolving an injunction against the execution of a judgment, the court may award the defendant statutory damages, under article 304 of the Code of Practice, without proof of such damages; but there is no authority for rendering judgment for damages without proof of them, on the dissolution of any other than an injunction restraining the execution of a judgment, nor for rendering judgment for any other than the statutory damages, without proof.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 398, 406, 407; Dec. Dig. &wkey;lS7.]</p> <p>3. Injunction <&wkey;186 — Dissolution— Damages for Attorneys’ Fees — Proof.</p> <p>In a judgment dissolving an injunction on the face of the pleadings, damages for attorneys’ fees should not be awarded the defendant on his reconventional demand made in the rule to dissolve, submitted without the introduction of any evidence, and decided upon no other proof of the defendant’s obligation for attorneys' fees than the judge’s observation of the proceedings conducted before him and his expert knowledge of the value of the legal services rendered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. §§ 397, 399-405; Dec. Dig. &wkey;?186.]</p>

Action by Ed. Hart against the Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff in the district court on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. W. Sutherlin, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Ruth Wells and others against John B. Files. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Execution <@=>216, 275 — Sale — Validity-Property Subject.</p> <p>A sheriff’s sale of property under a fi. fa. at the first offering for less than two-thirds of its' appraised value is a nullity. A sheriff’s authority, under a writ of fieri facias, to seize and sell the property of the debtor, does not extend to his property in another parish.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 16, 148, 345, 601-606, 791-796; Dec. Dig. <@=>216, 275.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Sequestration @=>17 — Dissolution — Damages.</p> <p>Whore writs of sequestration are dissolved as a result of a trial of a cause on its merits, attorney fees will • not be allowed as damages where it is impossible to determine what portion of the services of counsel related to the release of the property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sequestration, Cent. Dig. §§ 35-37; Dec. Dig. @=^17.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus 7¡y the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Malicious Prosecution <&^>2 — Defense —Want of Jurisdiction.</p> <p>In suits for damages for malicious prosecutions and false arrest, it is not material that the plaintiff was prosecuted on an insufficient process, or before a court without jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. <@¿=>2.]</p> <p>2. Malicious Prosecution <®=59 — Evidence —Reputation.</p> <p>In such suits, the bad reputation of the now plaintiff is a circumstance bearing on the state of mind of the defendant going to show that the prosecutor had reasonable grounds and acted in good faith.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. §§ 125-137; Dec. Dig. <®=359.]</p> <p>3.Disorderly House <@=3 — Blind Tiger— “Tippling -House. ’ ’</p> <p>A disorderly “blind tiger” is a disorderly “tippling-house.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. §§ 3, 9-13; Dec. Dig. <@=^>3.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First arid Second Series, Tippling House or Shop.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; A. M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Action by B. I-I. Banken against George Locke. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Limitation of Actions <S=>4, 72 — Prescription — Private Sale to Effect Partition-Statute — Application—Validity.</p> <p>Act No. 53 of 1912, providing that any action to annul a private sale of real estate, made in good faith to effect a partition, on the sole ground that a part and, not the whole of the property was sold, shall be prescribed by the lapse of six months from the promulgation ■of the act, applies to minors, and is constitutional.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 10, 11, 390-39S; Dec. Dig. ®=4, 72.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles; A. J. Lafargue, Judge.</p> <p>Action by L. M. Furlow and others against Amet Guillo’t, Sheriff, and L. M. Ducote, Assessor. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal and plaintiffs move to dismiss appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Webster; J. N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Billy Bullock was convicted of murder and George Bullock of manslaughter, and they appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Porter Lawson was convicted of retailing liquors without a license, and appeals.</p> <p>Affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Suit for injunction by Mrs. Henrietta Schwartz against Dr. Ivan F. Siekmann. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Lamar Doucet was convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Mary Jane Hyatt, widow of Louis Fe'arson, against John F. Lindner and another. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Lee Dodson was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mose Eli Mercer and wife against the Natchez, Ball & Shreveport Railway Company and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oowt.) </p> <p>1. Courts <@=66 — Session — Power to Shorten.</p> <p>The district courts of the state, save in the parish of Orleans, being required by the Constitution to hold continuous sessions during ten months of the year, a judge of such court cannot, under any circumstances, shorten the session as thus prescribed, and thereby prolong the period of vacation, consisting of the two remaining and consecutive months, although by an order entered upon the minutes, after the legal delay following a previous order, he may shorten the period of vacation and prolong that of the continuous session,- as the public business may require.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 231-242; Dec. Dig. <@=66.]</p> <p>2. Courts <@=66 — Shortening oe Session —What Constitutes.</p> <p>In a court where the established continuous sessions of ten months embrace the months from October to July, inclusive, and where the last week in July has been designated as a period for the holding of a civil term, the fact that, because the judge is led to believe that all the lawyers and litigants who are interested in the fixed cases are willing that they should be continued, he adjourns his court sine die, or “until court in -course” (i. e., until the first Monday in October following), does not authorize the inference that he is attempting to shorten the continuous session, or prolong the vacation of his court, in violation of the requirements of the Constitution, but indicates merely that he will not actually sit during a certain term of the continuous session, because the business does not require it; and the fact that such adjourned period of the continuous session happens to be followed by the vacation does not affect the duration or legal character of the session or the vacation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 231-242; Dec. Dig. <@=66J</p> <p>3. Prohibition <@=5 — Right to Remedy — Discretion — Reassignment oe Case.</p> <p>Where a judge, through error superinduced by the representations of counsel in a particular case then fixed for trial, adjourns and pretermits a regular civil term of his court, thus carrying all fixed eases over for a period exceeding two months, including the vacation, the question whether, upon discovering his error and upon complaint of injury by the opposing counsel in such particular case, he will reassign it for trial upon the day originally fixed, is within his jurisdiction to determine, and his action in the premises will not be reviewed upon an application for a writ of prohibition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prohibition, Cent. Dig. §§ 20-30; Dec. Dig. <@=5J</p> <p>4. Prohibition <@=24 — Error in Granting —Right to Rescind.</p> <p>Where an application, upon which an order for a writ of prohibition is made, is thereafter found to contain errors, in its reticence as well as in its allegations, concerning material facts, but for which errors the order would not have been made, such order will be rescinded, the writ as issued discharged, and the application dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prohibition, Cent. Dig. § 73; Dec. Dig. <@=24.]</p> <p>5. Prohibition <@=13 — Grounds eor Dismissal — Accomplishment oe Act.</p> <p>A writ of prohibition will not be sustained, when it is shown that the act sought to be prohibited has already been accomplished.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prohibition, Cent. Dig. § 62; Dec. Dig. <@=13.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>6. Courts <@=65 — Terms — “Continuous Session.”</p> <p>The constitutional requirement that the “district court shall hold continuous sessions during ten months of the year” means that those courts shall be open for the trial of cases, and that the judges shall fix cases for trial, and try them, during the period, provided there are cases to be fixed and tried.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 230, 246; Dec. Dig. <@=65J</p>

<p>Action by the Colonial Homes Realty & Investment Company against A. N. Sample. Plaintiff applies for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and rule for contempt.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. P. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Loyd Eppinett was convicted of larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error @=>1195 — Remand — Law oe Case.</p> <p>The defendants filed exceptions of no cause of action, which were overruled. They then filed exceptions of no right of action, which were sustained, and the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded, to be proceeded with according to law. Another judge having been elected to the district bench, the defendants filed another exception of no cause of action, which was sustained, and the plaintiff’s suit was again dismissed. Held, the district judge should not have given consideration to another exception of no cause or right of action when it had been finally decided that the plaintiff’s petition disclosed a cause and right of action.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4661-4665; Dec. Dig. § <@=>1195.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>2. Bills and Notes <§=>408 — “Protest.”</p> <p>“Protest” implies a demand and nonpayment or dishonor of the note.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 1019-1021, 1113-1128; Dec. Dig. <§=3408.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Protest.]</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Injunction by Widow Otto Touche and others against Joseph Brandner. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal, and defendant moves to dismiss.

A.ction by the Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank against Mrs. Minerva W. Alfred, wife of William McArdle. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by John S. Sutton for injunction against Duncan Buie and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>Affirmed.</p>

Dennis Mann was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Town of Rayville, and applies for writs of certiorari and mandamus.

Mandamus by C. F. Knoll and others against J. B. Levert. Judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and J. B. Levert, president of the Shirley Planting Compan5r, applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Execution <&wkey;328 — Sale — Proceeds — Payment — Waiver oe Objection.</p> <p>An opposition to the payment of the proceeds of a sheriff’s sale to the plaintiff in execution will be considered as having been abandoned, where the opponent allowed five years to elapse without having taken any steps in the prosecution thereof. See Act No. 107 of 1S9S.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 981-998; Dec. Dig. &wkey;328.]</p> <p>2. Execution <&wkey;325, 328 — Sale—Proceeds —Opposition—Action by Execution De-ITENDANT.</p> <p>Such a defunct opposition cannot serve as the basis of another concursus at the suit of the defendant in execution, alleging that the claims of his creditors against the proceeds of sale have been prescribed. Such suit, if admissible, should have been brought against the creditors, as well as against the sheriff alleged to have received and held the proceeds of the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 950, 981-998; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>325, 328.]</p>

Action by J. M. Savant against E. A. Mercada! Judgment for plaintiff. Suspensive appeal granted, and plaintiff applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>George W. Murry was convicted of buggery, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Criminal Law @=>627 — Indictment — Service — Waiver of Objections.</p> <p>Where a defendant in a criminal prosecution has announced his readiness to go to trial, and the impaneling of the jury has so far progressed as that ten jurors have been accepted, his right to object that the indictment (shown to have been served at Ms domicile) was not served upon him personally must be considered to have been waived, and the objection was properly held to.have been made too late.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1399-1408, 1412, 1434; Dec. Dig. @=>627.]</p> <p>2. Jury @=>72 — Selection — Discretion — Talesmen.</p> <p>Under Act No. 182 of 1914, neither the state nor the defendant, in a criminal prosecution, has the right to determine, originally, how many tales jurors shall be summoned for a particular occasion; nor has either the state or the defendant the right to determine how many of those whom the judge has thought proper to order summoned shall be present or reported on before the selection of those needed for the jury may be proceeded with. The matter is left, in the one case as in the other, to the discretion of the judge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-347; Dec. Dig. &wkey;72.]</p> <p>3. Indictment and Information @=>169, 176 — Variance—Evidence Admissible.</p> <p>In ordinary cases, where time is not of the essence of an offense, the evidence thereof need not correspond with the allegation, but may be admitted to show that the offense was committed at any time, whether before or after that alleged, provided it be within the period of prescription. But, where it appears that two offenses, identical in all their features, save as to time, were committed, and a defendant, charged with one, objects to the admission of evidence as to the other, unless and until the indictment be amended to correspond with the facts, including the time sought to be proved, his objection should be sustained; otherwise he may be prosecuted for and convicted of both offenses, though guilty of but one.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 320, 535, 548; Dec. Dig. @=>169, 176.]</p>

<p>Action by J. L. Hopkins against Perry Crow and others. Application by M. E. Crow for writs of certiorari (and prohibition to tbe Judge of tbe Fourth Judicial District Court of tbe Parish of Union.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Morehouse; J. P. Madison, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Frank B. Pratt against Corporation of Tillage of Bastrop, Louisiana. From the judgment, third persons appeal. On motion to dismiss appeal.</p>

James; Charles T. Wortham, Judge. In the matter of the receivership of Webre-Steib Company, Limited. Erom a judgment denying application for appointment of a receiver, the applicants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

X. Ransdell, Judge. Consolidated actions, one by George S. Yerger against G. W. Simmons and another, wherein R. H. Fitzgerald and another intervened, one by Joel F. Johnson, Sr., against G. W. Simmons, one by Joel F. Johnson, Sr., against R. I-I. Fitzgerald and others, and one by R. H. Fitzgerald against A. J. Sevier, Sheriff, and others. Judgment favorable to Joel F. Johnson, Sr., and others, and Fitzgerald and others appeal.

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial. District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>Samuel B. Woodward was convicted of shooting with intent to kill, and appeals.</p> <p>Affirmed.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Banks and Banking <©=>134 — Deposit — Agreement — Bills and Notes.</p> <p>An agreement, entered into between a bank and a depositor with said bank, that a certain deposit to be made in the future by said depositor shall be placed by the bank to the credit of a past-due note of the depositor, which note was held by the bank, is a binding agreement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Banks and linking, Cent. Dig. §§ 353-374; Dec. Dig. <©=></p> <p>2. Banks and Banking <©=>134 — Deposit-Application to Note — Prior Agreement.</p> <p>And, if the president of said depositor, it being a corporation, fraudulently causes the deposit to be transferred and credited to the personal account of said president, and it appears that a new deposit of said fund is made in the same bank to the credit of said president, the bank may apply the fund thus fraudulently withdrawn and deposited by the president of the corporation to the payment of the note as previously agreed upon.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 353-374; Dec. Dig. <©=></p> <p>3.Banks and Banking <©=>134^Deposit — Corporation — Estoppel.</p> <p>Under such circumstances, the bank will not be estopped to deny that the president of the corporation was not the real owner of the fund deposited by him, although it may have honored checks drawn by the president individually to the order of the corporation, the real owner of the fund.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 353-374; Dee. Dig. <®=> 134.]</p> <p>4. Banks and Banking <@=>134 — DepositEstoppel.</p> <p>If the president of a corporation is injured by the bank under ,such circumstances, it will be with full knowledge on the part of said president, and because of his own misconduct in violating the agreement made by him as president of the corporation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 353-374; Dee. Dig. <S=> 134.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant @=97, 101, 102— Same Place oe Work — Duty oe Master. The employer is bound to furnish his employes with a reasonably safe place for the performance of their work, and, if the place be unsafe, the remoteness of the danger will not excuse the employer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 135, 163, 171, 174, 178-184, 192; Dec. Dig. @=97, 101, 102.]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant @=>219, 235 — Injury to Servant — Assumption oe Risk — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Unless the danger be obvious, the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence have no application, where an injured employe was engaged at the time in the performance of his work in the usual manner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 610-624, 710-722; Dec. Dig. @=219, 235.]</p>

Dawkins, Judge. Annie Hightower was convicted of manslaughter, and, from a judgment sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment and remanding the case for further trial, the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Bills and Notes @=>241, 242 — Corporations @=>123 — Pledge oe Stock — “Maker” — Ownership oe Securities — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>A promissory note, bearing upon its back, when negotiated, the signature of a person other than the payee, and to which collaterals were attached to secure its payment, bore upon its face the following, with other printed matter, to wit: “We, signers, indorsers, sureties, and all of us, in solido, promise to pay. * * * The proceeds of the sale of the pledged securities shall be applied: * * (3) To the payment of any other indebtedness then due, or thereafter to become due, by the maker of this note, * * ® up to $250,000. * * * ” The securities pledged with this note are also pledged to secure any other obligations of the maker or makers, due or to become due. * * * ” Held (upon the issue of fact), that the pledged securities belonged to the party by whom the note appeared to have been executed. Held, further, that the obligation to pay the note being imposed, in terms, upon the “signers, indorsers, sureties, and all, * * * in solido,” and the obligation with respect to the debts for which the securities attached to the note were pledged, being also in terms confined in its application to the debts of the maker or makers, the obligation last mentioned cannot be extended to debts of parties other than the maker or makers, and that the name appearing upon the back of the note does not appear as that of a maker, either within the contemplation of the contract represented by the note or within the contemplation of the law of this state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 542, 547-559; Dec. Dig. @=>241, 242; Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 481, 191, 507-512, 537, 539-546, 569, 618; Dec. Dig. @=>123.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Maker.]</p>

Action by the Hossier Realty Company against the Caddo Cotton Oil Company. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and judgment rendered for plaintiff, and defendant applies for certiorari or wilt of review.

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>Jacie Williams Bennett was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from. Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Directors of Public Schools of Caldwell Parish against the Louisiana Central Lumber Company and others. Prom a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquobs <&wkey;143 — “Blind Tiger” — Statutory Definition.</p> <p>The definition of a “blind tiger,” in Act No. 146 of 1914, as a place in a subdivision of this state where the sale of intoxicating liquor is prohibited, where it is kept for sale, barter, exchange, or habitual giving away as a beverage, in connection with any business conducted at such place, is controlled by the phrase, m connection with any business conducted at such place, whether the intoxicating liquor is kept there for sale, barter, exchange, or to be habitually given away.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dec. Dig. <i&wkey;143.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Blind Tiger.]</p> <p>2. 'iNTOXttOATING LIQUORS <&wkey;213 — KEEPING Blind Tiger — Information—Suefioienoy.</p> <p>A bill of information, charging that the defendant kept intoxicating liquors for sale at a certain corner in a city where the sale of intoxicating liquor is prohibited, without alleging that it was in connection with any business conducted at such place, does not charge the offense of keeping a “blind tiger,” denounced by Act No. 146 of 1914.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 255-257; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 213.]</p> <p>Land, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gotirt.) </p> <p>1. Robbery &wkey;>17 — Information — Requisites.</p> <p>In an information for robbery of money from a person named therein, and which alleges force, violence, and putting said person in fear by defendants, the words “against his will” would be tautological; and they are unnecessary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Robbery, Cent. Dig. §§ 16-23, 26; Dee. Dig. &wkey;17.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by (Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>2. Robbery &wkey;>17 — Information — Requisites — “Against the Will” — “Unlawfully, Willfully, Forcibly, and Violently.”</p> <p>Since the words “unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, forcibly, and violently,” in an information charging robbery under Rev. St. § 810, imply a taking “against the will,” this latter phrase need not be added to the information.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Robbery, Cent. Dig. §§ 16-23, 26; Dec. Dig. &wkey;17.]</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>3. Robbery <&wkey;l — Definition of Crime.</p> <p>“Robbery” is the felonious taking of the property of another from his person, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or by putting him in fear.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Robbery, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 13; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>l.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Robbery.]</p>

King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of John Reilly. Suit to annul a bequest, by collateral heirs of John Reilly against the brothers and sisters of Bishop Thomas Heslin, deceased, wherein Thomas Regan, executor, was nominally a codefendant. From judgment for plaintiffs decreeing the bequest void, defendants appeal.

Rafe Kahn was convicted of violating a city ordinance, his conviction was affirmed by the district court, and he applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by George Howard Brooks against Homer Broussard and others. Prom judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

Lee Melton was charged with willfully assaulting, beating, and wounding another, and applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the judge of the district court from trying him.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Allen; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Pete Duplechain and two others were convicted of stealing a cow, and they appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Counties i&wkey;67 — Parish Secretary — Removal — Police Jury.</p> <p>The power of removal, conferred by law upon police juries, enters as much into the employment of a secretary as does the power of appointment, and a police jury has no capacity to avoid the law or abrogate its own functions with respect to either. If it were otherwise, an incoming police jury might impose upon its successor a secretary who would be unacceptable to the new members and out of sympathy with the policy of the body.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Counties, Cent. Dig. §§ 100-103; Dec. Dig. &wkey;67J</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Taxation <&wkey;44 — Uniformity — School Taxes.</p> <p>The Constitution having recognized school districts, and having provided for the giving of additional support to public schools, and for erecting and constructing schoolhouses in the school districts, and having authorized the levy of special taxes therefor by the parish school boards in the school districts, in excess of the limitation of taxation fixed by the Constitution for state purposes, it is not necessary that the taxes levied by such school boards for the several districts of a parish should be equal and uniform throughout the parish.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>44.]</p> <p>2. Schools and School Districts &wkey;*24 — Establishment of School Districts — Directors — Discretion—Review by Courts.</p> <p>The board of directors of the public schools of the several parishes of the state of Louisiana are given full discretion in establishing school districts in their respective parishes, and their action in establishing the boundaries of a school district will not be reviewed by the courts, where it is not shown that the discretion vested in the board has been abused.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 42, 45, 47-49; Dec. Dig. &wkey;24.]</p>

E. Bell, Judge. Action by Carrie Works against H. L. Heilpern and others to set aside a conveyanee of real property. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals.

Action by Peter J.¡ Flanagan, as administrator of the succession of Isaac Warbeck, against Laura Gehrke. From an order denying defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s capacity to sue, she appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Martin W. Harvey and others against Oscar Gartner and others. From the judgment, plaintiffs appeal.</p> <p>The following is an extract from appellees’ brief:</p> <p>In Ellis, Milbank & Co. v. Fisher, Burgess & Co., 10 La. Ann. 479, it was held:</p> <p>“Where two parties have judgments against each other, they are bound to compensate, and the execution in either case may be enjoined.”</p> <p>To the extent that plaintiff’s judgment was compensated by each judgment rendered in favor of each defendant, it ceased to be. Having no existence, of course no execution* could issue thereon against any one.</p> <p>Plaintiffs’ judgment being compensated to the extent of the respective judgments obtained by defendants, execution can only issue for the balanee, and this is what the judge a quo decreed should be done.</p> <p>Article 2091 of the Revised Civil Code reads as follows:</p> <p>“There is an obligation in solido, on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.”</p> <p>The judgment being in solido, under article 2091 of the Revised Civil Code, above quoted, any payment made by any of the debtors in solido exonerates the others toward the plaintiff to the extent of the amount paid.</p> <p>Pothier on Obligations, p. 152, lays down the following:</p> <p>“The payment which is made by one of the debtors (in solido) liberates all the others; this is a consequence of the principle, that a debtor, in solido, is only one debtor of the same thing,•of which there are several debtors.”</p> <p>“Not only a real payment, but every other kind of payment, ought to have this effect; therefore, if one of the debtors in solido, being sued by the creditor, opposes, in compensation of the debt demanded, a like sum owing to him from the creditor, the other debtors are liberated by this compensation, as well as by a real payment.”</p> <p>“Peter and Paul are my debtors, in solido, of the sum of one thousand pounds. Afterwards I become the debtor of Peter of the like sum. If I sue Peter for the payment of the thousand pounds due me, and he opposes the compensation of the debt due to him, this compensation, as we have seen, being equivalent to a payment, the debt due to me from Peter and Paul becomes extinct, as against them both.”</p> <p>Fuzier-Harman, Repertoire Général Alphabétique du Droit Frangais (Edition of 1894) vol. 12, under the word “Compensation,’! No. 126:</p> <p>“It has been decided that if the codebtor, who can of his own personal right plead ■ compensation, is sued, or if he intervenes in the suit directed against his codebtors to plead compensation, the discharge is acquired by all.”</p> <p>Pandectes Frangaises, Nouveau Répertoire de Doctrine de legislation et de Jurisprudence, Riviére, Weiss & Frennelet (Edition of 1893), Obligations, No. 459:</p> <p>“The character of the exception based on compensation, as exception of release of debt, cannot be determined ‘a priori.’ It would appear that compensation, likened theoretically to double imaginary payment, ought to produce in the matter of solidarity the same effect as payment. It is just that which happens when the creditor of the debt in solido at the outset (at first) demands payment from that one of the -codebtors to whom he himself is a debtor, -and he is met with the plea of compensation. If the creditor then attempts to claim payment of the debt from the other codebtor, he has the right to apply to the creditor that the debt extinguished by the compensation pleaded by his consort (codebt- or) has been at the same time'extinguished in regard to him. Compensation, as we are going to see, which furnishes only a personal exception, becomes here a common exception.”</p> <p>Paillet, Manuel de Droit Frangais, commenting on C. N. 1294 (our C. O. 2211), 7th Ed., p. 525, says:</p> <p>“Whenever one of the solidary codebtors, to whom is due something by the creditor, has himself used the means of compensation to have the debt, for which he is held as a solidary obligor, declared extinguished, all the other solidary co-debtors may take advantage of that fact to prove that the debt can no longer be claimed from them. The effect of the compensation is necessarily to terminate the action of the one who was originally the creditor, otherwise there would be a contradiction in recognizing in him again to recover it,” etc.</p> <p>Pothier on Obligations, p. 152, has the follow-</p> <p>article 1294, C. N. (R. 0.- O. 2211), does not permit a solidary obligor to oppose as compensation the sums which the creditor owes to his codebtor, it does not follow that the solidary obligor is not able to take advantage of a judgment in favor-of his codebtor which has already pronounced the compensation.”</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors &wkey;>143 — “Blind Tiger” — Elements of Offense.</p> <p>The purpose of Act No. 146 of 1914 is to penalize the keeping of a “blind tiger,” and a “blind tiger” is defined by the act “to be any place in those subdivisions of the state where the sale of spirituous, malt or intoxicant liquors are kept for sale, barter, exchange or habitual giving away as a beverage in connection with any business conducted at such place;” and the keeping of the “place” in the subdivisions mentioned, and of the liquors, “for sale, barter,” etc. “in connection with any [other] business conducted at such place,” are essential ingredients of the offense of “keeping a blind tiger,” and should be set forth in a bill of information purporting to charge that offense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Gent. Dig. § 152; Dec. Dig. &wkey;jl43.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Blind Tiger.]</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors &wkey;>132 — Wrongful Sale — Statutes—Application.</p> <p>Neither Act No. 107 of 1902, which grades the offense of selling intoxicating liquors, without the previous obtention of a license, with reference to the amounts required to be paid for such licenses, nor Act No. 176 of 1908 (known as the “Gay-Shattuck Law”), has any application in communities where the issuance of liquor licenses is prohibited. On the other hand, section 910' of the Revised 'Statutes (as amended and re-enacted), penalizing the offense of keeping a grog or tippling shop or retailing spirituous liquor without the previous obtention of a license, and Act No. 4 of 1910 (Ex. Sess.), defining “grog or tippling shops,” are applicable where no liquor licenses can be issued, but are inapplicable where such licenses can be issued, and where, as a consequence, the offense of selling liquor without a license must be, and is, graded with reference to the amounts paid for the licenses.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Gent. Dig. § 141; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>132.J</p> <p>Land, J., dissenting.</p>

Action by William H. Rapier against Henry Guedry. Application by plaintiff! for a writ of 'mandamus to compel respondent, as judge of Division D of the Civil District Court of the Parish of Orleans, to appoint an official shorthand reporter to serve in his court under Acts 1914, No. 141, p. 255.

<p> ■(Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1.Levees <&wkey;16 — Construction Contraci>VAcation by Reletting.</p> <p>A contract for the construction of certain levees provided that, if it should become necessary, in the judgment of the president of the levee board, to declare the contract vacated or annulled, for negligence, inefficiency, or abandonment by the contractors, he might proceed to do so; and, in such case all sums due to the contractors should be forfeited; that the decision of the board should be final as to the cause of action on the part of the president or engineer in charge; and that the contract so vacated or annulled might be relet by the board to another contractor without advertisement or other formality. Being unable to complete the work within the time stipulated in the contract the contractors abandoned the work. The board notified the contractors that, if the work was not resumed within a stipulated time and prosecuted as provided in the contract, the board would relet the work and cause the contract to be executed for the account of the contractors. On the failure of the contractors to resume operations within the time allowed, the board advertised and relet the work to another contractor under a slightly different contract, and sued the o'riginal contractors for the excess cost of the work when it was completed. Held, the reletting of the work to another contractor before the expiration of the time stipulated for its completion in the original contract vacated and annulled the original contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Levees, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>16.]</p> <p>2. Levees <&wkey;16 — Construction ContractReletting oe Work.</p> <p>The original contract did not authorize the board to relet the work to another contractor at the expense or for the account of the original contractors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Levees, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <5&wkey;16J</p> <p>3. Levees <&wkey;16 — Construction Contract-Breach: — Extent oe Liability.</p> <p>The forfeiture of the sum due by the board to the original contractors was the extent of their liability to the board for their breach of the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Levees, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>16.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberville; C. K. Schwing, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Dr. W. G. Owen against M. Hanlon’s Sons and others, wherein J. D. Hanlon, natural tutor, filed intervention and third opposition. From a judgment for plaintiff the tutor appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George I-I. Thgard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Magdalena Peterson against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Erom judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gotvrt.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law &wkey;>205, 207 — Costs <&wkey;129 — Pauper’s Affidavit — Validity of Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 156 of 1912, allowing pauper citizens of this state and pauper aliens who have been domiciled in this state for three years to prosecute lawsuits without paying the court costs in advance or as they accrue and without giving bond for costs, does not grant a special privilege or immunity to the citizens of this state generally or discriminate against the citizens of other states, in violation of section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution. of the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 591-648; Dec. Dig. 205, 207; Costs, Cent. Dig. § 496; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>129.j</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law <&wkey;42 — Pauper’s Affidavit-Validity of Statute — Right to Attack.</p> <p>, A citizen of the state of Missouri, who has never been domiciled in Louisiana, has no interest in questioning the constitutionality of a statute of this state, permitting the pauper citizens of Louisiana to sue in the courts of this state without previously paying or securing the court costs.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;42J</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Alice Lillian Hardy against William Andrew Collins. Plaintiff, having obtained judgment, ruled defendant to show cause why he should not be condemned to pay alimony, and defendant sued out a rule on plaintiff to show cause why certain certificates of stock should not be sold and the proceeds distributed according to agreement. From judgments overruling exceptions to plaintiff’s rule and dismissing defendant’s rule, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>1. Courts <&wkey;224 — Jurisdiction — Supreme Court — Landlord and Tenant.</p> <p>This court has not jurisdiction of a suit by a landlord to evict a tenant, when the plaintiff alleges that the rental was $80 a month and that the lease has expired.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dee. Dig. @¿^224.]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;791 — Jurisdiction —Dismissal.</p> <p>An appeal must be dismissed whenever it appears that the appellate court has not jurisdiction of the amount in dispute. Therefore the appellee’s motion to have the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction must be entertained, although it was filed after he had answered the appeal and had prayed that the judgment appealed from be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3133-3136; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey; 791.]</p> <p>3. Courts <&wkey;483 — Jurisdiction!—Transfer of Appeau-Dismissai.</p> <p>The Act No. 19 of 1912 gives this court the right to transfer to the Court of Appeal any case within the jurisdiction of that court, but the statute does not compel us to transfer the appeal instead of dismissing it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1288-1290, 1306; Dee. Dig. &wkey;483,]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Jack Jordan and another were convicted of murder, and appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Goivrt.) </p> <p>Municipal Corporations <&wkey;625 — Ordinance — Validity—Operation oe Business.</p> <p>A city ordinance, which makes it unlawful to establish or operate any sort of business whatsoever on a named public street of New Orleans, is ultra vires of the charter, unreasonable, and invalid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1378, 1379; Dec. Dig. &wkey;3625.j</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Injunction by Frederick Leitz against the City of New Orleans and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by the Iluttig Sash & Door Company against the Allen Manufacturing Company, Limited. Each party recovered. The judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and it applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;801 — Motion to Dismiss — Determination.</p> <p>In determining whether an appeal should be dismissed, this court will not decide or consider an issue raised in the motion to dismiss the appeal, which properly belongs to the merit's.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3161-3164; Dec. Dig. 801.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>2. Contracts &wkey;?214 — Building Contract-Construction — Time oe Payments.</p> <p>Under a building contract binding the contractor to construct eight cottages, “said work” to be done in conformity with the specifications, and to be commenced at once and continued uninterruptedly to completion, and providing, “in reference to each cottage,” that one-fifth of the price should be paid when the “building” was framed, one-fifth when it was inclosed, one-fifth when the second coat of plastering was on, one-fifth when the “building” was completed and accepted, - and the balance 15 days after completion and acceptance of the “work,” such balance was payable 15 days after the completion and acceptance of each building, and the owner was not required to retain it until completion and acceptance of all the buildings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 980-995; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>214.]</p> <p>3. Mechanics’ Liens <&wkey;238 — Mechanics’ Privileges — Completion oe Building — Notice — Error in Date — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>That a notice of completion of a building-registered by an owner erroneously fixed the date at a date later than the true date did not render premature certain payments made by him less than 45 days after such erroneous date, where they were not made until after the 45 days given materialmen by Act No. 167 of 1912, within which to record their liens.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mechanics’ Liens, Cent. Dig. § 420; Dec. Dig. <S=^238.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Statutes <§=>107 — Validity — Singleness 03? Object.</p> <p>A statute which deals with several branches of one subject does not violate the constitutional provision that it shall embrace but one object.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 121-134; Dec. Dig. <§=>107.]</p> <p>2. Statutes <§=>68 — Local and Special 'Laws — Constitution—Operation .</p> <p>Referring to local or special laws, articles 48-50 of the Constitution have no application to a statute which defines and relates to every subdivision of the state except the city of New Orleans.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 70; Dec. Dig. <§=>68.]</p> <p>3. Statutes <§=>109 — Title and Subject-Matter.</p> <p>Where the object of an act is otherwise expressed in its title, it is not necessary that the title should expressly declare its object to be to put into effect the article of the Constitution in pursuance of which the statute was enacted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139; Dec. Dig. <§=>109.]</p> <p>4. Schools and School Districts <§=>103— Special Tax Election — Taxpayers’ Petition-Recording.</p> <p>It is not required that the petition of the taxpayers of a school district, requesting the board of school directors to call a special tax election, should be recorded, except perhaps in ‘ the minutes of the proceeding's had at the meetings of the board.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other eases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 114, 115, 117, '240-245, 252; Dec. Dig. <§=>103.]</p> <p>5. Schools and School Districts <§=>103— Special Tax Election — Ballots—Requisites.</p> <p>In an election in which’ the taxpayers of a school district vote upon a proposition to levy a special tax to build a sehoolhouse, it is not necessary that the location of the proposed sehoolhouse within the district shall be stated on the ballots. The taxpayers have all the information required when the printed ballots conform with the requirements of the statute under which the election is held.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 114, 115, 117, 240-245, 252; Dec. Dig. <§=>103.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; T. M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. Sully Martel against Wilson T. Peterman, sheriff, and others. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

C. O’Donnell, Judge. A demurrer to an affidavit charging William Gaspar with selling river ducks during the closed season ivas sustained, and the state appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Witnesses <§=350 — Cross-Examination — Extent.</p> <p>When, for the purpose of establishing the credibility of a state witness who is a stranger in the community, the district attorney has examined him with regard to his reasons for leaving another state, the defendant’s counsel has the right, on cross-examination, to ask the witness whether there' is a charge of murder pending against him in the state whence he came.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1140-1149; Dec. Dig. <§=350.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Jury <®=^72 — Panel—Discretion—Criminal Prosecution.</p> <p>Under Act No. 1S2 of 1914, the state and the defendant in a criminal prosecution have not the right to determine how many tales jurors shall be summoned for a particular occasion ; and the state and the defendant have not the right to determine how many of those whom the judge has seen proper to order summoned shall be present, or reported on, before the selection of those needed for the jury may be proceeded with. The whole matter is left to the discretion of the judge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-347; Dec. Dig. <S=>72.]</p> <p>2.-Criminal Law <§^>814^-Refusal of Instructions — Issues.</p> <p>The refusal of a trial judge to charge a jury in a criminal case concerning the law with reference to a matter which was not involved in the trial of the cause will be sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1821, 1833, 1839, 1860, 1865, 1883, 1890, 1924, 1979-1985, 1987; Dec. Dig. <®=^814.]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

Action by William B. Bloomfield against W. B. Thompson, Commissioner of Public Utilities, and another. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and .defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review.

Action by Elsie Duvall against the Louisiana Western Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant in the Court of Appeals, and plaiptiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

Certified from Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Action by B. A. Bass against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals to the Court of Appeal, which certifies two questions to the Supreme Court.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Succession of Jean Serres. From a judgment sustaining exceptions.to petition of Mrs. Catherine Dautch Bordes, she appeals.</p>

Consolidated action by Mrs. Marie Magdaline Rohr, widow of Ferdinand E. Becker, individually and as natural tutrix, against the New Orleans Gaslight Company and another. From judgment for plaintiff, both parties appeal.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Robert Crudupt was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and ap- ■ peals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Trespass <§=>52 — Cutting Timber — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>One who cuts timber on the land of another in good faith, believing it to be his own land and timber, is liable for the value of the timber at the stump, and not as manufactured into lumber.</p> <p>[Ed, Note. — Eor other cases, see Trespass, Cent. Dig. §§ 137, 138; Dec. Dig. <§=>52.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Maggie O’Neal was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>Maud Wooten was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jacob Segen against L. B. Fabacher. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

K. Sehwing, Judge ad hoc. Mandamus by tbe State, on relation of tbe Louisiana Trust & Savings Bank, against the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt and others. From a judgment for relator, defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; C. K. Schwing, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by the State, on the relation of the Commercial National Bank, against the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt and others. Erom judgment for relator, defendants appeal.</p>

K. Schwing, Judge ad hoe. Action by the State, on the relation of the Commercial-Germania Trust & Savings Bank, against the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt and others. From judgment for relator, defendants appeal.

R. Land, Judge. E. A. Renfro, being charged with selling intoxicating liquors without a license, gave an appearance bond, and from a judgment thereon he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <@=1174 — Appeal — Grounds for Reversal — Misconduct of Jury.</p> <p>A verdict and sentence for manslaughter will not be reversed, where the court permitted the jury to attend a moving picture show in charge of the sheriff and several deputies, where the facts affirmatively show the absence of misconduct and prejudice. In a murder case, where the jury did not separate, a new trial will not be granted where it clearly appears that the defendant has not been enjoined or prejudiced by alleged irregularities or misconduct on the part of the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3170-3178; Dec. Dig. <§= 1174.]</p> <p>2. Homicide <§=342 — Verdict—Hostile Public Sentiment.</p> <p>In a murder case, where, on the admitted facts, the defendants might have been convicted as charged, and the jury found them guilty of manslaughter, the verdict tends to show that the jury was not influenced by alleged hostile public sentiment against the defendants.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 722; Dec. Dig. <§=342.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <§=868 — Misconduct of Jury — Objection—Time.</p> <p>Where alleged misconduct of the jury is known to defendants or their counsel, objection should be urged before verdict.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see' Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2070; Dee. Dig <§=868.] O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

M. Barbe, Judge. Hypothecary action by Robinson & Co. against George W. Cosner, with John H. Lewis as warrantor. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant and his warrantor appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error &wkey;>162 — Dismissal—Acquiescence in Judgment — Husband and Wife.</p> <p>Where the defendant appealed from a judgment decreeing a separation from bed and board, and ordering the sale of the community property for the purposes of effecting a partition between the parties, and the defendant, during its pend-ency, accepted her share of the proceeds of the sale of the community property, held, that she had acquiesced in the judgment, and her appeal must be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 179, 981, 982, 984-990; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>162.]</p>

Proceedings by the State against Sam Eulco. Eulco was released under a writ of habeas corpus, and the State, on the relation of W. A. Mabry, District Attorney, applies for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

<p>Felicia Syas was convicted of violating a city ordinance, and applies for certiorari and prohibition.</p>

Certiorari by George W. Moore, to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals, parish of Union, which affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in an action by Mrs. Barbara D. Hamilton against George W. Moore.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Descent and Distribution i&wkey;8 — Succession — Good Will oe Business — Rights of Minor Heirs — Forfeiture.</p> <p>Where the head of a family dies, leaving' a wife and minor children and a practically insolvent succession, included in which latter is the good will of a business involving, mainly, manual labor, such as the care of gardens and lawns, and the eldest boy, with the consent of the mother, after attempting to conduct such business as the agent, and for and on behalf of the estate, declines to go further in that capacity, but assumes the business for his own account and is thereby enabled to pay the debts of the succession and to provide shelter and protection for his mother and the other minors in a home of their own, until the minors are able to provide for themselves or are otherwise provided for by marriage, they have no standing, years after attaining majority, to claim an interest in the business so conducted, the good will of which could have been of no value to them, save as assumed by their brother, under the circumstances and for the purpose and with the result stated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Descent and Distribution, Cent. Dig. §§ 33-39; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>8.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jackson; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>J. Y. Head was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. B. Tommie against the Little River Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Divorce <&wkey;27 — Separation erom Bed and Board — Right oe Action — Petition.</p> <p>Where the allegations of a petition in a suit for separation from bed and board are such as, taking them to be true and assuming that they can be sustained by proof, to indicate that the plaintiff would find living with defendant insupportable by reason of defendant’s conduct, there should be a trial on the merits, and a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action will be reversed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 27, 62-83; Dec. Dig. &wkey;27J</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>W. E. Wood was convicted of abduction, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Fraudulent Conveyances <&wkey;300— Sufficiency of Evidence — Simulation.</p> <p>In a suit by judgment creditors to set aside the debtor’s sale of land to his mother, evidence held to show that the sale was a real contract and not a mere simulation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 896-903; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>300.]</p> <p>2. Fraudulent Conveyances ®=»295 — Sufficiency of Evidence — Preference—Statute.</p> <p>Evidence held to show .that the mother, purchasing from her son, sought to obtain a preference over the son’s other creditors, knowing that his financial condition made it necessary, laying the preference open to annulment at the suit of the creditors, under Rev. Civ. Code, art. 1983, expressly declaring that one taking a preference, under circumstances deI dared by law to be constructive fraud, shall lose the advantage endeavored to be secured thereby.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 867-875; Dec. Dig. &wkey;295.]</p> <p>3. Fraudulent Conveyances &wkey;>301— Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence— Insolvency.</p> <p>In a creditor’s suit to set aside the debtor’s sale of realty, it is not necessary to establish the purchaser’s positive knowledge of such insolvency, but proof of circumstances, tending to produce a strong impression that he was aware of it, will suffice.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 904-907; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>301.]</p> <p>4. Fraudulent Conveyances <&wkey;295 — Sufficiency of Evidence — Simulation—Insolvency.</p> <p>In a suit by judgment creditors to set aside the debtor’s sale of realty to his mother, •and her sale of the same land, together with another- tract, to her daughters, evidence held to show that the mother’s sale to her daughters was a simulation to put the property beyond the reach of creditors.</p> <p>.[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 867-875; Dec. Dig. <®=^295.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; J. B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Action by H. H. Kennedy against W. L. Young, State Bank Examiner, wherein J. S. Brock, Jr., intervened. From judgment for plaintiff and intervener, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Feliciana; Jos. L. Golsan, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Constance Delambre against Mrs. Maggie Wedge Kyes. From a judgment for plaintiff for less than claimed, she appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon; James R. Monk, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by Petty Poole Massey and wife against the W. R. Pickering Lumber Company. Prom judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Vicksburg, Alexandria & Southern Railway Company against the Louisiana & Arkansas Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Applications by H. B. Schofield and others for writs of certiorari and prohibition against the Judge of the District Court of the Parish of Lincoln.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law <&wkey;209 — Discrimination — Conditions in Deed — Sale to Negroes.</p> <p>A condition in a deed, for the benefit of the grantor and its other grantees, that the grantee shall not sell to a negro, does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. 14; since, so far as prohibiting discrimination .against the negro race, it applies only to state legislation, and not to contracts of individuals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 678; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>209.]</p> <p>2. Contracts <&wkey;110 — Legality — Sale to $ egro — Public Policy.</p> <p>A condition in a deed, for the benefit of the grantor and its other grantees, that the grantee shall not sell to a negro, is not against the public policy of the state, as creating a tenure of property unknown to the law, in view of Rev. Civ, Code, arts. 490, 491, 709, 1764, and 2013, giviag the fullest liberty to contract and dispose of one’s property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 506; Dec. Dig. <®^110.]</p> <p>3. Deeds <&wkey;158 — Conditions — Sale or Land to Negro — Running with the Land.</p> <p>A condition, in a deed for the benefit of the grantor and its other grantees, that the grantee shall not sell to a negro, expressly declaring that it runs with the land, creates a real, as distinguished from a personal, obligation, and is valid under Rev. Civ. Code, art. 1901, giving the effect of laws to agreements legally entered into, and articles 11 and 12 prohibiting contracts against law and good morals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other'cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 502-504; Dec. Dig. &wkey;158.]</p> <p>4. Deeds <&wkey;155 — Conditions Subsequent-Effect — Sale to Negro.</p> <p>A condition in a deed, for the benefit of the grantor and its other grantees, that the grantee shall not sell to a negro, is a condition subsequent, or a resolutory condition, the accomplishment of which has the effect of restoring matters to the situation in which they were before the contract was entered into (Rev. Civ. Code art. 2045).</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 488-495; Dec. Dig. &wkey;155.}</p> <p>5. Deeds <&wkey;168 — Condition Subsequent-Sale to Negro — Relief.</p> <p>Where a condition subsequent in a deed for the benefit of the grantor and its other grantees that the grantee shall not sell to a negro is broken by a sale on consideration, the grantee under Bev. Civ. Code, arts. 2046, 2047, will be given time to cancel the sale to the negro before a rescission of the grantee’s deed is had.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ '526-533; Dee. Dig. &wkey;168J</p> <p>6. Contracts &wkey;>324^-BEMEDiEs Provided— Eeeect on Other Bemedies.</p> <p>Where a contract provides certain specified remedies for its breach, other remedies are not excluded, in view of Bev. Civ. Code, art. 1962, providing that when a contract contains general obligations, and the parties in order to avoid a doubt whether a particular case comes within the scope of the agreement have made special provisions for such case, the general terms of the contract shall not be restricted to the single case provided for.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, ' see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1549-1557; Dec. Dig. &wkey;324.]</p> <p>7. Evidence &wkey;>419 — Parol Evidence oe Consideration.</p> <p>Parol evidence is admissible to show the real consideration of a contract reciting a consideration.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1912-1928; Dec. Dig. &wkey;419.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Application by George T. McCIoskey for writs of prohibition and certiorari.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans Railway Company against the Town of Amite City. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by-the Court.) </p> <p>1. Statutes <&wkey;109 — Title and Subject-Matter.</p> <p>The title of Act No. 24 of 1888, being to amend and re-enact section 807 of the Eevised Statutes of 1870, is sufficient; and the addition of words descriptive of the purpose of the section is mere surplusage.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;109.]</p> <p>2. Statutes <&wkey;107 — Subject-Matter^-Duplioity — Abortion.</p> <p>Section 807 of the Eevised Statutes of 1870 denounces both successful and unsuccessful attempts to procure abortion or premature delivery by the administration of drugs, potions, or other things. Act No. 24 of l8SS amends the same section by denouncing the procurement of abortion or premature delivery by any other'means. Held, that the act does not contain two objects, in the sense of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 121-134; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>107.]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Byllabxis by the Ooiirt.) </p> <p>1. Akpeal and Error &wkey;>776 — Right to Withdraw Appeal.</p> <p>An appellant will not be permitted to withdraw the appeal without the consent of the appellee who has answered the appeal and asked that the judgment be affirmed, even though, before answering, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal for want of citation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3115-3119; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;> 776.]</p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error &wkey;>435 — Motion to Dismiss Appeal — Waiver.</p> <p>A motion to dismiss an appeal for want of citation is waived by an answer to the appeal, praying that the judgment be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2184-2190; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 435.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Divorce &wkey;>25 — Separation erom Bed and Board — Grounds.</p> <p>Petty quarrels between husband and wife are not sufficient cause for a judgment of separation from bed and board.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Oent. Dig. §§ 61, 106; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>25.]</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by Mrs. Emile Munchow against her husband. From a judgment rendered on oppositions filed, plaintiff, and her attorney in his own behalf, appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.). </p> <p>Corporations <§=>668 — Foreign Corporations — Service op Process.</p> <p>Under Act No. 54 of 1904, providing that a foreign corporation, which has not appointed an agent in this state for the service of process, may be reached by service upon the Secretary of State, superseding Act No. 149 of 1S90, providing that service of process on a foreign corporation might be had by service on its agents, service upon defendant corporation by serving copies of process upon its state manager was not sufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2603-2627; Dec. Dig. <§=>668.]</p>

Proceedings by L. M. Layman against the Succession of M. P. Woulfe, wherein Harry A. Thompson intervened. From a judgment dismissing the injunction procured and a judgment dismissing a suspensive appeal, intervener appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <@=>394 — Evidence Obtained — Illegal Manner.</p> <p>Evidence is not rendered inadmissible by having been secured in an illegal manner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 875, 876; Dec. Dig. <@=></p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors <@=>11 — Ordinances — Eeeect oe Statute — “Blind Tiger” — “Nuisance.”</p> <p>Act No. 146, of 1914, defines a “blind tiger” to be any place in those subdivisions of the state, including the city of Shreveport, where prohibition obtains, where liquor is kept for sale, exchange, or habitual giving away in connection with any business conducted at such place, declares it a “nuisance,” and repeals all laws in conflict; there being no other such laws except local ordinances. An ordinance of the city of Shreveport defines a blind tiger, declaring it a nuisance, makes its keeping a punishable offense, and authorizes the search of suspected premises. Eeld, that the intention of the statute was to override local ordinances on the same subject so far as inconsistent, that a place where liquor was kept for sale in connection with some other business conducted at the same place was a blind tiger both under the statute and the ordinance, but that a conviction under the ordinance upon a charge ot keeping a blind tiger in violation of the ordinance would be set aside where it did not appear but that accused was convicted, even though liquor was not kept by him in connection with some other business conducted at the same place, leaving the charge to stand as to any violation of the ordinance as controlled and superseded by the statute.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. <&^11.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Blind Tiger; Nuisance.]</p> <p>Monroe, O. J., dissenting in part.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Dismissal and Nonsuit <@=342 — Right to Dismiss — Demand in Reconvention.</p> <p>It has been held by this court, and the later authorities are conclusive on the subject, that a plaintiff may discontinue his suit at any time previous to judgment being rendered, “but that he cannot by so doing put the defendant out of court with respect to his demand in reconvention.”</p> <p>• [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Dismissal and Nonsuit, Cent. Dig. §§ 75-83; Dec. Dig. <@=></p> <p>2. Mandamus <@=>43 — Peohibition <@=>5 — Motion to Discontinue — Denial.</p> <p>When, in such case, the motion to discontinue contains an express reservation of defendant’s right to proceed upon his reconventional demand, the matter is one in which the -law leaves nothing to the discretion of the judge, even though the plaintiff be a nonresident, and, when he has denied the motion, mandamus and prohibition will lie.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. §§ 88, 89; Dec. Dig. <@=>43; Prohibition, Gent. Dig. §§ 20-30; Dec. Dig. <@=>5.1</p>

Action by the Richard D’Aigle Company, Limited, against the Western Insurance Company of Pittsburg. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington? J. B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Dantonio was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jackson; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Police Jury of Jackson Parish, La., against the Tremont & Gulf Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Webster; John N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by A. A. Miller against F. L. Bopp. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Bed Biver; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Sibley, Lake Bisteneau & Southern Bailway Company against W. I-I. Elliott and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge. Action by Caire & Graugnard against Mrs. L. S. Hickox and others, wherein Mrs. Lelia S. Hickox filed intervention and third opposition. From an adverse judgment, intervener appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Widow Blanche Lutenbacher against the Mitchell-Borne Construction Company and the Sewerage & Water Board of the City of New Orleans; the Southwestern Surety Company of Oklahoma, warrantor. From the judgments, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Court of Appeal, Parish of Evangeline; S. D. Ellis, Paul Leche, and Julian Mouton, Judges.</p> <p>Action by Helaire Vidrine against Robert Dupre and others. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and the case is transmitted to the Supreme Court on application of defendants.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Insane Persons <§=^30 — Senile Dementia— Interdiction.</p> <p>One who is afflicted with senile dementia so as to be incapable of taking care of his person or of administering his estate is subject to interdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Not-e. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 43, 45, 61; Dec. Dig. <§=> 30.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Contracts @=^238 — Bill of Lading — Oral Modification — Validity.</p> <p>A bill of lading may be modified by subsequent oral agreement whereby the consignor, entitled to receive the goods, directed delivery to a third person.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1117, 1123; Dec. Dig. <®=>238.] '</p> <p>2. Guaranty <@==>7 — Written Guaranty — Construction.</p> <p>Where a consignor notified the carrier of his intention to hold it liable under the bill of lading for a delivery of the goods to a third person, instead of the consignor, to whom the goods were consigned, a reply by the carrier, wherein it advised that the consignor should proceed against the person receiving the goods for the amount due thereon, and that it guaranteed costs and attorney’s fees, was an unqualified authorization to the consignor to bring the action, and a promise to pay the costs and attorney’s fees, and notice by the consignor of' acceptance was unnecessary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guaranty, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. <@¿^7.]</p> <p>Monroe, J., dissenting in part.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Boundaries <@=>39 — Reopening Case — Objections to Surveyor’s Report — Time por Making.</p> <p>When, in an action of boundary, a surveyor appointed by the court has filed his proeSs verbal and plat of survey, and the same have been introduced in evidence, and the surveyor has appeared as a witness, and has been examined and cross-examined, and the appellant, who was present when the survey was made, has taken the stand and given his testimony, and the case has been continued for argument, all without objection, the objection that the report of the surveyor had not sufficiently detailed the work done by him, made for the first time when the case is again called, came too late, and the trial court, in refusing to'reopen the case, did not abuse the discretion vested in it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. § 195; Dec. Dig. <@=>39.]</p> <p>2. Boundaries <@=>44 — Judgment Fixing Boundary — Abfirmance.</p> <p>Where the procés verbal and plat of the surveyor appointed by the trial court' in an action of boundary are sufficiently definite to enable the trial court so to do, and it renders judgment fixing the boundary,, and no error therein is shown, the judgment will be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. §§ 209-211; Dec. Dig. <@=>44.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Eminent Domain @^>124 — Expropriation— Yai/uation.</p> <p>In expropriating property in a portion of a city which is not built up, and through which streets_ have not been opened or dedicated, the valuation will be based upon the value of the property at the time of taking, and not upon a purely speculative valuation, based upon the prospective value of town lots for residential purposes. If the property expropriated was in a residential section, or in close proximity to one, a different rule would be applied, although the property itself was not actually improved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 332-344; Dec. Dig. <©=» 124.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Bills and Notes €=370, 453 — Want oe ' Consideration.</p> <p>“Absence or failure of consideration is a matter of defense against any person not the holder of a promissory note in due course.” [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 963, 1344-1351; Dec. Dig. <@=370, 453.]</p> <p>2. Set-Oee and Counterclaim <@=35 — Compensation.</p> <p>“Compensation takes place only between two debts, having equally for their objects a sum of money, or a certain quantity of consumable things of one and the same kind, and which are equally liquidated and demandable.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Set-Off and Counterclaim, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-64; Dec. Dig. <@=35.]</p>

Sam Fulco was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and, an order having been madé suspending sentence and paroling defendant, W. A. Mabry, District Attorney, applies for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Mrs. Charles Atkins was convicted of manslaughter, and she appeals.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus by the State, on relation of Willis Burnett, against J. P. Flournoy, Sheriff. Relator was ordered discharged, and respondent brings certiorari.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law &wkey;>600, 720 — Argument oe Counsel — Impeachment—Absent Witness —Continuance.</p> <p>After admitting that an absent witness would, if present, testify as set forth in the defendant’s motion for a continuance, the prosecuting attorney may introduce evidence to contradict or impeach the testimony which he admitted the absent witness would give, and the prosecuting officer may therefore ai-gue, from the evidence before the jury, that the testimony which the absent witness would give, if present, would be false. Nevertheless, the prosecuting attorney has no right to withdraw his admission after the evidence is all in, or argue to the jury that the absent witness would not have testified as the prosecuting officer admitted he would if present.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1342-1347, 1604, 1670, 1671; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;600, 720.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;730 — Argument op Counsel — Cure op Error.</p> <p>When the prosecuting attorney, in his argument to the jury in a criminal case, indulges in remarks that are prejudicial to the defendant and improper under any circumstances or facts, the error is not corrected, but perhaps made worse, by the judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard such remarks, unless borne out by the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1693; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;730.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Sequestration <&wkey;ll — Jurisdiction — Domicile of Defendant.</p> <p>Under the terms of Act No. 64 of 1876, p. 106, the plaintiff in a suit may sequester property upon which he has a privilege, and cite the defendant in the place where the property is sequestered, though the domicile or residence of the defendant is out of that jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Sequestration, Cent. Dig. § 10; Dec. Dig. <@==oll.]</p> <p>2.Appeal and Error <&wkey;373 — Devolutive Appeal — Judgment Dissolving Writ of Sequestration.</p> <p>A plaintiff may appeal devolutively from a judgment dissolving the writ of sequestration in such suit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2001-2004; Dec. Dig. 373.]</p> <p>3. Estoppel <&wkey;101 — “Privilege”—Plea of Estoppel.</p> <p>A plea of estoppel, based upon alleged representations or admissions made by a debtor to sustain a privilege claimed by a plaintiff, is without merit. Privileges are granted by law, and not by covenant or estoppel.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 293; Dec. Dig. <§¿3-101.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, 'Privilege.]</p> <p>4. Sequestration &wkey;>17 — Dissolution of Writ — Grounds.</p> <p>A writ of sequestration will be dissolved where the plaintiff in writ fails to show that the money advanced by him was used to deaden, cut, haul, float, or raft the logs or forest timber belonging to another which have been seized under the writ.,</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sequestration, Cent. Dig. §§ 35-37; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;17.]</p>

Ellis, Judge. R. A. West was indicted for violating an 'ordinance of the State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, and from a judgment quashing the indictment, the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Emmet Hagen was convicted of unlawfully maintaining a public nuisance, and appeals.</p>

Land, Judge. A. Emile and another were convicted of unlawfully keeping a blind tiger, in violation of a police jury ordinance of Caddo parish, and defendant Emile appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Ordinance oe Police Jury — Power to Enact — J urisdiction.</p> <p>This case is governed’ by the ruling in State v. Hagen (No. 20860) 67 South. 935, ante, p. 868, this day decided.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Tony Couris was convicted of violating an ordinance of a police jury, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Cal Cross and others were convicted of violating an ordinance of a police jury, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Dan Foggin was convicted of violating an ordinance of a police jury, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Oaddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>George JolifE was convicted of violating an ordinance of a police jury, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Oaddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>F. A. Nejin was convicted of violating an ordinance of a police jury, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Deeds @=114^-Description oe Land-Construction.</p> <p>There is uo statute or rule of law providing that such a description as 50 acres of land in the northeast comer of a designated larger body of land means necessarily a square tract containing 50 acres.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 316-322, 326-329, 388; Dec. Dig. @=> 114.)</p> <p>2. Taxation @=764 — Tax Deed — Validity-Description oe Land.</p> <p>Such a description of land as 50 acres in the northeast corner of a large area constituting two tracts several miles apart is no designation at all; and a tax deed containing such description is absolutely null.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cept. Dig. §§ 1519-1522; Dec. Dig. @=764.]</p> <p>3. Taxation @=804 — Tax Deed — Validity-Prescription.</p> <p>The prescription of three years cannot give validity to a tax deed that is null for want of a description by which the property can be identified.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1591, 1592; Dec. Dig. @=804.1</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Lee George was charged with violating Act No. 211 of 1914, relative to the sale-of near-beer. From a judgment quashing the information, the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu'; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>John Mancuso was convicted of unlawfully selling and receiving an order for intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Cameron; Winston Overton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Dupraville Marceaux against the East Cameron Drainage District No. 3. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

F. Brunot, Judge. Mandamus by the State, on relation of the Louisiana National Bank, against L. E. Hall, Governor and President of Board of Supervisors of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. From judgment for relator, defendant appeals.

Action by the Meridian Fertilizer Factory against T. Q. Wright and others. A judgment for defendants was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and T. Q. Wright and J. F. Cochran apply for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Taxation @=»197 — Exemption — Operation op Statutes.'</p> <p>Act No. 138 of 1856, relative to municipal and parochial taxation in the parish of Jefferson, was superseded by Act No. 136 of 1898, relative to the creation and organization of municipal corporations. A law which exempts property within the limits of municipalities from parish taxation and provides for contributions by the municipalities for the purpose of paying the -general expenses of the parish is utterly inconsistent with a law which contains no such exemption, no such provision for contributions, and confers the power of taxation for municipal purposes only.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 315, 316; Dec. Dig. ®=»197J</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (SyllaTnns by tne Court.) </p> <p>1. Indictment and Information <^=109 — Requisites of Indictment — Statutory Crime.</p> <p>An indictment for a statutory crime must charge, with certainty and precision, that the person accused committed the act under the circumstances and with the intent mentioned in the statute; if any essential element of the crime is omitted, the indictment is not valid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 286-288; Dec. Dig. <@=>109.]</p> <p>2. Abduction <@=>1 — Unlawful Transportation of Woman — Consent of Woman.</p> <p>The act of taking a woman to a house of ill fame or assignation or other place with her consent for the purpose of having illicit sexual intercourse with her, is not denounced by a statute that merely prohibits the taking of a woman to such place against her will, for that immoral purpose.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Abduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 1-10; Dec. Dig. <@=>1.]</p> <p>3. Prostitution <@=>1 — Unlawful Transportation — “Prostitute.”</p> <p>In its restricted and legal sense, prostitution means the practice of a woman submitting to indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men for pay, as distinguished from illicit sexual intercourse with one man. A woman who submits to illicit sexual intercourse with one man, not for pay, is not a prostitute, within the meaning of a statute that prohibits transporting a woman through or across the state “for the purpose of prostitution or with the intent to induce her to become a prostitute” (citing Words and Phrases, Prostitute; Prostitution).</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 2; Dec. Dig. <@=>1J</p> <p>4. Prostitution <@=>1 — Statutes <@^118 — Title and Subject-Matter — “Pandering”— “Pimping.”</p> <p>Act No. 307 of 1910, entitled “An act in relation to pandering, to define and prohibit the same, to provide for the punishment thereof, and for the competency of certain evidence at the trial thereof,” deals only with the subject of pandering, vulgarly called “pimping,” defined in the dictionaries as catering for the gratification or lust of another. Hence the statute can-no't be construed to embrace other immoral acts, without, to that extent, rendering it violative of the constitutional provision that a statute shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 2; Dee. Dig. <@=>1; Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-160; Dec. Dig. <@=>118.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Frank D. Chretien, Judge.</p> <p>Frederick Poree was convicted, of murder, and he appeals.</p>

T. Wortham, Judge. Action by James Legendre, executor, against the estate of Richard McCall, wherein Putnam & Norman filed intervention and third opposition. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Uourt.) </p> <p>1. Habeas Corpus <@=>92 — Issuance of Writ —Proceedings Subsequent — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Although the.Constitution of this state authorizes the courts of appeal to issue the writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a person in actual custody, it does not follow that, after issuing the writ, the court may proceed to try and decide a case of which it would otherwise have no jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 81, 83, 87-96; Dec. Dig. <§=> 92.] .</p> <p>2. Courts <@=>477 — Conflicting Jurisdiction-Commitment to Asylum of Person Accused of Crime.</p> <p>The court of appeal has not jurisdiction to revoke an order rendered by the criminal district court committing to the insane asylum a person who is charged with a crime and was-not indicted on account of his insanity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1260, 1260% ; Dec. Dig. <@=>477.] .</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law <@=>255 — Insane Persons <@=>86 — Due Process of Law — Commitment to Asylum of Person Accused of Crime.</p> <p>Section 993 of the Revised Statutes, authorizing the criminal court to commit to the insane asylum a person who has been arrested to answer for a crime and has been found not guilty on the plea of insanity or has been not indicted by the grand jury because of insanity, does not violate the article of the Constitution conferring upon the civil district court exclusive original jurisdiction of suits for interdiction ; nor does the commitment, under that section of the Revised Statutes, deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 736-738, 740-745: Dec. Dig. <@1=255; Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. § 149; Dec. Dig. <§=>86.]</p> <p>4. Insane Persons <@=>30 — Interdiction — Persons Liable.</p> <p>Not only lunatics and idiots are liable to interdiction, but all persons who, on account of an infirmity, are incapable of taking care of themselves and administering their estates.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 43, 45, 61; Dee. Dig. <@¿=</p> <p>5. Insane Persons <@=>30 — Interdiction — Persons Liable — “Profligacy.”</p> <p>A sane person cannot be interdicted for profligacy, although psychologists and alienists call “profligacy” moral insanity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 43, 45, 61; Dec. Dig. <S=></p> <p>6. Drunkards <@=>3 — Interdiction—Persons Liable.</p> <p>Under the provisions of the Act No. 100 of 1890, in connection with article 422 of the Civil Code, any person who is such an inebriate or habitual drunkard that he is unable to take care of himself and his estate may be interdicted and put into the custody and care of a curator, who shall have authority to place the interdict into an institution for the treatment and cure of his infirmity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drunkards, Cent. Dig. ,§§ 5, 6; Dec. Dig. <@=>3.]</p> <p>7. Drunkards <@=>3 — Interdiction — “Inebriate” — ‘ ‘Habitual Drunkard.”</p> <p>An “inebriate” or “habitual drunkard” is a person who has acquired the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors or taking narcotic drugs to such an extent as to deprive him of reasonable self-control.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drunkards, Cent. Dig. §§ 5, 6; Dec. Dig. <@=>3.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Habitual Drunkard; Inebriate.]</p>

<p>Mandamus by the Metairie Ridge Nursery Company, Limited, to compel granting of a suspensive appeal to it in an expropriation suit against it by the Orleans-Kenner Electric Railway Company.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action, by Mrs. Laura Wilkinson against e Myatt-Dieks Motor Company and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal’from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish, of Pointe Coupee; Joseph E. Le Blanc, Jr., Judge.</p> <p>John Iverson was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville; W. U. Richardson, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by James M. McCoy against the Louisiana & Northwest Railroad Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Action by Mrs. Elizabeth MeCowen against W. M. Barnett and others. A judgment for defendants was modified on appeal to the Court of Appeal, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.</p>

J. H. McIntosh was indicted for murder. The petition of Mrs. Emma McIntosh, his wife, praying an examination into the question of his insanity was denied, and she applies for mandamus.

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Webster; John N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Ike Cox was convicted of subornation of perjury, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. O. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the H. B. Stevens Company, Limited, against the Board of Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;627 — Abandon-men^Failtjre to File Transcript.</p> <p>AVhere the transcript on appeal is not filed on the return day or within three days thereafter, the appeal will be deemed abandoned, and dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2744r-2749, 3126; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;627J</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;14 — Abandonment op First Appeal — Second Appeal.</p> <p>Where an appeal has been taken and perfected by the giving' of bond and has been abandoned by not filing the transcript in time, another appeal is not allowable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 48-57; Dec. Dig. <§=14.1</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;791 — Motion to Dismiss Appeal — “AVaiver.”</p> <p>An agreement of the parties after plaintiff’s appeal had lapsed for failure to file his transcript in time, entered into in ignorance of such fact and when they thought the appeal still pending, and looking to a determination on the merits on appeal, was not a waiver of defendant’s right to dismiss the appeal or a consent to its reinstatement, since “waiver” is matter of consent, and one cannot be said to have consented to a thing of which he was ignorant, though consent or waiver might have cured the situation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3133-3136; Dec. Dig. <&wkey; 791.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Waiver.]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error <&wkey;791 — Dismissal — Estoppel.</p> <p>Where appellants’ right to appeal had been lost by failure to file his transcript in time, appellee was not estopped to have appeal dismissed by agreement between parties for review on the merits; both parties being then ignorant of the right to dismiss.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3133-3136; Dec. Dig. <§= 791.]</p>

, Judge. Action by P. W. Carr and others against the Louisiana Central Lumber Company and others. From judgment of dismissal, with directions, plaintiffs appeal.

D. D. Pool was indicted for murder and a change of venue was granted to the State from the parish in which the indictment was found. On application of the defendant for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to review the order of the trial court overruling defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction because of error in granting, a change of venue.

Case Certified from Court of Appeal, Parish of Caddo. - Action by S. L. Herold and others against the Parish Board of School Directors and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, 'which certifies certain questions to the Supreme Court.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Justine Marie Nessans, wife of' Albin O. Boyer, against Honorine JeanneColomes, wife of C. J. Melchior. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Henry Sanders was indicted for abduction in violation of Act No. 134 of 1890. From a judgment sustaining a motion to quash, the State appeals.</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by J. B. Levert against the Shirley Planting Company. From orders of seizure and sale, defendant appeals, and James Rainey, a stockholder of defendant, also appeals.

Action by J. P. Hudson & Sons, in liquidation, against the Uncle Sam Planting & Manufacturing Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff was amended by the Court of Appeal, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

Edrington, Judge. Consolidated suits by Morgan’s Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Company, the Union Seed & Fertilizer Company and others, and the Texas & Pacific Railway Company and others against W. J. White and others. Prom a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal!

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Contracts <&wkey;277 — Enforcement—Putting Other Party in Default.</p> <p>It is not necessary for one of the parties to a contract to put the other in default before bringing suit upon the contract; the suit being in the enforcement — not for the violation — of the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1217-1232; Dec. Dig. &wkey;277.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Sarah J. Ham against the Louisiana & Northwest Railroad Company and others. Prom judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Jtjby <&wkey;59 — Juby Commissioner — Disqualification of “Officer.”</p> <p>A democratic parish executive committeeman is not an officer, within the meaning of the provision in section 3 of Act No. 135 of 1898, “that no person holding any office under the state or under any parish or municipality therein shall be competent to hold the office of jury commissioner.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 268-^72; Dec. Dig. &wkey;59.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Officer.]</p> <p>2. Jury &wkey;>75 — Discharge of Regular Jurors — Discretion of Judge.</p> <p>Although the defendant, in a criminal case, has the right to exhaust the regular venire before resorting to tales jurors, the judge is vested with some discretion in the matter of excusing or discharging a limited number of the regular jurors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 3S4-390; Dec. Dig. &wkey;75.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Certiorari <&wkey;12 — Prohibition <&wkey;5 — Preliminary Injunction — Dismissal.</p> <p>Where plaintiffs in an injunction suit, after the issuance of a preliminary injunction, move to dismiss the suit at their cost, the application by defendants to this court for writs of certiorari and prohibition in the cause will be dismissed, as there is no suit pending in the district court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Certiorari, Cent. Dig. § 18; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>12; Prohibition, . Cent. Dig. §§ 20-30; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;5.]</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>John Bleeks was convicted of retailing spirituous and intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

J. B. Long was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Town of Rayville, and appealed, and, the judge of the district court having refused to dismiss the appeal, the town applies for a writ of certiorari and mandamus.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Habeas Corpus <&wkey;44, 46 — Jurisdiction-Court op Appeals — Issuance op Writ.</p> <p>One judge of a Court of Appeals may order the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a person in actual custody within the circuit of the court of which he is a member, and two members, constituting a quorum, of the court, may determine the issues presented by the return to the writ (the question whether one member can do so not being here presented or decided); and it is immaterial in such case that the person on whose behalf the application is made is also within the jurisdiction of a district court, and that the judge of such court is present or absent, since the authority of the respective courts and their judges is concurrent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 35, 36; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 44, 46.]</p> <p>2. Habeas Corpus &wkey;j44, 113 — Jurisdiction —Appeal — Court op Appeals — Supreme Court.</p> <p>While the authority of this court and its members to issue the writ of habeas corpus is limited to cases in which the court “may have appellate jurisdiction,” and though, in such cases, the Court of Appeals may also issue such writs at the instance of persons in actual custody within their respective circuits; yet this court, being vested with plenary “control and supervision over all inferior courts,” and being especially authorized to review a decision of a Court of Appeals “in any case,” may exercise that authority in a case arising from the issuance by a Court of Appeals of the writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 35, 102-115; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 44, 113.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3.. Habeas Corpus <&wkey;ll3— Jurisdiction— Appeal — Custody op Child.</p> <p>The appellate jurisdiction of this court extends to, and is exclusive in, all “suits for divorce and separation from bed and board, and to all matters arising therein,” and to all “matters * * * of custody of children”; and the Courts of Appeal have no jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, to review a judgment rendered by a district court in such case. Hence though, upon the hearing of an application for habeas corpus, a Court of Appeals should conclude that a district court had erred in awarding the custody of a child to one or the other of the litigants, it would have no jurisdiction to reverse the judgment and correct the error.</p> <p>But the Court of Appeals may inquire, in such case, whether, in contemplation of law, there has been any judgment rendered of which the party alleged to have been condemned is bound to take notice; and where, as the result of such inquiry, it appears that such party has been condemned without having been cited or having appeared, a ruling to the effect that the judgment of condemnation is as absolutely null as though nonexistent, and is open to that objection whenever invoked or relied on, will be sustained by this court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 102-115; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 113.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Woeds and Phrases — Parties—“Plaintiff’ ’ — ‘ ‘Defendant. ’ ’</p> <p>The “plaintiff” is he who sues another for something he says is due or belongs to him.</p> <p>The “defendant” is one against whom the suit is brought.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions,, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Defendant; Plaintiff.]</p> <p>2. Judgment <&wkey;24iP-DEsiGNATi0N of Parties — Sufficiency.</p> <p>Numerous authorities hold that a judgment expressed to be merely for or against the “plaintiff” or the “defendant” will be sufficient, if the names of the parties thus designated can be ascertained without ambiguity from other parts of the record. •</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 430, 439, 440; Dec. Dig. &wkey;244.]</p>