Volume 136 — United States Reports

The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), was a Supreme Court case that upheld the Edmunds–Tucker Act on May 19, 1890. Among other things, the act disincorporated the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). The LDS Church was represented by its chief counsel Franklin S. Richards and former congressman James Broadhead.

Ejectment. The ease, as stated by the court, was as follows: This action of ejectment was brought to recover certain lands in the village of Sault Sainte Marie, Chippewa County, Michigan, of which the United States claims to be the owner in fee, and the possession of which is alleged to be wrongfully withheld from .the government by the defendant, Thomas Eyan.

<p>APPEALS EEOM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF INDIANA.</p> <p>In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: however, that the statute in question was not in its nature a regulation of commerce; that so far 'as it affected commercial transactions •among the States, its effect was so indirect, incidental and remote as not to burden or impede such commerce, and that it Avas not, therefore, in conflict Avith the Constitution of the United States or any laAV of Congress.

Held: following Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 , that corporations are not citizens within the.meaning of clause 1, sec. 2, of art. IV of the Constitution of the United States declaring that “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” And we also held that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution declaring that no State shall “deny to…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

in Parkins v. Campbell, 5 Martin, N. S. 149, said: “ When a debt, secured by mortgage, is due in several instalments, and the assignee of the second causes the property to… Held: as stated in the syllabus of the case, that “the hypothecary action against the third possessor is not barred by the prescription of ten years, when the principal obligation has been lcept alive, and the mortgage securing it has been properly inscribed and reinscribéd.” In Gentes v. Blasco, 20 La.

Mr. Justice Blatchford stated the case.as follows: This is a proceeding which originated in the surrogate’s court of the county of Tompkins, in the State of New York.

ORIGINAL. This .was an action' of debt, brought in this court, on November 5y 1889, by the.

This was a petition, in the nature of a bill in equity, filed in a court of the State of Missouri by citizens and corporations-of other States, judgment creditors (each of them in the sum. of less than $2500) in behalf, of all the creditors of James B. Melone, of Macon in the State of Missouri, Richard A. Melone and Charles H. Benedict, of Kansas City in that State, and- all three citizens of Missouri, and doing business át Kansas City as partners, under the name of…

This was a bill in equity, filed November 4, ,1885, by a corporation of Michigan against the Simpson and- Gault Manufacturing Company, a corporation of Ohio, Sayler, a citizen of Ohio and assignee of that company, under the laws of Ohio, McGroarty, Simpson, Gault and Fitch, also citizens of Ohio, and Charles, a citizen of New York.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES EOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OE OHIO.</p> <p>This was an action upon a policy of insurance, numbered 2,907,224, against fire for a year from September 5,1885, upon a stock of tobacco in the plaintiff’s warehouse at 413 and 415 Madison Street in Covington in the State of Kentucky. Among the' printed “ conditions relating to the methods of adjustment of loss and the payment thereof,” were the following: . .</p> <p>The tenth condition, after provisions relating to proofs of loss, certificate of .a magistrate, submission to examination on oath, and production of books and vouchers and certified copies ..of lost bills and invoices, further provided: «"When property is damaged, the assured shall forthwith cause it to be put in order, assorting and arranging the various articles according to their kinds, separating the damaged from the undamaged; and shall cause an inventory to be made and furnished to the company of the whole, naming the quantity, quality and cost of each article. The amount of sound value and of the loss or damage shall be determined by agreement between the company and the assured; but if at any time differences shall arise as to the amount of any loss or damage, or as to any question, matter or thing concerning or arising out of this insurance, every such difference shall, at the written request of either party, be submitted, at equal expense of the parties, to competent and impartial persons, one to be chosen by each party, and the two so chosen shall select an umpire to act with them in case of their disagreement; and the award in writing of any two of them shall be binding and conclusive as to the amount of such loss or damage, or as to any question, matter or thing so submitted, but shall not decide the liability of this company; and until such proofs, declarations and certificates are produced, and examinations and appraisals permitted, the loss shall not be payable. There can be no abandonment to the company of the property insured, but the company reserve the right to take the whole or any part thereof at its appraised value.”</p> <p>By the eleventh condition, “it is furthermore hereby expressly provided and mutually agreed that no suit or action against this company for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any court of law or chancery, until after an award shall have been obtained fixing the amount of such claim in the manner above provided.”</p> <p>The answer put in issue the amount of loss; and set up that. the plaintiff had not performed the conditions of the policy on his part; but had refused to submit a difference between the parties, as to the amount of loss, to. appraisal and award as provided in the policy; and, against the defendant’s protest, had sold the property insured, and deprived the defendant of its right under the policy to have, an appraisal.made and to .take the property or any part thereof at its appraised value; and had thereby waived the right to recover under the policy.</p> <p>At the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove the execution of the policy ; a loss by fire on April 16, 1886, occasioned by the tobacco becoming saturated and impregnated with smoke, and thereby greatly damaged ; and proofs of loss, in accordance'with the policy. The only other evidence introduced was a correspondence between the parties at Cincinnati, the material parts of which were as follows :</p> <p>. April 23, 1886. Defendant to plaintiff. “If any claim for loss is to be made under policy No. 2,907,224 of this-company, you will be expected to conform strictly to the conditions of said policy respecting the method of presenting claims for loss; and no' conditions of the policy, or rights of the Liverpool and London .and Globe Insurance Company thereunder, are in any manner waived or abandoned by that company. You will, of course, understand the necessity of not removing or disposing of any part of said stock, upon which loss is proposed to be claimed, pending the settlement of the claim, unless by agreement with the insurance companies.”</p> <p>April 24, 1886. Plaintiff to defendant. “ It is necessary that I should have the room in which the property now is for the purpose of prosecuting my business. I propose to the company, furnishing it with the invoice of the cost or value of the property before the loss, to send the entire stock to be sold at auction.” “ If this is not assented to by the company, I shall be obliged to remove the property from my warehouse and put it in' storage; and, in my judgment, the expense attending it and the disposition of it will considerably increase the amount of the loss. The property is ready for examination by your company. I desire that such examination as you wish to make shall be made at once, and that you will advise me forthwith whether you assent to the sale of the property hy public auction in the manner proposed, as the fairest, and most satisfactory mode of ascertaining, its present value.*”</p> <p>April 24,1886. Defendant• to plaintiff.' “This company' will be pleased to have your claim presented in due course and forn;,'giving” (among other things) “ the amount of loss- or damage you claim on the whole, and also as against this company, as it may be necessary to have the stock appraised by disinterested appraisers after receipt of proofs. We cannot consent to its removal, unless it be at your own expense. It should, if possible, be left where it is, though there can be no objection to your removing it to some other warehouse at your own expense, where it can be readily inspected by appraisers. We cannot consent to your disposal óf it by sale. The matter of determining the value or damage will be one for mutual confeience and agreement.”</p> <p>April 26, 1886. Plaintiff to defendant. “I inclose proof of loss under policy of your, company, with invoice attached, in compliance with the requirements of the policy.” “The-property described and damaged has been invoiced and arranged, and is ready for examination by your company. Such examination must be made at once, for the reason that I am obliged to occupy the premises in the' prosecution of my business, and each day of delay involves considerable logs and expense to me.. As before advised, I propose to send the entire stock to. be sold at public auction in a few days, whereof I will' give you notice. It can be readily inspected in a short time where, it now lies.”</p> <p>April 27, 1886. Defendant’s agent to plaintiff. “ I beg to acknowledge receipt of papers purporting to be proofs of loss under our policies 2,907,224 and .2,823,517.- The same-will have prompt examination and attention. Noting your purpose soon to sell the stock, permit us to say that we protest against such .disposition of it at this stage, and against this -ex fcvrte way of determining the loss sustained. Conditions of our policy provide the manner and mode of determining -the loss or damage; and we hereby formally demand an appraisal of the stock, as to value and damage, under each policy, ¡each - party to name a competent and disinterested party.”</p> <p>April 27, 1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to defendant. “Mr.Hamilton is obliged, for the prosecution of his business, to remove at once the property-covered by the insurance from his ■ factory in which the property was 'insured.” “ I do mot find any provision in your policy,, restricting the assured, under such circumstances, from removing -or selling the damaged property. If you claim that any such provision has that force, I should be glad if you should at once call my attention to it.” “ The property covered by the policy above referred to. will require at least two weeks from this date to remove and bring to sale, and during that time it will be subject to whatever examination you may wish to make.” “ It does not occur to me that there can be any impediment in ascertaining the amount of the loss by an arbitration, in the manner provided by the policy, from the course which Mr. Hamilton indicates that, he proposes to pursue.”</p> <p>April 28, 1886. Defendant to plaintiff’s counsel. “ It may be sufficient tó point out that the appraisement provided by the terms of our policies, in the printed clause referred to, contemplates the possibility of the company exercising .the right therein reserved to take thé property or any part thereof ‘ at its appraised value.’ A sale of .the property prior to such appraisement would' deprive the company of this right. We have refused and still refuse to consent to any disposition of the property, prior to the appraisement, or to any ex pcurte method of fixing the amount of the loss, which our policies-provide shall be determined ‘ by agreement between the company and the assured,’ and by appraisement in case of difference. As to the removal of the property, your client, has stated that the loss would ■ thereby be materially increased. ■You will understand, therefore, that such additional loss would necessarily be borne by him, and not by the company whose protest against such removal has been made. The proposed removal is expressly designed by Mr. Hamilton for -his own advantage in the ordinary prosecution of his business, and the indemnity furnished by insurance does not extend to losses sustained in that direction,. We protest against this-removal,' furthermore, because it takes away from the view of the appraisers the actual surroundings, location and condition of the property at the-time difference of opinion arose, and would thus materially affect the. judgment of the appraisers as to the loss sustained. We ask you for a direct answer to our request, 'for an appraisement, and desire that any further comniunica-. .tion be directed to that, point only-.' You will please take notice that any disposition of the property by sale prior to' the appraisement will be understood and accepted by us as a refusal upon the part of your client to permit such appraisement and as- a relinquishment of all claims under the policies of this company.”</p> <p>April 28, 1886. Defendant, and other insurance companies to plaintiff. “ The' undersigned, representing the several, insurance companies against which you have made claim for' loss under their respective policies of insurance upon stock' in your tobacco factory, Nos. 413 and 415 Madison Street, Covington, Ky., claimed to have been damaged by fire on April 16, 1886, beg leave jointly to take exception to the amount of' claim made, and to demand that the question of' the value of and the loss upon the stock be submitted to competent and disinterested persons, chosen as provided for in the several poli-, cies of insurance under which claim is made; and we hereby announce our readiness to proceed at once with this appraisement, so soon as your agreement to the demand is declared." We further desire jointly to protest against the removal, sale or other disposition of the property, until such an appraisement has been had, and to notify you that the insuring companies will in no way be bound by such ex parte action.”</p> <p>April 29, 1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to defendant and other insurance companies. “ Mr. Hamilton is not endeavoring to obtain any unfair advantage or unfair adjustment of his loss against the companies. He has believed that, in view of the fact that the traffic in tobacco is so large in this city, and substantially all of it, at least ninety-nine per cent of the leaf-tobacco business, is transacted by sale at public auction, that a sale of this tobacco presented the fairest mode of ascertaining its actual value as it stands. It is in- substance and effect an appraisement in detail of every package by the entire trade in this city. But in view of the fact that the insurers seem to demand arbitration by arbitrators, and that you propose to select a competent person, which we understand to mean a man acquainted with the manufacture of tobacco, to act as arbitrator in your behalf; Mr. Hamilton will accede to your proposition, upon the express understanding that the arbitrators selected ?hall have a full opportunity to examine the stock of tobacco, and that it shall then be sold at public auction,.in order that its value thus ascertained, together with such other evidence as either party may desire to offer, may .be presented to the arbitrators before they make their award.” “ If the proposed arbitration is satisfactory, will you at once inform me of the arbitrator selected by you 'and submit to me the form of agreement of arbitration which you propose? Mr. Hamilton will do the like in respect to the arbitrator selected by him.”</p> <p>April 30, 1886. Defendant and other insurance companies to plaintiff’s counsel. “We must insist upon arbitration, in accordance with the terms of our several contracts, without importing into it any conditions as to the sale of the property. Such conditions would be incompatible with, the provisions of our several policies of insurance and the rights of the insuring companies thereunder. As soon as Mr. Hamilton indicates his readiness to proceed with the arbitration called for, we will submit the name of an arbitrator, and also a form of agreement for arbitration.”</p> <p>April 30, 1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to insurance companies. “Mr. Hamilton, and I in his behalf, deny that the arbitration .in the manner indicated is in violation of the terms of any of the policies, or imports any condition into it which the insured is not entitled to insist upon, or which is incompatible with the provisions of the several policies of insurance, or the rights of the insurance companies thereunder. Mr. Hamilton is ready, and has directed me to express his readiness, to proceed at once with an arbitration, which, as he understands it, is in substantial compliance with the arbitration provided for in all the'several policies.” “ I wish to say that, as I understand the expression in my letter of the 29th, that ‘it’ (the tobacco) * shall then be sold at public auction, in order that its value thus ascertained, together with such other evidence as either party may desire to offer, may be presented to the arbitrators before they make their award,’ does not in any wise call upon the companies to consent to a sale of the property. Mr. Hamilton is quite ready to take upon himself the responsibility of selling it. It simply requires that the arbitration shall be commenced before the sale, when the arbitrators may have an opportunity of examining the property, and that the award shall not be made until after the sale has taken place and the assured has had an opportunity to submit the result of it, with other competent evidence, to the arbitrators before the award is made.”</p> <p>May 3, 1886. Insurance companies to plaintiff’s counsel. “¥e herewith enclose a form of agreement for csubmission to appraisers,’ which is in practical accordance with the conditions of the policies of the several companies, and which all the companies are willing to sign and abide by the award reached thereunder. We must again decline to entertain your proposition that the arbitrators,' after examining the stock, shall postpone their award until after the stock shall have been sold, when the result of such sale, with other evidence, shall be submitted to the arbitrators. We insist that the arbitration provided for in such case by our policies is in no sense a court for the hearing of evidence. The appraisers may, in their- discretion, seek any evidence they deem necessary for their own full information, .and the forming of their own judgments as to the value and damage of the goods; but we insist that under the conditions of the several policies there can be no abandonment of the stock to the companies, and that after an award has been reached the companies have the right to take the stock in whole or in part .at their appraised value. The companies propose to stand upon the conditions of their policies, and decline all propositions looking to a waiver thereof, or adding new and inconsistent conditions thereto.”</p> <p>The principal part of the form of submission to appraisers, enclosed in this letter, was as follows: “ It is hereby agreed by Robert Hamilton, of the first part, and the several insurance companies, by their representatives, whose names are hereunto affixed, of the second part, that-- — ^-and--shall appraise and estimate the loss by fire of April 16, 1886, upon the property of Robert Hamilton, as specified below and as hereinafter provided. In case of disagreement said appraisers shall select a third,-who shall act with them in matters of difference only. The award of said appraisers or any two of them, made in writing in accordance with this agreement, pursuant to the terms of the policies, shall be binding upon both parties; but it is understood that this agreement and appraisement are only for the purpose of fixing the sound value of the property before the fire, and the loss or damage 'thereon occasioned by said fire, and shall not waive, invalidate or terminate the right of the insurers to take said property at its appraised value, or any other rights of either party hereto, but the same are to be construed solely by reference to said policies.”</p> <p>May 4, 1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to insurance companies. “There can be no'misunderstanding as to the position taken by the companies and the assured in this matter. 1st. I understand the companies demand that appraisers be selected by the companies and the assured, who shall estimate the loss by their own judgment and without hearing the testimony of witnesses who may be called by either party, and that the parties shall be bound by their report or award as to the amount of the loss thus made. This Mr. Hamilton declines to do. 2d. Mr. Hamilton is willing that the companies jointly, or as they may arrange between themselves, shall make their own appraisement through their own appraisers of the value of the stock, and that they shall jointly, or either of them with the consent of the rest, have the right to take the stock, in whole or in part, at their appraisal. 3d. Mr. Hamilton has made and makes no claim to abandon the property, and he has made and makes no claim that the companies shall consent to the sale by him of. the damaged stock.”</p> <p>Enclosed in this letter, and signed by the plaintiff’s counsel, was the following: “ To the Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Company and the companies jointly acting with it in respect to the loss sustained by Eobert Hamilton on the property in Nos. 413 and 415 Madison Street, Covington, Ky.: Mr. Hamilton demands of the several insurance companies an arbitration of the amount of the loss sustained upon the goods covered by fire on the 16th of April, and will select an arbitrator to represent him in pursuance of the provisions of the policy, it being stipulated in the agreement for arbitration that the several companies and the assured shall be duly notified of the time of the hearing by the arbitrators, and that the arbitrators shall hear all competent legal testimony that may be offered by either party, as well as personally examine the damaged goods, in considering and awarding the amount of the loss.”</p> <p>May 5, 1886. Insurance companies to plaintiff’s counsel. “ Yoúr communication of the 4th is at hand. "We have nothing to add to our letter of the 3d; and if, as we are made to understand, Mr. Hamilton declines to consent to a form of ‘submission to appraisers ’ that does not provide for the introduction of ‘ all competent legal testimony that may be offered by either partj*,’ (under which provision, as you have repeatedly declared, Mr. Hamilton would seek to present evidence based on a sale of the property,) we must accept your communication as a refusal to comply with our request and with the conditions of the policies of insurance, which are clearly incompatible with your wishes in the matter.”</p> <p>May 7, 1886. Insurance companies to plaintiff’s counsel. “ Referring to your letter of the 4th, setting forth your understanding of the' position taken by the two parties, permit me, on behalf of the companies, to take exceptions to your first statement, to wit: ‘ I understand the companies demand that appraisers be selected by tha companies and the assured, who shall estimate the loss by their own judgment and without hearing the testimony of witnesses who may be 'called by either party, and that the parties shall be bound by their report or award as to.the amount of the loss thus made.’ This does not correctly state our position, which remains now as-stated in our communication of the 3d, to wit: ‘The appraisers may, in their discretion, seek any evidence they deem' necessary for their own full information.’ What we do object to and protest against is the sale of the goods, or the consideration by the appraisers of evidence founded on that fact or result. If the form of ‘ submission to appraisers’ we submitted contains any provision or condition limiting or defining the duties of the appraisers and not prescribed by the several policies, each- company will submit its own form, as we desire and demand a submission free from any conditions imposed by either party.”</p> <p>May' 8, 1886. Defendant to plaintiff’s counsel. “ On behalf of.the Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Company, we demand an appraisal of the value of and damage to the goods insured under our policies Nos. 2,823,517 and 2,907,224, issued to Eobert Hamilton, of Covington, Ky., as the same could not be determined by mutual agreement between us, and we take exceptions to the amount of loss and damage as stated in your claim. We herewith submit a form of agreement of submission to appraisers which we deem in strict accordance with the terms and conditions Of our policies, and. upon your assent thereto will be prepared to name our appraiser.”</p> <p>The form enclosed in this letter did not materially vary from that enclosed in the letter of May 3, 1886.</p> <p>May 10, 1886. ' Plaintiff’s counsel to defendant. “ In view of the number and diverse provisions of the several policies upon Mr. Hamilton’s property, and of what has transpired, I do not conceive that the several companies are now entitled each to demand a separate submission to arbitration by Mr. Hamilton. It does not seem to me that any provision in the policies of your company provides for a submission to appraisers in the manner expressed in the form of agreement enclosed; and I have already expressed in the correspondence, upoti the joint demand of all the companies, my reasons for this opinion, and my objections to this form of submission.”</p> <p>May 13, 1886. Defendant to .plaintiff. “Objecting to the amount of your claim for loss and damage under policies 2,823,517 and 2,907,224, we demand, according to condition 10 of the policies, that the differences which have arisen between us as to sound value and loss or damage to the goods covered by said policies shall be submitted, at equal expense between us, to competent and imipartial persons, one to be chosen by each party, and the two so chosen shall elect an umpire to act with them in ease of their disagreement. We name as our appraiser Wm. Spear, of St. Louis,-and upon the naming of your appraiser we will meet you to sign an agreement embodying the provisions of our policies without any conditions. Please take notice that this company reserves-the right to take the whole or any part of the property insured at its appraised' value; and you are further notified that until such an appraisal is permitted and had, our loss, if any, will not be payable.”</p> <p>May 15,1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to defendant. “Mr.-Hamilton adheres to the position taken by him in the joint correspondence between the insurers and Mr. Hamilton and myself in his behalf. Mr. Hamilton has acted upon the conclusion reached in that correspondence, and I do not understand that your company proposes to change its own attitude as taken in that correspondence.”</p> <p>May 20, 1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to defendant. Enclosing a notice in a newspaper of the sale by auction on May 29, 1886, at the plaintiff’s warehouse in Covington, of the tobacco insured by the policy in suit.</p> <p>June 3, 1886. Plaintiff’s counsel to defendant. “ Mr. Hamilton has disposed of the property claimed to have been damaged in the fire of April 16, by sale at public auction, in pursuance of the notice communicated to your company. If your company really desire to submit to arbitration the question of the amount of loss sustained by Mr. Hamilton, notwithstanding all that has transpired, Mr. Hamilton is quite ready now to- submit that question to competent and impartial arbi1 trators. He simply demands, the arbitrators being chosen, that in the agreement for submission it shall be provided that the company and the assured shall be notified of the time of the hearing of the arbitrators, and that the arbitrators-shall hear all competent legal testimony that may be offered by either party, and that a reasonable time shall be prescribed within which an award shall be rendered.”</p> <p>June 7, 1886. Defendant to plaintiff’s counsel. “As you have, in spite of our protest, sold and scattered the goods, so that an appraisement within the terms of our policies is now impossible, and have thereby deprived us of our right to take the property or any part thereof at its appraised value, we must accept your action as a refusal fco accede to our demand for submission of the differences that have arisen between us. By the course pursued, Mr. Hamilton has, in our judgment, waived any rights he may have had under the policies, and this company will stand upon its legal rights in the premises.”</p> <p>The court, after the case had been argued, instructed the jury that it appeared from the evidence that the defendant requested the plaintiff in writing to submit the amount of his loss or damage under the policy to competent and impartial persons, and the plaintiff refused so to do; and instructed the jury to return a verdict for the‘defendant, which was accordingly rendered. The plaintiff excepted to these instructions, and, after judgment on the verdict, sued out this writ of error:</p>

Held: That this was a negotiable promissory note according to the statute of Illinois, where it was made, as well as by 'the general ‘mercantile law; (2) That its negotiability was not affected by the fact that the title to the cars for which it was given remained in the vendor-until all the notes of the same series were fully paid, the title being so *269 retained only by way of security for the payment of the notes, and…

Held: That this clause does not necessarily import that a change of receivers during the life of the policy would work' a change either in title or possession; (2) That the title is not in the receiver, hut in those for whose benefit he holds the property; (3) That in a legal sense the property was not in his possession, but in the possession of the court, through him as its officer.

Held: The constitution of Arkansas of 1868 placed property thereafter acquired by a married woman, whether by gift, grant, inheritance or otherwise, as between herself and her husband, under her exclusive control, with power to dispose of it or its proceeds, as she pleased; (2) The deed by E and her husband to Á’s wife was subject to the constitution of 1868, which made any property acquired by the wife, *301 after it…

Held: to be an unauthorized burden upon interstate commerce. Looking at the nature of the property to which the Kentucky statute had reference, there was no difficulty in the way of the patentee of the particular oil there in question submitting to the required local inspection.

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was denied,, from which-judgment the petitioner took this appeal. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: That under the laws of Louisiana the privilege or lien of the landlord over the crops of the tenant was superior to that of the factor; (2) That the effect of Saloy’s agreement was only the waiver of that priority, and that it did not commit him in any degree to the fulfilment by the Dragons of their agreements with Bloch; (3) That if Saloy asserted his privilege by taking possession of the *339 crops, (which he…

Held: that, no one being prejudiced thereby, this did not estop the father in a suit in Louisiana between him and the assignee, involving a claim to property of the insolvent there, from showing that he was not a citizen of Massachusetts, but a citizen of New Hampshire.

Held: that the New Hampshire Corporation, being a citizen of that State, was entitled to go into the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, and bring its bill there against a citizen of Massachusetts; and that its union or consolidation with another corporation of the same name, organized under the laws of Massachusetts, did not extinguish or modify its character as a citizen of New Hampshire, or give it any such additional…

In equity. The defendants demurred to the bill and it was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

ORIGINAL. On the 5th May, 1890, Mr. Roger M. Sherman filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Kemmler, accompanied by a statement in which he said: “ This is a motion for an original writ of habeas corpus. “ The petitioner is under sentence of death in the Northern District of New York, under a statute of New York, which imposes the punishment of. death by the passing through his body of a current of electricity sufficient, in the opinion of the…

Held: in that case, that the District was subject to the ordinary rules governing the law of procedure between private persons, and was, therefore, embraced by the Maryland statute of limitations of 1715. It is further said that the fee-simple of the streets in the city of Washington is in the United States, and that that fact ■ is entitled to great weight. This point was made in the Barnes Case and distinctly overruled.

Held: that the order must be affirmed. As the commissioner had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the debtor, any errors or irregularities in the proceedings could not be reviewed by the Circuit Court on habeas corpus, or by this court, ' on the appeal. Ha he as Corpus. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William E. Jewell for the petitioner, appellant.

Held: in the. case of Railroad Company v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272 , that the meander lines of the United States surveys were run merely for the purpose of determining the amount, of land for which the purchaser from the United States government should pay, it placed a final negative upon any claim that the meander line' could ever be á state boundary fine.

Held: “ By the law of this Commonwealth, as declared by this court, a dividend made in new stock is ordinarily to be deemed capital.” (c) The New York cases. In 1855, James J., delivering *554 the

This case was submitted by the parties on a stipulation in. which, after reciting the trial and judgment in the court below it was said: “ Now it is conceded by the Attorney General, in behalf of the defendant in error, that the facts in this cause, as shown by the plaintiffs’ bill of exceptions, contained within the record on this appeal, duly filed in the office of the cleric of this court, are, in all substantial respects, the same as the fact^ upon which judgment was…

Held: that the motion should be granted, and the case should be restored to the docket.

The United States, being the real party interested as plaintiffs in error, by their counsel filed the following statement as a brief for the plaintiff in error : “This is an action of ejectment, brought in the Superior Court of Solano County, California, and afterwards removed into the United States Circuit Court, to recover a large body of swamp and overflowed lands contiguous to the mainland of Mare Island, upon which island the United States have a navy-yard, and…

This was an action to recover on bonds and coupons issued by the defendant, a municipal corporation, in aid of the construction- of a railroad.

Held: that the motion must be denied. . This was an action against the postmaster of Chicago and the sureties upon his official bond, the alleged' breach being that he had not accounted to the United States for large sums of money received by him from the sale of postage stamps knd other sources connected with the postal service.

Held: that though it could not take cognizance of the matter under any common law jurisdiction, yet the act of Congress of September 24, 1789, had conferred the jurisdiction, and they proceeded, by virtue of the statute, to exercise it in the case.