Volume 137 — United States Reports

Held: “ Admitting the negligence of the mate, and that the master or owner and the vessel are liable *5 therefor, still if the negligence of the libellant substantially contributed to produce the injury, he could not recover damage therefor.” The Chandos, 4 Fed. Rep. 645 , 649.

Held: therefore, that legislation simply forbidding the defendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action, without surrendering himself to • the jurisdiction of the court, but which does not attempt to restrain him from fully protecting his person, his property and his rights against any attempt to enforce a judgment rendered without due service of process, and therefore…

In equity to recover for the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: on appeal, (1) This court is concluded by the facts found by the Circuit Court; (2) The usage in question is to be presumed conclusively to have been known to.the shipper, so as to have formed part of the bill of lading, and to control its terms, and to have brought the accident within the exceptions therein; (3) It is no deviation, in respect to a voyage named in a bill of lading, for a vessel to touch and stay at…

This was an action for the infringement of two patents for improvements in machinery for unloading grain from railroad cars, issued in 1866 and 1868 to John Dable, and by him since assigned to the plaintiff.

Held: that the assessment, certified to him- (the collector), was his authority to proceed, and, like an execution to a- sheriff, regular on its face, issued by a tribunal having jurisdiction of-the subject matter, constituted his protection.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The court dismisses without costs to either party an appeal, the subject matter of which has been settled elsewhere, leaving only the disposition of costs involved.</p>

ORIGINAL. Not numbered. This was a petition for leave to file a petition for a writ ■ of habeas corptts.

In equity for an infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>In equity. The case, as stated by the court, ivas as follows:</p> <p>It was adjudged below, 35 Fed. Rep. 171, that the- appellees Bacon and Rogers each owned in fee an undivided one-fourth, and the appellant Hennessy an undivided one-half, of certain lands in Washington County, Minnesota, and that partition thereof be made between them upon that basis. Of this decree the appellant complains, his contention being that he holds the legal title to an undivided half of the lands and that the appellees should be required to surrender to him the title to the other half.</p> <p>It appears that the lands originally belonged to George N. Chittenden of Illinois, and that by written contract of date March 27, 1882, he sold them to' Bacon, agreeing' to convey to the latter, his heirs and assigns, “ by a good and sufficient deed of warranty, on or before the 27th day of June, 1882,” upon the punctual payment of the consideration, $4400, at such time as Chittenden should execute a sufficient deed of general warranty. . The contract provided that if Bacon failed to pay the consideration, then the contract should be void, “ time being of the essence of this agreement.”</p> <p>On the 27th of June, 1882, Bacon, — his wife uniting with him, — for the consideration of five hundred dollars,'(of which one hundred dollars was paid in cash,) assigned and transferred to Hennessy all his right, title and interest in the agreement with Chittenden. The contract of assignment provided that Hennessy should receive a good, clear and perfect title to the lands through a good warranty deed, with usual covenants, running from Chittenden and wife to Hennessy or from Bacon and wife to Hennessy, if it should be thought proper to have Bacon and wife take title from Chittenden; also, that Hennessy should pay to Bacon the remainder of the five hundred dollars upon receipt, and only upon receipt, “of such title through such deed to said lands or upon the said Hennessy accepting a deed of warranty ” from Chittenden or Bacon. If Hennessy did not receive such title on account of an incurable defect in the title or other cause, the deposit made b} him was to be refunded.</p> <p>On the day of the execution of the contract between Bacon and Hennessy, the latter made a tender of $4400 to Chittenden’s agent residing in St. Paul, in fulfilment of the contract of March 27, 1882, and demanded a conveyance in accordance with its terms. Hennessy was informed, before making the tender, that Chittenden had not executed the required deed, and it was made then only to preserve his rights under the contract. Shortly after the tender, Chittenden left with his agent a deed, in proper form, to be delivered upon the payment of the price of the land, and of this fact notice was promptly given to Hennessy and Bacon. Hénnessy received in the meantime an abstract of the title, and discovering therefrom that the record did not show a clear, unencumbered title in Chittenden, he sent to the latter’s agent a memorandum of the defects therein appearing of record, and demanded that those defects be remedied. The agent wrote twice to Hennessy, at Dubuque, Iowa, where he resided, urging him to give attention to the matter — stating, in a letter of date of Novemben 6, 1882, that unless some understanding was soon reached he would return the deed to Chittenden, who would probably decline to carry out the sale. Under date of November 16, 1882, he again wrote to Hennessy as follows: “ Yours of 15th inst. received in answer to a previous letter. You instructed me to see Mr. Horn. I immediately saw him and satisfied him as to some of the objections, consulted him as to others, and left the papers with him. He expressed the wish to see you about the matter in order that he might inform me directly and positively what further would.be required to make the title good. I have sought in every way since you went into this transaction to obtain an interview with you or some one authorized to act for you in order to arrive at something definite, and have found it exceedingly difficult to do so. Although instructed to refer me to Mr. Horn, Mr. Kavanagh did not do so until I wrote you, and now that I have interviewed Mr. Horn I find it difficult to reach any result. I am not accustomed to that way of doing business, and cannot say I particularly appreciate, it. I would suggest that the best and quickest way to come to some definite understanding about the matter is for you to meet Mr. Horn and myself at such early time as may be designated by you. Unless this is done by Monday next (Nov. 20) I shall return the deed (which I hold ready for delivery to you) to Mr. Chittenden, and it is doubtful whether he will carry out the same. Allow me to suggest it is part of your manifest duty not to interpose interminable delays to the settlement of the matter, and that if you will appoint the above meeting or designate Mr. Horn or some other person who can act for you in your, absence this transaction can speedily be finished.”</p> <p>The evidence is conflicting as to what passed between the parties after that date. But it is certain that the deed from Chittenden remained in the hands of his agent for more than three years; and that Bacon repeatedly urged Hennessy to* indicate more distinctly than he had done the nature of his final objections to the title, or give up his contract of purchase. Hennessy contended not only that Chittenden’s agent well understood the defects in the title, but that they should be remedied. During all that period the lands were appreciating in value, and by thp fall of 1885 were worth more than $30,000. Finally at the suggestion of Bacon, Rogers determined to buy them, the understanding being that Rogers was to make the purchase, allow Bacon, as commissions, the difference between $5000 and the amount paid- for the lands,' and, when Rogers'got them, he was to give Bacon an interest of one-half upon the latter’s paying half the expenses necessary to clear the title. There was an apparent cloud upon the title of record. It arose out of a mortgage in which Sanborn claimed an interest. Rogers, with knowledge of the contract between Bacon and Hennessy, paid Sanborn $1000 for that interest, and, on the 4th day of November, 1885, took a general warranty deed from Chittenden, paying the latter the sum of $4705.87. Chittenden took from Rogers a bond to indemnify him against any claim and demand made or that might be made by Bacon and Hennessy, or either of them, and against any loss or damage by reason of the conveyance to Rogers.</p> <p>On the 16th of December, 1885, Rogers informed Hennessy by letter, that, Bacon having forfeited his contract, he had purchased the lands from Chittenden, and put his deed on record. He sought by letters á meeting with Hennessy that the matter might be settled between them. The latter, for some time, took’ no notice of these letters, but, at last, he wrote to Rogers, under date of January 21, 1886, saying that, while he was fully assured of the validity of his title to the lands, nevertheless, in the interests of peace and for the sake of avoiding what might prove a long, vexatious, and expensive litigation, to say nothing of the bitterness of feeling usually resulting from such disputes, he was willing to meet Rogers and see if some amicable adjustment of the question between them could be reached. He said: “ I wish it, however, distinctly understood that I do not, by this concession to peace and harmony or good feeling, or any thing that may result therefrom, in any way, shape, or manner, waive any right, or recognize or admit in you, or in any one else, any right, title, or interest, legal or otherwise, in or to the lands in question, or any part thereof, and that I emphatically must oppose, and in the strongest terms, forever, any such right, title, and interest in you and any and every existing person. With that understanding I shall endeavor to meet you for this purpose in the course of the coming week, at such time and place as we may hereafter agree upon. . . .”</p> <p>Hennessy and Rogers finally held a conference, which resulted, March 18, 1886, in a written agreement between them, which recited their respective claims to the lands, and provided: “Now, to settle the same, the said Edward G. Rogers hereby agrees to make and execute to said David J. Hennessy a quitclaim deed of an undivided one-half of said property; and the said Hennessy agrees to execute and deliver.to said Edward G. Rogers a quitclaim deed of an undivided one-half of said property; and also, in further consideration of said deed, to pay said Rogers the sum of ($27-50.00) .two thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars. This settlement to be in full of all claims in favor of said D. J. Hennessy and against one George V. Bacon and one George N. Chittenden growing or arising out of any contracts in regard to the sale or purchase of said- land by said Hennessy from said Bacon or said Chittenden. This agreement to be executed and carried out as soon as possible, and at least within thirty days from this date, if possible. Time is not of the essence of this agreement.”</p> <p>Pursuant to this agreement Rogers made a deed to Hennessy for an undivided half of - the lands, the latter paying therefor the sum of $2750, and - Hennessy made a deed to Rogers for the other undivided one-half. Subsequently, Rogers conveyed one undivided fourth interest to Bacon, and at a later date conveyed to him the remaining one-fourth of his original one-half interest for the consideration of $10,000.</p> <p>.The present suit was brought by Bacon for partition between himself and Hennessy upon the basis of the ownership by each of an undivided one-half interest. Hennessy having alleged in his answer that the settlement of March 18, 1886, was a fraud upon him, Eogers, at Bacon’s request, repurchased, and took a conveyance for, the one-fourth' interest he had sold to Bacon, and, with leave of the court, became a co-plaintiff in the suit with Bacon.</p>

This was an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California discharging, on habeas corpus, the petitioner for the writ, the appellee here, from the custody of the chief of police of the city and county of San Francisco, by whom he was held under a warrant of arrest issued by the police court of that municipality, upon a charge of having engaged in and carried on in that city the business of selling spirituous, malt and…

This was an action of assumpsit against a collector of customs to recover back duties paid under protest. Plea, non assumpsit. A jury was duly waived, and the case submitted to the court, which made the following finding of facts: “ The plaintiffs imported an invoice of cloths popularly known as ‘ diagonals,’ which were classed by the collector as .woollens, and a duty of 35 cents per pound and 35 per cent ad valorem assessed upon them under paragraph 362, new tariff index.

<p>Where jurisdiction has been obtained by service of garnishee process in a proceeding in rem, the court has power to proceed notwithstanding defect in service on the person. ;</p> <p>In such case, objection to jurisdiction over the person, tobe availing, must not be raised in connection with denial of jurisdiction oter the subject matter.</p> <p>The defendant below having denied the power of the court to proceed at all, and upon decision against it having joined issue and gone to trial on the merits, as jurisdiction existed over the subject matter, it was properly maintained over the person, even though the service on the person might have been set aside.</p> <p>Where a foreign corporation is not doing business in a State, and no officer is there transacting business for the corporation and representing it in the State, it cannot be said that the corporation is within the State so that service can be made upon it; and evidence that the president of a foreign corporation so situated was induced by false representations to come within the jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining service of process, and that process was there served, is immaterial, inasmuch as the corporation must be held to have known that it could not be brought into court by such a service.</p> <p>Where an officer of a railroad construction company has full charge for it of the location and construction of a railroad, and is authorized to draw cheeks and drafts, and charged with the general management of the business of .the company in the absence of contrary instructions by the board of directors, notes given by him for moneys used to pay off indebtedness of the company arising in the construction of the road, cannot be held to be in excess of his powers.</p> <p>It was the duty of the directors to give contrary instructions if they wished . to withdraw the general management from the president, and to disaffirm, the action of their agents promptly if they -objected to it.</p> <p>If the notes were endorsed at the request of the party to whom the general management was confided, the indorsee, if compelled to protect his endorsement, cannot be treated as a volunteer, and if he was the superintendent of the work, and the money was raised and used to pay off sub-contractors and material men employed by him, then upon the refusal of the company to pay, he had the right to take up the notes and, have them assigned to him.</p> <p>Compensation for official services rendered in the absence of a specified' compensation, fixed or agreed upon, may not be recoverable, but in this, case it was properly left to the jury to determine whether the services rendered were of such a character and rendered under .such circumstances that compensation could be claimed therefor..</p> <p>. Action on a motion for new trial is not a subject of exception.</p>

Held: prior, to January 9, 1779, was practically revoked by the /terms of the resolution of Congress of that date, which authorized the governor and council of the State of Yirginia to appoint the officers of the new regiment out of those of the Yirginia line who had been “ left out of the late arrangement of the continental army; ” and by his acceptance of the appointment of lieutenant-colonel of the new regiment.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>If a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed Without any reservation as pending cases, all such cases fall with the law.</p> <p>Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56; Wilson v. Nebraska, 123 U. S. 286; Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U. S. 679; and Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, affirmed.</p> <p>Richmond & Danville Railroad Co. v. Thouron, 134 U. S. 45, affirmed.</p> <p>A judgment in a Circuit Court of the United States on a general demurrer . to the declaration in an action removed from a State Court, that the de-' murrer be sustained, and, as the record showed that the court had no jurisdiction, that the cause be remanded to the State Court, is not a judgment to which a writ of error from this court can be maintained.</p>

The case, as stated by the' court, was as follows: This was a libel filed to recover the value of the pilot-boat Mary and Catherine, sunk in a collision, and also of certain personal effects on board of her at the time. The value of the pilot-boat was determined by the Circuit Court to have been $5025, and of the personal effects, all of which were'a total loss, to have been $1032. This made a total valuation, according to the findings, of $6057.

Held: That such a transaction was in violation of sections 2347, 2348 and 2350 of the Revised Statutes; (2) That it was not necessary to the right of the United States to maintain a suit to set aside such patents as void, that the government should offer to refund to the corporation the moneys advanced by it to the patentees in order to obtain the lands, and which the latter paid to the officers of- the United States; (3)…

Jones v. United States 137 U.S. 202 (1890) is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court upheld the constitutionality of the Guano Islands Act, which states that any island that fell under the act was under the jurisdiction of any existing statutes or laws pertaining to high seas. The case originated from claims that the United States government could not prosecute Henry Jones for committing murder on Navassa Island during a riot.

Held: that the whole of the 75-cent tobacco was dutiable at that rate, and that the contents of the bale, as a whole, were not dutiable at 35 cents per pound. The unit upon which the 85 per cent was to be calculated was not the entire bale. The case of Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694 , distinguished.

Held: G. had a lien on the goods, which was foreclosed by the transfer of them to him; *235 (2) G. had a right to treat the goods as his own, so long as the acceptances were outstanding and his lien was unsatisfied; (3) The creditor could not have the relief asked. In equity. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. David Willcox, (with whom was Mr. William S. Opdyke on the brief,) for appellant.

<p>Letters patent No. 244,224, granted to Hamline Q. French, July 12, 1881, for an improvement in “ roofs for vaults ” are invalid, in view of the state of the art, for want of patentable invention, it requiring only mechanical skill to pass to the patented device from what existed before, the question being one of degree only, as to the size Of the component stones.</p> <p>A prior foreign publication is competent as evidence in regard to the state of the art, and as a foundation for the inquiry whether it required invention to pass from a structure set forth in the publication to the patented structure.</p>

Held: That this section is not repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States forbidding a state to pass any law impairing the obligation of - contracts, or to the clause declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law; (2) That, consistently with those clauses, the legislature may prescribe a limitation for the bringing of suits where none previously existed, as…

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>A reissue of letters patent is an amendment, and cannot be allowed to enlarge the claims of the original by including matter once intentionally omitted.</p> <p>Such intentional omission may be shown by conduct, and the inventor cannot be permitted to treat deliberate and long continued acts of- his attorney as other than his own.</p> <p>In this case there is no room for the contention that there.was any inadvertence, accident or mistake attending the issue of the original patent, and the reissue was correctly held to be invalid.</p>

This case arose upon a complaint. filed in the District Court of Weber County, Utah Territory, on the 22d of July, 1885, by James O. Armstrong, the appellee, against Mills H. Beardsley, to foreclose a mortgage of certain chattels, n^ade January 14-, 1885, by Beardsley to Armstrong, as security for the payment of his promissory note of that date to Armstrong, for the sum of $8000, payable in four months, with interest from date at one per cent per month, payable monthly from…

On the 6th day of December, 1889, R. Mason Lisle filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against John R. Lynch, Fourth Auditor, and Benjamin F. Gilkeson,- Second Comptroller, of the Treasury of the United States, and their successors, in the name of the United States, upon his relation, couched in these words: “ 1.

This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of Cecil County, Maryland, by the Grover and' Baker Sewing Machine Company against James Benge and John Benge, who were then citizens of Delaware, by summons and attachment on warrant, which was served on William P. Kadcliffe as garnishee. Badcliffé filed pleas on behalf of the Benges according to the Maryland practice, putting the validity of the judgment in issue.

This was a bill filed in the Chancery Court of Shelby" County, Tennessee, on October 28, 1885, by John Johnson against Thomas L. Risk, L. Tiff Risk, John D. Milburn, H. C. Warriner, Eben L. Risk, a minor, and his guardian, Alice H. Risk, all residing in Shelby County, and Frank L. Duncan and Jennie, his wife, residing in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Held: The instructions of the Treasury Department gave the importer all the rights to which he was entitled, and were not repugnant to that provision of §§ 2902 and 2930 which required the use of “ all reasonable ways and means,” in appraising, and the proper rights of the importer were accorded to him in this case; (2) The question of the dutiable value of the merchandise was not to be tried before the appraisers as if…

Held: Under Rule 21, of § 4233 of the Revised Statutes', the steamer was in fault for not going at a moderate speed in the fog; (2) She was, under the circumstances, bound to observe unusual caution, and to maintain only such a rate of speed as would enable her to come to a standstill,.by reversing her engines at full speed, before she should collide with a vessel which she should see through the fog; (3) The schooner was…

<p>When a person in the émploy of the United States makes an invention of value and takes out letters patent for it, the government, if it makes use of the invention without the consent of' the patentee, becomes thereby liable to pay the patentee therefor.</p> <p>If a person in the employ and pay of another, or of the United States, is directed to devise or perfect an instrument or means for accomplishing a prescribed result, and he obeys, and succeeds, and takes' out letters patent for his invention or discovery, he cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed, plead title thereto as against his employer.</p> <p>When a person in the employ of another in a certain line of work devises , an improved method or instrument for doing that work, and uses the property of his employer and the services of other employés to develop and put in practicable form his invention, and explicitly assents to the use by his employer of such invention, a jury, or a court trying the facts, is warranted in finding that he has so far recognized the obligations of service flowing from his employment and the benefits resulting from his use of the property, and the assistance of the coemployés,.of his employer, as to have given to such employer an irrevocable license to use such invention.</p> <p>McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, affirmed and applied.</p>

The case as stated by the court was as follows: This action was brought in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to recover certain amounts alleged to be due the United States for taxes on “profits” made and realized by the Central National Bank from its business for the years 1866, 1867, 1868, and 1870, — namely, $56,555.69 for 1866, $79,003.22 for 1867, $79,800 for 1868, and $33,750 for 1870 — of which no return was made to the…

Held: that the sums in dispute were sufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction of the case, and this court jurisdiction of .the appeal.

This was an action, brought June 26, 1886, upon a policy of insurance, numbered 3190, by which the Home Insurance Company of New York insured Robert Hamilton for one year from February 23, 1886, on a stock of tobacco in his warehouse at 413 and 415 Madison Street in Covington in the State of Kentucky, against loss or damage by fire to the amount- of $5000, “ to be paid sixty days after due notice and .proofs of the same shall have been made by the assured and received at the…

Held: that this court would not interfere. This was a motion for leave to file the following petition for a writ of habeas, corpus. To the Honorable, The Supreme Court of the United States: The petition of Wright Lancaster, Jno. K. Lancaster, Henry Lancaster, Jas.

At law for the infringement of letters patent. Yerdict for plaintiff and judgment on the verdict. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

At law, for an infringement of letters patent. Yerdict for defendant and judgment on the verdict. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

In equity. Decree for the complainants. Defendant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion. cited: (1) on the question of jurisdiction, Clarke v. Shee, Cowper, 197, 199; Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560, 563; Merrill v. Norfolk Bank, 19 Pick. 32; Bayne v. United States, 93 U. S. 642; Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wall. 16; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211; Root v. Lake Shore &c. Railway, 105 U. S. 189; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190; and (2) on…

In equity for the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that there was no error in these instructions. This was an action against the collector of the port of New York to recover back duties alleged to- have been illegally exacted. Upon the trial there was a verdict for the plaintiff as to a- part of the sum demanded, and for the defendant as to the residue thereof, and judgment was entered on this verdict. Each party sued out a writ of error.

<p>The first claim in letters patent No. 11,208, granted May 27, 1879, to the New York Belting and Packing Company for a new and useful design for rubber mats, viz.: “ 1. A design for a rubber mat, consisting of corrugations, depressions or ridges in parallel lines, combined or arranged relatively, substantially as described, to produce variegated, kaleidoscopic, moire, stereoscopic or similar effects, substantially as set forth,” covers things which were then well known and were not new; and is therefore too broad to be sustained.</p> <p>Claims two and three in those letters patent, viz.: “ 2. A design for a rubber mat, consisting of a series of parallel corrugations, depressions, or ridges, the lines of the said corrugations being deflected at one or more points, substantially as set forth: 3. A design for a rubber mat, consisting of a series of parallel corrugations, depressions, or ridges arranged in septions, the general line of direction of the corrugations in one section making angles with or being deflected to meet those of the corrugations in the contiguous or other sections, substantially as described: ” may fairly be regarded as confining the patentee to the specific design exhibited in his patent and shown in the drawing.</p>

ORIGINAL. This was a petition for mandamus to the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, to take jurisdiction of the suit of Alberto T. Roraback against the petitioner. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>On petition for mandamus to the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, to take jurisdiction of the suit of Samuel A. Herman against the petitioner.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the relief asked could no.t be granted, because such admissions were made after the debtor’s intellect had become so far impaired, that his statements ought not to be the basis of a decree affecting his rights of property, and-because it did not satisfactorily appear from other evidence that he had made false or fraudulent representations to the creditor.

Held: That whether the bill contained the entire .contract between the parties was a question' for the jury; (2) That the bank, having received the money with knowledge that it belonged to C, and that it was to be used in the payment of his liabilities, could not substitute for his instructions the wishes of the party to whom he was remitting the money; (3) That when his instructions were disobeyed and a loss ensued, that…

The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: This case comes before the court on a writ of error, under the act of February 25, 1889, 25 Stat. c. 236, p. 693, to review the decision of the Circuit Court, upon the question of its jurisdiction.

This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was denied by the court below, from which judgment the. petitioner appealed. The case, is stated in the opinion.

Held: that its identification and authentication were perfect and were sufficient to bring the questions raised by the record within the jurisdiction of this court.

Held: under the act of 1862, that the statute included the case of an employé who was engaged in connection with a dirt train, and was injured while loading a car, by the falling of a bank of earth; and in Frandsen v. Chicago, Rock Island &c. Railway, 36 Iowa, 372 , that a person employed as a section hand, in the business of keepipg a certain part of the road in repair, and- going with his coemployés on the track in a…

Held: that the principal of the sum bequeathed to a daughter, who never married, vested in her absolutely, and passed by her will. *522 This was a bill in equity, in the nature of a bill of inter-pleader, for the construction of the will, dated July 1, 1824, of John Tayloe, by which, after providing for his wife, giving an annuity of $1200 to a daughter-in-law, making a devise to a grandson, and devising and bequeathing…

<p>The grant of lands to the Territory of Minnesota by the act of March 3, 1857, 11 Stat. 195, c. 99, and the grant to the State of Minnesota by the act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 526, c. 105, were grants inpraesenti, and took effect by relation upon the sections of land as of the date of the grant, when the railroads were definitely located, both as to so much of the grants as was found within the limits of the State of Minnesota as defined by the act admitting it as a State, and as to so much thereof as was within the limits of the Territory of Minnesota under the territorial organization of 1857, but was not within the limits of the State when admitted as a State.</p> <p>It cannot be safely asserted that it has been the general policy of the United States government to restrain a grant of land made to a State in aid of railways, to lands within such State, when a part'of the line of road extends into one of the Territories.</p> <p>Where the language of .a series of statutes is dubious, and open to different interpretations, the'construction put upon them by the Executive Department charged with their execution has great and generally controlling force with this court; but where a statute is free from all ambiguity, the letter' of it is not to be disregarded in favor of a presumption as to the policy of the government, even thoiigh it may, be the settled practice of the Department.</p> <p>Congress may authorize a territorial corporation to construct a railroad in a Territory, and may make land grants in aid thereof, which will be valid after a part of the Territory becomes a State.</p> <p>The various land grant statutes reviewed.</p> <p>Lands within Indian Territory, covered by said grant of March 3, 1867, passed on the extinguishment of the Indian title.</p>

of the case by the reporter it is said: “ The right of the importer .to complain or appeal begins with the date of the liquidation, whenever that is made.” These quotations abundantly show, we think, that the question as to when the ascertainment and liquidation should take place was not considered by the court at all, further than that it should take place some time after the entry of the merchandise for warehouse.

<p>Merritt v. Cameron, ante, 542, affirmed and followed.</p> <p>A change in the ruling of the Treasury Department whereby merchandise in bond, such as is involved in this case, is held dutiable at a greatly reduced rate, is of no aid to an importer who has not protested against the previous ruling.</p> <p>This was an action against the collector of the port of Philadelphia to recover duties alleged to have been illegally-exacted.' Judgment for the plaintiffs, to review which the defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: ■ (1) That, the plaintiff not having appealed, it was difficult to see why that decree was not a bar in this suit; (2) That it furnished no satisfactory explanation of his laches herein.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action to recover duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. When the cause was reached on the docketargument was begun on the part of the plaintiff in error; but the court interrupted the counsel and declined to hear further argument. The case is stated in the opinion.

This was a motion to dismiss an appeal, on the ground that it “was not taken within the time prescribed by law.” It appeared that the final decree was entered of record by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Dakota, on the 25th of May, 1886.

<p>error to the circuit court of the united states for the SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>Ejectment. The ease is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the bankers were guilty of gross negligence, and were liable to the owner of the bonds for their value at the time they were stolen.

Held: That the defendant in error was not bound to have the case docketed and dismissed if he did not choose to do so; (2) That the motion to dismiss for this cause could be made at any time before hearing, or the court could avail itself of the objection sua sponte; (3) That, as the plaintiff in error was a member of this bar, and notified the clerk in transmitting' the transcript that the case was one of his own, the…

This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground that the petitioner is “ deprived of his liberty without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of the' Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” It appears from'the record annexed to the petition that petitioner was arraigned in the Circuit Court for the county of Calhoun in the State of Michigan, upon an information in the words and figures following, to wit': “Herbert E. Winsor,…

Held: That, under such circumstances it was not proper to allow affidavits as to value to be filed here; (2) That the jurisdictional value was not made out by a preponderance of evidence. Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. W. Hallett Phillips for the motion. Mr. Sawnie Robertson opposing.

Held: That the return showed disputed questions of law and fact, which ought not to be tried in a proceeding for a mandamus, and that this was sufficient cause for the discharge of the rule and the refusal to issue the writ ; (2) That the agreement between M. and the accounting officers was lawful, and, if carried out, would have been proper. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Franklin H. Mackey for the relator.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.</p> <p>This was a petition for dower in a guano island. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, upon the bill of a citizen of Maryland against the Navassa Phosphate Company, a corporation of New York doing business in Maryland, having appointed receivers of all its property within the jurisdiction of the court, Isabella Duncan of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, filed in the cause a petition containing the following allegations and prayer:</p> <p>“ 1st. That she is the widow of Peter Duncan, late of Baltimore-city, in the State of Maryland, and now deceased, having been married to said Peter Duncan on December 19, 1850, and said Peter Duncan having died on January 26, 1875.</p> <p>“2d. That on July 1, 1857, her late husband, said Peter Duncan, discovered a deposit of guano on an island in the Caribbean Sea, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any government and not occupied by the- citizens of any government, said island being called Navassa, and lying in latitude 18° 10' north, longitude 75° west, and that on September 19, 1857, he took peaceable possession and was in occupation of said island in the name of the United States under and by virtue of the act of Congress of August 18, 1856, c. 164, (11 Stat. 119,) and did, on November 18, 1857, file his claim to said island in the Department of State of the United States, in accordance with the provisions of said act of Congress, and did afterwards furnish satisfactory evidence of his said discovery, occupation and peaceable possession to the said Department of State, and in respect to said island so discovered his assignee was declared to be entitled to the rights intended to be secured by said act.</p> <p>“ 3d: That said Peter Duncan remained in lawful possession and was legally seized of said Island of Navassa from September 19,1857, unto November 18, 1857 ; all of which will appear by the said claim of Peter Duncan as discoverer of said island and the affidavit in evidence thereof, on file with the records of the Department of State in Washington, D. C., certified copies whereof are filed herewith as- part of this petition, and by the proclamation of the proper authorities of the United States,” a certificate from the Department of State of the issue of which was also filed with the petition. Said claim and proclamation, and the substance of said affidavit, are set forth in Jones v. United States, ante, 202, 205, 206, 218.</p> <p>“4th. That after remaining in possession and lawfully seized of said Island of Navassa from September 19, 1857, to-November 18, 1857, as aforesaid, and which period of time was-during the coverture of your petitioner, said Peter Duncan did grant and assign and convey his title and interest in said Island of Navassa to E. K. Cooper; and that by mesne assignments the title to said island became vested -in the Navassa Phosphate Company of New York, who now hold said island under and through the title of her late husband, said Peter Duncan, and through no other title; but does not know when said Navassa Phosphate Company became the owner of said island, or who were owners since the death of her said husband ; but she avers that there was a reconveyance of said island to her husband 'about January 1, 1860, and a subsequent conveyance of the same by her husband to E. K. Cooper; but your petitioner has not said deeds of assignment, but believes they are in possession of the Navassa Company.</p> <p>“ 5th. That she has never joined in the execution of any deed for said island, or in any other manner made conveyance or release of her dower interest in the same.</p> <p>“ 6th. That she has been advised that by said act of Congress, the United States assumed jurisdiction of and over said Island of Navassa, and an heritable estate therein vested in her late husband, said Peter Duncan, from the time of his discovery and occupation of said Island of Navassa, and that, by reason of his seizin of said estate in said island during coverture, and alienation of the same without the joining of your petitioner, your petitioner did at the death of her .said husband become by the common law of this land entitled to her dower interest in said Island of Navassa and of the rents and profits thereof; but by reason of legal and other impediments, and through no fault of hers, she has heretofore believed that a demand for said dower would be fruitless.</p> <p>“ That said island is covered largely with a deposit of guano, and the chief or entire profit of the said island consists in the sale of this guano, which constitutes a portion of the soil of said island; and she cannot ascertain in a court of law to how much and in what proportion of the said guano heretofore mined and removed by said Navassa Phosphate Company since the death of her husband she should be equitably entitled, and that all the title deeds are in possession of said Navassa Phosphate Company, and she is and has been since her widowhood unable to proceed at law for an assignment of her dower and accounts; and furthermore, said company being under the immediate charge and control of this court, she is advised that she should ask for relief from this honorable court, which is also the proper tribunal to construe said act of Congress; and that the amount involved exceeds $5000.</p> <p>“ Your petitioner therefore prays that the said Navassa Phosphate Company of New York, and.Thomas M. Lanahan and Walter B. McAtee, the receivers of the samé, may be directed to bring into this court for the inspection of your petitioner all title deeds relating to said Island of Navassa; that they may discover, under oath, to your petitioner, the amount of guano mined and disposed of since the death of her said husband, Peter Duncan, and the net value or profit of the same; and that, to the extent of her dower interest therein, said Navassa Phosphate Company may be declared to have acted as trustee for your petitioner, and to hold the same in trust for her to the extent of her said dower interest, and may be directed to account with your petitioner and pay over to her such sum or amount as this court may find proper; and that this court may assign to your petitioner her dower in said Island of Navassa, or a gross sum as reasonable and just commutation for the same; and may grant such other and further relief as her case may require.”</p> <p>The Navassa Phosphate Company and the receivers demurred to the petition. The demurrer was sustained, and the petition dismissed. 35 Fed. Rep. 474. The petitioner appealed to this court.</p>

This was an action at law, brought in one of the Territorial Courts of Utah Territory, by Edward D. Egan against James T. Clasbey, to recover the value of 14Y5 shares of stock of the Bannock Gold and' Silver Mining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of that Territory, which, it was alleged, had been received by the defendant, in excess of the number to which he was entitled, under the following agreement : “ Salt Lake City, 11 th Sept., 1885.' “ This agreement,…

Held: that the title under this patent did not extend beyond the edge of the stream, and that it did not include an island opposite the tract, and separated from it by a channel of the river which lay between it and the principal channel. This was an action for the possession of an island, embracing about eighty acres of land, in the river Sacramento, within the county of Colusa, in the State of California.

Frank A. Page filed his petition in the Court of Claims on the 31st day of August, 1887, stating: “ I. That he' is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the District of Columbia.

This was an appeal from a decree of distribution, originally pronounced by the Probate Court of Salt Lake County, affirmed by the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Utah,, and again by an equal division of the.Supreme Court of the Territory. The sole question presented for consideration was, whether George H. Cope, the illegitimate child of Thomas Cope, was, under the facts of the case, the. heir of Thomas Cope, deceased.

Motion to dismiss. The case was stated by the court as follows: William Caldwell was arraigned upon the following indictment found by the grand jury of Fort Bend County, Texas: “ In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas. “The grand jurors, good and lawful men of the State of Texas, county of Fort Bend, duly tried on oath by the judge of the District Court of said county touching their legal qualifications as grand jurors, elected, empanelled, sworn and charged…