¶1On Petition for Rehearing.
¶2Appellee advances five (5) reasons in his petition for re-hearing of this cause.
¶3The first three (3) reasons in combination allege that this court has failed to consider other questions of error presented by the appellant. This argument is untenable because it is well settled in Indiana appellate procedure that this court will not consider questions unessential to a determination of the appeal. Bowen, et al. v. Stewart, Administrator (1891), 128 Ind. 507, 26 N. E. 168, re-hearing denied 128 Ind. 507, 28 N. E. 73. It is also established that only one prejudicial error need be presented for reversal. Appleby v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 544, 48 N. E. 2d 646, re-hearing denied 221 Ind. 544, 49 N. E. 2d 533; also see Flanagan, Wiltrout and Hamilton, Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice, §361, p. 362. In the instant case, we have reversed on the error that the trial court wrongly directed the verdict of false imprisonment, and reversal on this error alone, is sufficient.
¶4For. his fourth reason, appellee cites Paris v. Strong (1875), 51 Ind. 339 in support of the proposition that proof of “causing to imprison” cannot be made under an allegation of “to imprison”. The Pariscase, supra, is not authority for appellee’s proposition in that in the Pariscase, supra, plaintiff failed to allege the marriage contract that he was attempting to prove at trial. There was no *134question of an allegation of false imprisonment in the Paris v. Strongcase, supra.
¶5Appellee further contends that we have misapplied Sumner, et al. v. Beeler (1875), 50 Ind. 341, for the reason that the holding in the Sumner case, supra, was based upon an arrest pursuant to a statutue which had been declared unconstitution before the arrest and in the instant case, the. ordinance was declared unconstitutional after the arrest. Here again, appellee’s argument is without merit. The Sumner case, supra,, was cited only for authority that proof of an arrest under an unconstitutional statute is prima facie false imprisonment. Oolitic Stone Co. v. Ridge (1910), 174 Ind. 558, 91 N. E. 944 is the authority cited for the proposition that it makes no difference at which time such statute is declared unconstitutional because if the law is unconstitutional, it is deemed to be so from its inception.
¶6Appellee also claims that the instant case contravenes Batten v. McCarty (1927), 86 Ind. App. 462, 158 N. E. 583, for the reason that in the instant case the Municipal Court judge and the City Attorney had the sole duty to determine whether the affidavit charged any offense. But on the contrary, the Battencase, supra, is authority for the instant case in that in the former, appellee was chargeable for false .imprisonment although he apparently performed fewer acts in causing imprisonment under a void affidavit than the appellee in this case.
¶7Therefore, the petition for re-hearing is denied.
¶8Note. — Reported in 202 N. E. 2d 577. On Petition For Re-hearing Reported in 203 N. E. 2d 834.