Volume 140 — Louisiana Reports

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Marshall Lanis against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Will Williams against the Shreveport Traction Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Rell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. G. Marston and others against the Shreveport Traction Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Dominick O. O’Malley was prosecuted for libel. On refusal of the trial court to pass upon a demurrer to the information or plea to the jurisdiction, defendant applies for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Rule made absolute.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Homestead <@=^151 — Rights oe Surviving Spouse — Community Property.</p> <p>The decisions of this court holding that a surviving partner in community could not claim the benefit of the homestead exemption on his or her undivided half interest, in the community property were rendered prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1879; when there was no expression in the Constitution extending the benefit of the homestead- exemption to the surviving spouse. In the Constitution of 1879 it was expressly provided that the benefit of the homestead exemption might be claimed by the surviving husband or wife or minor children of the deceased beneficiary, and the same provision was retained in the Constitution of 1908 and in that of 1913. Hence it follows that although, as a general rule, the owner of an undivided interest in property is not entitled to the homestead exemption, the surviving husband or wife of a deceased beneficiary is now entitled to the benefit of the homestead exemption of community property by an express provision of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 286-292; Dec. Dig. <3=»151.j</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <@=1211 — Punishment— Successive Ojotenses.</p> <p>Under section 974 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, the judge has no power to sentence the accused convicted of the fourth offense to the penitentiary in misdemeanor cases, and, in such cases, has no power to sentence the accused to perpetual imprisonment in jail, except in cases where double and triple penalties have been previously imposed on him, as provided in said section.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3302; Dec. Dig. <§=1211.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <§=1090(1) — Appeal—Record — Questions Presented eor Review.</p> <p>The appellate court will consider errors patent on the face of the record, when they are suggested by counsel in brief or oral argument.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2653. 2803, 2805-2807, 3204; Dec. Dig. <§=1090(1).]</p>

Ellis, Judge. Giltz Cutrer was charged with assault with intent to commit rape. From an order sustaining motion to quash indictment, the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; T. O. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Leon A. Atzenhoffer against Odile C. Engelbrecht. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Indictment and Information ©=>121(2)— Bill of Particulars.</p> <p>In a prosecution for operating a blind tiger, in violation of Act No. 8 of 1915, the defendant is entitled to be informed, before pleading to the indictment or information, whether he is to be prosecuted for keeping intoxicating liquors for sale or barter or exchange or the habitual giving away of such liquors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. § 317: Dec. Dig. ©=>121(2).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error >@^19 — Prohibition ©==> 13 — Nature oe Remedy — Existence oe Actual Controversy.</p> <p>Prohibition will not lie to prohibit the doing of a thing already done; nor will this court enter into the investigation of a legal question with a view of determining whether an order of a district court which, according to its own terms, has ceased to be operative, should be annulled.</p> <p>[E'd. Note. — Ror other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 63-80; Dec. Dig. <S=j19; Prohibition, Cent. Dig. § 62; Dec. Dig. <§=>13.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana against the Police Jury of Red River Parish. Prom a judgment rejecting its demand, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law @^=>1114(1) — Appeal—Review —Scope and Extent.</p> <p>In criminal cases mere reservations of bills of exception have no legal effect. Where the-record contains no bills of exception, or assignment of errors, and no suggestion, in any form, of error patent on the face of the record, has been made before the appellate tribunal, there is nothing before the court to be reviewed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2918; Dec. Dig. @=»1114(1).]</p>

Action by Samuel Dreyfus and others against the Process Oil & Fuel Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition to Hon. David B. Samuels, Judge of the City Court of the City of Shreveport.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; II. P. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Mattie S. Alexander, individually and as tutrix of Lucius Alexander, against the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law <@=>106 — Corporations <@=>500 — Powers and Liabilities — Representation by Officers — Oommence- . ment of Action.</p> <p>The provision of section 16 of Act No. 267 of 1914, to the effect that the “no exception of want of authority shall lie on the part of any defendant” to any action brought on behalf of a corporation by the authority of its president, vice president, or manager, relates to the remedy, devests no vested right by operating upon pending litigation, and is decisive of the question of the right of a defendant and appellee in this court to urge an exception, filed in the trial court before the passage of the act, and assumed to be leveled at the capacity of the president of the corporation, plaintiff and appellant, to authorize the bringing of the suit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 238, 257; Dec. Dig. <@=>106; Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1912, 1940, 1941; Dec. Dig. <@=>500.]</p> <p>2. Limitation of Actions <@=^104}4, New, vol. 6 ICey-No. Series — Prescription—Computation of Period — Accrual of Cause of Action.</p> <p>The mere pendency of negotiations with respect to a claim for damages for the unauthorized pulling of the timber of another does not operate to suspend the prescription of one year, against the action on such claim, as established by Act No. 33 of 1902 amending and re-enacting Civ. Code, art. 3537.</p> <p>3. Limitation of Actions <©=>197(2) — Prescription — Computation of Period — Ignorance of Cause of Action.</p> <p>This being an action in damages for the un-' authorized pulling, by defendants, of timber belonging to plaintiff, the uncontradicted testimony, offered on behalf of plaintiff, as to the date upon which plaintiff received notice of the depredation, sufficiently establishes that date for the purposes of an exception of prescription, notwithstanding that it appears that the information might have been sooner acquired but for the fact that the ownership of the particular timber in question had been overlooked.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 724; Dec. Dig. <@=>197(2).]</p>

Wortham, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Richard McCall. Proceeding by rule by Putnam & Norman, Limited, against Emile Legendre, executor, to set aside an order of sale. Prom a judgment denying the relief demanded by the plaintiff in rule, he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Evidence &wkey;>596(l) — Documentary Evidence-Signature.</p> <p>In a suit depending upon the genuineness of the signature to a private writing, if the alleged signer disavows the signature, the burden is on the party relying upon the instrument to prove the signature by a preponderance of evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2446; Dec. Dig. &wkey;596(l).]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error i&wkey;842(9) — Review — Scope and Extent.</p> <p>Whether the proof of the genuineness of a disputed signature on a private writing conforms with the requirements of article 325 of the Code of Practice and article 2245 of the Civil Code involves a question of law as well as a question of fact.</p> <p>[E'd. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3328; Dec. Dig. <®=>842(9).]</p> <p>3. Evidence <&wkey;596(l) — Documentary Evidence — Authentication—Signature.</p> <p>Where the private writing bears a cross mark purporting to represent the signature of the alleged obligor, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness that he saw the alleged obligor make the cross mark or hold or touch the pen with which it was made cannot prevail over the denial of the latter on oath.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2446; Dec. Dig. t&wkey;>596(l).]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>4. Homestead <&wkey;181(l, 2) — Waiver — Evidence-Burden of Proof — Sufficiency.</p> <p>When, in a proceeding to enforce an alleged waiver by a wife, of her homestead, to which her “mark,” instead of her written signature, appears to be attached, the wife denies that she made the mark, the plaintiff in the proceeding is not restricted to the proof required by article 325 of the Code of Practice, which is inapplicable in such case; nevertheless, the burden of proving the genuineness of the mark rests upon him who asserts it, and, in view of the facts that a mark may be forged more readily than a written signature, and that the person who binds himself thereby may, by reason of his illiteracy, more readily fall into error, or be deceived, the proof in such case should leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the fact to be proved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 351, 352; Dec. Dig. &wkey;181(l, 2).)</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>5. Appeal and Error <&wkey;382 — Proceedings for Transfer of Cause — Bond.</p> <p>Under Code Prac. arts. 574, 575, requiring the bond for a devolutive appeal to be in an amount fixed by the judge and the bond for a suspensive appeal to be in an amount exceeding by one-half the amount for which the judgment was given, where a party takes both a suspensive and devolutive appeal, the bonds therefor may be cumulated in a single bond in the sum of the amounts required in each appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2038, 2039; Dec. Dig. &wkey;5 382.]</p> <p>6. Appeal and Error &wkey;>465(l) — Proceedings for Transfer of Cause — Bond.</p> <p>Under Code Prac. art. 575, requiring the bond for a suspensive appeal to be in an amount exceeding by one-half the amount for which the judgment was given, costs are not included in the judgment in computing the amount of the bond.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. §§ 2235-2238; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 465(1).]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Patrick Connelly against the Southern Pacific Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

C. W. Ellis (in 20764) and Fred D. King (in 20765), Judges. Actions by the Frank I. Abbott Lumber Company against the Home Insurance Company, and by the same plaintiff against the iEtna Insurance Company. From judgments for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

<p>James M. Thompson and another were prosecuted for libel. Demurrer to the information on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction was overruled, and defendants apply for writs of prohibition and certiorari to Hon. John E. Fleury, Judge of the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson.</p>

<p>Appeal from Juvenile Court, Parish of Orleans; Andrew H. Wilson, Judge.</p> <p>Henry J. Casey was convicted for nonsupport of his infant child, and appeals.</p>

Henry Jackson applies for a writ of certiorari, to review the refusal to quash an indictment, and for a writ of prohibition.

Action by John W. Westerfield against the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans and others. Application by plaintiff for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Master and Servant <@¿3107(2) — Injuries to Servant — Saee Place to Work.</p> <p>It is the duty of the employer to give to the employé a safe place in which to work. And a pile of lumber on the wharf of the city of New Orleans, piled in the ordinary way, is a safe place, particularly where the employé is an experienced longshoreman, familiar with loading lumber from the wharf onto a vessel adjacent thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 200, 254; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 107(2).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Courts <&wkey;200(7) — Appellate Courts — Original Jurisdiction — Hearing—Reception oe Evidence.</p> <p>Under article 85 of the Constitution, this court may exercise such original jurisdiction as may be necessary to enable it tQ determine questions of fact affecting its jurisdiction in any case pending before it or may remand the case for the hearing of evidence concerning such questions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 612; Dec. Dig. &wkey;206(7).]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error &wkey;>781(7) — Dismissal-Grounds.</p> <p>Where, pending an appeal to this court from a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action and dismissing a suit, brought, under the general law, for damages for personal injuries, on the ground that it should have been brought under the Employers’ Liability Act (Act No. 20 of 1914), the plaintiff brings a suit, under that act, for damages for the same injuries, and submits his case under an agreement with defendant as to the judgment which shall be rendered, and such judgment is accordingly rendered, and plaintiff, through his counsel, is paid, and acknowledges payment in full and satisfactory settlement thereof, he cannot thereafter be heard to offer evidence with a view of injecting into said judgment conditions and understandings not therein expressed, and can no more prosecute his claim in the one suit than in the other, since both wore necessarily terminated by the full and satisfactory settlement of the judgment rendered at his instance; and hence, upon the production in this court of duly certified copies of the proceedings, judgment, and satisfaction of judgment, in the second suit, the pending appeal in the first suit will be dismissed, without remanding the case for evidence such as that above referred to.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3122; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;781(7)J</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Henry Cahn against the City of Shreveport. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Action by James J. Costello against the Southern Publishing Company, Incorporated. Application by the defendant for writs of mandamus and prohibition on refusal to allow suspensive appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Statutes <@=^123(4) — Subjects and Titees— Constitutional Provision.</p> <p>The title of Act No. 199 of 1916, to amend certain sections of Act No. 183 of 1914 (relative to the construction of public roads in road districts), is a substantial compliance with- the requirement of article 31 of the Constitution, reading:</p> <p>“Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed' in its title.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 178, 179, 181; Dec. Dig. 123(4).]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Certiorari from Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans. Suit by R. H. Ketteringham against the Eureka Homestead Society, Alfred Salzer, and another. Certiorari on relation of Salzer to review judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming judgment of the district court for plaintiff.

<p> (Syllabus by the Qourt.) </p> <p>Master and Servant «>=3302(6) — Injuries to Third Persons — Liability.</p> <p>Where a man, experienced in the business, is employed to pump an oil well, and, for his own convenience and that of his family, but without the knowledge of his employer, he installs a bath tub in the engine room, Ms sister, living as a member of Ms family, has no right of action against his employer for personal injuries sustained by her in consequence of her falling into the machinery whilst using such room for bathing purposes; and, the less so, when the accident resulted from her brother’s neglect to replace safeguards which he, himself, had removed; nor would it affect the question that the employer was informed, prior to the accident, that the engine room was so being used, there having been no invitation, express or implied, from him to use it in that way, and the person injured having been, at most, a mere licensee to whom he owed no duty with respect to the safety of the premises, save that of not, knowingly, allowing her to run upon a hidden peril, or willfully causing her harm.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1220; Dec. Dig. <§=s 302(6).]</p>

<p>Action by William F. Hanby against the Texas Company, in which the Lake Front Oil & Gas Company intervenes. Application by the intervener for certiorari or writ of review.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Attorney and Client @=>113 — Mutual Rights and Liabilities — Contracts.</p> <p>Where an attorney at law, by fraudulent misrepresentation, induces a client to enter into a contract purporting to be one of loan and mortgage, in the belief that it is to operate merely as a security for tlie execution of another similar contract, and it appears that he was also acting as the attorney of the other contracting party, with whom the proceeds of the loan were divided, and the mortgagor obtained no part thereof, the contract will be avoided, for error, save in so far as it may operate as a security, in the manner contemplated by such mortgagor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 229; Dec. Dig. @=>113.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Statutes <&wkey;162 — Taxation <&wkey;310 — Parishes— Compensation oe Assessors — Statutory Provisions — Implied Repeal.</p> <p>A special law creating a political corporation and fixing the compensation of certain public officials in that particular district or subdivision of the state is not repealed by implication or superseded by a general law fixing the compensation of such officials throughout the state generally and repealing all laws or parts of. laws in conflict therewith, because the application of the special or local law on the subject dealt with in the general law to the officials within the district for which the special law was enacted does not conflict with the application and effect of the general law throughout other parts of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 235-237; Dec. Dig. &wkey;162; Taxation, Oent. Dig. §§ 511-513; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 310.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Thomas McC. Hyman against the succession of William S. Parker-son. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals..</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Suit by Alfred F. Page against W. F. Pinckard, president of the Business Men’s Racing Association, Incorporated, and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals, and defendants move to dismiss the appeal.

Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge. Application, by the State, on the relation of Joseph P. Colomb, for writ of mandamus to J. G. St. Julien, Clerk and ex officio Recorder, and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

<p> {Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Venue <S=>5(4) — Revocatory Action — “Local Action.”</p> <p>Code Prac. art. 162, establishes as a general rule that suits must be brought in the courts of the defendant’s domicile; and articles 164 and 165 recognize exceptions to such rule embracing “local actions,” being those in which the subject or thing to be recovered is in its nature local or has a permanent situs, though the common-law division into local and transitory actions is not known in the civil law. Article 163, as amended by Act No. 64 of 1876, requires suits for provisional seizure and sequestration to be brought in the jurisdiction of the place where the property is situate, and confines the judgment to the property provisionally seized or sequestrated. Held, that a revocatory action to set aside a mortgage upon real estate situated in a parish other than that in which defendant resided was an action to obtain the restoration of the estate of a debtor, and, though not expressly included among local actions or actions in rem, was properly brought in the parish where the realty was situated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Venue, Gent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. <®=>5(4).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Local Action.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <@=3780(1) — Dismissal-Determination op Motion.</p> <p>Where a judgment is, in its nature, appealable, and an appeal has been granted and perfected, the right to be heard thereon does not depend on the merits of appellant’s case, which are to be determined on the hearing, and not upon a motion to dismiss.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3121; Dec. Dig. <@=3780(1).]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Schools and ScnooL Districts <@=>2 — Private Schools — Incorporation—Powers op Trustees.</p> <p>A corporation organized by the Legislature for educational purposes in a particular parish, for the benefit of the people of that parish, and the same act names certain persons as incorporators, to be known as “trustees,” does not confer On the incorporators any proprietary rights whatever in the property of the corporation. The trustees have the power -to administer the affairs of said corporation to the exclusion of every other person during the life of said corporation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. <@=>2.]</p> <p>3. Corporations <@=>621(2) — Receivers — Right to Appointment.</p> <p>When a corporation has become defunct, any individual who-has an interest therein may ask for the appointment of a receiver in the court of the district where the property is located.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2465, 2471; Dec. Dig. <@=3621(2).]</p> <p>4. Corporations <@=3621(1) — Receivers—Appointment-Power op Court.</p> <p>Where plaintiff alleges the necessity of the appointment of a judicial liquidator to a defunct corporation, and the defendant alleges that the corporation has been dissolved, and that there are funds belonging to said corporation; and there is no provision in the charter for the liquidation of its affairs, the court may proceed to the appointment of a receiver, or a judicial liquidator, on the face of the papers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2461-2464, 2471; Dec. Dig. <@=3 621(1).]</p> <p>5. Corporations <@=>621(4) — Receivers — Right to Appointment.</p> <p>When an applicant to be appointed judicial liquidator to a defunct corporation is charged with having maladministered the affairs of said corporation, the application is properly refused.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2467, 2471; Dec. Dig. <@=>621(4).]</p> <p>6. Statutes <@=>80(1) — Local and Special Laws — Liquidation op Corporation.</p> <p>Act No. 24, 1915, p. 55, which authorized the board of school directors of Caldwell parish to cause a judicial liquidation of a defunct corporation, is not violative of article 48 of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 86; Dec. Dig. <@=80(1).]</p> <p>7. Constitutional Law <@=249 — Equal Protection oe Law — Liquidation oe Corporation.</p> <p>The act does not deny to the trustees of the Pine Grove Academy, or the creditors of said corporation, the equal protection of the laws of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 710; Dec. Dig. <@=249J</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <§=737(2), 1158(1) — 'Venue —Question oe Fact — Determination by Court.</p> <p>Although the question, in what parish the offense was committed, is a question of fact, it does not pertain to the guilt or innocence of the accused. There is no constitutional prohibition of the right of the trial judge or of the supreme court to decide questions of fact that do not pertain to the question of guilt or innocence of the person accused, when such questions are properly presented, in a criminal prosecution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1706, 3070, 3071, 3074; Dec. Dig. <§=737(2), 1158(1).]</p> <p>2. Criminal Daw <§=Eí76 — Víenue—Determination.</p> <p>The requirement of article 9 in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of this state, “that all trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense was committed, unless the venue be changed,” guarantees the defendant in a criminal prosecution, not merely that he shall not be convicted in any other parish than that in which the offense was committed, but that he shall not be tried in any other parish. Therefore, to have the benefit of that constitutional guaranty, a person accused of a crime has the right to have the question of venue or territorial jurisdiction of the trial court decided by the judge before being put on trial for the alleged offense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 636, 637; Dec. Dig. <§=276.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <§=276 — Venue—Determination.</p> <p>The constitutional guaranty is not that all criminal trials shall take place in the parish wherein the offense is alleged in the bill of indictment or information to have been committed, but that all criminal trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense was committed. Therefore the allegation in the indictment that the crime charged was committed in the parish in which the indictment is presented may be traversed by the defendant’s filing a plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court or a motion to quash the indictment, alleging that, if the offense charged was committed at all, it was committed in another parish than that alleged in the indictment. And, on tz-ial of such a plea, the defendant has the right to introduce evidence to contradict the allegation that the alleged offense was committed in the parish in which the indictment is presented, and to have the question determined, not on the face of the indictment, but from the evidence adduced on the preliminary trial of the plea to the jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 636, 637; Dec. Dig. <§=276J</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <§=107 — Venue—Constitutional and Statutory Requirements.</p> <p>When the Act No. 121 of 1855 was adopted, there was no constitutional requirement that all criminal trials should take place in the parish in which the offense was committed; the only requirement in that respect was the provision of article 103 of the Constitution of 1852 that the accused should have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage. Therefore section 12 of the statute, providing that, under certain circumstances, a criminal trial might be had in another parish than that in which the offense was committed, was valid legislation, until it was repealed by article 105 of the Constitution of 1864, declaring that the accused pei’son should have a speedy public tx*ial by an impartial jury of the parish in which the offense was committed. As that provision of the Constitution of 1864 was embodied in article 6 of tlie Bill of Rights in the Constitution of 1868, the re-enactment of the provision of section 12 of Act No. 121 of 1855, as section 988 of the Revised Statutes, approved March 14, 1870, was of no effect, in so far as it contravened the provisions of the Constitution. That section of the Revised Statutes is yet null and of no effect in so far as it conflicts with the guaranty retained in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1879, of 1898, and of 1913, that all trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense was committed, unless the venue be changed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 219; Dec. Dig. <@=>107.]</p> <p>5. Libel and Slander <@=>151 — Action — Venue — * ‘Publish. ’ ’</p> <p>The word “publish,” with refex-ence to the crime of defamation by publishing a libelous article, has a technical meaning, to exhibit or expose the libelous matter. In tliat sense, each and every delivery, exhibition, or exposure of the libelous article may constitute a separate offense. But the wox'd, “publish,” has also a commonplace meaning, with reference to publishing a newspaper, magazine, or book. When the indictment accuses the defendant of having committed the crime of defamation by publishing a newspaper containing a libelous article, it does not follow that the mailing or delivery of a copy of the newspaper to each and every subscriber or purchaser was a separate offense on the part of the proprietor or publisher of the newspaper, or that a separate and distinct offense was committed in each and every jurisdiction into which the newspaper found circulation. The offense committed by the proprietor or publisher of the newspaper in such a case is but. one offense, for which his liberty can be put in jeopardy only once. The parish in which the offense was committed by the proprietor or publisher of the newspaper, if the article published was libelous, is that in which the newspaper was printed and published, and the prosecution should take place in that parish only (quoting Words and Phrases, Publication).</p> <p>(Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 415; Dec. Dig. <@=>151.]</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., dissenting.</p>

<p>W. J. Leppert was accused of crime, and appeals for writs of certiorari and prohibition.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Action by M. Borne against the Alexander Hardwood Company, Limited. From a judgment amending, the final account of the receivers of defendant and order of distribution of the funds of the corporation, the Union Bank & Trust Company and others appeal.

urt, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge. .Action by the State against J. S. Richardson and others. From a judgment for defendants, the State appeals. The following is the sketch referred to in the opinion:

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Railroads ¡@=>9(2) — Regulation—Operation or Trains.</p> <p>When a railroad company makes application to the Railroad Commission to be permitted to take off a train that runs on the main line and on a branch line, and to substitute for it another train running further on the branch line but not at all on the main line, and the commission orders the railroad company to put an additional train on the branch line without talcing the train off of the main line, and the railroad company files suit to have the order of the commission rescinded, and thereafter the railroad company makes another application to be permitted to take off the train on the main line, and the application is granted, the railroad company, having then all the relief originally asked for, is not entitled to have the first order of the commission rescinded.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 17-19; Dec. Dig. c@=^9(2).]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Euzebe Guillory and others were convicted, and appeal.</p>

Suit by tbe City of Gretna and others against James J. Bailey, Secretary of State, and another, wherein, after injunction was granted, defendants applied for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus l>y the Court.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <@=>333(1). — Operation —Accident .at Crossing — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>It is negligence per se for a traveler, seeing the rapid approach of a fast passenger- train, to attempt to cross the track a short distance in front of the locomotive.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1080, 1083; Dee. Dig. <@=>333(1).]</p> <p>2. Railroads <§=>333(1), 335(5) — Operation-Accident at Crossing — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>In such a case the belief of the deceased that he could cross in safety is no excuse for his negligence; and prior negligence in the operation of the train does not affect the situation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1028; 1080, 1083; Dee. Dig. <§=> 333(1), 335(5).]</p>

<p>Action by Mrs. Georgina Richard against Paul B. Habans. Application by plaintiff in the Supreme Court for writ of mandamus against A. T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p>

<p>Succession of Sarah Cosner. Application for writ of mandamus by George N. Cosner, Jr., Tutor.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish Df Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William Maekay against John J. Pendergast. From a judgment for plaintiff for $50, he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts <§=>224(9) — Appellate Jurisdiction -Subject-BIatter of Controversy.</p> <p>Where the matter in dispute is the right of the mayor, board of aldermen, and marshal of a village to hold their respective offices for a year longer, and the record does not show the pecuniary value of such offices, the cause will be transferred to the proper Court of Appeals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 617; Dec. Dig. <§=>224(9).]</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of La Salle; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>Action by Granville E. Clark against the Tall Timber Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Orleans-Kenner Electric Railway Company against J. W. Skidmore and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Louis Abadie against Louis Re-court and others. From a judgment for plaintiff against defendant Recourt, he appeals.</p>

Wilson, Judge. Arthur Dunn and another were convicted of being delinquent children, and of having committed petty larceny, and appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error @=>1011(1) —.Review — Questions op Fact-Findings.</p> <p>In a suit for damages for personal injuries, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff will not be disturbed, where the testimony is conflicting and irreconcilable, and the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, and his findings do not appear to be clearly wrong.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see. Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3983-3988; Dec. Dig. <^=> 1011(1).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Railroads @=>350(6) — Operation — Accidents at Crossings — Question of Fact.</p> <p>It is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence whether a railroad train, moving within municipal limits, was being run at a rate of speed unsafe and dangerous to the public; so as to amount in law to an omission to use reasonable care.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1160; Dec. Dig. @=350(6).]</p> <p>2. Railroads @=316(2) — Operation—Accidents at Crossings — Care Required.</p> <p>The rule, that the highest rate of speed consistent with the safety of their passengers is permissible to railway trains, has its exceptions, and one of these arises where a train enters the limits of a city or town where people congregate and pass to and fro in numbers. Then it is for those in charge of a train to have a duty for those in the inside and also for those on the outside.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1007; Dec. Dig. @=316(2).]</p> <p>3. Railroads @=327(1) — Operation — Accidents at Crossings — Contributory Negligence — Care Required.</p> <p>It is the duty of one approaching a railroad crossing in the country, or in a sparsely settled village, to stop, look, and listen before crossing the track.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1043,1045; Dec. Dig. @=327(1).]</p> <p>4. Negligence @=80 —Action— Contributory Negligence — Effect.</p> <p>Where one contributes to an accident,-he may not recover damages against the defendant, who may have been negligent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 84, 85; Dec. Dig. @=80.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Theard, Judge.</p> <p>Proceedings by the ■ State, on the relation of the Employers’ Liability Corporation, Limited, against John Fitzpatrick, State Tax Collector. From the judgment, an appeal is taken.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; John B. Holstead, Judge. D. B. Garland was convicted of a misdemeanor, and he appeals, and in respect to the suspension of the sentence the State also appeals.

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,against Joseph Charpentier. From a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners against Adam Vincent. Prom a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Proceeding by the State against Vincent Tambera for forfeiture of his bail bond. On refusal to set aside forfeiture, Prank Defatta applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Homicide @=166(3) — Evidence—Motive-Rebuttal.</p> <p>In a trial for murder, wherein defendant called his wife, who testified that she informed him as he was about to leave the house on the day of the homicide of what had taken place the night before between their daughter and the deceased, a question by the state as to whether she told another in the afternoon of that day that there had never been any trouble between deceased and her family was in rebuttal, and properly allowed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 323; Dec. Dig. @=166(3).]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law @=730(8) — Appeal—Harmless Error — Argument.</p> <p>In a trial for murder, where the prosecution sought to introduce accused’s statement before the coroner’s jury, which was excluded because not a voluntary statement, and, after accused testified in his own behalf, sought to impeach him by showing that he had made a different statement before the coroner’s jury to which the same objection was made, the district attorney’s remarks, in the presence of the jury and while having before him the proceedings at the coroner’s inquest, that accused’s statement there was “entirely different” from that made by him at the trial, notwithstanding the court’s instruction to disregard such remarks, was reversible error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1693; Dec. Dig. @=730(8).]</p> <p>3. Witnesses @=393(3) — Impeachment — Statements oe Accused — Voluntary Character.</p> <p>If the accused’s statement before the coroner was made under duress, accused was entitled to have it entirely excluded from the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — -For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1254; Dec. Dig. @=393(3).]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Mike Buchanan was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

Wilson, Judge. Charles Trapp was convicted of permitting a girl aged 14 years to serve in a barroom conducted by him, and appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Deeds <§=65 — Sales—Acceptance by Going into Possession.</p> <p>The going into possession by the purchasers of land shows an acceptance of the deed by them which supplies the absence of their signatures thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 144; Dec. Dig. <§=65.]</p> <p>2. Evidence <§=265(10) — Conclusiveness— Admission by Plaintiff.</p> <p>In suit for land by parties claiming under the father of one of them against party claiming title under the grantee of the father, the admission by a plaintiff, in answer to interrogatories which he thought had been propounded by his own lawyer, that he did not purchase the property or pay anything for it, but acquired it by inheritance, made out the case of defendant, who had regularly paid taxes on the property, wild land, for 40 years.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 1038; Dec. Dig. <§=265(10).]</p> <p>3. Trial <§=58 — Admission by Plaintiff-Withdrawal.</p> <p>Such admission by a plaintiff could not be withdrawn by him to defendants’ prejudice on the ground that it was made thoughtlessly.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 137; Dec. Dig. <§=58.]</p> <p>4. Evidence <§=265(17) — Admission of Plaintiff as Affecting Title of Coplaintiffs.</p> <p>In such suit, the title of the other plaintiffs, as established by their recorded deed, could not be overthrown by the admission, especially after its retraction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 1049; Dec. Dig. <§=265(17).]</p>

Sandlin, Judge. S. C. McGarrity was indicted for murder, and from judgment sustaining his motion to quash the indictment on the ground of former jeopardy and for irregularity in the composition of the grand jury, the State appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jeff D. Neely against the Texas & Pacifiic Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Defendant appeals from ruling on sufficiency of surety, and brings certiorari. These matters were consolidated.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. Frankel and others against the Morse Timber Company, Limited, and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Mrs. Caroline Woolfarth Schenkel Zeller. From a judgment homologating the account of the executor, appeal is taken.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Piftli Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; W. S. Rownd, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Benjamin Guy Painter, against the Bank of Osyka. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Corporations &wkey;482(l) — Functions and Dealings — Contracts—Performance.</p> <p>Where payments of interest are made annually, in accordance with a written contract, by the president of a corporation on a debt due by the corporation, the payments are presumed to have been made by the company and not by the president in his individual capacity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1718, 1726, 1743, 1762; Dec. Dig. @=>432(1).]</p> <p>2. Limitation of Actions @=>157(3) — Prescription — Operation—Payment of Interest.</p> <p>The payment of interest on a promissory note interrupts prescription.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 633; Dec. Dig. @=> 157(3).]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; W. S. Rownd, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Miss Fannie C. Painter against the Bank of Osyka. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Commerce &wkey;>61(l) — Statutes <&wkey;114(l)— Subjects of Regulation — Liquor Traffic —Titles of Acts.</p> <p>Act No. 23 of 1915 (Ex. Sess.), regulating the shipment of intoxicating liquors into a prohibition parish, held not to violate either the state or federal Constitutions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 81, 89; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>61(l); Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 145; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;114(l)J</p> <p>2. Indictment and Information <&wkey;125(20) — Joinder of Offenses — Disjunctive Offenses.</p> <p>Disjunctive offenses may be joined in the same count, and the defendant convicted of either or both.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. § 351; Dec. Dig. &wkey;125(20).]</p> <p>3. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;139 — Offenses —Ordering or Receiving Shipment.</p> <p>The ordering or receiving of a shipment of intoxicating liquors in a fictitious name is penalized by section 8 of Act Ño. 23 of 1915 (Ex. Sess.).</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Gent. Dig. § 149; Dec. Dig. <§=>139.]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;1149 — Indictment and Information <§=>121(1) —Appeal—Discretion of Trial Court — Bill of Particulars.</p> <p>The granting of a bill of particulars is_ a matter left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, and its refusal furnishes no ground for reversal, unless resulting prejudice be clearly shown.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3039-3043, 3058; Dee. Dig. <§=>1149; Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. § 316; Dee. Dig. &wkey;121(l).]</p>

C. Weber, Judge ad hoc. Action by Manuel Coguenhem against the Himalaya Planting & Manufacturing Company and others. On intervention and third opposition of the Texas Oil Company and others. From the judgment plaintiff and others appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;361 (2) — Interest-Right to Perfect.</p> <p>It is incumbent upon an appellant, appealing from a judgment or order rendered in proceedings to which he was not a party, to disclose, in his petition for the appeal, that he is aggrieved by the judgment or order complained of, and that a reversal of the judgment would be of advantage to him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1943, 1948; Dec. Dig. <&=> 361(2).]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;437 — Taking op Appeal — Devolutive Appeal.</p> <p>The taking of a devolutive appeal implies the right to have the judgment or order appealed from executed pending the appeal. The validity of a sale made by a sheriff by virtue of a writ of seizure and sale in executory proceedings, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot he affected by a reversal of the order of seizure and sale on a devolutive appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2193-2195; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 437.]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;361(4) — Perfection of Appeal — Interest—Petition.</p> <p>One who alleges, in his petition for a devolutive appeal from an order of seizure and sale granted in executory proceedings to which the appellant was not a party, merely that he had a vendor’s lien on certain machinery which the owner of the mortgaged land had placed upon it for its service and improvement, and which was sold, confusedly with the land, under the writ of seizure and sale in the executory proceedings, does not disclose that he hasi an interest in prosecuting the devolutive appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1942, 1950; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 361(4); Reference, Cent. Dig. § 217.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist; John E. Fleury, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Cecile Smith against the Lyon Cypress Company. There was judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals, and defendant moves to dismiss.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; David B. Samuel, Judge.</p> <p>F. A. Nejin was convicted in the city court of the City of Shreveport of keeping a blind tiger, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; David B. Samuel, Judge.</p> <p>A. Emile was convicted in the city court of the City of Shreveport of keeping a blind tiger, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Morris against the St. Bernard Cypress Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <&wkey;316(2) — Injury at Crossing —Negligence—Speed oe Train.</p> <p>A speed of at least 30 miles an hour at a crossing at the boundary line of the corporate limits which the train was entering, which though outside of the 'built-up part of the city was as much used as any crossing in the city, in view of an ordinance limiting the speed of trains at a point several streets further inside the city to 15 miles an hour, and defendant’s rule that within the limits of the city the speed of trains should not exceed 6 miles an hour, was excessive, and of itself constituted negligence rendering defendant liable for the death of one in an automobile struck and killed by the train.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1007; Dec. Dig. &wkey;316(2).]</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;348(5, 6) — Injury at Grossing — Speed — Contributory Negligence —Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for the death of one who, while in an automobile, was struck and killed by train at a crossing, evidence held not to show that the driving of the automobile upon the track was the proximate cause of the accident, or that the accident would have been Unavoidable had the speed of the train been less.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1143, 1144, 1149; Dee. Dig. &wkey; 348(5, 6).]</p> <p>3. Railroads <&wkey;327(l) — Injury at Crossing —Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Failure to look and listen before attempting to cross a railroad crossing in an automobile was grossly negligent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1043, 1045; Dec. Dig. &wkey;327(l).]</p> <p>4. Negligence <&wkey;93(l) — Imputed Negligence-Passenger in Automobile.</p> <p>The negligence, if any, of an experienced chauffeur on an automobile operated as a legal transfer in attempting to cross a railroad crossing without looking and listening, was not imputable to a passenger for hire.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 147, 148; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>93(l).]</p> <p>5. Railroads &wkey;>348(ll) — Injury at Crossing — Contributory Negligence — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for the death of a passenger in an automobile killed at defendant’s crossing, evidence held not to show that those in the automobile did not hear the train and ventured recklessly on the track because they were on a joy ride and had been drinking.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads. Cent. Dig. § 1150; Dec. Dig. &wkey;348(ll).]</p> <p>6. Death <&wkey;99(4) — Excessive Damages.</p> <p>In an action by a widow and her five children for damages in her own behalf, and that of the children, for decedent’s suffering and death, where it appeared that deceased was 36 years of age, earning $65 a month, and that he survived the accident some 30 minutes during which he suffered greatly, a verdict allowing the widow $8,000 individually, and $2,400 to each of the five minors, would be reduced to $5,000 in .favor of the widow and $2,000 for each of the minors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 125, 126, 129; Dee. Dig. &wkey;99(4).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Death <®=»31(8) — Parties Entitled to Recover — “Children. ’ ’</p> <p>The word “children,” whether as used in the Civil Code or elsewhere, ordinarily applies to a distinct class of persons whose relations to those from whom they descend differ from the relations of grandchildren and other descendants, and, as used in the Code, the word is to be so construed with reference to the body of the law and to the immediate connection in which it is used as to give it the meaning plainly intended, rather than such meaning as might be deduced by proceeding upon the theory that the only part of the Code to be considered is the definition contained in article 3556.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 44, 45; Dec. Dig. <S=»31(8).</p> <p>Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and .Second Series, Children.]</p> <p>2. Death <g^31(8) — Parties Entitled to Recover — “Children.”</p> <p>The word “children,” as used in article 2315 of the Civil Code, as amended and reenacted by Act No. 120 of 1908, does not include grandchildren or more remote descendants, upon whom, therefore, the article confers no right of action.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 44, 45; Dec. Dig. <@=>31(8).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <§=>331(1) — Street Railroads— Liability for Overcrowding.</p> <p>Where negro passengers could occupy only the rear half of the street car, and the rear half and the platform were overcrowded so that the front trucks jumped the track, and in the derailment a negro passenger was injured, it was not such passenger’s duty to see that the car was properly balanced, but such duty was the conductor’s.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1375, 1382; Dec. Dig. <§=» 331(1).]</p> <p>2. Carriers i$=3331(4) — Street Railroads — Liability for Overcrowding.</p> <p>While one voluntarily boarding a crowded train and taking his place on the platform without effort to obtain a seat cannot assign the overcrowding of the train as negligence, such rule does not prevent recovery by a street railway passenger injured when the car jumped the tracks owing to the overbalance of the load.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1376-1378; Dec. Dig. <®=>331(4).]</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>3. Damages @=^131(1) — Excessive Damages— Personal Injuries.</p> <p>A verdict of $1,420 for a negro laborer, who in the derailment of a street car was thrown violently against the controller, suffered a bruised shoulder and chest, remained in bed three weeks and could do no work for several months, and had doctor’s fees to pay, was not excessive.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 357, 363, 364; Dec. Dig. <©=> 131(1).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <@=>1002 — Review — Conflicts op Evidence.</p> <p>In a conflict of evidence, the court is bound to consider the probabilities in their relation to the direct evidence, and will accept the version which is thereby the better sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3935-3937; Dec. Dig. <@=> 1002.]</p> <p>2. Malicious Prosecution <@=>6 — Action — Basis.</p> <p>Where a person charged with a misdemeanor admits his guilt and is willing to pay the fine, which, upon request, he is informed will probably be imposed, and the deputy marshal of a town, in presence of the mayor pro tern., receives the fine and turns it into the town treasury, a charge equivalent to that of robbery, of which he is subsequently acquitted, will afford a basis for an action in damages for malicious prosecution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <@=>6.]</p> <p>3. Assault and Battery <@=>37 — Malicious Prosecution <@=>66 — Personal Injuries— Reputation — Award.</p> <p>Where, in an action by the deputy marshal of a town for damages for assault and battery and malicious prosecution, it appears that the assault and battery was committed in order to effect the release of a prisoner, convicted of a misdemeanor, and that the prosecution was instituted as means of getting even with respect to a charge, brought by the deputy, of resisting an officer, though the deputy may have' sustained no permanent injury, either to his person or his character, substantial damages will be awarded, because the injuries which he has thus sustained, and the humiliation to which he has thus been subjected, were inflicted under circumstances of aggravation, by reason of the fact that they were inflicted while, and because, he was endeavoring to discharge his duty as an officer of the law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. § 52; Dec. Dig. <@=>37; Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. § 154; Dec. Dig. <@=>66.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant <@=239 — Liability eor Injuries.</p> <p>Where the employe of an oil company adopted unnecessarily an admittedly dangerous method of throwing in the clutch of a gas engine which ran the pump of an oil well, the employer was not liable for his injuries.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 749, 750; Dec. Dig. <©==> 239.]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant <@=278(5) — Manner oe Injury — Sueeioiency oe Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for injuries received by an oil company’s employé when throwing in the clutch of a gas engine which ran a well pump, evidence held, insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that plaintiff was injured in such manner that the employer was liable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 961; Dec. Dig. <@^278(5)J</p>

Proceedings by the City of Shreveport against James Riley for the construction of concrete sidewalks. Application by defend,ant for certiorari or writ of review to the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Edward Eisenhauer against the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. B. H. Fuge, wife of Thomas F. Fuge, against the New Orleans Railway & light Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier; John N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action between Thomas B. Simpson against Mary E. Bulkley. From a judgment for the latter, the former appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier; John N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Thomas B. Simpson against the Busch-Everett Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Percy Viosca against Henry Landfried. and another. E’rom a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of G. R. H. Sauvage. Proceeding by Albert J. Laplace, executor, opposed by Mrs. Bertha Frois Lehman, legatee. From the judgment, the legatee appeals. Alma L. Colomb, alleging ownership of certain property, appeals from its award to said Laplace.

Théard, Judge. Action by the Fireman’s Insurance Company against Mrs. M. E. Hava and others, consolidated with an action by Mrs. M. E. Hava against Alfred F. Livaudais. From the judgment, Adrian Hava appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts i@=>90(1) — Former Determination — Eeeeot.</p> <p>Where the Supreme Court dismissed the suit of the widow for damages for the death of her husband, because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the alleged negligence of the defendant railroad company, and, thereafter a similar suit in behalf of the minors for damages for the death of their father was tried, and a verdict for $1,500 was rendered in their favor held, that the additional evidence, adduced as to the nature of the wounds of the deceased, tended to support the judgment of the Supreme Court in the first suit, and that the testimony of a newly discovered woman witness that she actually saw the train strike the ’deceased while he was sitting in full view on the end of a cross-tie, but never disclosed the fact to the widow, her friend and neighbor, or to any other person except her father, is in itself improbable and suspicious, and, when contradicted in several material particulars, is unworthy of serious consideration.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 313-315; Dec. Dig. <@=>90(1).]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>William Shuler was convicted of a violation of a city ordinance, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by the Parish of Jefferson Davis Police Jury against Bolger, Mosser & Williman. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Libel and Slander <&wkey;71 — Actions—Defenses.</p> <p>In an action for slander, the only defenses are a denial, a justification, or a confession under mitigating circumstances.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 173; Dec. Dig. &wkey;371.]</p> <p>2. Libel and Slander <&wkey;94(l) — Actions— Pleading.</p> <p>Truth should be specially pleaded.</p> <p>-[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 2Í9; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 94(1).]</p> <p>3. Pleading <&wkey;93(2) — Defenses — Inconsistent Defenses.</p> <p>Defendant in action of slander cannot he heard to deny the authorship of the slander and claim privilege or justification.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 189, 190; Dec. Dig. &wkey;93(2)J</p> <p>4. Witnesses <&wkey;405(2) — Cross-Examination — Collateral Issues.</p> <p>Defendant is bound by testimony elicited by him from the plaintiff on collateral issues; he cannot deny it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1273; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>405(2).]</p> <p>5. Libel and Slander &wkey;>101(l), 114r — Malice — Presumption.</p> <p>The law presumes malice upon the one hand, and injury upon the other, when slanderous words are used; and damages will be awarded in a substantial amount, but not for an am'ount too great for the defendant to bear.</p> <p>• [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 273, 277, 278, 352; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 101(1), 1Í4.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Daniel L. Kirkland against William Edenborn. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;>275 — Review—Exceptions.</p> <p>Where an exception is not passed on in the court below, it cannot be considered by the appellate court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1566, 1567, 1647; Dec. Dig. &wkey;275.]</p> <p>2. Corporations &wkey;j540 — Receivers—Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Act No. 267 of 1914, relative to corporations, does not provide for the appointment of receivers therefor, and does not repeal Act No. 159 of 1898, which authorizes and regulates appointment of receivers for corporations.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Coi-porations, Gent. Dig. § 2152; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>540.]</p> <p>3. Receivers <&wkey;92 — Continuing Business.</p> <p>If the business of defendant corporation, horse racing, cannot be conducted legally, the functions of a receiver appointed for the corporation under Act No. 159 of 1898 will have to be confined to winding up the affairs of the corporation, and if it can be conducted legally, it is pot beneath the dignity of the court, acting through one of its officers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. § 169; Dec. Dig. &wkey;?92.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <&wkey;>325(2) — Crossing Accident —Negligence.</p> <p>_A person afflicted with deafness who voluntarily stands at a railroad crossing dangerously near the track, on which an expected train is approaching, in such a position that he cannot see signals on the crossing or the train as it draws near, and maintains the same position until he is struck by the train, is guilty of such gross negligence as will debar the recovery of damages by his heirs.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 1030; Dec. Dig. &wkey;325(2)J</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;338 — Crossing Accident-Last Clear Chance Doctrine.</p> <p>The doctrine of the “last clear chance” has no application to such a case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1096-1099; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;338J</p> <p>3. Railroads &wkey;>320 — Crossing Accident-Railroad Employés.</p> <p>Railroad trainmen have a right to assume that a person standing on or near the track can see and hear, and will get out of the way on receiving the usual signal warnings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1014-1016, 1019; Dec. Dig. 320.]</p>

M. Calhoun, Judge. Thomas L. Jackson was indicted, and from judgment overruling his motion to quash the indictment, he appeals.

Samuel, Judge. Victoria Rigdon was convicted of keeping a place where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, and appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Evidence <&wkey;588 — Physical Facts.</p> <p>One cannot be said to fall upward when the object upon which he falls, though above the level of his feet or his knees, is below his center of gravity; as, for instance,' where one in ascending a flight of stairs falls upon the landing, at the top, from the second or third step below.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Gent. Dig. § 2437; Dee. Dig. &wkey;>588; Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1164.]</p> <p>2. Carriers &wkey;>287(5) — Taking up Passengers — Negligence.</p> <p>Prospective passengers are entitled to reasonable time within which to board street cars, and when it is not allowed, and they thereby suffer personal injuries and other damages, they will be awarded such an amount as will compensate their sufferings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1159, 1163, 1164; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 287(5).]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <@=3327 — Personal Injury — attempt to Catch Car — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Where, at a moment when he is preoccupied with an impulse to catch a street car upon one of two adjacent tracks, a person precipitates himself against or in front of a moving car upon the intervening track, under circumstances which preclude the possibility of averting the injury which he thereby sustains, he has no just claim on that account against the company operating the car.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1363-1366; Dec. Dig. &wkey;327J</p> <p>2. Carriers <&wkey;287(9) — Personal Injury-Operation — Ordinance.</p> <p>The city ordinance which requires that on double-track streets, where an electric car has stopped to let off or take on passengers, a car, headed in the opposite direction on the other track, must halt 30 feet from the stopped car long enough to permit the passengers who alight therefrom to cross the track of such halted car, should they so desire, is intended as a measure of protection for the passenger who alights from a car on one of two adjacent tracks, and, passing behind it, to cross the other track, incurs the danger of being injured by a car moving in the other direction on such track, and which remains masked by the car from which he has alighted until he, perhaps, finds himself immediately in front of or underneath it. There is, however, nothing in the ordinance which indicates any purpose to legislate for the protection of persons who approach a street car for the purpose of taking passage on it by crossing an intervening track, and in so doing negligently expose themselves to danger from cars operated thereon within plain view of ail who make proper use of their senses of sight and hearing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — Eor other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1155, 1166; Dec. Dig. &wkey;287(9).]</p>

Action by the Newspaper Feature Service, Incorporated, against the Southern Publishing Company, Incorporated. From a judgment of the Court of Appeal annulling a judgment for plaintiff and remanding to the district court for trial, plaintiff applies for writs of certiorari or review.

<p> (Syllabus 5y the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Attorney and Client &wkey;>130 — Gratuitous Services — Curtesy oe Proeession.</p> <p>There is no doubt a rule of courtesy among the members of the bar, as among members of other professions, agreeably to which each will render services to the others without expectation of reward, other than such as may come by way of similar service; but the courtesy of the profession is not to be strained to meet the demand of one who, having practically withdrawn from the profession and thereby disabled himself from reciprocating in kind, demands the courtesy as an aid to the accumulation of wealth in another pursuit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 292; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>130.]</p> <p>2. Attorney and Client <&wkey;>130 — Gratuitous Services — Custom.</p> <p>A member of the bar, who is no longer engaged in the active practice of his profession and has accumulated wealth in other pursuits, has no right to avail himself of the services of an active practitioner, in a long litigation, involving valuable property, upon the assumption that the services will be rendered gratuitously, by reason of a custom, supposed to prevail at the bar of the city in which he lives, since no such custom, applicable to the case stated, is shown to prevail.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig-. § 292; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>130.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Maddox was convicted of keeping a grog and tippling shop in violation of statute, and he excepts and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;1148 — Excessive Bail— Murder.</p> <p>The bail bond of $7,500 in a murder case, and fixed by the district judge, is not excessive; and Ms discretion in the matter will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3050-3052; Dee. Dig. &wkey;> 1148.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;1020 — Appellate Jurisdiction — Supreme Court.</p> <p>The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, in criminal cases, in which a fine exceeding $300, or imprisonment exceeding six months, has been actually imposed, or in which the punishment of death or imprisonment at hard labor may be inflicted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2578-2580; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 1020.]</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; David B. Samuel, Judge.</p> <p>Frank Mackie was convicted for operating a blind tiger in the City of Shreveport, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Glover was convicted of manslaughter, and he excepts and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Damages <&wkey;124(l) — Contracts—Preventing Performan ce — Damages .</p> <p>Where one of the parties to a contract is prevented by the other, without just cause, from executing the same, he is entitled to recover an amount equivalent to the profit of which he has been deprived and such other damages as he may show that he has sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 326-329, 336; Dee. Dig. 124(1).]</p>

Action by Joseph E. Salittes against the Southern Publishing Company, incorporated. Judgment in the First City Court of the City of New Orleans for plaintiff, on defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, was affirmed, and from an order directing the clerk to deliver a copy of the mandate or decree to plaintiff to be filed in the First City Court for execution, defendant petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Action by W. H. Voss against the Southern Publishing Company, Incorporated. Judgment in the First city court of New Orleans for plaintiff, on defendant’s appeal to Court of Appeal was affirmed, and from order directing clerk to deliver copy of the mandate or decree to plaintiff, to be filed in the First city court for execution, defendant petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Action by Sam M. Hussey against the Southern Publishing Company, Incorporated. Judgment in the First city court of the city of New Orleans for plaintiff, on defendant’s appeal to Court of Appeal, was affirmed, and from an order directing the clerk to deliver a copy of the mandate or decree to plaintiff, to be filed in the First city .court for execution, defendant petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Action by J. H. Conner against the Southern Publishing Company, Incorporated. Judgment in the First city court of the city of New Orleans for plaintiff, on defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, was affirmed, and from an order directing the clerk to deliver a copy of the mandate or decree to plaintiff to be filed in the First city court for execution, defendant petitions for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

Action by E. A. Fundenberg against the Southern Publishing Company, Incorporated. Judgment in the First city court of the city of New Orleans for plaintiff, on defendant’s appeal to Court of Appeal, was affirmed, and from an order directing the clerk to deliver a copy of the mandate or decree to plaintiff to be filed in the_ First city court for execution, defendant petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Actions by Joseph Jackson and by Joseph Moliere against Edwin P. Brady. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.</p>

Proceeding in forma pauperis by Ed. White against W. W. Kavanaugh and others. Order permitting plaintiff to litigate without pacing costs vacated, and plaintiff applies for writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Moliere against Edwin P. Brady. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Dawkins, Judge. Proceeding by C. P. King, trustee, against the Hardwood Manufacturing Company. From an order of seizure and sale under executory process after the order had been fully executed, Charles E. Easterling, signing himself as trustee of the defendant Company, appeals devolutively.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines; R. E. Hingle, Judge.</p> <p>Action for injunction by the Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration against J. Z. Tanzmann. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Proceeding by the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company against the McCall Brothers Planting & Manufacturing Company, in which J. P. Hudson filed a petition .of intervention and third opposition in the executory proceedings claiming a vendor’s lien and privilege. Question certified from Court of Appeal, First Circuit, by the judges thereof applying for instructions.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Assumption; Charles T. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Morgan’s Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Company against Edgard Aucoin, Tax Collector of the Parish of Assumption. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Municipal Corporations &wkey;>100, 122(2) — Adoption op Ordinance — Presumption.</p> <p>Where the minutes of a town council show that an ordinance was adopted by a vote of “yeas” and the “nays,” their silence as to other formalities, not required by the statute to be entered on the minutes, does not prove that such formalities were not observed; but, on the' contrary, the presumption is that the ordinance was properly enacted. State v. Joseph, 139 La. 734, 72 South. 188, reaffirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 213-218, 284r-286; Dee. Dig. &wkey;100, 122(2).]</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., dissenting.</p>

Théard, Judge. Suit by Miss Grace Tujague, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Bernard Tujague, against Mrs. Laurentine Courtiade, widow of Bernard Tujague, and Sylvain Tujague. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;19 — Penal Ordinance-Authority of Town — Statute.</p> <p>Under Act No. 136, of 1898, providing for the incorporation of towns and villages, and that towns and villages so incorporated have no authority to enforce their ordinances by fine.or imprisonment except by fine not to exceed $100 or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, or both, where a town’s ordinance provided that whoever should be found guilty of keeping a “blind tiger” should be fined in any sum not less than $80, nor more than $100, or be imprisoned for a period of not less than 20 days or more than 30 days, or both, at the discretion of the court, and that, if defendant should be unable or refuse to pay the fine, he should be required to work it out on the streets at the rate of $1 a day, such latter part of the ordinance was beyond the authority of the town, and null.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. <®=>19.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;lll(4) — Penal Ordinance — Partial Invalidity.</p> <p>The invalidity of such part of the ordinance did not nullify the whole ordinance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 248-251; Dec. Dig. &wkey;lll(4).]</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors @=10(2) — Ordinances — Nuisances—-Blind Tiger.</p> <p>A city in which the sale of intoxicating liquor is prohibited has authority, under the general welfare clause in its charter and under the general grant of police power, to adopt an ordinance to suppress “blind tigers” as a public nuisance. It is not necessary that the authority to suppress such a nuisance be expressed in exact terms in the municipal charter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 8, 9; Dec. Dig. @=10(2).]</p> <p>2. Statutes @=141(2) — Amendatory Act-Reference — Validity.</p> <p>Act No. 8, Ex. Sess. 1915, entitled “An act to amend and re-enact Act No. 146 of 1914, entitled ‘An act to define and prohibit the keeping of a “blind tiger,” ’ ” etc., is valid as original and independent legislation, defining and prohibiting blind tigers, notwithstanding Act No. 146 of 1914 is not mentioned in the body of Act No. 8, Ex. Sess. 1915.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 48, 209; -Dea Dig. @=141(2).]</p> <p>3. Statutes @=108 — Subject and Title-Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>The constitutional requirement that a statute shall have only one object does not mean that each and every means necessary to accomplish the object of the law must be provided for by a separate statute relating to it alone. A statute that deals with several branches of one subject does not thereby violate the constitutional requirement that the act shall have only one object.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 135; Dec. Dig. @=108.]</p> <p>4. Searches and Seizures @=7 — Constitutional Provisions — Blind Tiger.</p> <p>The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States does not apply to state statutes. The corresponding article of the Constitution of Louisiana, article 7, guaranteeing the people against unreasonable search and seizure, is not violated by a statute that authorizes the issuance of a warrant t-o search a place suspected of being a “blind tiger,” on an affidavit reciting that the affiant believes the place designated to be a “blind tiger” and on such additional evidence as the court may require to make out a prima facie case,</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Searcnes and Seizures, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dee. Dig. @=7.]</p> <p>5. Constitutional Law @=251 —Fourteenth Amendment — Police Power of State.</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States was not intended to .hamper, or to authorize the courts to interfere with, the state’s exercise of its police power to promote the morals, health, and safety of her citizens.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 726, 727, 732; Dec. Dig. @=251.]</p> <p>6. Statutes @=77(1) — “Local or Special Law” — Criminal Statute.</p> <p>A criminal statute, general in its terms, applying alike to all persons who may come within its provisions, is not a “local or special law,” even though the conditions under which it can operate prevail only in certain parts of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 79, 81; Dec. Dig. @=77(1).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Local Law; Special Law.]</p> <p>7. Courts @=224(7) — Supreme Court of Louisiana — Jurisdiction — Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>The constitutional provision that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases in which the constitutionality or legality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation is in contestation does not mean that in any such case this court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into the regularity or legality of the proceedings had in the prosecution, but limits the jurisdiction to questions of constitutionality or legality of the municipal ordinance imposing the penalty.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 616; Dec. Dig. <®=224(7).]</p> <p>Monroe, C. X, dissenting.</p>

B. Samuels, Judge. F. A. Nejin was convicted of keeping a blind tiger, his motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were overruled, and he excepts and appeals.

F. Brunot, Judge. Action by the State, on relation of Phillip G. Yeith, against Paul Capdevielle, Auditor of Public Accounts. Judgment dismissing the petition, and relator apipeaM, and defendant moves to dismiss the appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Insurance <@^282(6) — Fire Insurance-Interest.</p> <p>Under fire policy conditioned to be void if interest of insured was other than unconditional and sole ownership, insured could not recover for a loss if at the time of issuing the policy and for some time thereafter the title stood in the state under tax sale, though the sale was subject to redemption.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 613, 614.]</p> <p>2. Insurance <@=3146(2) — Fire Insurance-Contracts — Construction.</p> <p>A fire insurance contract must be enforced as written.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 294.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William L. Tarver against the Natalbany Lumber Company, Limited.</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Ida Rothstein against Ike Schimsky, her husband, for separation from bed and board. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard; R. Emmett Hingle, Judge. Suit by Alexander P. Perrin against the New Orleans Terminal Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and he asks for an amendment of the judgment by increasing it to a certain sum, and defendant appeals.

Judicial District Court, ■ Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge. Action by Nathan Abramson and others against Chas. G, Larabee, Chas. G. Larabee and his wife, Fannie W. Smith, interveners and opponents. Judgment for plaintiffs, allowing defendants’ homestead exémption, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Malicious Prosecution @=>55 — Grounds of Action.</p> <p>To maintain suit for malicious prosecution, a _ prima facie case that the prosecution was without probable cause must be alleged and proven by showing that the prosecution terminated in plaintiff’s favor, either by acquittal or abandonment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. §§ 106-110.]</p> <p>2. Malicious Prosecution @=>35(2) — Sufficiency of Evidence — Termination of Prosecution.</p> <p>Where a prosecution for embezzlement was abandoned as the result of compromise, solicited by the accused, this was not such an equivalent of an acquittal as to justify a suit for malicious prosecution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. § 77.]</p> <p>3. Malicious Prosecution @=>56 — Probable Cause.</p> <p>Where plaintiff in malicious prosecution suit did not show the equivalent of an acquittal in the prosecution complained of, the trial court cannot go into question of probable cause.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Malicious Prosecution, Cent. Dig. §§ 112-116.]</p>

Samuel, Judge. A. Emile was convicted of operating a blind tiger in violation of law, and from the conviction and sentence, he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;942(2) — Newly Discovered Evidence — Impeaching Testimony.</p> <p>The oral statements of a state witness made after verdict, and impeaching his own testimony as given at the trial, furnish no legal basis for granting of a new trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2316, 2332.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;398(l) — Demonstrative Evidence as Best Evidence.</p> <p>Where the deceased died from a fracture of his skull, the skull itself is best evidence of the location and extent of the wound.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 879-881.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;665(2) — Triai^Separation of Witnesses — Discretion of Court.</p> <p>The exception of a deputy sheriff from an order directing a separation of the witnesses is within the sound discretion of the court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1550-1554, 1565.]</p> <p>4. Witnesses <&wkey;287(4) — Re-Examination —Scope.</p> <p>Where a witness has been cross-examined as to certain statements made during a certain conversation, he may be re-examined on the whole conversation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1002.]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <&wkey;1141(2) — Ruling on Evidence — Exception—Affirmance.</p> <p>Where the judge overruled an objection to certain testimony as immaterial and irrelevant, his ruling will be affirmed, when the bill of exception fails to show that the testimony had no bearing on any material or relevant issue of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3015, 3022.]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;958(l) — Appeal — Motion for New Triai>-Affidavit.</p> <p>The trial judge may disregard an affidavit annexed to a motion for a new trial, where it contradicts undisputed facts proven on the trial.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2396.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Louis Reynaud against Peter Fabacher, in which, after his death pending appeal, his widow, Mrs. Sophie Wendling Fabacher, executrix, made herself a party defendant. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Janie King against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Condemnation proceeding by the Police Jury of the Parish of Lafayette against Adelma Martin and others. Judgment for defendants dismissing the suit, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Miss Kate Gibbon and others against the Police Jury of the Parish of St. Mary. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine; J. H. Boone, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Dottie Mathis against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company and others. Suit dismissed, and plaintiff allowed a devolutive appeal without giving bond for costs.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Absentees &wkey;^7 — Pbocess — Substituted Seevige.</p> <p>In a case of substituted service on an absentee the record must show that citation and copy of petition were served on the regularly appointed curator ad hoc.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Absentees, Cent. Dig. §§ 14-19.]</p>

E. Reynolds, Special Judge. Action by Bryceland Lumber Company, Limited, against T. J. Kerlin Lumber Company, Limited, in solido. Judgment in solido for plaintiff against the answering defendant T. J. Kerlin, and against the defendant company by default, and defendant Kerlin prosecutes a devolutive appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Elizabeth Mertz against Yito Di Giorgio, for assault and battery and abusive language. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Street Railroads <&wkey;114(l) — Injuries to Wagon Driver — Evidence—Cause oe In- • JURY.</p> <p>In an action for injuries resulting in death to the driver of a wagon when the end of a street car which was turning a curve swung out from the tracks and struck his wagon a glancing blow, evidence held not to show that deceased received any injuries from the collision.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 239.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; W. L. Bagwell, Special Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Ada Machen Wallace against the Tremont & Gulf Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Divorce <@==327(1,2) — Separation erom Bed and Board — Cruel Treatment — Single Instance.</p> <p>There is no unqualified rule in the jurisprudence of Louisiana that only one instance of cruel treatment of the wife by the husband is not a sufficient cause for her to obtain a decree of separation from bed and board. Her right to the decree on that ground depends upon whether the cruel treatment was of such a nature as to render her living with her husband intolerable or insupportable. In the determination of that question the court will consider not only the nature and extent of the cruel treatment, but the character and mode of living of the wife and whether there was provocation for the ill treatment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 62, 63, 76, 81, 82.]</p>

Suit for injunction by the Tremont Lumber Company against S. N. Talbot and others. Judgment for plaintiff perpetuating the writ of injunction, and defendant Talbot appeals.

F. Brunot, Judge. Action by Xeter Realty, Limited, against William; J. Basler, in whi,eh Thomas. Dl Boyd, Jr., and others were called in warranty. Judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Leon Denena against Joseph Gernelli. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <@^1002 — Verdict—Conflicting Evidence — Conclusiveness-.</p> <p>Where, on the question of the negligence of the servants of the railroad company, in the case of a collision between one of defendant’s trains and plaintiff’s automobile, coming' suddenly upon the track, the evidence is conflicting and contradictory, the verdict of the jury in favor of the railroad company will not be disturbed, when it does not appear to be clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3935-3937.]</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Suit by A. E. Johnson against Mrs. Louise Muller, in which Mrs. Georgina T. Young filed an intervention and third opposition, with application for an injunction. From an order refusing to issue writs of injunction, the intervener and opponent appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Suit for libel by Luther E. Hall against Robert Ewing and others. Exception of no cause of action sustained, suit dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;656(4) — Appeal — Harmless Error — Remarks op Trial Judge.</p> <p>Where on the trial of the accused charged with shooting with intent to murder, the district attorney in the course of his argument said, “The prosecuting witness did not even have a poeketknife on him when he was shot,” to which remark counsel for the accused objected, and requested the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the same, and thereupon the judge stated, in the presence and hearing of the jury, that he distinctly remembered that it had been testified by many witnesses that the prosecuting witness did not have a knife on his person at the time of the shooting, to which comment on the evidence by the judge in the presence and hearing of the jury, counsel for the accused excepted, held, that the remarks of the judge were in plain violation of section 991 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, prohibiting the judge from stating or recapitulating the evidence, or stating or repeating the testimony of any witness, or giving any opinion as to what facts have been proved or disproved, to the jury or in its presence or hearing, and that such remarks constitute reversible error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1529.]</p>

<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; David -B. Samuel, Judge.</p> <p>P. A." Nejin was convicted of operating a blind tiger in violation of law, and he appeals.</p>

Proceeding by the State Tax Collector against Benjamin C. Brown. Judgment in Court of Appeal affirming judgment for the collector, and defendant brings writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by George G. Myers against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company for compensation under the Employers’ Liability Act. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Suit by Anne Metcalfe and others against Thomas K. Green and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs apply for certiorari.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Assumption; Charles T. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company against the Succession of Leo Cancienne. Judgment for plaintiff, and the administratrix of the succession appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Landlord and Tenant >&wkey;167(2) — Injury to One on Premises — Liability.</p> <p>The owner is‘bound to know whether his building is safe for the purposes for which he rents it or authorizes its use, or is rotten and unsafe, and is answerable, in damages, to those who, being lawfully therein, are injured by reason of its defects, whether of original construction or caused by failure to make proper repairs.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Gent. Dig. §§ 669, 679.]</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Suit by W. A. Nabors and others against the Producers’ Oil Company, for the annulment of an oil and gas lease. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals, and plaintiffs, answering the appeal, ask that judgment be amended by allowing their demand for damages for the alleged violation of the contract on which 'demand the district court had rendered a nonsuit.

Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge. Action by Mrs. Amelia Tyler Guidry against the Morgan’s Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Company. Judgment for plaintiff, -and defendant appeals, and plaintiff prays that judgment be increased from $5,000 to $10,000.

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <@=>290(1), 297 — Passengers — Personal Injury — Speed.</p> <p>A railroad company is liable for an injury to a passenger occasioned by rapid traveling over slippery tracks, on a downgrade, over a bad roadbed; or by the breaking of an axle by reason of a defect therein, if the defect could have been discovered by the exercise of the utmost human skill and foresight.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1177, 1204.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>2. Damages <@=»132(4) — Excessive Damages— Personal Injury.</p> <p>A verdict of $2,000 awarded plaintiff, a man of 50 years, of robust constitution, earning from $2.50 to $4 a day, for injury resulting in inguinal hernia incapacitating him for hard work and reducing his earning capacity, would not be reduced.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 375.]</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; John E. Fleury, Judge. Action by James H. Vincent and wife against the Morgan’s Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals and plaintiffs, answering the appeal, pray that the amount of the award be increased from $10,-000 to $20,000.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Partnership <&wkey;35 — Partnership Transactions — Estoppel.</p> <p>A firm of brokers, who have held themselves out to the plaintiff as dealers in bonds and stocks on margins, are estopped to urge that such transactions were contrary to the articles of partnership.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 50.]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;173(3) — Questions Below — Estoppel.</p> <p>A defendant member of a dissolved firm of brokers, who in his answer admitted that the firm was a “commercial partnership * * * engaged in the stock, bond, and securities brokerage business and buying, selling, and dealing in stocks bonds and securities” is estopped to urge on appeal that the firm was an ordinary partnership.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1080, 1110, 1111.]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error &wkey;jl73(6) — Review— Points Not Raised Below.</p> <p>The contention that plaintiff’s contract with the defendant brokers for the purchase of bonds on margin was a gambling transaction should have been pleaded below.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 1088.]</p> <p>4. Partnership <&wkey;153(l) — Transaction With Partnership — Book Entries.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s contract with the defendant firm, evidenced by the firm’s written acknowledgment of the receipt of a certain margin, and the purchase of certain bonds for the account of the plaintiff, cannot be affected by the wrongful conversion of the margin by one of the partners, and by Ms change of book entries so as to show that the contract was made with himself, as an individual, and not as a member of the firm.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. §§ 274, 276, 277.]</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Ida Helen Wirth, widow of Frederick William Code, and suit by Mrs. Ida H. W. Code, tutrix of Carrie Martha Code, and others, against the Alex Dussel .Iron Works. Judgment for plaintiff individually, and as tutrix, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering the appeal, asks that both judgments be increased.

Wilson, Judge. Joseph Fiek was convicted of willfully neglecting and refusing to provide for the support of his destitute minor child, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia: Wm. Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William M. Egan against the Signal Publishing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

D. Webb, Judge. Action by the City of Shreveport, subrogee, against the Southwestern Gas & Electric Company. Exception of no cause of action sustained, and suit dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law &wkey;>1166%(12) — Trial—Remarks of Trial Judge.</p> <p>When the trial judge during the course of the trial, in the presence of the jury, makes remarks prejudicial to the accused or his witnesses, the verdict will be set aside.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3125.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;600(l) — Trial — Evidence of Absent Witnesses.</p> <p>Where a defendant in a criminal case asks for a continuance on the ground of the absence of important and material witnesses, and the district attorney admits that if the witnesses were present they would testify as indicated in the motion for a continuance, the prosecuting attorney cannot withdraw his admission, after the evidence is all in; and the trial judge must permit the statement to be read to the jury, although it may be cumulative.</p> <p>[E'd. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1342, 1345, 1604.]</p>

Holstead, Judge. . Action by Adam Riser against Melvin Riser for an accounting of partnership funds. Judgment for plaintiff, the amount of which was modified on defendant’s motion for a new trial, and defendant appeals.

Judicial District Court, Parish of La Salle; George Wear, Sr., Judge. Petitory action by Sallie Douglas and others against George R. Nicholson and others, and in which Sallie Douglas sued to annul a sale of her interest in a tract of land to George R. Nicholson. Judgment for plaintiff: declaring the sale from Sallie Douglas to George R. Nicholson to be void, and judgment for defendants against plaintiffs in solido for a certain amount, and plaintiffs appeal.