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141 Me. 260

MacVeagh

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided June 14, 1945

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1945-06-14

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently June 1974

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““A ‘disposing mind’ involves the exercise of so much mind and memory as would enable a person to transact common and simple kinds of business with that intelligence which belongs to the weakest class of sound minds; and a disposing memory exists when one can recall the general nature, condition and extent of his property, and his relations to those to whom he gives, and also to those from whom he excludes, his bounty. He must have active memory enough to bring to his mind the nature and particulars of the business to he transacted, and mental power enough to appreciate them, and act with sense and judgment in regard to them. He must have sufficient capacity to comprehend the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were or should have been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will. He must have sufficient active memory to collect in his mind, without prompting, the particulars or elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to each other, and be able to form some rational judgment in relation to them.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including In Re Leonard

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1945-06-14

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Chapman, J.

¶1The will of Helen Josephine McKeen was allowed by the Judge of the Probate Court and,.upon appeal to the Superior Court sitting as the Supreme Court of Probate, the decree of allowance was sustained. In her stated reasons for appeal from the decree of the Judge of Probate to the Supreme Court of Probate, the appellant claimed mental incapacity on the part of the testatrix and undue influence. The case comes to this court upon exceptions to the decree of the Superior Court.

¶2There was no evidence upon which to justify a finding that the will was the result of undue influence.

¶3Upon the question of mental incapacity each of the parties presented evidence material to the issue.

¶4The burden was upon the proponent to prove that the testatrix, at the time of the execution of the will, had such mind as would enable a person to transact common and *262simple kinds of business with that intelligence which belongs to the weakest class of sound minds, together with a memory sufficient to recall the general nature, condition and extent of her property and her relations to those to whom she gave and also to those from whom she excluded her bounty. Hall v. Perry, 87 Me., 569, 33 A., 160; 47 Am. St. Rep., 352; Rogers, Appellant, 126 Me., 267, 138 A., 59.

¶5The credibility of the witnesses and the probative force of their testimony were for the determination of the presiding justice and his decision if supported by competent evidence was final. For this there is abundant authority. Hooper Estate, 136 Me., 451, 12 A., 2d., 417.

¶6A careful examination of the record convinces us that the decision of the justice should be sustained.

¶7The entry must be

¶8 Exceptions overruled. Ordered that the costs and stenographers’ and counsel fees of the proponent in the Supreme Court of Probate and in the Probate Court be fixed and allowed by the respective judges of those courts, and paid by the administrator to be appointed by the Probate Court, and charged by such administrator in his account with the estate.

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