Volume 143 — United States Reports

Held: for the reasons already stated, that the acquisition by the sinking fund of the stock'of the water company, whether before or after the passage of the act of 1882, was subject to the reserved power of the. legislature, at.its will, by amending or repealing that act, to withdraw; the exemption from taxation.

The court stated the case as follows: ■ This was an, action by Harry S. Hutton against the District, of Columbia to recover the'sum of $182.50, with interest, al-’ leged to be due him for salary as a member of the-metropolitan police force of the District, from June 6, 1890, to August 20, of the same year.

Held: that these questions were not admissible. It being shown that a paper was served as a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the defendant, with an order to show cause in the action on trial, it is *29 thereby sufficiently authenticated to enable it to be read in evidence against him, and it is competent evidence on behalf of the plaintiff as an admission by the defendant that the facts stated in the affidavit are true.

Held: that it was not open to the plaintiff to contest the bona fides of the preemption settlement. The court stated the case as follows : *33 On May 15, 1856, Congress passed an act granting lands to the State of Iowa to aid in the construction of certain railroads. li Stat. 9, c. 28. The grant was a grant m :prmenti, and of alternate sections, with the familiar provision.: “ But in case it shall appear that the United.

<p>The stealing of distilled spirits from a distillery warehouse by reason of the omission of the internal revenue officers to provide sufficient locks on the doors affords no defence to an action on the distiller’s bond to pay the tax due on the spirit before their removal and within three years from the date 'of entry.</p>

Held: To support jurisdiction in equity, there were in the case.discovery, account, fraud, misrepresentation and concealment; the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken in the court below; and the case was not one of a plain defect of equity jurisdiction, under § 723 of the Revised Statutes; (2) The decree was not outside of the case made by the bill, but gave relief agreeable to it, under the prayer for general…

Held: as indicated in the case cited, and in a later case, where it may fairly be said the question now-before the court' was decided adversely to the contention of the plaintiffs in error. Ex parte Dubuque <& Pacific Bail- road, 1 Wall. 69 .

Held: in its enactment, to have abridged the freedom of the press. The circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people.

<p>An ordinance of a city, imposing, pursuant to a statute of the State,' a license tax, for the business of running any horse or steam railroad for the transportation of passengers, does not impair the obligation of a contract, made before the passage of the statute, by which the city sold to a railroad company for a large price the right of way and franchise for twenty-five years to run a railroad over certain streets and according to certain regulations, anti the company agreed to pay to the city annually a real estate tax, and the city bound itgelf not to grant, during the same period, a right .of way to any other railroad company over the same streets.</p>

Held: that this direction did not include joint and several notes made to the testator, between' the date of the will and his death, by a partnership of which a brother was a member, to obtain money to carry on the business of the partnership, and secured •by a conveyance of valuable property.

ORIGINAL. No number. This was an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth District. The' court stated the case as follows: This was an action brought by August Lindvall in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota against John Woods and Stephen B. Lovejoy, partners as Woods & Lovejoy, to recover for a personal injury alleged to have been caused, through the negligence of the defendants.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE .CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>This was an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court, dismissing'a writ of habeas corpus. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL EROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity, filed September 12, 1889, in the Circuit Court of- the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, by William H. Nelson, a citizen of Indiana, and George M. French, a citizen of Arkansas, against Edward F. Lawrence, a citizen of Illinois, “ as' administrator of the estate of David Ballentine, deceased, and in his own right,” seeking to charge him as administrator appointed in Illinois with the -amount of a judgment recovered against him in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The material allegations óf the bill were as follows:</p> <p>That on May 10,1878, David Ballentine died at Hot Springs in Arkansas, leaving a large- real and personal estate, and a paper purporting to be his last will and testament, which was soon after admitted to probate, and letters testamentary issued to an executor named in the will, by the county court of Lake County in the State of Illinois; that on January 10,1880, that court set aside the will and probate, and recalled the letters testamentary, and appointed Edward F. Lawrence “as administrator of the estate of the said David Ballentine, deceased,” and he forthwith qualified as such, and took possession of the personal property; that the estate was abundantly solvent, and that all debts except the plaintiffs’ had been paid in full.</p> <p>That the plaintiffs were partners with David Ballentine in his lifetime in business at Hot Springs, and on November 27, 1878, brought a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas for the.purpose of settling, up the partnership accounts, and of securing from his estate the moneys justly due them; that in that suit the executor was duly served with process and entered an appearance, and that when the letters' testamentary were Recalled and Lawrence appointed administrator, as above statedv “ the said Edward F. Lawrence, as administrator as aforesaid, was duly substituted as defendant in said suit instead of ” the executor, “and said Lawrence thereupon duly appeared in said court and thereafter conducted said suit for said estate; ” that on July 25, 1882, that'court entered a final decree that “Edward F. Lawrence as administrator of David Ballentine, deceased,” was indebted to the plaintiffs severally in the sum of $1574.45,'with interest, for their several shares of profits of the partnership received and held by Ballentine before his death, and should pay the same to them “ out of the assets of the estate of said David Ballentine in his hands remaining to be administered,” with costs; and that the defendant filed a petition for a rehearing, which was overruled on Novembér 30, 1883.</p> <p>. That on January 24, 1884, the defendant, seeking, with the consent and connivance óf the heirs,,to embarrass and defeat the plaintiff and to avoid the payment of said decree, falsely and fraudulently represented to the county court of Lake County that all debts and claims against the estate had been paid and the estate' had been distributed among the lawful heirs, and thereby obtained from that court an order declaring a final settlement of the estate and discharging him as administrator.</p> <p>That on November 3, 1884, the'defendant, “'a§ administrator of said estate, filed in said United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas his bill of review against the plaintiffs, in which said Lawrence set out the decree recovered by the plaintiffs against him in said court as aforesaid, and that the plaintiffs were about to proceed against him for the recovery of the moneys therein mentioned in the State of Illinois, and in said bill of review prays that, until the matters in said bill of review contained could be inquired into, the plaintiffs might be -restrained by said court from prosecuting said decree or proceeding in any manner to collect the moneys therein mentioned, and that said original decree so recovered by the plaintiffs might be reviewed and reversed for the reasons : 1st. That the facts upon which said decree was rendered were false and contrary to the evidence. 2d. Because said decree was rendered against Said Lawrence’without service of process upon him-or notice to .him, or without any opportunity on his part to make, defence thereto. 3d. Because of newly discovered evidence by said Lawrence in support of the ^de-fence to said suit. 4th. Because said Lawrence, being an'administrator appointed not by the courts of Arkansas, but by the courts of Illinois, could not be sued in Arkansas.”</p> <p>That the plaintiffs, “ as soon as said bill of review was -filed and they received notice thereof, desisted and refrained from proceeding to collect said, decree until the matters in said bill of review set out could be passed upon'by said court, and to thaft end they appeared in said court and filed their answer to said bill of review, and the plaintiffs as expeditiously as possible caused said bill of • review to be brought to a hearing, and upon such Rearing, and on or about April 16,1888, said Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed said bill of review for want of equity, by reason whereof the said original decree so recovered as aforesaid by the. plaintiffs against said Lawrence remains in full force and effect, and the plaintiffs are advised that they are entitled to recover from said Lawrence and said estate the amounts therein decreed to the plaintiffs, with interest and costs of said suit.”</p> <p>That the. plaintiffs did not appear or present their claim in the Lake County court, nor in any way become parties to its proceedings, nor receive any notice thereof, or of the defendant’s .intention to obtain a final settlement and discharge iii that court, until more than two years after the order had been entered; arid that; the defendant “purposely avoided giving the plaintiffs notice of said intended application, and intentionally suppressed from the plaintiffs the knowledge of the said settlement and discharge, for the purpose of carrying out his said fraudulent scheme and purpose to defeat the plaintiffs in the collection of their said debts; ” and that the defendant, while falsety claiming to have paid out and distributed the estate according to the order of the county court, still retained in his hands, with the connivance of the heirs and distributees, sufficient assets to pay and satisfy the decree obtained by the plaintiffs against him as aforesaid.</p> <p>The bill prayed for an account, for payment of the plaintiffs’ claim out of the assets of the deceased, or, if he had not now sufficient assets, but had paid them out since he had notice qf their suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, that he might be adjudged guilty of a devastavit, and be decreed to pay to the plaintiffs de bonis jpropriis the sums mentioned, in the decree in that suit, and for further relief.</p> <p>A demurrer to the bill for want of equity was heard before Mr. Justice Harlan and the Circuit Judge, and overruled, according to the opinion of the presiding justice. The defendant elected to stand by his demurrer; and admitted in- open court that at the time of the entry of the decree of July 25, 1882, he, as administrator appointed in Illinois, had assets in his hands, after paying all other creditors, sufficient to satisfy that decree, and had since distributed those’ assets among the next of kin. A final decree was thereupon entered that the defendant pay to each of the plaintiffs the sum of $3136.67.and costs.</p> <p>The defendant appealed to this court; and the judges certi-tified that they were opposed in opinion upon several questions of law, substantially embodied in the following: ■</p> <p>“1st. Whether it<was competent for the administrator of • David Ballentine, appointed under the laws of Illinois, to appear in the suit brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the .Eastern District of Arkansas by the plaintiffs herein, and submit himself to the jurisdiction of that court in respect to the matters involved in that suit ? ”</p> <p>“6th. Whether the decree of -July 2'5, 1§82, recited in the bill, is void, simply because it was rendered against an administrator appointed in Illinois, voluntarily appearing therein and submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree ?.</p> <p>“ 7th. Did the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of-Arkansas, rendered July 25, 1882, bind the defendant as the administrator of David Bal-lentine,-deceased; appointed under the laws of Illinois, and the assets of the estate of said decedent in the State of Illinois in his hands as administrator, in the sense that the defendant was bound to pay said decree without further action against him or said' estate by the plaintiffs, and,, having settled said estate in and under the order of the. county court of. Lake County, Illinois, and obtained his discharge as such administrator from said county court without having paid said decree, is he, the defendant, now liable in this action ?</p> <p>“8th. Even if the decree of July. 25, 1882, aforesaid was not binding in the sense last above mentioned, did the said 'decree become binding, in the sense last above mentioned, by-reason of and upon the rendition of the decree of the Circuit Court of tbe United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas on or about April 16, 1888, dismissing the'bill of review in ■the plaintiffs’ bill mentioned ? ”</p> <p>The statue of limitations of Illinois, as to filing claims against the estate of a decéased person, binds a non-resident creditor. Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U. S. 449.</p> <p>It was not competent for the appellant as administrator by the appointment ff the county court of Lake County, Illinois, to appear in the suit of appellees, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and submit himself to the jurisdiction of that court. Judy v. Kelly, 11 Illinois, 21T; 8. G. 50 Am. Dec. 455; McGarvey v. Darnall, 134 Illinois, 367; Durrie v. Blauvelt, 49 1ST. J. Law (20 Yroom) 114; Caldwell v. 'Harding, 5 Blatchford, 501.</p> <p>The rule is uniform that no action can be maintained against an administrator, founded on a debt due from.the estate of ■the decedent, unless such administrator has been qualified by a probate tribunal in the state and county where the suit is brought. Caldwell v. Harding, 5 Blatchford, 501; Vaughan v. Northvp, 15 Pet. 1; Melius v. Thompson, 1 Cliff. 125; Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565; Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368; Judy v. Kelly, 11 Illinois, 211 ; 8. C. 50 Am. Dec. 455 ; Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 467 ; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 159'; low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259.</p> <p>Suppose that the appellant had been appointed by proper legal authority, and by one of the probate courts within the State of Arkansas-, administrator of the estate of David Bal-lentine, deceased, and the same decree of July 25, 1882, had been recovered against him in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, it is clear that such decree of July 25, 1882, would have no binding effect upon the assets being administered by appellant as administrator under appointment by one of the probate courts of Illinois, and that such decree rendered by the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Arkansas would not have been evidence against appellant as administrator in Illinois of any debt, and that, notwithstanding such decree of July 25, 1882, against him as an Arkansas administrator, the appellees, had they sued in Illinois, must have sued appellant as administrator in the courts' of Illinois, not upon the said decree, but upon the original cause of action on which. the said decree was recovered.</p> <p>How, it being the fact that appellant never was appointed administrator by any court of Arkansas, can it be logically contended that the decree of July 25, 1882, rendered against him in Arkansas, should have any greater force against him as administrator appointed by and administering the estate of David Ballentine, deceased, in> the county court of Lake County, Illinois, than the same decree would have had, had he been properly appointed administrator by the proper court in Arkansas ? It seems to us that the statement of the position carries with it its own refutation.</p> <p>The dismissal of the bill of review mentioned in the bill of complainant on April 16, 1888, could give no greater force to the decree of July 25, 1882, than it had in the first instance by reason of its rendition. 2 Daniell, Ch. Pract. §§ 1582,1585.</p>

Held: That there was nothing in all this to indicate fraud. *225 ' In all cases where actual fraud is not made out, hut the imputation rests upon conjecture, where the seal of death has closed the lips of those whose character is involved, and lapse of time has impaired the recollection of transactions and obscured their details, the welfare of society-demands the rigid enforcement of the rule of diligence.

The Barbed Wire Patent Case, 143 U.S. 275 was a significant patent dispute in 1892 between plaintiff Joseph Glidden and the USPTO regarding the right of barbed wire. Lucian Smith was the original inventor in 1867 and held patent rights for it, while Glidden made changes to the production of barbed wire, holding the barbs in place, in 1874 that he believed were novel enough to merit a new invention and thus new patent.

Held: that the decision was not subject to review by this court on writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. S. II.- Hubbard and Mr. Solicitor General• for plaintiff in error. Mr. Charles J. Boatner, for defendants-in error, submitted an his brief. Me. Jdstioe G-bay delivered the

Held: to be conveyed by good and sufficient deeds so that each of the three parties should hold an undivided third theréof as a tenant in common with the others. 7.

In 1889 the legislature of the State of Michigan passed an act, number 202 of the-Public Acts of that year, pages 282 and 283, by which, among other things, section 2333 of Howell’s Statutes, being a part- of the railroad law of that State, was amended. So far as affects the matters in controversy here, it is enough to quote from the ninth paragraph, referring to the powers.and liabilities of railroad companies. That is as follows: “ Ninth.

The court stated the case as follows: This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of Claims, dismissing the petition of the ■ appellant, praying, judgment for the amount of the proceeds of certain cotton, the property of his testator, which was seized by the forces of the United States and sold and the proceeds paid into the Treasury.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OR THE STATE OR MINNESOTA.</p> <p>By an act of the legislature of the State of Minnesota, approved. March 5,1877, (General Laws of Minnesota of 1877, c. 106,) it was • enacted, by sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 thereof, as is printed in the margin.1</p> <p>Purporting to proceed under sections 4 and Y of that-act, the Plain-view Railroad Company, a Minnesota corporation, on the 31st of January, 1878, delivered to the town clerk of the town of Plain view a proposition in writing, signed by the president and secretary of the company, containing the statements and specifications required by section 4 of the act, and stating that the amount of the bonds of the town desired by the company was $50,000. The town clerk endorsed on the proposition the date of filing, and transcribed the proposition in his records on March' 30, 1878. On the 31st of January, 1878, the company posted in three public places in the town á notice that, after February 6, 1878, a petition to the supervisors of the town, appended to a copy of .said proposition, would be presented to the resident taxpayers of the town, asking the supervisors to agree to the proposition. The notice and the ■ proposition were published in a newspaper printed and published in the town.</p> <p>On the 30th of March, 1878, within three months after the filiug of the proposition with the town clerk, the company delivered to him four petitions, in the form required by section 7 of the act, addressed to the town board of supervisors, stating that the petitioners, being residents of the. town- and assessed fox taxes upon real or personal estate therein, as shown by its last assessment roll, asked' the supervisors, as the proper authorities of the town, to agree to the'proposition of the company to which the petition was appended. The petitions bore the signatures of a majority of .the persons residing in the town who were assessed for taxes on real or personal estate therein, as shown by its then latest assessment roll, and the signatures were verified by the affidavits of the persons witnessing such signatures; but the petitions were not signed by a majority of the electors, or legal voters of the town. Those petitions were the only ones ever made asking the authorities of the town to agree to the proposition of the company, and they and section 7 of the act constituted the only authority had or claimed for the issue of the bonds hereinafter mentioned. No election was held in the town to authorize its supervisors to agree to the proposition or to the issue of any such bonds.</p> <p>On the 30th of March, 1878, the board of supervisors of the town adopted and placed on 'file in the office of the town clerk resolutions which recited the proposition of the company, the posting of the notices and the presenting of the petitions, with signatures and affidavits, from which it appeared that a majority of the resident taxpayers of the town, assessed for taxes upon real or personal estate therein, als shown by its last assessment roll, had signed the petitions, and that the construction of the railroad by the company, as set forth in its proposition, ■would promote the general prosperity and welfare of the taxpayers of the town. The resolutions were, that the proposition of the company was .accepted, so far as related to the issue of bonds; that bonds of the town to the amount of $50,000, with interest coupons attached and payable as requested in the proposition, be issued to the company as soon as it should have its railroad completed, with the cars running thereon ; and that the issue of stock to the town by the company, in consideration of the bonds, was waived.</p> <p>The company constructed its railroad, had the cars running thereon, and performed what was stated in the proposition, except that it never issued to' the town any stock of the company.</p> <p>Before any bonds of the town were issued to the company, one George W. Harrington, a resident citizen and taxpayer of the town, brought a suit in the District Court for Wabasha County, in which county the town is situated, against the town and its officers and the railroad company, setting forth the proceedings on which the bonds were to be issued; that they were illegal; and that it was intended to issue the bonds; and praying that the town and its officers, particularly the chairman of- the board of supervisors and -the town clerk, might be enjoined from issuing, and-, the railroad company from accepting or receiving, any such bonds. The town answered the complaint, and in January, 1879, the case was tried by the District Court, which, on February .6, 1879, gave judgment for the defendants and dismissed the" suit. Harrington. took an appeal to tne ¡Supreme Court of tbe State, but, before it was perfected, tbe bonds were issued and delivered to tbe company. Tbe Supreme Court, on October 6,1880, reversed tbe judgment below, its opinion being reported in 27 Minnesota, 224. It held that, under tbe Constitution of Minnesota, it was not competent for tbe legislature to authorize any person or cl%ss of persons, other than tbe electors of a town or tbe officers chosen by such electors, to determine what action, requiring local taxation, tbe town would take in any particular case; that, therefore, section 7 of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877, which assumed to empower a majority of tbe “ resident taxpayers,” whether they were' electors or not,' to bind a town to issue its bonds to aid in tbe construction of a railroad, was unconstitutional and void ; and that, although the mode for authorizing the issue of bonds provided by section 7 was invalid, yet, as the same act provided another mode for authorizing such issue, which was valid, and as the bonds need not recite under which of the two provisions "of the act they.were issued, but .only that they were issued under and pursuant to such act generally, and a purchaser would then have the right to presume that they were issued under its valid provisions, and there might thus be bona fide purchasers of the bonds, a suit for an injunction would he to restrain the issuing of the bonds by the town officers under the invalid mode provided by section 7 of the act.</p> <p>On the 18th of March, 1879, the town board of supervisors passed a resolution that the town issue to the company its bonds in the sum of $50,000, dated on January 1, 1879,-to become due on or before 20 years from that date, with interest thereon, payable annually, at seven .per. cent per annum; that the bonds be signed and issued by the chairman of the board and the town clerk ; and that the issue of stock by the company to. the town in a corresponding amount was waived. The bonds were issued on the 19th of March, 1879,. being one hundred in number, and numbered consecutively from 1 to 100, each purporting to be the bond of the town of Plainview, payable to the-Plainview Railroad Company or bearer, for $500, dated January 1,1879, due on or before January 1,1899, with interest at seven per cent per annum, payable annually, according to the' conditions of the twenty interest coupons attached, one of them payable January 1, 1880, and one on January l of each year thereafter until the maturity of the bond. Each bond contained. on its face the following statement : “ This bond is issued in pursuance of a mutual agreement between the said town and the ‘ said railroad company, which agreement was made in accordance with the laws of the State of Minnesota, and through and .by a proposition made by said railroad company, and duly accepted .by said town upon petition therefor signed by a majority of the resident taxpayers of said town, said agreement having been fully performed by the said railroad company on its..part. This bond is issued in pursuance of the authority given for that purpose by the laws of the State of Minnesota and in compliance with a resolution of the board of supervisors of said town.”</p> <p>The company, on or about July 9, 1879, sold, transferred and delivered the bonds and coupons to citizens of the State of Wisconsin, who purchased the' same without notice of any facts invalidating the bonds, and paid the company $50,000 for them. The bonds and coupons were purchased and acquired by Samuel Marshall and Charles F. Ilsley, citizens of Wisconsin, who purchased them in -good faith, for value, without notice of any facts invalidating them. On the 29th of January, 1881, Marshall and Ilsley commenced an action at law in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota against the town of Plainview, to recover the amount of 46 coupons for $35 each, cut from said bonds, which coupons fell.due January 1, 1881. The action was defended by the town, and was tried before the Circuit Court without a jury, which-found in favor of the plaintiffs and entered a judgment in their favor for $1746.98. - The opinion of the Circuit Court of the United States is reported in 3 Me Crary,.35. It held that the recitals in the bonds were conclusive evidence in favor of a purchaser without further information; that the conditions precedent prescribed by the statute.had been complied with; that, as the law under which the-bonds were issued had been recognized as valid by the highest court of the State of Minnesota, before they were purchased by Marshall and Ilsley, no subsequent decision could affect their validity in the hands of such purchasers ; and that the rule charging every one with notice of pending suits was inapplicable where negotiable securities constituted the subject matter. The case referred to by the Circuit Court, as that in which the Supreme Court of Minnesota had recognized section 7 of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877 as constitutional and valid, was that of State v. Town of Highland, 25 Minnesota,- 355, decided January 10, 1879. ■The Circuit Court arrived at the conclusion that, as the bonds in question had been purchased by Marshall and Ilsley before the case of Harrington v. Plavnview Railroad Company had been decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and that court had said nothing on the subject previously except what was contained in its opinion in State v. Town of Highla/nd, the bonds were' not affected by the decision in the Harrington Case. As to the point that the bonds were invalid in the hands of Marshall and Ilsley, from the fact that they were purchased during the pendency of the Harrington suit, the Circuit Court made answer that said purchasers were not parties to that suit and had no knowledge of it, and that the rule that all persons were ■bound to take notice of a pending suit did not apply to negotiable securities, citing County of Wa/rren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96.</p> <p>Thereafter, Marshall and Ilsley brought five other suits against the town of Plainview, to recover severally upon coupons cut from said bonds, which coupons became due from year to year, two of which suits were defended by the town, and in all of them judgments were recovered against it, amounting respectively to $1717.31, $4154.08, $2595.57, $771.15 and $3906.22, three of which six judgments the town paid.</p> <p>Like judgments with those against the town of Plainview were recovered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota by Marshall and Ilsley against the town of Elgin, Minnesota, and one of the judgments against each of the two towns was brought to this court by a -writ of error! Neither of the two judgments exceeding $5000, this court dismissed the writ of error in each case, 106 U. S. 578, 583, for want of jurisdiction in tins court, although the defendants in error were holders and owners of bonds to the amount of more than $5000, from which the coupons sued on in the two casés were cut.</p> <p>Oil the 3d of March, 1881, an act passed by the legislature of Minnesota was approved by the governor, entitled “An act to authorize the Winona and Saint Peter Bailroad Company to purchase the stock and to purchase or lease the property and franchises of the Plainview Railway Company,” Special Laws of Minnesota of 1881, c. 414, the provisions of which were as follows: “ Section 1. The Winona and Saint Peter railroad company is hereby authorized to purchase the stock or to purchase or lease the property and franchises of the Plainview railway company; and said lastmamed company hereby authorized to sell and convey or to lease its property and franchises to the said first-named company, upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the respective boards of directors of said companies, so as to make the property and franchises of the last-named company a part of the property and franchises of said Winona and Saint' Peter railroad company to be used and operated by it under its charter. Provided, that, any such purchase of the property or franchises of the Plainview railway company shall be made, and all such property held by said Winóna and Saint Peter railroad "Company, subject to all demands, claims and rights of action against said Plainview railway company, arising or' growing out of the latter company’s having heretofore obtained and disposed of certain bonds and coupons purporting to have been issued by the towns of Plainview, Elgin and Yiola to said ^Plainview railway company, and in taking such transfer under this act said purchasing company shall assume all claims and demands against said Plainview railway company to the extent and value only of the property and franchises so transferred. Sec. 2. The Winona and Saint Peter railroad company is hereby authorized to issue its capital stock to an amount necessary to make and complete the purchase aforer said.- Sec. 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.” •-</p> <p>In September, 1884, the town of Plainview brought a suit ■against the,"Winona and Saint Peter Bailroad Company, in the District Court for the county of "Wabasha in the State of Minnesota, the complaint in which set forth the making by the Plainview Bailroad Company of the proposition in writing and the aforesaid acts of compliance with the provisions of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877, and the filing with the town clerk of the petitions signed by the taxpayers, and alleged that the petitions were not signed by a majority of the electors or legal voters of the town; that no election was held in the town to authorize the supervisors to agree to the proposition or to issue any bonds; that the board of supervisors adopted the resolutions before referred to without authority or right from the.electors of the town or otherwise, the supervisors and the railroad company well knowing that a majority of the electors or legal voters of the town had not signed the petitions and that no election had been held authorizing the passing of the resolutions; that there was no authority to pass the same, or to bind the town thereby, or to issue the bonds; that the bonds were issued and delivered to the company; and that the latter, on or about July 9, 1879, intending to injure and defraud the town and deprive it of any defence to the bonds or coupons as against bona fide holders thereof for value, sold and transferred the bonds to citizens of Wisconsin, who purchased the same of the company bona fide, without notice of any of the facts invalidating the bonds, and paid the company $50,000 therefor. The complaint then set out the suits and judgments against the town by Marshall and Ilsley, and the passing of the act of March 3,1881, and averred that the passage of that act was procured by the Winona and Saint Peter Bailroad Company, and the act duly accepted and assented to by that company; that the bonds and coupons mentioned in that act were the same before referred to, and the said company- under said act issued and disposed -of its stock to an amount necessary to make and complete the purchase authorized by the act; and that, about May, 1881, that company, acting solely under the provisions of the act, purchased all the property and franchises of the Plainview Bail-road Company, of the value of $200,000, and in making such purchase, and as part of the consideration therefor, assumed all claims, demands and rights of action against the Plain-view Railroad Company, as provided in the act, including the claim,- demand and right of action set forth in the complaint, and agreed to pay the same. The complaint demanded judgment against the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company for $50,000, with interest from January 1, 1879, at seven per cent per annum.</p> <p>The record shows that on the 11th of May, 1881, the Plain-view Railroad Company conveyed, by an instrument in writing, to the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company all its railroad, about sixteen miles in length, and all its franchises and property, for the consideration of $225,000 paid, “ and by virtue of the 'power and authority conferred upon the parties ” by the act of March 3,1881,</p> <p>The defendant put in an answer to the complaint, denying its liability, to which answer the plaintiff replied. Evidence was given as to the suit of Harrington and the suits of Marshall and Ilsley against the town, and- the case was tried in June, 1885, before the District Court for Wabasha County, which made findings of fact and conclusions of law, on December 26, 1885, and entered a judgment for the plaintiff for $14,451.31, being $50,000 with interest from January 1; 1879, at seven per cent per annum.</p> <p>The defendant' moved for a new trial, which was denied in May; 1886, and it then appealed to the Supreme Court .of Minnesota from the order denying the motion. The case was decided by that eourt April 28, 1887, (36 Minnesota, 505,) and it affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial, and adjudged that the plaintiff have judgment accordingly. On the' mandate of the Supreme Court, the District Court gave judgment for the plaintiff for $80,031.86 damages and $257.09 costs and disbursements, being in all -$80,288.95. Prom that judgment the defendant took a further appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, which court affirmed the judgment below', for the reasons given in the opinion of the court, reported in 36 Minnesota, 505, and directed judgment accordingly, which was entered in the Supreme Oourt. To review that judgment, a writ of error was sued out from this court on the allowance of the- chief justice of the Supreme Oourt of Minnesota.</p> <p>The writ of error in the case of Winona and Saint Peter Pail/road Company v. Town of Elgin, (No. 172,) is presented for consideration at the same time with the case of the town . of Plainview, and was argued .at the same time on the same briefs. The two cases have gone along together pari passu in the lower courts, and the proceedings in them have been alike, mutaUs mutandis. The bonds in the case of the town of Elgin were for $40,000, being eighty in number, of $500 each, bearing date January 1, .1879, and containing the same recital as in the case of the town of Plainview. The judgments in favor of Marshall and Ilsley against the town of Elgin were five in number, being respectively for $1696.85, $1443.91, $2852.85, $2745.12, and $3175.82, all recovered upon coupons. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota against the plaintiff in error here in the suit brought against it by the town of Elgin was rendered July 30, 1887, for $64,245.77. In 36 Minnesota, 517, the Supreme Court says that the case of the town of Elgin against the railroad company was argued and submitted with the case of the town of Plainview against the same defendant, and involved the same questions; and that court affirmed the order of the lower court.</p> <p>In the decision reported in 36 Minnesota, 505, the first opinion was given by Judge Yanderburgh and concurred in by Judge Berry. A second opinion was given by Chief Justice Gilfillan and Judge Dickinson. Judge Mitchell dissented. In the first opinion, it was said that the question of the validity of. the bonds was considered and determined in Harrington v. Town of. Plainview, 27 Minnesota, 224; that .the bonds were not issued on the vote of the electors of the-town, in pursuance of section 5 of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877, but in pursuance of section 7 of that statute, on- the petition of a majority of the resident taxpayers; that the proceedings to procure the bonds were initiated and prosecuted by the railroad company under the act, by filing with the town clerk its proposition in writing, as provided by section 4 of the act, for the issue to it of the bonds of the town, and thereafter by securing and filing the petition of the taxpayers, as directed by section Y; and that the evidence in the case was sufficient to uphold the finding of the trial court that the bonds in controversy were issued to the Plainview Railroad Company, and by its agents transferred to the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company, at their par value, in consideration of the amount due to the latter company, which it had previously advanced in aid of the construction of the other, company’s railroad. The first opinion then proceéded as follows: “ Before the issuance of the bonds, the action above referred to was commenced to enjoin the same, and, while-the-case was pending in this court, the bonds were issued and transferred. The evidence, however, does not warrant the conclusion that there was any actual fraud in the procurement or transfer of the bonds. Roth railway companies were cognizant of the pen-dency of the action, and of the grounds of the alleged invalidity of the bonds; but the legal questions involved were still open and in dispute, and they were advised and believed them to be legal and valid. It is affirmed by the trial court, upon sufficient evidence, that, except as appears upon the face of the bonds, Marshall and Ilsley, and others,. to whom they were subsequently transferred, had no notice Of the suit, and were bona fide purchasers and holders for value. The Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company was a foreign corporation, and the subsequent purchasers of the bonds were and are citizens of other States. The bonds all recite on their face that they were issued in pursuance of the authority given for that purpose, by the laws of thé State of Minnesota, and in compliance with a resolution of the board of supervisors of- the town, and also ‘ in pursuance of a mutual agreement, between the said town and the said railroad company, which agreement was made in accordance with the -laws of the State of Minnesota, and through and by a proposition made By said railroad company and duly accepted by said town, upon petition therefor signed by a majority of the resident taxpayers of said town, said agreement having been duly performed by said railroad company on its part.’ This court held in the Harrington Case that an agreement, consummated by proceedings under the provisions of the statute referred to, between the railway company and the majority of the taxpayers, could not, under the Constitution, be considered as the lawful agreement of the town, nor be of any binding obligation as such, and that bonds issued in pursuance thereof would be void, except in the hands of bona fide purchasers.”</p> <p>The first opinion then said, that the bonds were invalid in the hands of the Plainview company, and could not have been enforced, by it; that although that company had built its road, there was no agreement, made with the town; that the town, in its corporate capacity, had received'nothing, been guilty of no laches, and waived nothing, and there was no estoppel; and that it was entitled to be protected against the unauthorized acts of its own officers, when that could be done without ' injury to third parties, citing Thomas v. City of. Richmond, 12 'Wall. 349, 356, and Town of South Ottawa v. PerJdns, 94 . U. S. 260. ’ The first opinion also said, that, while the recitals in the bonds were sufficient to piit the purchasers upon inquiry as to the authority for the issue of the bonds and the manner in which they were in fact issued, and by the recitals all pur- ' chasers were chargeable with notice .of the invalidity of the ' bonds, Marshall and Ilsley had brought suit upon the coupons •in the Circuit Court of the United States for the-District of Minnesota, and the bonds had been duly adjudged and déter- . mined, in a trial upon the merits in .that court, to be valid in their hands, and the result of that judgment was to make the bonds valid negotiable securities, held by them as bona fide purchasers; that, as the Plainview company and the Winona and Saint Peter company were not parties to that action, the town was not estopped from litigating in the state courts the questions involved in the case; that .the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States could nof be reviewed or modified by the staté courts; that the result of its decision and judgment was-to fix irrevocably the liability of the town for the' whole amount of the indebtedness • evidenced by the bonds; and that it must be deemed, therefore, to have been settled conclusively that the bonds had been transferred to parties in whose hands they had become valid and legal obligations against, the town.</p> <p>It was further said, that it was determined conclusively, by the judgment in Harrington- v. Town of Plainview, that the bdncls were void in the hands of the Plainview company, that company having had its day in court.in that case; that the issuing and disposition of the bonds must be treated by the state courts as unlawful and wrongful; that, as the bonds, when once placed on the market, were liable to pass into the hands of purchasers'who would be entitled to enforce the same as valid negotiable securities in the United States courts, it followed that the town had a cause of action for damages; that the Plainview company transferred the bonds for full value, in payment of moneys advanced for building its road, and Marshall and Ilsley paid nearly par for them; that they were treated by all parties as valuable commercial securities, placed on the market and sold, and enforced as such against the town; and that, as the bonds were invalid and the Plain-view company acquired no title to them as obligations of the town, it could not claim to be entitled to the proceeds of them as its property.</p> <p>It was further said that, as the Plainview company received the full' face value of the bonds, the amount of the recovery would be the same whether the suit was one for money had and received or one for a conversion; that the allegations of the pomplaint and the findings of fact were sufficient to support the action in either form; that the title to the bonds had been confirmed in the present holders of them, who had recovered, or would recover, the Ml amount thereof; that the liability of the town had been fixed through the acts of the' Plainview company in procuring and negotiating the- bonds, which acts were unauthorized and wrongful; that such proceedings as would result in the enforcement of the bonds must be presumed to have been intended and contemplated by the Plainview company, either in its own hands or by purchasers who might occupy a more advantageous position, and it could not be permitted to object that the bonds were of no. value,"or allege its own. wrong, for the purpose of defeating the action, (citing Oomstock v. Kiev, 73 1ST. Y. 269; Lamb v. OiarJc, 15 Pick. 193, 197;) and that the town'was not estopped or concluded by the result of the suit of Marshall- and Hsley, to which the Plainview company was not a party.</p> <p>The first opinion further held that, under the provision of the act of March 3, 1881, that the Winona and Saint Peter company should make the purchase from the Plainview company “subject to all demands, claims and rights'of action against said Plainview Railway Company arising or growing • out of the latter company’s having heretofore, obtained and disposed of certain bonds and coupons purporting to have been issued • by the towns ” named to the Plainview company, the Winona and Saint Peter company acquired the property and franchises of the Plainview company by virtue of that act, and of course took the grant cum onere and subject to the provisions and conditions of the act. The conclusion was that the town was' entitled to recover, and that the order denying a new trial should be affirmed. - ■</p> <p>The second opinion concurred in the conclusion of the first opinion, but based the responsibility of the company on the following considerations, viz.: That the company, having procured the unauthorized execution and delivery to itself of the bonds, in form expressing the obligation of the town, and having negotiated them so that they had come into the hands of parties who had enforced a recovery upon them by proper action in a competent tribunal, was answerable for its own unauthorized acts, which had resulted in that injury to the town, unless the recovery upon the bonds was to be deemed. to be too remote a consequence to afford a ground of legal lia- - bility; that, as to the acts of' the company, the injurious consequence was not remote, but proximate; that, when the company procured and disposed Of the bonds, it must be deemed to have contemplated that the town should pay the bonds, either voluntarily or by legal compulsion; that it made no difference if the judgment by which the liability of the town to pay the •bonds had been conclusively established was erroneous; and that that did hot make remote the damage complained of.</p> <p>The Federal questions alleged to be involved in these cases are thus 'stated by the plaintiff in error: (1) Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in rendering its judgments in these cases, fail to give to the judgments of the United States Circuit Court in the Marshall and Ilsley cases such faith and credit as they 'were entitled to under the Constitution and laws of the United States? (2) Did it, in rendering these’judgments, disregard the provision of the Constitution of the United States that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract ? They are otherwise stated in another of the briefs for the plaintiff in error as follows: (1) The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in rendering the judgments under review, disregarded the provision Of the Constitution of The United States that no State shall' pass any law impairing the obligation of 'a ^contract, in that it erroneously decided that the contracts and bonds of the towns were invalid, and on that ground gave' effect to the act of March 3,1881, as making the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company hable for the transfer of the bonds; (2) The Supreme Court, in rendering its judgments in these cases, disregarded the Constitution .and laws of the United States in deciding that the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company was liable to the towns, because it was responsible for the consequences to them of the judgments in the Marshall and Ilsley cases, although the company wpuld not have been liable but for said judgments.</p> <p>The towns have moved to dismiss the writs of error for want of jurisdiction in this court, on the ground that the records present no Federal question.-</p> <p>■ I. It is not necessary, in order that a subsequent statute shall impair a previous contract’s obligation, that the statute should itself be made the reason for declaring the contract invalid or for restricting the contract’s full and proper operation. Even if, as here, the state court declares the contract invalid on grounds independent of the later statute, still if the de-dared invalidity of the contract, though placed upon such independent or general grounds, is made the reason for giving the subsequent statute an effect which it could not have but for the contract’s invalidity, the contract is unpaired by the later act. The essential thing is only that the -subsequent act be given an effect which it cannot properly have if the contract is valid.' An inconsistency between the subsequent statute, as judicially given effect, and the rights growing out of the 'contract, correctly construed, makes a case of impairment of the. obligation of the contract. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Go., 1 Wall. 116, 144, 145; Pelmas v. Merchants Ins. Go., 14 Wall. 661; University v. People, 99 IT. S. 309; Wright v. Nagle, 101 IT. S. 191, 193, 794; .Louisville Gas Go. v. Citizens' Gas Go., 115 IT. S. 683, 696 ; Soiithwestern Railroad v. Wright, 116 IT. S. 231; Vicksburg dac. Rail/road v. Dennis, 116 IT. S. 665 ; Given v. Wright, 117 IT. S. 648; Chicago, Burlington die. Railroad v. ’Guffey, 120 IT. S. 569 ; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 124 IT. S. 639; New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Go., 125 U. S. 18;. Yazoo da Miss.. Valley Railroad v. Thomas, 132 IT. S. 174.</p> <p>It is the effect actually given to a statute, subsequent to a contract and claimed to impair it, which determines whether, .if the contract exists, the statute does in fact impair it. The statute, as construed by the state court, and with the operation there accorded it, is what this court looks at to decide whether a contract has had its obligation impaired.</p> <p>II. It is settled on principle and by the express adjudications of this court that due effect is not given to the judgments of Federal courts sitting in a particular State unless they are accorded such effect as would in a like case; under similar circumstances, be accorded to the judgments of the state courts of equal authority in such State; and the question whether a state court has given such effect to any such judgment is a question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States .and falls within the jurisdiction of this court. Crescent Live Stock Go. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141; Erribry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3; Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130.</p> <p>Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota in these cases give to the judgments-of the United States Circuit Court in Marshall and Ilsley’s cases such force and effect as it 'would have allowed them had they been rendered by it ? That it did not hardly admits of discussion; and it follows that it did. not accord to them such, credit and effect as it should have accorded under the Constitution.</p> <p>To break the force of this conclusion counsel are understood to argue that the state courts are not hound to give full faith .and credit, or any faith and credit; to judgments of the Federal courts except- in a suit and between parties where such judgments would operate as a technical estoppeL This ■court, has in well-considered language answered this contention. Speaking of the Federal courts, it says: “ Their judgment or decree when rendered is binding and perfect between the parties until reversed, without regard. to any adverse opinion or judgment of any other court of merely concurrent jurisdiction. Its integrity, its validity, and its effect are complete in all respects between all parties in every suit and in every forum where it is legitimately produced as the foundation of an action, or of a defence, either by plea or in proof, as it would be in any other circumstances. While it remains in forcé it determines the rights of the parties between themselves, and-may be carried into, execution in due course of law to its full extent,,furnishing a complete protection to all who act in compliance with its mandate.”- Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U..S. Ill, 157. The. learned counsel of the defendants in error rely on the case of Dupasseur v. Boch-ereau, 21 Wall. 130, which they claim is on all fours with this case and decisive of this question.</p> <p>If I have intelligently read that case, all it decides is that, inasmuch as the judgment of the United States Circuit Court relied on by Dupásseur as a defence did not touch or' affect the rights of either party or any question involved in that suit, the state court acted properly in not regarding it. It has no application to the question to which it is cited. Creen v. Vcm Buskirk, 5 Wall. 301; S. C. 7 Wall. 139;' Crapo v. Kelly, 10 Wall. 610; .Factors’ <& Traders' Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 738; Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers'■ Union, 120 U. S. 141.</p>

Held: in Dahl v. Raunheim, 132 U. S. 260 , 263, 10 Sup. Ct.

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