Volume 144 — United States Reports

United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), is a decision issued on February 29, 1892 by the United States Supreme Court, discussing the constitutional definition of "a quorum to do business" in Congress. Justice David Brewer delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, analyzing the constitutional limitations on the United States Senate and House of Representatives when determining their rules of proceedings. In particular, the Court held that it fell within the powers of the House and Senate to establish their own rules for verifying whether a majority of their members is present, as required for a quorum under Article I of the Constitution.

The court stated the case as follows : This was a bill in equity for the infringement of letters; patent'number 272,660, issued February 20, 1883, to Alfred A. Cowles for an “insulated electric.conductor.” In his specification, the patentee stated that “before my invention copper wires had been covered with one or two braidings of cord, and paraffine, tar-, asphalt and various substances had been employed for rendering the covering waterproof and furnishing a proper…

Prior to March, 1882, plaintiffs in error, defendants below, filed their application in the United States land office • at Helena, Montana, for a patent to the Smelter lode claim.

<p>Under the act of March 3, 1883, “ to adjust the salaries of postmasters,” 22 Stat. 600, c. M2, a postmaster who is assigned by the Postmaster General to the third class, at a designated salary, from a designated date, is entitled, if he performs the duties of the office, to compensation .at the rate of that salary, froin that date, without regard to his appointment by the President and confirmation by the Senate.</p>

Held: Under § 14 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 171, 13 Stat. 214 , 215, the protest set forth distinctly and specifically the grounds of the objection of- the importer to the decision of the collector, and was sufficient; (2) It was immaterial that the protest did not • specify that the gloves were made on frames; *29 (3) The goods were dutiable only at 33 per cent less 10 per cent under § 22 of the act of March 2,…

Held: under the later § 2499, that “ to place articles among those' designated as enumerated, it is not necessary that they should be specifically mentioned. It is sufficient that they are designated in any way to distinguish them from other articles; ” and that the words “ manufactures of hair ” were a sufficient designation to place such manufactures among the enumerated articles.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>This was an action brought by Wilson, a citizen of Missouri, against' Seligman, a citizen of New York, in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, and duly removed by the defendant •into the Circuit Court of the United States. The action was upon an order or judgment of the state court under section 736 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, (which is copied in the margin,1) by which execution was awarded against the ' defendant as a stockholder in the Memphis, Carthage and Northwestern Railroad Company, a corporation of Missouri, upon a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the corporation. The defendant answered, denying that he was a stockholder, and averring that the order or judgment against him was void, for want of jurisdiction of his person. The present case was submitted, a jury being duly waived in writing, to the court, which found the following facts:</p> <p>The plaintiff’s judgment against the corporation was recovered in. the state court on April 2,1883, for $72,799.38, and interest. Upon that judgment' executions against the corporation were issued to the sheriffs of the several counties in Missouri through, which it had built its road, and were returned unsatisfied; and the corporation was then, and has been ever since, insolvent. On July 9, 1883, the plaintiff filed a motion in the same court for an order that execution for the amount .'of. that judgment issue against the defendant as the alleged holder of stock in the corporation on which more than the amount of the judgment against the corporation was still unpaid. Notice of this motion was- served on him personally at his domicil in New York, and was posted in the clerk’s office of the- state court. No notice was served on him within the State of Missouri, and he never was a citizen or a resident of this State. At the hearing of the motion, on December 3, 1883, the defendant did not appear, and the court entered an order, finding that he was a stockholder as alleged, and washable to execution- for the amount of the judgment against the corporation, and granting the motion and ordering execution to issue against him accordingly. This was the order or judgment upon which the present action was brought.</p> <p>Upon these facts, the court below gave judgment for the dófendant. 36 Fed. Eep. 154. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.</p>

Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892), was a United States Supreme Court case. Occurring at the beginning of the era of Chinese Exclusion as well as the formation of the United States courts of appeals, the case set precedents for the interpretation of the rights of Chinese merchants as well as the jurisdiction of the new courts. The ruling relied heavily on the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, the Angell Treaty of 1880, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the amendments to the Act in 1884, as well as the Evarts Act of 1891. The case helped to establish not only the rights of the Chinese merchant class, but also informed future cases about the power of the Circuit Court of Appeals as well as the perception of Chinese immigrants.

Held: That under the rule laid down in. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 , it was competent for the court, if, assuming all the statements and claims made in 1¡he defendant’s opening with all'expla-’ nations and qualifications to be true, he had no case, to direct a verdict for the plaintiff; but (2) That he should-have been allowed, especially in view of the statement that there was no imputation upon his integrity or…

Held: are charged with fraud or any conduct in bad faith, and neither is a party to this bill. The matters alleged to be fraudulent are the steps taken to have the property foreclosed and the purchase thereon ensuing, and what is charged is that the holders of large amounts of the bonds and of all the receiver’s certificates combined to bring about the foreclosure and to make the purchase.

ORIGINAL. No Number. Thomas H. Heath was convicted of manslaughter at a special criminal term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary at Albany,'New York. Upon appeal to the general term of that court the judgment was affirmed, whereupon he applied for a writ of error from this court-.

Held: that although greater care should have been exercised, by plaintiffs in the averments, the diverse citizenship of the parties appeared affirmatively and with sufficient distinctness in the record. A promissory note payable to the order of the maker, being endorsed by him, was endorsed and delivered to another for his accommodation. .The latter endorsed it and borrowed money upon it, waiving demand and protest.

The court stated the case as follows: These were appeals from, a decree requiring the appellant-Stuart to pay the sum of $18,937.08, and appellant Camden the sum of $9195.12, these being the amounts unpaid upon certain subscriptions made by them to the stock of the Green-brier White Sulphur Springs Company.

Held: The case was not one for a suit in equity; (2) The. possession of X. was that of M.; and X. as a. purchaser pendente lite, was subject to the operation of the writ of possession; (3) The proper decree was to dismiss the bill, without- prejudice to an . action at law. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Alfred Goldthwaite for appellant. Mr. A. 3. Leonard and Mr. Morris Marks for-appellee.

<p>Service‘of citation by a plaintiff in error upon tlie defendant in error by depositing in the post-office a copy of the same, postage paid, addressed to the attorney of the defendant in error at his place of abode, is an insufficient service.</p> <p>The decision of the Supreme Court of a State in a case in'which application for removal to the Circuit Court of the United States had been made in the trial court and denied, that, as no appeal was prosecuted from the final judgment, the order denying the application to remove was not open to review, and its judgment' thereupon dismissing the appeal from the orders refusing to set aside the judgment of the court below, rest upon grounds of state, procedure, and present no Federal question.</p>

The. plaintiff in error, as plaintiff below, filed a bill in a District Court in a county in Colorado, to restrain the collection of taxes which had been assessed against him. An injunction being refused, he filed a second bill, in another court in another county, seeking the same remedy. An injunction being issued there, the cause was taken to the Supreme Court of the State, where the decree was reversed and the injunction dissolved.

Held: That a trust relation between the parties was disclosed, which entitled the complainant to an account; (2) That it was the duty of H. to keep an account and that in its absence it must be presumed that he reinvested interest moneys, as received, at the rates named in the correspondence; (3) That after his death his .executors should be charged at the legal rate of 6 per cent; (4) That certain claims set up by the…

Held: that, as the decree in the equity suit was prior to the judgment in the trespass' suit, and as the plaintiffs in the ejectment suit were not parties to the trespass suit, the judgment in the last named suit was of no force or effect in favor of the plaintiff in error, as against' the decree in the equity suit. The case is stated in the opinion. ; Mr. 8. P. Hamilton and Mr. Mills Deam, for plaintiff in error.

Held: That all that the act of June 3, 1878, denounces is a prior agreement by which the patentee acts for another in the purchase; (2) That M. might rightfully go or send into that vicinity, and make known. generally, or to individuals, a willingness to buy timber land at a price in-excess of that which it would cost to obtain it from the government; and that a person knowing of that offer might rightfully go to the land…

Held: that the city had .no authority to issue negotiable bonds, and that, ■ therefore, even a bona fide holder of them could not recover against the city on them or their coupons.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE KANSAS.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that no Federal question was involved in the decision of the state court.

This was an action brought in a district court of the Territory of Washington, against a corporation owning a saw-mill, by a man employed in operating a machine therein, called a trimmer, to recover damages for the defendant’s negligence in providing an unsafe and defective machine, whereby one of the pulleys, over which ran the belt transmitting power to the saw,- fell upon and injured the plaintiff.

■ This was an action brought by the defendant in error to recover damages for the non-performance of a contract contained in a bill of sale of cattle running on a range and in the pastures of the plaintiffs in error in Texas. The record contained no copy of this contract. The brief of the counsel for plaintiffs in error stated “ the questions involved ” thus: “ 1.

Held: That this bill of exceptions was not settled and filed within the time allowed by law or under any order of the court; (2) That the alleged motion for a new trial not having been filed until December 14, 1889, was not made, and no notice of intention to make it was given, within the time allowed by law or by any order of the court; (3) That a renewal of notice and motion after the State was admitted, if. it could…

Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892), was an early United States Supreme Court decision refusing, on public policy grounds, to enforce an agreement not to contest patent validity. The Supreme Court later relied on Pope in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins as authority in support of overruling the doctrine of licensee estoppel. That doctrine had prohibited patent licensees from challenging the validity of patents under which they had been licensed.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>

Held: in the territory specified, and that any assignment short of that is a mere license. “ For,” said Chief Justice Taney, “it was obviously not the intention of - the leg *251 islature to permit several monopolies to be made out of one, and divided among different persons within the same limits.

Held: in the case between the plaintiff and"defendant Gofimully, No. 204, that the contract of December 1, 1884, did hot operate to estop the defendants from contesting the validity of these patents, it is not necessary to consider this case any farther so far as the claim for recovery based upon this contract is concerned. The case must be tried as an ordinary suit in equity for the infringement of a patent.

This suit was originally commenced in the District Court of Karnes County, Texas, on September 12, 1882, and thereafter propeily removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the "Western District of Texas. The facts as disclosed by the bill were, that in 1876 there existed a corporation, known as the Helena Bridge Company, and organized for the purposes of building an iron bridge over the San Antonio Biver at the town of Helena.

Held: in default of-bail, to await his trial bn a criminal charge within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts, such citizen has a right, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, and, until tried or discharged by due process of law, has the right, under said Constitution and laws, to be treated with humanity, and to be protected against all…

This was an indictment on sections 5508 and 5509 of the Revised Statutes, (copied ante, 264, note,) averring that while one Joseph Wright, a citizen of the United States, was returning to his home, after having,appeared and testified before the grand jury of the United States, in obedience to subpoenas from the Circuit Court of the United States, against person^ charged with violations of the internal revenue laws, and while he was still a witness under such subpoenas, the…

This case came on for argument in regular course on the 4th day of December in October term, 1889. ■ The court ordered the case to be passed to be heard before a full bench. When reached at October term, 1890, it was again passed in consequence of the illness of counsel. The case as now made is stated in the opinion'of the court.

<p>A collision occurred between a ship and a steam-tug while the navigation rules established by the act of March 3, 1885, c. 354, 23 Stat. 438, were in force. The tug was required to keep out of the way of the ship and the ship to keep her course. The tug ported her helm to avoid the ship, and that would have been effectual if the ship had not afterwards changed her course by starboarding her helm. If the ship had kept her course, . or ported her helm, the collision would have been avoided. The change of course by the ship was not necessary or excusable. The tug did everything to avoid the collision and lessen the damage. The tug had a competent mate, who faithfully performed his duties although he had no license. Although the tug had no such lookout as was required by law, that' fact did not contribute to the collision. The tug did not slacken her speed before the collision. There was no risk of .collision until the ship starboarded, and then the peril was so great and thib vessels were such a short distance apart that the tug may well be considered as having been in extremis, before the time when it became her duty to Stop and reverse, so that any error of judgment in not sooner stopping and • réversing was not a fault.</p> <p>The case of The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 97, distinguished.</p> <p>The tug was not in tault and the ship was wholly in fault.</p> <p>The appeal being from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington, and that Territory having become a State, the case was remanded to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington, (Act of February 22, .1889, c. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 682, 683, §§ 22, 23,) for further proceedings according to law.</p>

Held: That, taken in connection with the evidence, this conveyed to J. S. W. no present interest in the property, but only the right to acquire ;uch an interest within a period of “twelve months from this date.” (2) That time was of the essence in such a contract for acquisition.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the-United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

by the reporter as follows: “ Plaintiff, a woman about 65 years of age, of ordinary intelligence, and possessed of good sight and hearing, was… Held: that it did not appear as matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of gross or wilful negligence, and that it was proper to submit the question to the jury.” See also Evans v. Lake Shore & Mich. South. Railway, (Mich.) 50 N. W. Rep. 386 ; Ellis v. Lake Shore & Mich. South. Railway, 138 Penn. St. 506 ; Brown v. Tex. & Pac.

The case was stated by the court as follows: Benjamin E. Thompson and Homer Root brought this action of assumpsit against the J. S. Keator Lumber Company for a balance alleged to be due them for cutting and hauling saw-logs, etc. The two main grounds of dispute were: (1) Whether the price for the work was limited by the contract in question to $3 per thousand feet of saw-logs cut and delivered into the boom limits of the Black River, Wisconsin, without extra charge, or…

Held: That no rebate of interest should be allowed on the payments made , March 4, March 11 and October 8; • (2) That a rebate should be allowed on the remittance of June 8; (3) That the attorney’s fee should be reduced to $500. *452 The court stated the case as ionows: Oa February IT, 1886, the appellants, residents of Hall' County, Nebraska, executed and delivered. two instruments, each dated February 1, 1886, and…

Held: That B.’s man could use these books in his examination in chief to assist him in testifying as to the actual working of the machines from ■ October 18 to November 7; (2) That the defendant not having introduced the books, (which were in his possession,) in his evidence in reply to the plaintiff’s evidence in chief, could not, in rebuttal, ask a witness to examine them and state . the results as to the working of the…

Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488 (1892), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held 1) A copyright is held by default with the person whose name it was taken out in, regardless of potential conflicts with state law. 2) If a work contains a mixture of original and copyright infringing material, but it is so intermingled as to be inseparable, then the copyright holder may take all profits from the work.

Held: speaking through Mr: Justice Field, now a member of this court, that “the interest, mentioned in the statute which entitles a person to intervene in,-a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigar tion, and of such a direct and immediate character that theintervenor will either gain or lose by the direct- legal operation and effect of the judgment. ...

This was a bill in equity, filed August 29, 1881, in the superior court of Cook County in the- State of Illinois, by Joseph T. Torrence against Susan M. Shedd, John B. Brown and ninety others, for partition of a tract of- land in that county, to an undivided third of which the plaintiff claimed title under a deed, from Edward Sorin. Brown and twenty others were not served-with process.

The court stated the case as follows •; This was a suit in equity to establish, as matter of record,, the title of the complainants to certain real property in the city of Washington, constituting a part of square number one hundred and fifty-one, and to enjoin the defendants from asserting title to the same premises as heirs of the former owner.

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p>

This was a petition for leave to file a petition for rehearing in the case reported, ante, page 113. Among the causes assigned were the following: The decision visits with-severity your petitioner, who, in perfect good faith, with prudence and care, invested the trust money of its depositors in what at the time of the transaction was universally regarded under the decisions of this court. as a form of negotiable security of the safest and best- character.

This was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to satisfy a judgment recovered against Macon County upon bonds issued by the county. The bonds were of the same issue which was before this court in United States v. County of Maeon, 99 U. S. 582, and the remedy sought for was the same remedy which was prayed for in that suit. The court below dismissed the writ upon the authority of that case.

<p>APPEAL. FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>This was a suit for the cancellation of a deed, and to compel a reconveyance of land, commenced in the District Court of Shawnee County in the State of Kansas. The complaint did not disclose the citizenship of the parties. The defendants, before pleading, presented a petition as follows for the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States:</p> <p>“And now come the said defendants Edward P. Kellam and Cyrus K. Holliday, by Kossington, Smith & Dallas and John T. Morton, their attorneys, and represent and aver that in this action the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs and interest, the sum and value of five hundred dollars, and in fact exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of two thousand dollars, and that in this suit there is a controversy which is. wholly between citizens of different States, the said plaintiff being a citizen of the State of Nebraska and both of said defendants being citizens of the State of Kansas, and that the controversy can be fully determined as between them, the said plaintiff and said defendants.</p> <p>“ These defendants therefore ask that this cause be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States in and for the District of Kansas to be held in said district; that this court accept this petition and the bond herewith filed and proceed no further in this action, and that this cause be removed into said Circuit Court.”</p> <p>After removal the Circuit Court ordered the pleadings to be recast, whereupon the plaintiff filed a bill in equity in which the parties were described as'follows: “Morrell C. Keith, of North Platte, Nebraska, and a citizen of the State of Nebraska, brings this his bill against Edward P. Kellam; of Topeka, and a citizen of the State of-Kansas, and Cyrus K. Holliday, of Topeka, and a citizen of the State of Kansas; and thereupon your orator complains and says, etc.”</p> <p>The case then proceeded to judgment, and, a decree for the plaintiff being rendered, the defendants appealed to tbia court.</p>

Held: that this, court had no jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of error.

<p>APPEALS EROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON.</p> <p>The court stated the case as follows :</p> <p>This was a bill filed by Charles A. Neal in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the county of Linn, July 1, 1886, against James II. Foster, John A.- Crawford, William Crawford, Ashby Pearce, John E. Baltimore, J. L. Liles, E. Walden, and W. H. .Goltra, and subsequently removed, on the application of the complainant, to the Circuit Court of the United States for the' District of Oregon. The bill was in the nature., of a creditor’s bill, seeking to set aside certain conveyances of real (and some personal) property by the defendant James H. .Foster to the defendants John A. Crawford, William Crawr ford and. Ashby Pearce, upon the ground that they were made • to hinder; delay and defraud the complainant and certain of the defendants, as'- judgment creditors of the said Foster. Complainant was a citizen of the. State of Illinois and defendants were ' citizens of the, State of Oregon, and complainant claimed as the assigneé of two judgments, the first rendered in the state circuit court, March-'8, 1886, in favor of - Sibson, ‘Quackenbush & Co., for $14,037.87, -with costs and interest, and the second, rendered in the same court and oh the same day, in favor of W. O. Noon & Co., for the sum of $1920.35 with interest. The defendants' Goltra, Walden, Liles and Baltimore were also judgment creditors of Foster,'</p> <p>Answers and replications having been filed, the cause was. referred to a master to take testimony and- to report his find- ■ ings of fact and conclusions of law thereon.</p> <p>The master found the various judgments, and that execution had been issued and returned unsatisfied upon those in favor ,of -Sibson,, Quackenbush & Co. and W. C. Noon & Co.; that Foster was insolvent on February 6,-1884, and' had so continued since that time, and had no property out of which the judgment's of complainant and the other creditors could (be satisfied'; that on February 6,1884, Foster conveyed to John A. Crawford certain parcels of real estate fiumbered from one to five, and certain personal property, and to William Craw-' ford' another pareel of real estate known as the “ brick store property,” numbered six, and that on February 7, Foster con-' •veyéd to Ashby Pearce a pertain other /parcel nitmberéd seven, and a small amount of personalty; and that the parties to these /transfers, at the time they were made, agreed upon the' prices - of the property, which aggregated $79,000..</p> <p>“ That at the time of the transfer the said several parcels of' property, real and personal, so transferred by Foster to J. A. Crawford, were fairly and reasonably worth —</p> <p>Tract 1 & 2 ...........,................. $30,000</p> <p>“ 3 ..'.............................. 2,500</p> <p>“ 4...............................500</p> <p>“ 5................................ 3,000</p> <p>Book accounts.........................,. 3,000</p> <p>Grain sacks.............................. 3,000</p> <p>Total.............................•.......$42,000</p> <p>The property conveyed to William Crawford at the time of the transfer was actually worth.......... 18,000</p> <p>The real property conveyed to Ashby Pearce was at the time of the transfer actually worth .. $3,500</p> <p>And the personal property............:.'. 700</p> <p>Total...........................'...'...... 4,200</p> <p>$64,200”</p> <p>The master further found —</p> <p>“XYEEE. That in 1867 J. H. and John Foster were partners in a mercantile business under the firm name of J. EE. Foster & Co., and in that year bought .the Magnolia mill from Wm. Crawford for $16,000, paying $6000 cash and executing five notes, for $2000 each, of date July 20, 1867. These notes were secured by a mortgage on the mill property and a brick store, which mortgage was duly recorded. .</p> <p>“That in 1876 J. ’H. Foster bought out John Foster’s interest in the mills and business and assumed all the debts and' liabilities of J. H. Foster & Co., and thereafter individually continued the business under the same firm name.</p> <p>“ That the business, of the Crawfords with J. H. Foster was, 'for a considerable time, conducted under the name of Crawford Bros., and’ was transacted by John A. Crawford, who was the agent and representative of Wm. Grawford.</p> <p>“That on or before the 6th day of February, 1884, J. EL Foster was owing said J. A. Crawford on notes and accounts for money lent and water rent the sum of $27,733,' which was then due and unpaid, and that at the time said J. A. Crawford was also liable as surety for $16,000, or thereabouts, upon, endorsements which he had made for the accommodation of said Foster.</p> <p>“That on said 6th day of February, 1884, said J.-A. Crawford, as a part of the consideration for said transfer, executed and delivered to J. H. Foster his note for $10,000, with the understanding that said Foster should hold said note as a security that said Crawford should perform a verbal agree: ment then made between said J. A. Crawford and said Foster, to the effect that said Crawford should purchase the wheat of or satisfy divers persons who held warehouse receipts of said Foster for wheat stored by them with said Foster in his warehouse, and which wheat Foster had converted to his own use, to the amount, in all, of about 20,000 bushels, and save said Foster harmless therefrom.</p> <p>“That said J. A. Crawford then agreed with said Foster, that, as a part consideration for the transfer of said property, he would assume and pay the said $16,000 for which he was security for said Foster as aforesaid.</p> <p>“ That all of said indebtedness of said J. H. Foster to said J. A. Crawford was at the date of said transfer surrendered to said Foster and cancelled,-as a part of the consideration for-said property so deeded and transferred as aforesaid, and that said Crawford has since taken up and cancelled' said wheat receipts and satisfied said note of $10,000, and has since said 6th day of February, 1884, paid said debts on which he was security for said Foster and caused the sanie to be cancelled as to said Foster.</p> <p>“ That the purchase 'of said property from, said J. EL Foster by'J. A. Crawford, as iaforesaid, was made in good faith, and that full value was paid therefor.;</p> <p>“ That the defendant Ashby Pearce .was an accommodation maker only of the note to J. EE Foster & 'do. which said Pearce afterward paid to John Conner; that at the date of-the transfer by J. El. Foster to said Pearce-as aforesaid said Foster was indebted to Pearce in the amount of said note so paid by Pearce as surety for Foster; said note was for $5000; that the purchase of said property by Pearce was in good faith, and that more than full value was paid therefor.</p> <p>“ That on the said 6th day of February, 1884, said J. H. Foster was not indebted to William.Crawford; that the mortgage referred to in finding XYIII was prior to its satisfaction on the record, which took place on the 31st of July, 1883, paid in full; that said mortgage was satisfied of record by Wm. Crawford on the last-mentioned daté; that no valid consideration for the transfer of the brick block to said Crawford by said Foster passed from said Crawford to said Foster; that said conveyance of said brick building by said Foster to said Crawford was a voluntary one.</p> <p>“That since the transfer of said brick building by said Foster to said Wm. Crawford the latter has expended thereon in permanent improvements some $2000.”</p> <p>And as conclusions of law the master reported:</p> <p>“I. That the complainant’s bill should be dismissed as to defendants Ashby Pearce and John A. Crawford.</p> <p>“II. That the deed of J. H. Foster to defendant Wm. Crawford is constructively fraudulent and void as against the complainant and the other creditors of said Foster named in the pleadings and should be cancelled and set aside.”</p> <p>Exceptions were filed to the master’s report by complainant and by William Crawford.</p> <p>The case as to Goltra was disposed of adyersely to him upon a cross-bill filed by Foster and the Crawfords, and, as he did not appeal, requires no further reference. The defendants Foster, the Crawfords and Pearce, in addition to denying that. any of the conveyances were fraudulent or without consideration, or made to hinder, delay -or defraud creditors, denied that the complainant was the real owner of the two judgments of which he claimed to be the assignee, and averred that they were transferred to him withoht his knowledge and without consideration; that said transfers were made for the sole and only purpose, and with the object and intention, of collusively giving or attempting to give jurisdiction to the Federal yaourt-, and that Sibson, Quackenbush & Co. and W. Ct^Noon & Co. were and h^d ever been, since the judgments were rendered, the real owners thereof, respectively; and that complainant had no interest in either of them.</p> <p>The case was heard upon the bill and answers, the testimony and the exceptions %b the master’s report, and a decree entered dismissing the bill as to the defendants John A. Crawford and Ashby Pearce, and setting aside the conveyance by Foster to William Crawford, and directing a sale of the property included in that conveyance and the application of the proceeds, first, to the satisfaction of the judgments held by complainant as assignee and the costs and expenses of the sale, and second, to the satisfaction of other judgments referred to in the pleadings. From this decree Neal and William Crawford, severally, took appeals to this court.</p> <p>The opinion of Judge Deady, holding the Circuit Court, will be found reported in 36 Fed. Hep. 29.</p>

Held: that, as the evidence clearly showed that *602 tlie goods were' invariably bought and sold as “ torchons,” and not as thread laces, and that thread lace was always hand-made, it was proper to direct a verdict for the defendant, in a.suit brought by thé importer against the collector to recover an alleged excess of .duty.

Held: that the assessment of duties, as made, was correct. “ Goring ” and “ gorings ” make their first appearance in the act of March 3, 1883. The cases of Davies v. Arthur, 96 U. S. 135 , and Beard v-. Nichols, 120 IT. S. 260, do not control the present case.

. The court stated the case as follows: This was an action on five bonds purporting to have been issued by the School District, defendant. The case was tried by the court without a jury.

On January 31, 1883, defendant in error, defendant below, insured the life of Michael O’Brien.

Held: on final hearing, that it had no jurisdiction, because the case did not arise under any law of the United States, and remanded the case to the state court. This court affirmed the decree, citing as authority Wilson v. Sandford, and Hartell v. Tilghman.

Held: that the appearance of the receiver in this court for the purpose of securing a reversal of' the judgment below and the release of the mortgaged property gave to the Circuit Court . in Tennessee no jurisdiction over the case, after the dissolution of the corporation, which could bind the property of the company in the hands of the receiver, or prevent the receiver from showing that the judgment was invalid because…

Held: as’ assignee of the agent of Mrs. J. D. Wells, and others, five bonds of the State, of one thousand dollars-each, with coupons attached dated August 1, 1864, payable twenty-five years after date, with six per cent interest, payable semi-annually;. that these bonds were issued by the State at that date under the law of February 8, 1864, and other laws, and were properly endorsed and assigned to the plaintiff, or the…

<p>The judgment of a state court in a suit to compel the funding of state bonds, ’ that a former adverse judgment upon bonds of the same series could be pleaded as an estoppel, presents no Federal question.</p>

In this action, brought June 11, 1887, by Lewis against Roberts in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, the petition was as follows: “Comes-now the said plaintiff and shows and represents unto this honorable court that he is a resident of the city of Milwaukee in the State of Wisconsin, and a citizen of the said State of Wisconsin, and that the defendant is a resident of the city of Lincoln in the State of Nebraska, and a citizen of the said…

This action was brought in a District Court of Colorado to recover possession of a tract of mineral land, a part of what was known as the “ Bear Lode.” The plaintiffs claimed under a location made September 3, 1872. The land so located was at that time within the territory reserved for the use and occupancy of the Ute Indians. The Indian title was extinguished in March, 1874, and the defendant claimed under a location made August 29, 1874.

The court stated the case as follows: In an action at law, brought in the court below, in the name of Charles F. Jones against William C. N. Swift, judgment was rendered against the latter upon a promissory note dated April 20, 1883. That judgment was satisfied by the payment into court, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, of the amount, principal and interest, due Upon it — $21,926.90.

Held: that the claim could not be allowed; that the payment of the note to the bank by J. discharged the mortgage, so far as it was a security for the note; and that the certificate of deposit was not secured by the mortgage. The case is stated in the opinion. ' Mr. James F. Mister (with whom, was Mr. Wallace Pratt on the brief) for appellants. Mr. G. 0. Tichenor, for appellees, submitted on his brief.

CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION IN OPINION FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT •OF THE-UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT’OF MASSACHUSETTS. The court stated the case.as follows: This case comes to this court on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.- At May term, 1888, of that court, an indictment was found by the grand jury against George R. Eaton, containing two counts.