Volume 144 — Louisiana Reports

Mary; Thomas M, Milling, Judge. Petitory action by Robert B. Lawrence and others against Mrs. M. M. Young. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Judgment annulled, and judgment rendered for plaintiffs as to title, rents, and interest.

F. Brunot, Judge. Suit for injunction and mandamus by the State of Louisiana, on the relation of Thomas J. Duggan, against A. W. Crandell, Register of the State Land Office. From judgment of dismissal, the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Marriage &wkey;ll — Validity—Second Marriage.</p> <p>A marriage which has not been dissolved by death, or by divorce, remains a valid, existing marriage; and neither party thereto can contract a second marriage.</p> <p>2. Marriage &wkey;50(l) — Evidence.</p> <p>The evidence of a second marriage, where a preceding marriage has not been dissolved by divorce, must be dear and positive.</p> <p>3. Marriage &wkey;40(6) — Presumption.</p> <p>A divorce will not be presumed, where the evidence is positive that it does not exist, and the party alleging it fails to produce any testimony concerning it, except the alleged declaration of the deceased spouse to that effect during his lifetime.</p> <p>4. Marriage <&wkey;40(5) — Presumptions—G-ood Faith.</p> <p>Good faith will not be presumed on the part of a mature woman who enters into a marriage with a man whom she knows to be already married, when she has no evidence of a divorce beyond the assertion of the man whom she says she has married.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Concursus proceeding by the Savings & Homestead Association, the owner of a building, against August Prank, contractor, the sureties on his bond, and the workmen and materialmen.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Mandamus &wkey;>102(l) — Duty Imposed by Law — Right to Writ — Statute.</p> <p>Under Act No. 49 of 1910, empowering state highway engineer, etc., to contract to build a highway, his written contract was merely a recognition of a duty imposed by law, so that contractor’s mandamus to compel engineer to issue a warrant in its favor might be maintained as against objection that it attempted to enforce a conventional obligation contrary to Code Prac. arts. 829-834.</p> <p>2. Mandamus &wkey;>72 — Ministerial Duty.</p> <p>A duty, the performance of which may be compelled by mandamus, must not only be imposed by law, but it must be ministerial in its nature and not depending upon the exercise of legal discretion.</p> <p>3. Mandamus <&wkey;71 — Ministerial Duty — Province of Court.</p> <p>It is within the province of courts to decide whether an act sought to be enforced by mandamus is or is not ministerial.</p> <p>4. Highways <&wkey;113(5) — Protection of Laborers and Materialmen — Stipulation by the State Engineer.</p> <p>Under Act No. 49 of 1910, empowering state engineer, etc., to build highways, without provision to safeguard claims of laborers and materialmen or authorizing state highway department to require .that contractors guarantee payment of such claims, the state engineer, etc., could not bind a contractor by a stipulation against cancellation of bond until he adjusted such claims.</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., dissenting.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; Joseph Burrougli Crow, Judge. Action by Robert Burson against Tom H. Hamilton, with writ of sequestration and wherein defendant set up a claim for damages. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering the appeal, prays that the amount of the judgment be increased.

W. Bailey, Judge. Israel Oliva was indicted for violating a contract of hire, the indictment was quashed, and the State appeals.'

S. Rownd, Judge. Elias Rout was indicted for violating a contract of hire, the information was quashed, and the State appeals.

S. Rownd, Judge. A. B. .Statham was indicted for, violating a contract of hire, the indictment was quashed, and the State appeals.

S. Rownd, Judge. Elijah Rout was indicted for violating a contract of hire, the indictment was quashed, and the State appeals.

Théard, Judge. Suit for divorce by Adrien Hava against Marie El Chavigny, wherein plaintiff obtained an injunction preventing defendant from disposing of or incumbering any property belonging to the marital community. Suit for divorce dismissed and writs of injunction dissolved on an exception of no cause of action, and plaintiff appeals.

Action by Prank Kraemer against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering the appeal, asks that the judgment be increased to the amount sued for.

<p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Governmental Function.]</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Proceeding by Carleton Hunt against tHe succession of Catherine M. Aiken, widow of Joseph A. Aiken, deceased, through the testamentary heirs of Mrs. Aiken, and against Charles K. Burdeau individually. Demand against the succession rejected, and judgment against Charles K. Burdeau personally, and he appeals.

Action by Dugas & Le Blanc, Limited, and others against the Port Barre Timber & Tie Company, Incorporated, in which a rule by the receivers of defendant Company upon the Chicago Lumber & Coal Company and J. H. Maassen show cause why they should not be punished for contempt was made absolute, and the Chicago Lumber & Coal Company and Maassen apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Lee Sherman was convicted of arson, and, from an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, the state appeals.</p>

uachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Bertha R. Dotson, individually and as tutrix for her minor children, against the Louisiana Central Lumber Company for damages for the death of her husband. Judgment for plaintiff individually in the sum of $5,000 and in favor of the minors in the sum of $10,000, and defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Action <&wkey;52 — Possession — Statute.</p> <p>Code Prac. art. 55, forbidding cumulation of petitory and possessory actions, except by consent of parties, was intended to protect possession, and one in possession for more than one year cannot be disturbed except by another who has acknowledged that possession and has obtained contradictorily against it a judgment recognizing his ownership.</p> <p>2. Action <&wkey;52 — Petitoby Action — Statute.</p> <p>Under Code Prac. art. 55, forbidding cumulation of petitory and possessory actions, except by consent of the parties, a defendant sued in a possessory action cannot bring a petitory action until after judgment rendered in the possessory action, and until, if he has been condemned, he shall have satisfied judgment.</p> <p>3. Action <&wkey;52 — Cumulation oe Actions —Waive».</p> <p>Code Prac. art. 55, forbidding the cumulation of petitory and possessory actions, except by consent of parties, was enacted in possessor’s interest, but a possessor who cumulates actions to maintain possession by injunction, and ..to have ownership recognized, waives its benefits, and, in view of article 150, defendant may have the question of ownership decided.</p> <p>4. Limitation oe Actions <&wkey;36(3) — Possessory Action — Statute.</p> <p>In action to have ownership of property recognized, wherein defendant put plaintiff’s title in issue, plaintiff’s established plea of 5 years’ prescription, within Civ. Code, art. 3542, relating to the nullity or rescission of contracts, in view of article 2221 and of article 3543, fixing a like prescription against all informalities in a public sale by which plaintiff acquired property, was good.</p>

t Suit by Corinne Malmore, and by her husband, J. Malmore, against J. P. Martinez. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff answering prays for an increase of the judgment.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law t&wkey;957(3) — Verdict — Impeachment-Statements by Juror.</p> <p>Statements by a juror in a criminal case, whether made in the jury room, while the case is under consideration, and offered to'be proved by his fellow jurors, or made after the finding, and offered to be proved by nonjurors, are • equally inadmissible for the impeachment of the verdict.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Bank of Napoleonville against Knobloch & Rainold. Plaintiff’s demand rejected, and it appeals.</p>

S. Rownd, Judge. Suit for injunction by Dan Wolf against the Commission Council of City of Hammond and others. Preliminary injunction dissolved, and suit dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Cause transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, State of Louisiana, Third District, for the Parish of Tangipahoa, to be proceeded with according to law.

Boone, Judge. Suit by R. M. Bishop and others against the Town of Mansfield and' others. From a judgment rejecting their demand, plaintiffs appeal.

Petition by the executor of Mrs. Leocadie de Lesseps Canton, deceased, for interpretation of certain parts of her will, opposed by Ruth Edwina Baldwin, legatee. From the trial court’s construction of the will, the legatee appeals.

Land, Judge. Jim Britton was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors in a parish without having obtained a license therefor from the police jury of the parish, or from the municipal authorities of any town or city in the parish, his motion for new trial was overruled, and he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <&wkey;805 — Abandonment oe Appeal — Dismissal.</p> <p>Where an appellant fails to prosecute his appeal, does not file an assignment of errors, or file a brief, or appear when his case is called for trial, and his attorneys inform the court that they are no longer in the case, the appeal will be considered abandoned.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Courts <&wkey;224(10) — Louisiana Supreme Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Although the question of original jurisdiction of a suit is determined by the amount sued for, the question of appellate jurisdiction is controlled by the amount that was in contest when the judgment appealed from was rendered by the court of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Courts &wkey;>224(10) — Louisiana Supreme Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>In a suit for $2,507.65, of which $1,732.65 was represented by a note, and the balance by an admitted indebtedness, where defendant pleaded payment of the note, and the trial was confined to that issue, and judgment was rendered for the admitted indebtedness, the Supreme Court under Const, art. 85, had no jurisdiction on plaintiff’s appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; W. S. Round, Judge.</p> <p>Suit for injunction by Edward B. Kennon against R. L. Hilburn, Mayor of Town of Kentwood, and others. Injunction maintained and defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; A. M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by George F. Bolton against Peter W. Rouss and others. From a judgment dismissing his suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; A. M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Daisy Bolton against Peter W. Rouss and others. Prom a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;751 — Jury <&wkey;137(l)— Withdrawal or Jury — Mistrial—Peremptory Challenges.</p> <p>If a juror be removed from the panel for any cause, against the protest of the defendant,' after the trial has commenced by the reading of the indictment to the jury and testimony has been heard, the discharge of the disqualified juror and the drawing of another juror in his stead is, in effect, the entering of a mistrial and the beginning of a new trial; and the defendant is then entitled to have his peremptory challenges restored to him, and to have the remaining 11 jurors retendered for acceptance or rejection, especially if the defendant’s peremptory challenges were exhausted in the original drawing of the jury.</p> <p>2. Witnesses <&wkey;318, 414(1) — Cobroboeation —Hearsay.</p> <p>Hearsay evidence may not be received as part of the affirmative evidence for the prosecution in a criminal case, on the ground that it is designed to corroborate the statement of another witness which has been, or may be, the subject of impeachment.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;9, 742(1), 758 —Criminal Procedure — Common Law — Peovince or Juey — Instruction.</p> <p>At common law, which regulates criminal procedure in Louisiana, save where abrogated or modified, the right to determine the credibility of a witness, testifying in a criminal prosecution, is within the province of the jury. Under the law of this state, the trial judge, in such case, is required to limit his instructions to the jury to matters of law, and is prohibited from trenching upon the facts, or from expressing any opinion thereon. When, therefore, he designates a particular witness, whether it be the defendant or another, and instructs the jury that they should consider his interest in the case in determining his credibility, he instructs them to make use of a fact with which he is prohibited from dealing, in order to determine a question which, of itself, is entirely within the province of the jury.</p>

Ring, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Marie I-Iillery and Mrs. Josephine Augustin against the succession of John D'.

Théard, Judge. Suit by the heirs at law of Mrs. Olivia C. Kittredge Race against the testamentary executor and the Rector, Warden, and Vestrymen; of Trinity Church, the residuary legatees. From a judgment decreeing a residuary legacy and certain codicils to the will void, the executor and the legatees appeal.

Land, Judge. Action hy C. E. Dunson, in hehalf of his minor son, against R. B. Baker. Exception of no cause of action sustained to the damages for malicious prosecution, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Emma Broussard Demarets against Dorsin Demarets. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

H, Pavy, Judge. Suit by E. J. Aubrey, trustee in bankruptcy of Raoul E. Guillaumin, against R. E. Guillaumin and another. Judgment for plaintiff, defendants’ motion for new trial overruled, and an appeal to the Supreme Court granted.

Allen Bordelon, Judge. Suit by George Wiley against Eliza Bowman, widow of Edmund Wiley, deceased, to annul a nuncupative will of deceased, giving the usufruct of his property to her, and for recognition as the sole heir of the deceased.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; J. B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Petitory action by the Salmen Brick & Lumber Company against the H. Weston Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Barnette, Judge. Suit by Crawford, Jenkins & Booth, Limited, against M.. T. Stephens, resulting in judgment for plaintiff, on which execution issued, the attached property being sold for cash. On opposition of defendant and another.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Carriers &wkey;>346(3) — Passengers — Injury in Alighting — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>In suit against a. railroad for injuries, while alighting, to its passenger, a woman of 66, feeble, and with impaired eyesight, evidence held not to sustain judgment for plaintiff in that it showed that she was not without fault, having placed her foot at the side of the stool the railroad furnished for convenience id alighting, so that it slipped off and she fell.</p>

Suit for partition by Theophile Larose against Olay Naquin and others, with ruling by plaintiffs to show cause why a sale should not be made and the proceeds held in court for distribution according to the final judgment to be rendered. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs in rule, and plaintiff, defendant in rule, moved for a suspensive appeal from the judgment, which was refused, and he applies for writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel the granting of a suspensive appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;507 — Showing op Motion for Appeal by Minutes.</p> <p>Where the minutes show that an appeal was granted, the appeal is not subject to dismissal on the ground that the minutes do not show that motion for appeal was made, a matter appearing inferentially.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;897 — Grant of Appeal in Open Court — Citation of Warrantor.</p> <p>Where an appeal was granted in open court, no further citation of the warrantor was necessary.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Adverse Possession <&wkey;74 — Thirty Years’ Prescription — Possession of Land Under Judicial Sale.</p> <p>Where plaintiff’s land was sold to satisfy mortgages, and the land was adjudicated to defendant’s remote predecessor, whose possession began in 1879, defendant’s plea of 30 years’ prescription in plaintiff’s petitory action, begun in 1914, was properly sustained.</p> <p>4. Adverse Possession <&wkey;84 — Prescription —Defect in Title.</p> <p>A purchaser of realty from one who himself or his predecessors had held by good, valid, and binding titles, duly recorded, for more than 10 years, held protected by the term of 10 years’ prescription against the original owner of the land, who had lost it by mortgage foreclosure; the fact that purchaser’s predecessor warranted title to it only during his life not showing bad faith on part of purchaser.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal Law &wkey;>593 — Continuance—Absence oe Counsel-^Legislative Duties.</p> <p>Under Acts 1912, No. 196, p. 383, absence of leading counsel for defendants, charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter, because of his duties as a member of the state Senate, was peremptory ground for continuance.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Judgment <®=»S15 — Foreign Judgment-Enforcement in Other State.</p> <p>A judgment by a court of one state can have no operation in another, and to give it the force of judgment in such other state it must be made a judgment there by suit on it; the effect of the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution being simply to preserve the conclusivencss of the foreign judgment as evidence of the debt, not to preserve its executory character.</p> <p>2. Pleading <&wkey;72 — Petition — Prater —General Relief.</p> <p>Where petition against administratrix sought enforcement of judgment of another state against her deceased husband’s estate, and also prayed general relief, leaving no room to doubt what relief plaintiff was entitled to or was seeking, the deficiency of the express prayer hold supplied by general prayer for general relief.</p>

Suit by the City of Lake Charles against the Lake Charles Railway, Light & Waterworks Company. After an order dissolving an injunction on bond, the City applies for mandamus to compel granting of a suspensive appeal.

Le Blanc, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Milda Bergeron, widow, for herself and on behalf of her children, for compensation under the state Employers’ Liability Act for the death of her husband, a yard foreman, against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for the widow and children, and defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Pasquale Di Micele against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. From judgment for xilaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; N. M. Calhoun, Judge.</p> <p>Revocatory action by Putnam & Norman, Limited, and others, against L. P. Conner and L. R. Martin, receivers of the First Natchez Bank, and others. Pleas to jurisdiction overruled as - to suit of Putnam & Norman, and sustained as to the other plaintiff, and exception of no cause of action sustained, and the suit of both plaintiffs was .dismissed, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <©=1213 — Penalty — Constitutionality.</p> <p>Act No. 267 of 1914, § 22, penalizing any domestic or foreign corporation, other than those reporting to the Railroad Commission, operating a public utility, for failure to report its receipts, etc., is not violative of the federal Constitution and Const. La. art. 12, prohibiting excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments, as exacting an excessive penalty.</p> <p>2. Corporations <§=396 — Report—Liability to Penalty — Notice—Statute.</p> <p>A domestic or foreign corporation, other than a corporation reporting to the Railroad Commission, operating a public utility, is liable to the penalty of Act No. 267 of 1914, § 22, for failure to report receipts, etc., though no notice was given it to do so; the notice mentioned in section 21 being only to officers when the object is to render them liable to penalty.</p>

Tammany. Suit by Mrs. N. Levy & Son against J. J. Paquette, tbe town of Mandeville, and others, with writ of attachment. Judgment in Court of Appeal, affirming judgment of district court, for plaintiff, maintaining the attachment, and the town of Mandeville applies for certiorari or writ of review.

Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Suit by James Bihm and others against Mrs. Frances Wilkins Bihm to set aside and annul the last will of Louis M. Bihm in a nuncupative form under public act. Judgment for defendant dismissing plaintiffs’ suit, and they appeal.

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Amel Benoit and Stanley Benoit were prosecuted for murder and Stanley Benoit was acquitted, and, from a conviction of manslaughter, Amel Benoit appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <&wkey;430(2) — Dismissal op Appeai^-Failube to Cite Appellee to Answer-Statute.</p> <p>This court will not dismiss an appeal on the ground that the appellee was not dted to answer the appeal, when it appears that the appellant prayed for the citation and that the failure to issue it was due entirely to an oversight of the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered. The provision of the law that, in such case, a reasonable time shall be granted to the appellant to correct the error. is intended to protect the appellant against the errors or omissions of the court officials; it does not require the appellant to obtain an order for an extension of time if the error or omission can 'be corrected without delay. -</p>

<p> (Syllabus by tbe Court.) </p> <p>Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;168(l) — Injury to Tenant — Assumption oe Risk.</p> <p>Where one, assuming the character of tenant, without the consent of the owner, enters upon premises which are unfit for occupancy and undergoing repairs, including the repairing of plaster upon walls and ceilings saturated and loosened by stormwater, he assumes the risks incidental to such repairs, and, among them, the risk of falling plaster.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; James Andrews, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by John H. Cannon and wife against the City of Alexandria. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, and plaintiffs appeal, and defendant, answering the appeal, prays that judgment be reversed and suit dismissed.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Statutes <&wkey;114(2) — Subject and Title-Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>The title to Act No. 170 of 1914 conveys the idea of an act, requiring that a discharged employs, if he demand payment, shall be paid, immediately, at the usual place of payment, the wages due him, and is inadequate and misleading as prefixed to the act, the text of which requires that such payment shall be made on demand, at the time and place of the discharge; hence the statute is not within the requirement of article 31 of the Constitution that the object of every law shall be expressed in its title, and is void.</p>

In the matter of the succession of Laurence C. Fallon, deceased. Rule by Paul O. Fallon, executor, and by four major heirs and a minor heir, represented by tutrix, against the Inheritance Tax Collector, to show cause why money paid should not be held to be all that was due, and why it should not be decreed that the estate of the father of the minor heir owed no inheritance tax.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Martin L. Ludlow against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company. Prom judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Divorce <&wkey;49(l), 298(1) — Separation erom Bed and Board — Final Divorce — Judgments— Custody oe Children.</p> <p>Where a judgment of divorce is sought by the wife, on the ground that she has previously obtained a judgment of separation from bed and board and that there has been no reconciliation within the year, the divorce is properly denied upon its being shown that the parties have, during the year, frequently assumed the marital relations; and, in such case, if it appears that the wife has taken care of three (of the four) minor children of the marriage, with but little assistance from the husband, and is in a better position to care for them, whilst he has charge of the other, and eldest child, a boy, no present change will be ordered, but the rights of the parties will be reserved with respect to the custody of the children as circumstances may require in the future.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by R. A. Calhoun against J. B. Ardis. Exception of no cause of action overruled, and judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllables by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal Law &wkey;5ll82 — Appeal — Affirmance.</p> <p>Where there is no bill of exceptions, or other assignment of error in the record, and the proceedings appear to have been regular, conviction will be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Wesley Majors against the Allen Manufacturing Company. From a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermilion; W. W. Bailey, Judge. .</p> <p>Hunter Huff was convicted of assault with intent to rape, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the succession of Mary A. Deubler. Suit by Henry Deubler against Mrs. Anna M. Deubler, wife of John Thomas Brady, and John Thomas Brady. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Wilson, Judge. Edwin L. Clark was convicted of willfully neglecting and refusing to provide for the support of a minor child in destitute and necessitous circumstances, his motion for a new trial was overruled, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Leonard Wolf against Luca Cuccia. Judgment for plaintiff, and. both parties appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the State of Louisiana against the Albert Mackie Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, and the State appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Ered D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by James Dale against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Infants <®==>40 — Minors — Emancipation — Sale by Auction — Statute.</p> <p>Save in the exceptional cases, specially provided by law, the immovable property of a minor, whose emancipation, by notarial act, has conferred on her only the power of administration, cannot be sold in any other manner than that required in the ease of an unemancipated minor, to wit, at public auction, as provided by Civ. Code, art. 341.</p>

Frank Thomas Lahiff was convicted of bringing into a dry zone around Camp Beauregard, a United States cantonment, intoxicating liquor in violation of statute, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville; William C. Barnette, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by John H. Green, trustee, against Prank Kettler. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Suit for partition by Mrs. Eugenie Lozes Delord, widow of Peter Delord, against Sidonie Lozes, Felicien Lozes, and others, in which the other defendants sought an interdiction against defendant Sidonie Lozes. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff and Sidonie Lozes appeal.

<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Frank D. Chretien, Judge.</p> <p>Louis Werner and Walter Fazende were convicted of murder, and Werner appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Banks and Banking <3=77(4) — Impairment op Capital — Deposits — Banking Law.</p> <p>Where, to satisfy bank examiner, an ostensible loan was made to a bank and trust company in failing circumstances, the amount thereof being retained as a deposit by loaning bank under arrangement that loan might be charged to deposit at lender’s option, the transaction did not accord with the Banking Law (Act No. 179 of 1802) as to the making good of impaired capital.</p> <p>t. Banks and Banking <@=77(6) — Deposit in Another Bank — Application to Indebtedness.</p> <p>. Where a bank in failing circumstances, to quiet bank examiner, secured an ostensible loan, which was deposited to its credit in defendant bank, and executed a note therefor, the deposit would be regarded as what the president of defendant bank pretended it was; that is, “an absolute, unconditional, bona fide checking account.”</p> <p>3. Banks and Banking <@=77(6) — Insolvency — Set-Oee Against Claims.</p> <p>Where failing bank obtained ostensible loan from defendant bank in form of a deposit ostensibly subject to cheek, but no part of deposit was.used by borrower bank, it was too late, after examiner was notified to take charge of borrower bank on its failure, for defendant to charge the borrower’s note for the loan to the deposit, in view of Civ. Code, art. 2215, forbidding compensation to prejudice of a third person.</p> <p>4. Banks and Banking <@=74 — Irregular and Confidential Deposit.</p> <p>Where bank in failing circumstances, to quiet bank examiner, obtained an ostensible loan from defendant bank in form of a deposit in defendant bank, such deposit was an irregular and confidential deposit, and the stipulation in the loan note that defendant bank might at its option charge the note to the deposit was, so far as attempting to authorize defendant, after failure of the borrower, to pay itself with the borrower’s funds to the prejudice of all other creditors, contrary to public policy and void.</p> <p>5. Banks and Banking <3=77(4) — Insolvency — Collection of Claim — Set-Oee.</p> <p>Where bank in failing circumstances obtained from defendant bank a loan in the form of a deposit in defendant bank, executing its note therefor, and after insolvency defendant charged the note against the deposit and returned the canceled note, and the examiner, upon taking charge of borrower bank as liquidator, made prompt demand for payment of deposit but took no further action until suit ■ was brought for the deposit, the canceled note then being formally tendered as defendant’s property, the liquidator’s failure to offer promptly to Return the canceled note was not ratification of its payment by application of the deposit.</p>

Suit by Frank V. Butcher against Joseph V. Arceneaux, Jr., to recover rent, etc., for land, and summary proceeding by plaintiff to obtain possession of land leased by him to defendant, which on defendant’s motion were consolidated by order of the court.

Action by Dr. Eddie H. Blackwood against the National Life Insurance Company of America. Judgment for plaintiff, and he appeals, and defendant asks that judgment be amended by rejecting the demand awarded plaintiff.

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; James Andrews, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Dr. Eddie H. Blackwood against the General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Limited. _ Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Théard, Judge. Action by Gaspar Cusachs against the Sal-men Brick & Lumber Company, Limited. Judgment for plaintiff for less than claim and he appeals.

King, Judge. Mandamus by the State, on relation of George F. Long and others, against the Board of Deacons of the Good Hope Second Baptist Church of Algiers, to compel the Board to call an election for the Board of Deacons or Trustees and other officers of the corporation.

Action by the Hallo well Granite Works against C. A. Orleans. From a judgment rejecting its demand for a balance due on an open account, plaintiff appeals.

B. Holstead, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Emma Howell and her divorced husband, George S. Long, against the Vicksburg,. Shreveport & Pacific Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiffs, judgment thereon, and defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of La Salle; E. E. Jones, Judge. '</p> <p>N. J. King was convicted of murder without capital punishment, and he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by JMitorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Cbiminai. Law <&wkey;927(l) — Separation Before Swearing.</p> <p>Whore the jurors who were to try a murder case had not been sworn, the fact that one of them, with the consent of defendant’s counsel, was allowed to separate from his fellows, and go out of their presence and that of tne court officers into another room of the court building to answer a telephone call, was not good ground for new trial.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting in part.</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;1132 — Right to be Represented by Counsel — Appeal from: Conviction of Murder — Constitution and Statute.</p> <p>Const, art. 9, and Rev. St. § 992, do not require that one convicted of murder and sentenced to hang be represented by counsel on his appeal to the Supreme Court, particularly in view of the custom of such court not to appoint counsel, and where defendant has made no request for assignment of counsel to him.</p>

In the matter of the Succession of Hugh McGloskey, deceased. Appeal by Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, testamentary executor, from a judgment sustaining the opposition of Mrs. Geo. D. May, divorced wife of decedent, to the final account, and recognizing opponent’s claim to a certain amount.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Insueance <®=»291(1) — False Answees in Application — Materiality—Recoveby.</p> <p>Where, in an application for life insurance, it appears that the applicant answered that he had had none of the diseases indicated or specified in a certain question 9, and that, save in a single instance — of temporary malaria — he had not .consulted any physician for any ailment or illness not included in that question, and it is shown, in an action on the policy issued on such application, that, within the two or three years preceding the application, the applicant had, on several occasions, consulted physicians, had been told that he had a bad heart and treated for it, and, though not informed, in so many words, that he had Bright’s disease, had, within a few weeks prior to the making of his application, three times called upon and consulted with his physician, by whom, on each occasion, a certain familiar test was made, to determine the question of the existence or progress of that disease, held, that the statement last mentioned was untrue, to the knowledge of the applicant; that the defendant would not have issued the policy if informed of the tests, without knowing the results; that the statement therefore operated to deceive it and induce it to issue the policy; that the deception related to a material fact of which defendant was entitled to be informed; and that, whether the statement be regarded as a representation or a warranty, there can be no recovery on such policy.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. ■ Action by the Parish of St. Landry against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Prom a judgment ordering defendant to remove an obstruction from the channel of Bayou Petit Prairie, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman and James Andrews, Judges.</p> <p>Ezekiel Bradley was Indicted for obtaining money by false pretenses, and from a judgment quashing the indictment the State appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the succession of Mary Erhart Path, deceased, in which Eugene Path and others filed suit against Samuel Levy, executor, and the widow and children of Christopher Path, deceased, asking for the nullity of the will. Prom a judgment of partial nullity, the executor by motion appeals, and Mrs. Path and children appeal by petition.</p>

Boone, Judge. Action of jactitation by J. M. Nabors against R. S. Fortson and Others. Judgment for defendants, motion for new trial overruled, and plaintiff appeals.

•'Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge. Suit by the Kirby Lumber Company against Hicks Company, Limited, and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal, and plaintiff, answering the appeal, prays that the judgment be amended by increasing the amount.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>On Application for Rehearing of Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;795(l) — Motion to Dismiss Appeai>-Denial.</p> <p>A motion to dismiss an appeal, based on grounds not appropriate to the appeal, but appropriate to an appeal in a case of the same title having a different number, -where the motion to dismiss the appeal in the other ease is based upon grounds not appropriate to that case, but appropriate to present appeal, will be overruled.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Courts <&wkey;99(l) — Law op Case.</p> <p>A decision in same case when it was before Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, in effect deciding that the contract sued on was a contract of lease, and not a contract of sale, as contended by defendants, is the law of the case on a subsequent appeal involving the merits of the same question.</p>

Joe Delovisio was convicted of bribing one from appearing and testifying as a witness against himself and wife, in eases charging them with violation of an ordinance. His motion in arrest of judgment was sustained, and he was discharged from custody, and the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Corporations @=189(10) — Receivership — Mismanagement by Stockholder and Officer.</p> <p>Where' one farm of a rice growing company had been badly infested with red rice, so that it seemed advisable to let it lie idle for a season, or to put in some other crop, and a large stockholder and officer who had management of farm leased it at about highest rent paid in neighborhood, he was guilty of no mismanagement justifying receivership.</p> <p>2. Corporations @=189(10) — Receivers — Ground for Appointment — Temper of Stockholder and Officer.</p> <p>One of two brothers controlling rice growing company, owning land and cattle worth more than its debts, cannot have receivership because his brother, of quick temper and a “good scrapper,” is persona non grata with some of the bankers of the vicinity, so that it is somewhat more difficult than it might otherwise be for the company to finance itself.</p> <p>3. Corporations @=189(10) — Receiver- ‘ ship — Ground of Appointment.</p> <p>One of two brothers controlling rice growing company cannot have receivership on ground that his brother does not co-operate with him in procuring funds for feeding the company’s cattle, which might have been secured by selling some of the cattle, as in the past; moreover, if the cattle branch of the business cannot support itself, proper course would be to get rid of it.</p> <p>4. Corporations @=189(10) — Receivership-Partnership Corporation.</p> <p>Two brothers controlling rice growing company owning land and cattle, which is of recent formation and practically a partnership, furnishing their experience and services gratis, can administer the business more economically, if not better, than a receiver could do, so that there will not be a receiver at the suit of one, in the absence of showing of good cause.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Application by the Texana Oil & Refining Company and. others for writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition against W. L. Dickinson, to prevent execution of an order of judicial sequestration.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Insurance @=>335(2) — Fire Insurance— Inventory.</p> <p>An inventory of the stock of a country store with which a fire insurer’s agent was satisfied, though consisting mostly of full barrels, eases, and dozens, held a compliance with the clause of the policy requiring inventory.</p> <p>2. Insurance @=>335(3) — Fire Insurance-Keeping Books — File of Invoices.</p> <p>File of invoices kept by the owner of a country store insured against fire held to answer all the purposes of a merchandise account for showing what merchandise had been purchased, certainly for so short a time as the little over a month that elapsed from date of inventory under the policy to the date of the fire, so that such file of invoices complied to that extent with the policy’s requirement of a set of books showing business transactions.</p> <p>3. Insurance) @=>335(3) — Fire Insurance— Method of Accounting. •</p> <p>Practice of owner of country store to put in cash drawer price of credit sale when collected, and to enter at end of each day contents of such drawer in cashbook, held not prejudicial to his fire insurer, not having effect to show that less goods were sold than appeared from books.</p> <p>4. Insurance @=>335(3) — Fire Insurance-Method of Handling Cash — Nonprejudicial Character.</p> <p>Practice of owner of country store to transr fer cash from cash drawer to sack and to pay all expenses from such sack held not prejudicial to the fire insurer.</p> <p>5. Insurance @=>335(3) — Fire Insurance— Depletion of Stock.</p> <p>Where fire in country store occurred but little over a month after inventory was made under fire policy covering stock, fact that goods had been taken from store for use of owner’s family, and no entry made in books, it being safe to assume goods were groceries, did not materially prejudice insurer.</p> <p>6. Insurance @=>602 — Fire Insurance — Unjustified Refusal to Pay Loss — Statute.</p> <p>Where fire insurer’s refusal to pay a loss was unjustified, the penalty of Act No. 168 of 1908 must be imposed in insured’s suit on the policy.</p>

Schofield 'Rownd, Judge.' ¡ In the matter of Leonie Le Bourgeois, interdicted as insane. On rule to show cause, taken by.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Robert L. Brown and Oscar Zenor, coreceivers of the Mrs. E. D. Burguieres Planting Company, Limited, against the North River Insurance Company of New Vork, in which the American Central Fire Insurance Company of New Jersey intervened. Judgment for plaintiffs and for intervener, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Robert L. Brown and Oscar Zenor, coreceivers of the Mrs. E. D. Burguieres Planting Co., Limited, against the American Fire Insurance Company of New Jersey, in which the American Central Fire Insurance Company of New Jersey intervened. Judgment for plaintiffs, and intervener and defendant appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Gourt, Parish of Grant; James Andrews, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Florence Blackburn; individually and as tutrix for her two minor children, against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company; Verdict for plaintiff, motion for new trial overruled, and from a judgment on such verdict, defendant appeals.</p>

S. Rowud, Judge. Action in solido by the Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank against Edward George Davies, Jules J. Terry, Charles L. Buck, Robert B. Beid and others. Final judgment against defendants Terry and Buck, and plea of division by defendant Beid sustained, and case reinstated on trial docket, and judgment sustaining the plea of division, and plaintiff appeals.

Schofield Rownd, Judge. Action by Richard M. Amacker, Jr., against R. A. Kent, with demand in reconvention. Judgment for plaintiff for a certain amount with interest and for defendant on his demand in reconvention, and plaintiff appeals, and defendant, answering, prays that the judgment be amended.

John the Baptist; John E. Eleury, Judge. Action by the State of Louisiana against the Louisiana Cypress Lumber Company. Exceptions of no cause of action, want of authority of the district attorney and special attorneys to bring the suit, and of estoppel, sustained, and suit dismissed, and the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Principal and Agent ®=578(6) — Accounting — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for the balance of an amount received by defendant to invest and account for, wherein the issues were purely issues of fact, plaintiff, to recover, must prove his claim with reasonable certainty and by preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>2. Principal and Agent &wkey;>78(4) — Accounting — Burden op Proof.</p> <p>In action for balance of an amount intrusted to defendant for investment, wherein the answer admitted that he had received the amount from plaintiff to be invested by him as plaintiff’s agent, defendant had the burden of proving payment.</p> <p>3. Bills and Notes <&wkey;211 — Transfer—Delivery.</p> <p>A note payable to the order of the maker and indorsed by him was transferable by mere delivery.</p> <p>4. Principal and Agent <&wkey;78(6) — Receipt of Money by Agent — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for balance of an amount intrusted to defendant for investment, evidence, aside from defendant’s acknowledgment in authentic deed of sale of a farm purchased by him on plaintiff’s account that he received from the purchaser a cash payment of $800, held, to show defendant’s receipt of that amount from purchaser.</p> <p>5. Principal and Agent &wkey;>78(6) — Agent’s Receipt of Note — Evidence-</p> <p>In an action for balance of an amount intrusted to defendant for investment, evidence, in addition to defendant’s acknowledgment in the authentic deed of sale of a farm purchased by him for plaintiff’s account, that he received a mortgage note of $1,000 from the purchaser, held to show his receipt of such note.</p>

H. Pavy, Judge. Application by Semilien Deshotels, in the matter of the estate of Avenant Deshotels, for appointment as tutor of the minor children of deceased, contested by their divorced mother. Erom a judgment rejecting the application, and appointing contestant as tutrix, applicant appeals, and after his death Benoit Deshotels, administrator of Avenant Deshotels, deceased, undertook to prosecute the appeal.

<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Lonnie Eaton and Will Flournoy were convicted of murder, and they appeal.</p>

Action for libel by Hardy L. Brian against 5. J. Harper. From a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action, and dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.

Suit by T. W. Parish, Sr., as tutor of his minor son, T. W. Parish, Jr., against Mrs. A. R. Machen and others, to set aside order for and notations of cancellation on a certain tax deed. Judgment for defendants decreeing the tax sale void, and plaintiff appeals.

Mc-Intosch, Judge. Suit by R. W. Shilling against Lee R. Brooks. From a judgment rejecting his demand to have declared exempt from seizure certain mules on which plaintiff holds a chattel mortgage, defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey; 1090(1) — Appeal — Bills of Exception.</p> <p>In order for the Supreme Court to review proceedings of a district court in a criminal case, complaints thereto should be embraced in bills of exceptions.</p>

H. Pavy, Judge. ' Suit by the Pawnee Land & Lumber Company against Adraste Lafleur, Assessor, and others.

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>Action by Noah Frazier against the Louisiana Central Lumber Company and others. Judgment for defendants, .and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by MdAtorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Pause Pretenses &wkey;7(4) — “Extension of Credit” — “Extension”—Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 72 of 1912, penalizing a false written statement as to one’s financial condition, with intent that it be relied upon to procure an “extension of credit,” covers an extension of time for the payment of a debt, and does not mean only the procuring of an additional credit; that term ordinarily meaning the giving or allowance of credit, and in commercial law and usage the word “extension” meaning a creditor’s indulgence by giving debtor further time to pay an existing debt.</p> <p>2. Statutes <&wkey;206 — Construction to Give Effect.</p> <p>Conceding that “extension of credit,” as used in Act No. 72 of 1912, penalizing a false written statement as to one’s financial condition to procure an extension of credit, may mean either an increase in the amount of credit or an extension of time for payment of a debt, the court is constrained to construe the expression so as to give effect to latter meaning, rather than to render it meaningless in respect to context.</p> <p>Dawkins, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;691 — Property Encroaching on Street — Destruction-Liability.</p> <p>No citizen may, with impunity, whether willfully or negligently, destroy the property of another, which causes him no injury, and which, under a claim of right, and with the sanction of a municipal government, occupies a portion of a street administered by such government.</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;705(l) — Use op Street by Automobile Truck — Destruction op Property — Liability.</p> <p>It is gross negligence for the chauffeur of a motor truck, having a trailer, in the form of a wagon, behind it, to drive the tandem through a much-frequented thoroughfare in a populous city, after one of the two attachments connecting the trailer, at its front axletree, with the truck, has parted, and the trailer, for several hundred feet, has zigzagged across the roadway, at times scraping the curb, until finally it mounts the banquette, and, one after another, breaks and knocks down three cast-iron posts, set near the curb, which support a gallery that extends-across the banquette from the house; and the owner of the truck and trailer is liable in damages for the loss and injury thereby inflicted upon the owner of the gallery, which, deprived of its support, falls to the ground and is destroyed.</p> <p>3. Damages <&wkey;lll — Measure op Damages— Injury to Building.</p> <p>In such case, the owner of the gallery is entitled to recover an amount sufficient to pay for a gallery as good as that destroyed, and is not required to build, or accept a gallery constructed of the broken material, matched, patched, and welded, which constituted the old gallery.</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations &wkey;s697(2) — Nuisance in Street — Removal by Citizen.</p> <p>A citizen has no right of action for the removal of an obstruction, alleged to be a nuisance, from a public street, unless he shows that it causes particular injury to his person or property.</p> <p>5. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;691 — Nuisance-Destruction op Property.</p> <p>A citizen has no right to take the law into his own hands, and willfully or negligently destroy an obstruction in a public street, alleged to be a nuisance, as the question of nuisance vel non in such case is to be determined between the municipality and the citizen claiming ownership of property.</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Suit by the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word against R. R. Emery, who impleaded the heirs of J. I. Schumpert. Judg-' ment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Suit for partition by A. J. Thurston and George Schaub against Nathan Rosenberg and others.

<p>Appeal from Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Richland; John R. McIntosh, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by C. C. Mengel & Bro. against Elisha Powell Norman. From a judgment dissolvtag an in junction, plaintiff appeals..</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Allen; Winston Overton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Shelby D. Bums against the Industrial Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

E. Ho.well, Judge. A petitory action by Mathilda and Mary Minor against Francis Young and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Action by Harve M. Wheeler against the H. M. Wheeler Lumber Company. Application of H. M. Wheeler Lumber Company for writ of certiorari and prohibition rule on the district court and the plaintiff to show cause.

<p>(Syllabus by the Court.) '</p> <p>Negligence <&wkey;121(3) — Fire — Proximate Cause — Recovery.</p> <p>While it does not follow, because a fire occurs after an engine has passed, that the one happening is necessarily the consequence of the other, yet, where a fire occurs, the ignition of which is explicable by the proximity of an engine, capable, through negligence, of emitting sparks and cinders, and upon no other theory which finds any support in the facts, it is unnecessary, in order to entitle the owner of the burned property to recover, that he should have followed the sparks or cinders from the engine to the property and watched the process of ignition.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Corporations <&wkey;125 — Transfer of Stock-Title of Transferee.</p> <p>A certificate, showing the defendant H. to be the owner of 50 shares of the stock of the company named as codefendant, not having been indorsed by him, for transfer or otherwise, hut having been deposited in a proper place, in his own office, for safe-keeping, and having thereafter been obtained by an unauthorized third person, through fraudulent misrepresentation, and by him delivered, in the condition above described, to the plaintiff, C., in discharge of his (H.’s) personal and pre-existing debt to C., it requires no citation of authority to sustain the conclusion that C. thereby acquired no title to the stock represented by the certificate, nor, under the circumstances,- would he have acquired title if he had parted with value at the time, and in consideration, of the delivery of the certificate, since the person by whom the delivery was made had no title to convey and no authority from the owner to make either conveyance or delivery of the stock or certificate.</p>

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Rene F. Delahoussaye against Patout, Labau & Co. Judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twentieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne; W. P. Martin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Amédée Hebert against Charles J. Champagne. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of West Carroll; John R. McIntosh, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Fannie M. Lawton against the Pacific Coast Casualty Company and another. Judgment for defendant named, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Carter, Judge. Action by Mrs. Lenora C. Kemp against Philip B. Kemp and others, for séparation, alimony, dissolution of the community, etc. Judgment for plaintiff, granting a separation and alimony, etc., and defendant named appeals.

Extradition proceeding by the State against O. S. Knisely, who after his arrest sued out a writ of habeas corpus against T. R. Hughes, Sheriff of Caddo Parish, and Charles A. Berry, agent for the state of Michigan, on which he was held under a warrant and admitted to bail, and the sheriff and the agent apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition, which preliminary writ was granted.

<p> (Syllabus by Mditorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Highways <&wkey;129 — Special Tax Election-Suit to Nullify Election — Sufficiency of Petition.</p> <p>A petition in suit to declare special tax election in a road district, ordered by police jury of a parish, void because authority to hold such election was vested by Act No. 199 of 1916, §§ 2, 3, 5, in board of supervisors organized thereunder, need not allege that board had been created and organized, as, in virtue of the statute and of Const. 1898, art. 291, as amended in 1912, such authority was either in police jury or board.</p> <p>2.Highways <&wkey;129 — Special Tax Election — Validity—Pbesckiption.</p> <p>To a petition in suit to declare special tax election in road district ordered by police jury of a parish void because authority to hold such election was vested by Act No. 199 of 1916, §§ 2. 3, 5, in a board of supervisors organized thereunder, a plea of 69 days’ prescription will be overruled, as, if police jury had no right to call an election, it was absolutely void, and as, if it was called by proper authority, there was nothing to be cured by plea.</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law <&wkey;5 — Change or Amendment.</p> <p>Const. 1898, art. 291, as amended in 1912, permitting levy of taxes by police. juries for l'oad purposes not to exceed five mills for five years on the property of parish after an election, though entirely omitted in the Constitution of 1913, remained in full force and effect, as framers of that instrument could not change or amend the Constitution of 1898.</p> <p>4. Highways <&wkey;127(l) — Authoeity oe Police Jury — Special Tax Election — Road District.</p> <p>The calling of an election by the police jury of Winn Parish by ordinance adopted January 9, 1917, to levy a special road tax, was an absolute nullity, as Act No. 199 of 1916, then in force, placed such power in the board of supervisors for road districts.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Joseph B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by attachment by the Mechanics’ Bank of McComb City, Miss., against W. J. Van Zant and Sam Sheridan. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

D. 'Webb, Judge. Action by Jules Maritzky against the Shreveport Railways Company. Judgment for plaintiff for $5,000 damages, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering the appeal, prays that the amount of the judgment be increased to $10,000.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Master akd Servant <&wkey;101, 102(1)— Master’s Duty — Tools and Appliances.</p> <p>A master must furnish to his servant safe appliances with which to work and see that the appliances are kept in good condition.</p> <p>2. Master and Servant &wkey;>101,102(1) — Master’s Duty — Saee Place to Work.</p> <p>A master must furnish to his servant a reasonably safe place in which to work.</p> <p>3. Master and Servant <&wkey;101, 102(8)— Tools and Appliances — Safeguards.</p> <p>The work of a sawyer in a lumber mill being a most hazardous occupation, it is the employer’s duty to safeguard one employed as a sawyer.</p> <p>4. Master and Servant &wkey;>264(ll) — Defects —Proximate Cause — Liability.</p> <p>There can be no recovery where the evidence, so far as any certain deductions can be drawn from it, tends to prove that the accident was not caused by the defects complained of.</p> <p>5. Master and Servant <&wkey;236(13) — Personal Injury — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Where a sawyer, after discovery of a large sliver hanging from side of log while facing the saw, started the carriage back at its usual rate, and sliver pulled saw off and caused it to break, and a piece of the broken saw struck sawyer in the head, he was guilty of contributory negligence, and could not recover from his employer.</p> <p>6. Master and Servant <&wkey;217(25) — Assumption of Risk.</p> <p>Where a large sliver hanging from side of a log which was facing the saw was dangerous, a sawyer whose attention was called to it, and who saw it, assumed the risk of getting log by the saw without accident, and where sliver pulled saw off and broke it, with resulting injury to sawyer, he could not recover.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <®=^1004(1) — Review —Personal Injuries — Assessment oe Damages.</p> <p>Under Civ. Code, art. 1934, providing that on an assessment of damages for quasi offense, much discretion must be left to the judge, refers particularly to the trial judge rather than the judges of appellate courts and an assessment of damages, neither excessive nor insufficient, will not be disturbed on appeal.</p>

Tammany; Prentiss B. Carter, Judge. Suit by William E. De,Brueys against Albert S. Burns, W. B. Lancaster, and another, for an injunction and for an accounting and damages against defendant Lancaster. Judgment against defendant Lancaster, and against all defendants perpetuating a writ of injunction, and defendants Burns and Laneáster appealed to tlie Court of Appeal, which ordered the appeal transferred to the Supreme Court.

<p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Sale.]</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Immovable.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Evidence @=>10(1) — Judicial Notice-Venue.</p> <p>Petition in action for slanderous and IK belous words, stating that petitioner had purchased goods from defendant, “a resident of this city and state,” meant the city and state in which the petition was drawn and presented, that is, the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana, as court to which petition was addressed would take cognizance of name of city and state in which it sits.</p> <p>2. Pleading @=>46 — Residence of Plaintiff —Petition.</p> <p>A petition in an action for slanderous and libelous words, annexing a circular giving plaintiff’s address and elsewhere referring to plaintiff’s residence on a named street and to fact that she had lived in New Orleans all her life, but not setting out residence in usual manner and place in petition, sufficiently, stated plaintiff’s residence in New Orleans.</p> <p>3. Pleading @=>406(9) — Petition—Exception of Vagueness — Waiver.</p> <p>Whore defendant urged in limine an exception to the petition and that plaintiff particularize, and after that exception was overruled did not urge a proper general objection to testimony at inception of ease, and where proof was admitted without objection, its effect was to amend the pleading, and the exception to that extent was waived.</p> <p>4. Libel and Slander @=>33 — Presumptive Damages.</p> <p>There is a species of injury resulting from a libel or slander, from the very nature of thp words or writing, which the law presumes..</p> <p>5. Libel and Slander @=>89(1) — Special Damages — Proof.</p> <p>There is a species of injury flowing from libel or slander, known as special damage, which must be alleged and proved.</p> <p>6. Libel and Slander @=>89(2) — Petition-Special Damages.</p> <p>Petition in action for libelous and slanderous words, which set out defendant’s acts and alleged that plaintiff had almost had nervous prostration and was ashamed to go out in street in her neighborhood, or to meet her friends, because of defendant’s statement that she owed bim money which she refused to pay, alleged an injury to her reputation.</p> <p>7. Libel and Slander @=>12 — Special Damages — Allegation and Proof.</p> <p>An oral charge that 'one is trying to avoid and refused to pay an honest debt gives rise to special damages, which must be alleged and proven.</p> <p>8. Libel and Slander @=6(3) — Actionable Words — Injury to Reputation.</p> <p>A charge that one is trying to avoid and refuses to pay an honest debt, when made in writing and published, is actionable per se.</p> <p>9. Threats @=>1(1) — Extortion—Money Due.</p> <p>It makes no 'difference that the money sought to be extorted, in violation of Act 110 of 1908, p. 166, was legally due.</p> <p>10. Action @=>5 — Right of Action — Injury. While violation of a penal statute does not</p> <p>give rise to a private action, unless complainant has suffered some special injury, yet if there be such special injury, of a kind of which the law can take cognizance, the right to recover follows.</p> <p>11. Libel and Slander @=>119 — Damages— Mental Suffering.</p> <p>The Louisiana law of torts, found principally in the Civil Code, particularly Civ. Code, art. 2315, taken from the civil law, recognizes a right of action for mental suffering or injury to the feelings, unaccompanied by any physical injury.</p> <p>12. Libel and Slander @=>13 — Damages— Mental Suffering — Recovery.</p> <p>Under Civ. Code, art. 2315, slanderous and libelous words intended to bring about such a mental condition as would induce compliance with an illegal demand for the payment of a debt, bordering on blackmail or extortion, cause a special damage.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>13. Libel and Slander @=>24 — Publication.</p> <p>Where it was alleged that slanderous words were spoken to a third person, who denied hear-; ing them, there was no publication, in the sense that no third person heard the slanderous .words.</p> <p>14. Libel and Slandeb <@=54 — Defense— . Truth.</p> <p>Though creditor said to third person that plaintiff owed him, or asked her to pay it in presence of others, without other defamatory or derogatory remarks, he might, under Marr’s Rev. St. § 6779, prove truthfulness of statements.</p> <p>15. Appeal and Error <@=931(1) — 'Weight of Evidence — Finding in Favob of Plaintiff.</p> <p>Where the lower court allowed a recovery for plaintiff, the Supreme Court must assume that, whenever the weight of evidence was involved, it found it in favor of plaintiff, unless the Supreme Court is convinced of the contrary by the record itself.</p> <p>16. Libel and- Slandeb <@=6(3) — Actionable Woeds — Injury to Reputation.</p> <p>Publication of plaintiff’s name on list of delinquent debtors, as part of a plan to extort money which defendant claimed to be due him, intending to impute a refusal to pay her just debts and to destroy her reputation for integrity, though not specifically so charging, was actionable per se, if by fair implication and reasonable interpretation it had that effect.</p> <p>17. Libel and Slander <@=25 — Publication.</p> <p>Where defendant and his collection agency mailed to plaintiff the first and second demands for payment of a debt, as well as the list of delinquent debtors issued, handled, and mailed by the agency, imputing plaintiff’s refusal to pay a just debt, there was a sufficient publication.</p> <p>Proyosty, J., dissenting in part.</p>

Land, Judge. Grover C. Johnson and Henry Wooley were jointly tried for murder, and Wooley was convicted without capital punishment, and Johnson was convicted on the charge and sentenced to be hanged, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Perry A. Abbott against Fernand G. Pratt. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by George W. Reine against the Pontehartrain Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

F. Blackman and James Andrews, Judges. Earnest Jeansonne was charged by information with the larceny of hogs, his motion to dismiss the charge was sustained, and the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;20 — Relation —Requisite.</p> <p>To create the relation of landlord and tenant, within Rev. Civ. Oode, art. 2676 et seq., there must be a thing, a price, the consent of the parties, and an implied obligation of warranty, etc.</p> <p>2. Landlord and Tenant &wkey;>l — Relation— Obligations— “Commutative Contract.”</p> <p>In view of Rev. Civ. Code, art. 2692, the relation of landlord and tenant is a commutative contract, and, once established, certain well-defined rights and obligations attach to each party thereto.</p> <p>3. Landlord and Tenant i&wkey;l — Relation— Obligation.</p> <p>A tenant’s obligation to pay rent, etc., makes him a debtor to his lessor, and the lessor’s obligation of maintaining his tenant in undisturbed possession of premises during the term makes him the tenant’s obligor or debtor.</p> <p>4. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;53(l) — Transfer by Lessor— Discharge from Duties.</p> <p>Under Rev. Civ. Code, arts. 2185, 2188-2190, 2192, 2194, relating to novation, in order for the lessor and his heirs to be discharged from his obligation to a lessee, the lessee must clearly and unequivocally intend, not only to accept lessor’s transferee in the lessor’s place and stead, but to discharge the original lessor.</p> <p>5. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;53(l) — Subtenant — Sale by Lessor — Release.</p> <p>That a lessee merely paid his rent for three months to the lessor’s transferee, after notice of transfer, and that the lessee’s negotiable rent notes were transferred to such transferee, in view of lessor’s right to transfer his interest, under Rev. Civ. Code, art. 2009 et seq., did not expressly or impliedly release lessor’s obligations.</p> <p>6. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;176 — Liability of Lessor — Defects—Statutes.</p> <p>Under Civ. Code, art. 2676 et seq., a lessor is liable for loss to lessee from defects and for such damages as reasonably entered into contemplation of the parties in making of lease, and in view of articles 1933, 2681, 2682, and where leased building was destroyed under city’s police power, because of its defective condition, the lessor, though not the owner, was liable to lessee for eviction.</p> <p>7. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;101 — Destruction of Property — “Unforeseen Event.”</p> <p>. In Civ. Code, art 2697, relating to termination of lease by total destruction of property by an “unforeseen event,” that term in the civil law is equivalent to vis major or uncontrollable force.</p> <p>8. Landlord and Tenant &wkey;>176 — Defects in Premises — Liability of Lessor — Stipulation.</p> <p>A stipulation in a lease that lessee accepted building in its present condition, and should make all repairs and improvements at his own expense, which should revert to lessor, in view of intent that lessee should make his own changes without regard to defects subsequently discovered, did not release lessor from damage to his lessee from eviction by destruction of building under city’s police power by reason of its defective condition.</p> <p>9. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;180(4) — Eviction — Damages—Improvements.</p> <p>Where lessee agreed to make repairs and improvements which were to revert to the lessor, their value to the lessee, on his eviction by destruction of building under city’s police power because of its defective condition, was an amount bearing same proportion to their cost as his occupation bore to entire term, with a credit for value of material removed by lessee,</p> <p>10. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;180(4) — Eviction — Expense of Moving.</p> <p>A lessee, compelled to move by destruction of building under city’s police power because of its defective condition, was not entitled to recover from his lessor the expense of moving, as he would have incurred such expense at expiration of lease.</p> <p>11. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;180(4) — Eviction — Loss of Professional Time.</p> <p>A lessee, evicted from leased premises by reason of destruction of building under city’s police power because of its defective condition, was entitled to recover loss of his professional time in looking for a new location, as it might have entered into mind of parties in event of such eviction.</p> <p>12. Landlord and Tenant <©=»180(4) — Eviction — Loss of Subleases.</p> <p>In view of Rev. Civ. Code, art. 2696, relating to eviction, construed with article 1933, relating to breach of contracts, an evicted lessee was entitled to recover damages for his inability to sublease the premises, measured by the difference in rental value of premises at time of eviction and value at date of lease, deducting what he had to pay to his own lessor.</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting in part. Sommerville, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the E. B. Williams Cypress Company, Limited, against W. O. Martin, Sheriff and Tax Collector, and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Iberia Cypress Company, Limited, against W. O. Martin, Sheriff, and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Company, Limited, against W. O. Martin, Sheriff, etc. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Widow Joseph E. Eolwell against the Demack Motor Car Company and another. Erom a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Proceedings for mandamus by the Miller Engineering Company against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company. From judgment refusing the writ, relator appeals.</p>

Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge. Action by Sam Cerneglia„ against Ben Fratello with reconventional damages by defendant. Prom a verdict rejecting the damages of both parties and a judgment thereon, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus ~by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Cbiminal Law <&wkey;547(2) — Evidence—Testimony ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.</p> <p>The testimony on preliminary examination of defendant charged with murder would have been inadmissible if the stenographic notes had been offered as being a voluntary declaration or confession, such as Rev. St. § 1010, refers to the testimony not having been taken in accordance with the statute.</p> <p>2. Witnesses &wkey;>393(2) — Impeachment—Testimony on Preliminary Examination.</p> <p>Stenographic notes embodying the testimony on preliminary examination of defendant charged with murder were admissible as testimony given by defendant on a former trial to impeach him in his denial on cross-examination that he had made certain statements in his testimony on preliminary examination.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;547(4) — Evidence—Authentication op Stenographer’s Notes.</p> <p>Testimony of stenographer who took down defendant’s testimony on preliminary examination that he had no present recollection of what the testimony had been, but that whatever it was it had been correctly taken down, rendered his stenographic notes admissible in chief.</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;396(2) — Testimony on Preliminary Examination — Use of Part for Impeachment — Introduction op Whole.</p> <p>Testimony on preliminary examination of defendant charged with murder, embodied in stenographic notes, and introduced to rebut and impeach defendant who had denied on cross-examination that he had made certain statements as to what occurred at the time and place of the homicide in his testimony on preliminary examination, should have been introduced as a whole, or, at any rate, defendant should have been allowed to introduce other relevant parts of it.</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <&wkey;>396(2) — Evidence—Introduction of Whole Writing or Conversation.</p> <p>The prosecution in offering a writing or conversation must not garble it, or select parts and exclude other parts which might be elucidative of the parts selected.</p> <p>6. Witnesses <&wkey;394 — Impeachment — Contradiction and Rebuttal.</p> <p>Evidence offered in impeachment of a witness is open to contradiction and rebuttal.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Libel and Slander <&wkey;44(l) — Qualified Privilege.</p> <p>In suit for slander, a plea of privilege, in appearing at request of investigating committee of an Order of Druids considering plaintiff’s application for membership, and stating that plaintiff had negro blood, was not an absolute privilege.</p> <p>2. Libel and Slander <&wkey;101(4) — Qualified Privilege — Presumption and Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In suit for slander, a plea of privilege, in appearing at request of investigating committee of an Order of Druids considering plaintiff’s application for membership, and stating that he had negro blood, was a qualified!? privileged. communication, as occasion rebutted the inference prima facie arising from statement, and put on plaintiff the burden of proving malice in fact, or motives of personal spite or ill will, independent of the occasion.</p> <p>3. Libel and Slander <&wkey;>51(4) — Application for Membership — Statements on Investigation.</p> <p>Plaintiff, applying for membership in the Order of Druids, knowing that his character and reputation would be investigated, could not complain of statements made on investigation, unless objectionable testimony was given through actual malice or ill will toward him.</p> <p>4. Libel and Slander <&wkey;101(4) — Qualified Privilege — Malice.</p> <p>Where words imputing misconduct to another are spoken by one having a duty to perform and are spoken in good faith and in belief that it comes within discharge of duty, or where spoken in good faith to those having an interest in communication and a right to know and act upon fact stated, no presumption of malice arises from such speaking, and no action can be maintained in such ease without proof of actual malice.</p> <p>5. Libel and Slander &wkey;>44(l), 50 — Qualified Privilege — Occasion.</p> <p>The duty under which a party is qualifiedly privileged to make the communication need</p> <p>not be one having the nature of a legal obligation, but it is sufficient if it is social or moral, and defendant in good faith believed he was acting in pursuit thereof, although in fact he was mistaken.</p> <p>6.Libel and Slander <&wkey;112(l) — Qualified Privilege — Malice—Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for a reference to plaintiff as of negro blood made by defendant on an occasion of qualified privilege while plaintiff’s character was being investigated on his application for membership in the Order of Druids, evidence held to sustain a verdict for defendant.</p>

Action by Charles Vicknair against the Daily States Publishing Company. Application by defendant for writs of certiorari and prohibition to the Twenty-Eighth judicial district court, parish of Jefferson, Hon. E. A. Middleton, Judge.

King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Eugene Ibos. To the final account of Mrs. A. Bourdette, executrix, John Ibos, an heir, appeals, and files opposition, and from a judgment requiring an accounting of a sum other than shown by her accounts, and from an allowance to opponent and the denial of her motion for a new trial, the executrix appeals, and Perrin, Batter & Blum, creditors, appeal from a reduction of their claim.

E. Jones, Judge. Suit by L. H. Day against the Louisiana Central Lumber Company, for damages, or in the alternative for compensation. Exception of no cause of action sustained as to right to proceed for damages, and overruled as to right to compensation, and judgment for plaintiff for compensation, and both parties appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Samuel Dean, Jr., against Abe Burglass. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering, asks for an amendment of the judgment.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Suit by George Marshall and others against the Louisiana State Rice Milling Company, the firm of Danove & Delvaille and its members, Morris Peitel and the M. Peitel House Wrecking Company, and the City of New Orleans.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Public Lands <&wkey;16 — Cutting Timber on State Lands — Bad Faith.</p> <p>In an action for nullity of a contract and for restoration of what defendant received under an invalid contract from a school board of a parish to cut timber from a school section, the bad faith attributable to defendant is legal bad faith, the bad faith that is imputable to one whose ignorance of truth is due to his fault or negligence and not to his fraud or dishonesty.</p> <p>2. Public Lands <&wkey;16 — Cutting Timber-Illegal Contract — Damages.</p> <p>In an action for nullity of an invalid contract with the school board of a parish to cut timber from a school section and for restoration of what defendant received under the contract, the basis for the calculations should be the value which the manufactured product had when the timber was taken and converted into lumber.</p> <p>3. Public Lands <&wkey;16 — Removal of Timber under Legal Contract — Measurement.</p> <p>In such action the timber, in absence of agreement as to where diameter of logs should be measured, was to be calculated by amount of lumber that could be sawed the full length of the log, as measured by diameter of small end, though the average diameter should be taken in measuring timber long enough to be cut into sawlogs, according to the statutory Doyle rule.</p> <p>4. Public Lands t&wkey;16 — Removal of Timber from School Section — Amount—Evidence.</p> <p>In an action for nullity of an invalid contract with the school board of a parish under which defendant cut and removed timber from a school section and for restoration of what it received under the contract, evidence held to show that defendant pulled 6,844 trees, averaging 22.1 inches in diameter at the small end and 34 feet in length.</p> <p>5.Public Lands <&wkey;16 — Cutting Timber from School Land — Invalid Contract-Damages.</p> <p>A lumber company, cutting timber from a school section under an invalid contract with the' school board of a parish, is liable for the market value that the manufactured product of the timber had when converted into lumber and shingles, less the cost of logging and manufacture, without any credit for the cost of labor spent for felling and taking away worthless timber.</p>

F. Blackman and James Andrew, Judges. John Woodard and another were charged with the crime of willfully shooting, and Woodard alone was convicted, and he appeals.

Suit by the Bowman-Hicks Lumber Company and others against the Town of Oak-dale to set aside an ordinance extending the town's corporate limits. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Eusebe Robichaux against Joseph L. Block. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier; John N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by C. B. Wimbish against Mrs. Mattie R. Mayer. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;392 — Defective Appeal Bond — Mode oe Complaint — Dismissal for Insufficiency — Statute.</p> <p>Under Act No. 112 of 1916, § 9, despite section 3, appellee in a divorce suit should have urged his complaint in relation to the , insufficiency of appellant’s appeal bond in the district court, should have had it served on appellant, and should have given her opportunity to correct the errors, or to furnish a new bond within two legal days after service of the- complaint; and, appellee having failed so to do, the appeal cannot be dismissed on account of errors or omissions in appeal bond.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Divorce &wkey;>13 — Desertion — Statute —Retroactive Effect.</p> <p>Act No. 269 of 1916 gives a right to sue for divorce on the ground of 7 years’ separation of the parties, though part or all the time had. expired prior to the adoption of the statute.</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law <&wkey;>305 — Divorce <&wkey;13 — “Due Process” — “Law of the Land.”</p> <p>Act No. 269 of 1916, providing a certain state of facts shall be basis for a suit for divorce, but relegating the parties to an action through the courts for a determination of the existence of such facts, as well as an application of the law, is not violative of the due process clause of Const. La. Bill of Rights, art. 2, or Const. U. S. Amend. 14, § 1; “due process” meaning the general law of the land, which hears before it condemns, proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial (citing Words and Phrases, Hirst and Second Series, Due Process of Law).</p> <p>4. Constitutional Law <&wkey;197 — Bill of Rights — Ex Post Facto Law.</p> <p>Act No. 269 of 1916, allowing one suing for divorce to avail himself of conditions which obtained prior to its passage, is not violative of Const. La. art. 166, or Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10, as an ex post facto law.</p> <p>5. Constitutional Law <&wkey;93(l), 153 — Vested Rights — Obligation of Contracts —Statute.</p> <p>In view of Civ. Code, arts. 86-90, dealing with marriage, Act No. 269 of 1916, stating grounds for divorce, leaves the wife’s right to a settlement and division of community property and to claim alimony unimpaired,' as provided by the Code, and is not violative of Const. La. art. 166, or Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10,' as divesting vested rights or impairing contracts.</p>

Théard, Judge. Petitory action by W. W. Wall against Mrs. A. P. Rabito. Judgment for plaintiff condemning defendant to pay costs, and defendant appeals.

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Suit by the Aztec Land Company for confirmation of title, opposed by John F. Dupuy and others, setting up title. Judgment for defendant Dupuy, and the plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Ered D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Erancis J. MacDonnell against Jules S. Dreyfous. Erom judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Carter, Judge. Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Mr. and'Mrs. B. A. Bannister, against Quincy Norris for the restoration of a child alleged to have been adopted by relators. Judgment for defendant, and relators appeal.

McIntosh, Judge. Mandamus by the state, on the relation of Jasper Curtis, against W. L. Ross and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

<p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Laborer.]</p>

Respite proceedings by S. Bartolotta & Co. against Their Creditors. From judgments condemning them to furnish bonds to two of the creditors, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James; Charles T. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Laura Robert Millet against Olide Millet. Prom a judgment for plaintiff granting a separation from bed and board and giving her the custody of minor children, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Sales <§=>391(2) — Right of Buyer — Reclamation oe Overpayment — Honoring Drafts. ,</p> <p>Where buyer of staves agreed to pay seller market value delivered at point, by honoring without reservation drafts of seller, buyer lost right to reclaim from seller amount he had been overpaid; buyer having been in position to ascertain value of staves as soon as delivered, so that he should have protected himself.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Master and Servant <§^=302(6) — Injuries to Third Persons — Liability oe Lender oe Automobile.</p> <p>The president of a mercantile corporation, who lent his automobile to the company’s employé for the employé’s own purposes, was not liable for whatever damages the car might cause while being used by the employé, who was a competent driver.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Landlord and Tenant <§=55(1) — Parol Lease — Incomplete Character — Enforcement.</p> <p>Where verbal lease specifying date, monthly rental, and duration of term was made, and stipulations as to repairs and the placing of a new front in the leased store building were intended, but the parties never reached an agreement on them, there was no complete parol lease enforceable by the lessees.</p> <p>2. Contracts <@=515 — Treatment as Whole-Lack oe Agreement upon Parts.</p> <p>Since a contract must be treated as a whole, where some parts of an alleged contract were not definitely agreed upon by the parties, the contract is not enforceable.</p>

<p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Interstate Commerce.]</p>

Théard, Judge. Suit by the Grasser Paving & Contracting Company against F. Rivers Richardson. From the judgment, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court.

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by G. L. Adsit against Joe M. Park and others. Judgment for defendants on terms, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Lena Saragusa was convicted of operating a blind tiger, and applied to the judge of the Twenty-Sixth district court for the parish of Washington for writ of mandamus to compel granting of an appeal by C. Ellis Ott, Judge of the City Court, and, her application having been refused, she applies for writs of certiorari and mandamus to compel action by tbe district court.

Skinner, Judge. Suit by the succession of Samuel Powers against W. H. Howcott, and a supplemental petition by plaintiff against Howcott and others. Exceptions by defendant Howcott and another to plaintiff’s supplemental petition sustained, and suit dismissed as to defendant, Howcott, and another, and plaintiff appeals.

Suit by Barney Y. Wemple against Mally Eastham and others, wherein defendants asked for preliminary injunction, which was denied, and they apply for writs of certiorari and mandamus to compel the judge of the First judicial district for the parish of Oaddo to issue preliminary writ of injunction'restraining plaintiff and his agents, resulting in issuance of a rule nisi, coupled with a writ of certiorari.

Suit by tbe Department of Conservation against the Louisiana Gas & Fuel Company, Incorporated. Counter injunction to the Department of Conservation against a previous injunction obtained against it by the company, and the Louisiana Gas & Fuel Company, incorporated, prays for a writ of prohibition against Hon. John L. Sandling, Judge, to prohibit the enforcement of the injunction obtained by the Department of Conservation.

K. Skinner, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Joseph A. Courtin. After the executor had filed his final account and a judgment sending Miss Marie Emma Courtin and Mrs. May or Mary Willoz into possession as usufructuary and residuary legatees, respectively, Mrs. Stephen Garidel and Louis J. Courtin, Jr., heirs of the deceased, brought an action attacking the will.

<p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Arson.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <@=31206(4) — Sentence — Manner oe Execution — Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 133 of 1918, providing that death sentences shall be executed in parish in which crime was committed, does not repeal Act No. 61 of 1910, which merely construes method of execution provided by Rev. St. § 983, and provides for hanging in state penitentiary at Baton Rouge, as it does not conflict with act of 1910, so as .to abolish hanging and require district court to direct manner of execution.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Ella Clay against Edward A. Parsons. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Contracts <&wkey;311 — Contract to Repay When Able — Prior Death.</p> <p>Where a father made advances to his son to enable him to study civil engineering, under an agreement the advances should be repaid when the son should have procured a start in his profession enabling him to do so, and the son died before he had secured such a professional position, the father has no cause of action against the son’s succession to subject to the obligation the son’s inheritance from his mother.</p>

<p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Tax Lien.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Carriers i&wkey;333(10) — Injuries to Passenger Leaving Car — Crossing Other Track — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Where plaintiff left the street car on which she had -been riding, and started across the street in a hurry because it was raining, and she wished to deliver a message, and so did not take time to go to the regular crossing, and in bolding her umbrella she obstructed her vision and did not see an approaching street car, and ran into it from the side, her negligence bars recovery.</p>

Boone, Judge. Consolidated suits by Dr. J. L. Leopold individually, and by himself and wife, for the use and benefit of Girard Leopold, a minor, against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Prom judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

Suit by Octave F. Bocage against Mrs. Angela Lombard, his wife, for divorce, in which defendant reconvened, demanding a divorce. From a judgment denying defendant alimony, she appeals.

James; Philip H. Gilbert, Judge. Suit by Adele Jacob for appointment of a receiver of the Uncle Sam Planting & Manufacturing Company. Petition by Jules J. Jacob, Jr., and others for removal of the receiver. From a judgment for the petitioners, the receiver appeals.

Théard, Judge. Suit for compensation under the' Employers’ Liability Act hy John Mack against James J. Legeai. From the judgment awarding compensation, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;393 — Bond — Devolutive and Suspensive Appeal.</p> <p>Where the appellants obtained an order for both a devolutive and a suspensive appeal, and the bond ior the devolutive appeal was'fixed at $100, and for the suspensive appeal according to law, and the appellants gave bond and security for $4,000, held, that the bond, though not good for a suspensive, was amply good for a devolutive, appeal, and that the obtainment by appellants of a subsequent order for a devolutive appeal, and the giving of two bonds to perfect the same, were mere surplusage.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>2. Contracts <&wkey;140 — Stirling Bidding — Subsequent Contract.</p> <p>Where at judicial sale bidding was stifled by agreement between one bidder and agent of another that they should not bid further against each other, but should match a coin to determine who should have the property at the price then bid, the winner to pay the loser a certain consideration, the principals of such agent, to whom the property was adjudicated at the sale, and who thereafter, learning of their agent’s agreement, ratified it, and in pursuance thereof transferred their adjudication of the auctioned property to the other bidder, who had won the coin matching contest, on the latter’s agreement to deliver the promised consideration, were entitled to recover such consideration; such principals not having been present or participating in the illegal combination, but merely ratifying their agent’s agreement.</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., and Sommerville, J., dissenting.</p>

Suit to enjoin a tax by the Tremont Lumber Company against the Police Jury of Jackson Parish and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>. Action by Leopold Godchaux against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company and the Wells Fargo & Co. Express. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

Action by Mrs. Mary Elster against Albert R. Picou. Judgment for defendant in the city court, and plaintiff appeals. Judgment for plaintiff on trial de novo, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; R. D. Webb, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by J. Rogers Jefferson and wife against J. K. Herold and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;251(2) — Lien of Landlord — Removal of Goons by Creditor of Lessee.</p> <p>Where, a bank, creditor of a company which had absorbed the business of a lessee, on learning that the debtor company was in bad financial condition, arranged to remove from the leased building goods of such debtor company and sell them, meanwhile paying the rent to the lessor until the goods were removed and sold, there was a willful violation of the rights of the lessor, in that his prior lien, under Civ. Code, art. 2705, on the goods of the debtor company was destroyed, and to that extent a legal fraud.</p> <p>2. Landlord and Tenant t&wkey;265(5) — Suit fob Rent — Seizure of Property Subject to Lien.</p> <p>Under Code Prac. art. 287, when a lessor sues for his rent, whether due or not due, if he fears that the property on which he has a lien may be removed from the building, he may provisionally seize it by virtue of his lien.</p> <p>3. Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;202(l), 207(1)— Removal of Goods by Tenant and Creditor-Maturity of Whole of Rent.</p> <p>Where a leased building, for rent of which the lessor sues the company which absorbed his lessee and a bank to which such company owed money, was practically emptied of goods and abandoned by the company when the goods on which the bank claimed' a pledge were removed to escape the lessor’s lien, the whole of the rent became due at that time, and plaintiff can recover it in his action against the company and the bank.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

F. Brunot, Judge. Suit by the Brooks-Scanlon Company to cancel and set aside an order of the Bailroad Commission of Louisiana, wherein the Commission sued out injunction in reconvention. From judgment dismissing defendant’s rule to set aside the order dissolving the writ of injuiiction, and from judgment in favor of plaintiff declaring defendant Commission’s order to be null and void, defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabvs ly Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Executors and Administrators &wkey;>534— Succession — Administration Bonds — Proceedings Against Principad.</p> <p>Proceedings by judgment creditors of a succession, under Code Prac. art. 1065 et seq., against one who succeeded the administratrix of the succession on her death, by which her liability to the creditors for funds belonging to the succession and her insolvency were established, held to justify suit by the creditors against her surety under Civ. Code, art. 3066.</p>