Volume 145 — Louisiana Reports

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Walter T. Carey against the Commonwealth Building & Loan Association. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, the liquidators -of defendant company appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law &wkey;366(3) — Res Gestas.</p> <p>A calm and deliberate response, “Yes, he got me,” by a wounded person in answer to a question of a physician, “Do you realize your condition?” was not admissible in a homicide case as a part of the res gestae.</p> <p>2. Homicide <&wkey;203(l) — Dying Declarations.</p> <p>A statement by a wounded person, “Yes, he got me,” was not admissible in evidence as a dying declaration, whore it was not proven that the wounded man believed he was dying when ho made the declaration.</p> <p>3. Homicide <&wkey;338(l) — Harmless Error— Evidence,.</p> <p>In a homicide case, admission in evidence of a declaration by deceased, “Yes, he got me,” could not have been prejudicial, where there was no proof that the declaration had reference to the defendant.</p> <p>4. Homicide <&wkey;338(3) — Harmless Error — ADMISS19N oe Evidence.</p> <p>In á homicide case, the admission in evidence of a declaration by deceased, “Yes, he got me,” was harmless, if erroneous, where defendant did not deny that he hilled deceased; his defense being that he committed the homicide in self-defense.</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <&wkey;859 — Misconduct oe Bystanders.</p> <p>In a homicide case, where the widow with an infant on her lap caused an interruption of the trial by giving vent to her emotions and crying aloud, the court did all that was required of it, when the attorneys for defendant protested, by promptly having the sheriff take the woman out of the courtroom and instructing the jury to pay no attention to her display of grief and not to allow it to influence them in any manner whatever; defendant’s attorneys having demanded no more.</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;887 — Trial—Discharge oe Jury — Misconduct oe Bystanders.</p> <p>A defendant in a homicide case was not entitled to have the jury discharged and a mistrial entered by reason of the fact that deceased’s widow with an infant on her lap sitting immediately in front of the jury caused an inter-' ruption of the trial by giving vent to her emotions and crying aloud in court, the court immediately having her removed.</p> <p>7. Criminal Law <&wkey;719(l) — Argument — Matters Not Proven.</p> <p>The prosecuting attorney should not inform the jury of facts that might have been, but were not, proven.</p> <p>8. Criminal Law <&wkey;730(7) — Harmless Error — Misconduct oe Prosecuting Attorney.</p> <p>In a homicide case, where defendant who claimed that he killed deceased in self-defense introduced evidence that 10 or 12 months before the homicide deceased had cursed and abused him, any error of attorney assisting the prosecution in saying in his argument that the prosecuting attorney could have proved by ample evidence what had provoked the action of the deceased on the occasion referred to, a matter not proven, was cured where the court promptly admonished the attorney to confine his argument to the record and instructed the jury to pay no attention to the argument except in so far as it related to the facts that had been proven on the trial.</p> <p>9. Criminal Law &wkey;>1064(l) — Appeal — Grounds eor New Trial.</p> <p>An allegation that a verdict was contrary to law and the evidence does not on appeal present for consideration any distinct question of law.</p> <p>10. Criminal Law <&wkey;956(13) — New Trial-Misconduct oe Juror — Evidence.</p> <p>On application for new trial, evidence held insufficient to show that a juror thrust his head through a window and told a certain person, “'We’ve got him, I’ll fix him,” indicating by a gesture, placing his hand about his throat.</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <&wkey;274(5) — Failure to Blow Whistle at Place Required by Custom and Rule.</p> <p>Where a railroad company’s custom and rule required the whistle to be blown 800 yards from the station to allow those having business with road to cross the track, the company was negligent in blowing the whistle only 150 yards from the station.</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;274(3) — Injuries to Person at Station.</p> <p>It was negligence for a railroad company to place its ticket office and waiting room on the wrong side of the track and force people having business with the company to cross the track before approaching trains.</p> <p>3. Railroads <&wkey;274(5) — NEGLiGENCEr-OPERating Engine Without Headlight.</p> <p>As to one having business necessitating crossing tracks at a depot at night, it is negligence for the railroad company to operate an incoming train without a headlight.</p> <p>4. Railroads <&wkey;274(5) — Negligence—Speed op Train.</p> <p>Permitting train without a headlight to enter a station, where it had to stop, at a high rate of speed, on a down grade, on a dark night is negligence as to one having business necessitating crossing the tracks.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Petitory action by the Ponehartrain Railroad Company against Guinlio Guimbelato. From judgment for plaintiff against the original defendant, who was dead when suit was filed, answer having been filed by Barbara, Catherine, and Joseph Guibilati, and Jone Bordenave, the substituted defendants appeal.

N. Sandlin, Judge. Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Arthur Bradley, against Richard and Myrtis Ann Lewis, for possession of relator’s three minor children. Judgment for defendants, and relator appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation <&wkey;611(4) — Injunction — Tax Collector — Parties.</p> <p>Where a tax collector is proceeding to enforce the payment of an illegal and unconstitutional tax, he may be restrained by injunction without calling in the lawmaking power, whether state or parish, as a party defendant.</p> <p>2. Highways <&wkey;126 — Taxation <&wkey;44 — Road Tax — Power oe Police Jury — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Whilst, under article 291 of the Constitution, as amended pursuant to Act No. 236 of 1912, a police jury is authorized to form its parish into road districts, and, with the assent of a majority in number and value of the property taxpayers in a district so formed, entitled to vote under the election law, is authorized to levy other taxes (than those already provided for by the Constitution), for road and bridge purposes, “not to exceed five mills for five years,” it is impossible that the framers of the amendment should have contemplated, in conferring such authority, that it (police jury) would undertake to include either the property of its entire parish or that of any ward or other subdivision in more than one road district, since, if that should be done, the road tax, instead of being.limited to five mills, may be as many times that rate as there are districts in which the property is included, and the number of districts would appear to have no other limit than such as may be determined by the police jury. The tax, moreover, would be unequal and discriminatory.</p>

<p>Appeal from Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Richland; 'John R. McIntosh, Judge.</p> <p>Prank Vaughn was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals:</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. P. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Fred Martin was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Gunning-ham, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Jim Butler against James G. Mars-ton and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

C. Ellis, Judge. Action by the Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank against A. S. White, wherein defendant’s creditors intervened and sought injunction. From judgment dissolving the injunction, the creditors appeal.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Daniel Wilkins against the Washington Oil Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, dismissing the action, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Suit by Aaron Blum and others against William Allen and the Sabine Land Company. Judgment of nonsuit, and the Sabine Land Company alone appeals, and plaintiffs, answering the appeal, pray for judgment in their favor.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the New Orleans Railway & Light Company against the ¿Etna Fire Insurance Company. From judgment for plaintiff, it appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Nabors Oil & Gas Company against William E. McCormick and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.</p>

Wortham, Judge ad hoc. Actions by Dominique Harang and others, and by Delia Harang and others, against the Bowie Lumber Company, Limited, which were consolidated and tried together by consent. Judgment for certain plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Wortham, Judge ad hoc. Suits by the Widow John Bendernagel and others against Davis J. Foret and others, by Dominique Harang and others against Davis J. Foret and others, by Delia Harang and others against Davis J. Foret and others, and by Dominique Harang and others against the Choctaw Planting Cpmpany, consolidated. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Action by the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company against John M. Dresser, with the J. M, Dresser, Company Limited, as garnishee. On rule to show cause why interrogatories should not be taken for confessed. Rule dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations &wkey;>173(5) — Officers — Action on Bond — Pleading—Sufficiency.</p> <p>In an action by a city on a surety bond covering loss sustained by “fraud or dishonesty committed by the employs personally during tFe period” of the bond, a petition, alleging that the principal at the expiration of his office as tax collector was indebted to the city, that his accounts showed a shortage, that a settlement had been refused, and that such indebtedness had been incurred while in the discharge of his duties, was sufficient to charge fraud or dishonesty committed by the principal during the term of his office as tax collector.</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;145 — Official Bonds — Form and Construction.</p> <p>Where a bond was given by surety for the commissioner of finance of a municipality, and so stated on its face, such bond will be construed as complying with Rev. St. § 903, notwithstanding that it did not contain a stipulation for the faithful performance of the principal’s duties.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Charles; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge. Petitory action, etc., by Samuel J. Fried-lander against Mrs. Rosie Friedman, wife of Charles E. Alexander. Exception of no cause of acuon sustained, and action dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Taxation <&wkey;482(l) — Increase by Board of Reviewers — N otioe — Necessity.</p> <p>Where owner’s valuation, as increased by assessor, was approved by police jury, which under resolution of board of state affairs was sitting as a board of reviewers, pursuant to sections 22, 24, of Act No. 170 of 1898, its subsequent approval of further increase by board of state affairs was an increase of assessor’s valuation, and invalid without the five days’ notice required by section 24 of Act No. 170 of 1898, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 130 of 1902, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 63 of 1906.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by E. Borneman & Co. against the New Orleans, Mobile & Chicago Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Hyman Hiller & Co., Limited, against the New Orleans, Mobile & Chicago Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Hampton Reynolds against John Reiss and the New Orleans Terminal Company. Defendants’ plea of prescription sustained, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

On Rehearing. Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. P. Brunot, Judge. Suit by Henry F. Reymond against the City of Baton Rouge and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Judgment set aside.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Robert A. Hart against the City of Baton Rouge and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Judgment' set aside.</p>

On Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Hugh C. Cage, Judge. Suit for injunction by Wilbert Black and three others, resident taxpayers of New Orleans, against New Orleans Railway & Light Company and the city of New Orleans. Preliminary injunction denied, and plaintiffs’ demand rejected, and they appeal.

<p> (Syllalms ty Editorial Staff.) . </p> <p>1. Corporations <&wkey;80(8) — Subscriptions for Stock — Action for Price — Defenses.</p> <p>Fraudulent representations by representative of corporation as to dividends and value of property owned by the corporation may be set up as a defense in an action by the corporation on notes given for stock.</p> <p>2. Pleading <&wkey;350(3) — Rule for Judgment-Admissions.</p> <p>Rule to take judgment for plaintiff on the face of the pleadings admits all allegations of fact in the answer for that purpose.</p> <p>3. Bills and Notes <&wkey;497(5) — Defenses— Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In an action by an assignee of a note, where defendant proved fraud, which would have been a good defense against the payee, he established a prima facie defense, and cast the burden upon the plaintiff to prove that he was a bona fide holder before maturity and without notice of fraud.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Cabbiebs <&wkey;282 —Riding in Locomotive Cab — Logging Raileoad — Assumption ob Risk.</p> <p>Plaintiff, who at one time had been employed to haul logs to defendant’s railroad, used for hauling logs to its sawmill, and who was severely injured in a wreck while riding free of charge on defendant’s locomotive pulling a heavy log train, held to have “assumed the risk of that mode of travel,” so that he could not recover.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Davis Walters was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

F. Bell; Judge. Action by Max Hahn against the Southwestern Gas Company. Judgment for. plaintiff, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering the appeal, asks that the amount of the judgment be increased to the amount claimed -in his petition.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Percy D. Parks and A. R. Robertson, receivers of the Interstate Oil, Gas & Development Company, against T. R. Hughes, Sheriff, and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Adjoining Landowners <&wkey;8 — Use of Property.</p> <p>An owner cannot be debarred from the legitimate use of bis property simply because it may cause a real damage to his neighbor.</p> <p>2. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;47 — Percolating Oils — Use of Pumps.</p> <p>There is no difference between a well and a pump used in taking oil from subterranean regions, as far as adjoining landowners are concerned; both being artificial and both causing oil to flow from the neighbor’s land by creating a vacuum which the oil from the neighbor’s land comes in to fill.</p> <p>3. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;47 — Fugitive Oil — Ownership.</p> <p>An owner of land does not own the fugitive oil beneath it, and cannot complain that it is being drawn off by a pump sunk by an adjoining landowner.</p> <p>4. Adjoining Landowners <S&wkey;l — 'Use of Property.</p> <p>An owner of land is not bound to do anything to save his neighbor from loss; the only restriction upon him being that he abstain from doing anything that might cause a loss.</p> <p>5. Mines and Minerals &wkey;>121 — Abandoned Oil Weli^-Interference with Live Well.</p> <p>Where an owner of land sunk an oil well which was a nonproducer, but which let air into the subterranean regions, preventing an adjoining landowner from drawing oil with a pump he had sunk, he will be enjoined from leaving the well open, to the adjoining landowner’s damage, the dry well not benefiting him, under Civ. Code, arts. 491, 505, 666-668, 2315.</p> <p>6. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;47 — Fugitive Oils.</p> <p>A landowner may prevent fugitive oil from being drawn from under the surface of his own land, if he can do so by some mechanical means which does not interfere with the rights of adjoining landowners to draw off the oil under their respective lands.</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., dissenting.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine; J. H. Boone, Judge. Concursus proceeding by the State of Louisiana and another against C. S. Jackson & Co., the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and others, in which the last-named defendant filed a rule to compel clerk of court and the Sabine State Bank to pay fund claimed to be on deposit, and filed a petition for injunction against the bank. Rule and petition for injunction dismissed, and last-named defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Libel and Slander &wkey;>130 — Slander of Title — Probable Cause — Evidence.</p> <p>In view of the fact that defendants in the first suit, acceded to demand of plaintiff (defendant in action for slander) and that he in beginning second suit acted upon the advice of highly respected attorneys at law whose opinion of the justness of his demand was afterward shared by two of the five judges who heard and considered the second suit, it cannot be said that defendant acted without probable cause in filing the suits, and he is not, in the absence of malice dr improper motive, liable in damages for recording in accordance with Acts 1898, No. 134, and Acts 1904, No. 22, notices of pendency of suits in which property would have been recovered had relief sought been obtained.</p> <p>2. Libel and Slander <&wkey;130 — Slander of Title — Adverse Finding.</p> <p>A plaintiff who has reason to believe that he has a good cause of action is not rendered liable in damages to the person sued by the finding of the court that plaintiff did not have good cause of action.</p> <p>3. Libel and Slander <&wkey;131 — Slander of Title — Probable Cause.</p> <p>An action for damages for slander of title cannot be maintained if the act complained of was done without malice and was founded upon probable cause or was prompted by a reasonable belief in a just cause of action.</p>

<p>On Motion to Strike from the Record.</p> <p>Appeal from Twelfth. Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Petitory action by S. G. Sample against Will Brockenton. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. B. Le Bourgeois and others against the City of New Orleans. From judgment rendered, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

Action by W. E. Howell and others against Chas. J. Mundy, in which Michel Fakier and others sought to intervene, and on denial of their right they apply for writs of mandamus against H. M. Wallis, Jr., Judge, and P. J. Aucoin, Clerk, of the Twentieth Judicial District for the Parish of Lafourche.

T. Cunningham, Judge. Suit by S. P. Carroll against M. J. Carroll, his son, in which a judgment was rendered for plaintiff dissolving a sale, and in which suit the Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana obtained an order of appeal, and another suit by the Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana against S. P. Carroll and son to annul the judgment in the first suit on the ground of collusive proceeding to get rid of an oil lease by the son to the company, in which plaintiff obtained a…

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Proceedings by the Board of Public Utilities in and for the City of New Orleans against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by E. M. Scarborough, Sr., against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company. Judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $2,000, and defendant appealed, and plaintiff answered the appeal asking an increase of the judgment to $3,500.

Théard, Judge. Action by the New Orleans Credit Men’s Association, subrogee, and others, against Mary Cattana, wife of John Rotonti, and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Christina Mattern, widow of Louis Schick, against Joseph Jenevein. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Oscar Jones was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Suit for injunction by the Big Pine Lumber Company against J. E. Hunt. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Insane Persons <&wkey;2 — Interdiction — Senile Dementia — Evidence.</p> <p>In a suit by children of defendant, a man of 80, to interdict him on ground of senile dementia, evidence that he could no longer personally attend to his business, that three years before he had married a woman of 26 to look after his household and had made a will giving her one-fourth of his property, and that he was mentally alert and vigorous, though slightly irritable and inclined to neglect in paying his taxes and repairing his place, showed no ground for interdiction.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Courts i&wkey;487(l) — Louisiana Supreme Court — Jurisdictional Amount — Transfer of Cause.</p> <p>In suit for $2,400, a year’s salary beginning April 26, 1911, wherein petition gave no credit for monthly payments of $200 made up to and including November, 1911, so that it appeared that more than one-half of claim was fictitious, and that amount in dispute was less than $2,-000, the Supreme Court, without a motion to dismiss on such ground and noticing its own want of jurisdiction under Const. 1898, art. 85, would transfer cause to Court of Appeal, First Circuit.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Pleading <&wkey;8(6) — Conclusions — Invalidity of Tax Sale.</p> <p>Petition in action to annul tax sale alleging that sale was “null ab initio” because no valid assessment was made against plaintiff and no valid advertisement of sale “was made in the official paper of the parish” would be too vague to deserve consideration, even if Const, art. 233, were inapplicable, as allegations amounted to no more than that assessment and advertisement were invalid or illegal," which conclusion could not be intelligently reached without knowing any facts on which it might be based.</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;805(3) — Annulment of Tax Sale — Limitation.</p> <p>In such action a csmplaint that ne netice of delinquency was sent to plaintiff was not a ground excepted from Const, art. 233, barring such an action to annul a tax title for any cause except on proof of dual assessment or of a previous payment of tax for which property was sold, unless suit is brought within three years from registry of tax deed.</p> <p>3. Taxation <§=>796(1) — Action to Annul Tax Sale — Title.</p> <p>In action to annul a tax sale, grounds of petition that no notice of sale was sent to plaintiff by purchaser at sale, that purchaser took no action to quiet his title after the year allowed for redemption had expired, and that no action was taken to quiet tax title at expiration of the three years mentioned in Const, art. 233, had no application whatever to the validity of the title.</p> <p>4. Taxation <&wkey;805(4) — Action to Annul Sale — Time—Possession.</p> <p>Possession by purchaser at a tax sale is not necessary to give effect to Const, art. 233, relating to prescription, etc.</p> <p>5. Taxation <&wkey;809(2) — Annulment of Tax Deed — Prescription.</p> <p>The allegation in the petition to annul a tax sale that plaintiff was “divested of possession” by the tax sale recorded more than three years before the suit was filed disclosed that the action was barred by prescription under Const, art. 233.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion of Defendant Thomas J. Linn to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>1. Courts &wkey;»224(ll) — Jurisdiction on Supreme Court — Amount.</p> <p>The plaintiff, as a stakeholder for the two defendants, deposited in the registry of the court the sum of $569.39, and cited the two defendants to assert their respective rights to the same. The defendants made no objection to the form of the proceeding, but answered, both claiming ownership of the fund, and defendant Derbes claiming the additional sum of $5,500 of his codefendant as the balance of the price of certain real estate alleged to have been purchased by him.</p> <p>Both claims of the defendant Derbes were, after a regular trial on the merits, adjudicated against him; and he thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Sold, that the matter in dispute consisted of the two demands of the appellant against his codefendant, and that quo ad such demands the appellant occupied the position of a plaintiff, and not of a defendant in reconvention, and that the demand for $5,500 alone was- more than sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Vendo» and Purchase» <&wkey;10 — Sales— Contract — Validity.</p> <p>One who is neither the owner nor the properly authorized agent of the owner of immovable property has no capacity to bind another, appearing in the capacity of purchaser, by an agreement for the sale of the same.</p> <p>3. Contracts &wkey;=lo(5) — Seller’s Failure to Sion.</p> <p>An instrument purporting to witness an agreement for the sale of immovable property does not bind the party who signs as prospective purchaser, when the party appearing as seller fails to sign.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Counties <&wkey;113(l) — Parishes — Contract by Police Jury — Ordinance.</p> <p>An ordinance of a parish police jury adopted in 1907, imposing a tax of 214 mills on all property in parish for its criminal expense for that year, providing that if incorporated towns, including defendant, should pay into parish treasury the equivalent of 214 mills criminal expenses and 3 mills for. school purposes, such towns need not pay the tax imposed, did not authorize jury’s alleged contract with defendant by which defendant agreed to pay certain sum as its share of parish’s criminal expense for 1907 in lieu of the tax.</p> <p>2. Estoppel <&wkey;62(6) — Parish Police Jury.</p> <p>Allegation in suit by parish police jury on contract that defendant agreed to pay certain sum as its share of parish’s criminal expense for 1907 in lieu of a tax and had done so since then, except for year 1917, and that parish, relying on such agreement, had fully spent said amount in criminal expenses, in view of defendant’s notice that for 1917 the amount would not be paid by it, did not show an estoppel to contest the agreement.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Courts <&wkey;224(6) — Jurisdiction of Louisiana Supreme Court — Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>Const, art. 222, providing that in suits thereunder to remove a member of a police jury the defendant, the state, and taxpayers, etc., on whose information and request suit is brought, or any of them, may appeal from judgment, prevails over article 85, extending jurisdiction of Supreme Court to all eases in which a law has been declared unconstitutional, so that, where Act No. 22 of 1898, prescribing grounds for removal of member of police jury, was declared unconstitutional, relator’s appeal will be transferred to Court of Appeal, First Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. C. Saunders against D. W. Saunders to annul a sale of land to defendant. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the New Orleans Railway & Light Company against the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Théard, Judge. Action by the Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank against the Southwestern Surety Insurance Company and others. Exception of no cause of action filed by defendant Southwestern Surety Insurance Company sustained, and suit as against defendant Louise Gruber dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.

Suit for injunction by the Planters’ Hotel, Incorporated, and others, against A. D. Stewart and H. A. Michel. Ex parte injunction issued which the court on a hearing on a rule nisi permitted to be dissolved on a bond, plaintiffs’ application for a suspension of appeal was denied, and they apply for writs of mandamus and prohibition to the civil district court, Parish of Orleans, Division A, Honorable Hugh O. Cage, Judge.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Evidence >&wkey;83(l) — Presumption—Regularity op Official Acts.</p> <p>A presumption of regularity attaches to official acts. •</p> <p>2. Taxation &wkey;>810(3) — Tax Deed — Notice— Evidence.</p> <p>In suit to annul a tax deed held by defendant under a sale made for taxes of 1894, on ground that plaintiff, who had purchased the same property at sale in 1894 for the taxes of 1893, had not received the delinquent tax notice required by Act No. 85 of 1888, as amended by Act No. 106 of 1890, evidence held not to sustain plaintiffs burden of proving want of notice.</p> <p>3. Adverse Possession <&wkey;79(4) — Annulment of Tax Deed — Plaintiff’s Plea of Prescription Acquirendi Oausa.</p> <p>In suit to annul a tax deed held by defendant under a tax sale for taxes of 1894, on ground of want of notice to plaintiff, a purchaser of tax sale in 1894 for taxes of 1893, and whose deed was first recorded, plaintiff’s plea of prescription acquirendi causa was without merit, because, if the sale to defendant divested plaintiff’s prior tax title, there was no subsequent act or title upon which plaintiff could rest such a plea.</p>

King, Judge. In the matter of the liquidation of the Mitchell-Borne Construction Company, in which oppositions were filed to the final account of Michael Mitchell, receiver, by the New Orleans Bailway & Light Company, William F. Kelly, John O. Chisholm, the Southwestern Surety Company, succeeded by the Southern Surety Company, and Mrs. E. D. Borne, widow and administratrix of the estate of Benjamin W. Borne, deceased, which oppositions were consolidated for trial on the…

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard; Winston Over-ton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. S. Terry Construction Company against James K. Sutherlin Company and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard; Jerry Cline, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the J. S. Terry Construction Company against the James K. Sutherlin Company and others. Judgment for defendants, ¿nd plaintiff appeals. Appeal dismissed.</p> <p>T. T. Varner, of Poteau, and P. L. Ferguson, of De Ridder, for appellant.</p> <p>Kay & Plauche, of De Ridder, and John Dymond, Jr., A. Giffen Levy, and A. G. Williams, all of New Orleans (R. J. Weinmann, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellees.</p>

Suit by Jerry White against Dr. W. A, Nabors. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. From a judgment of the Court of Appeal, rendered against him on a rehearing after an original judgment of that court in his favor, defendant applies for a writ of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Petitory action by Michael W. McHugh and others against the Albert Hanson Lumber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Judgment set aside, and decreed that plaintiffs be recognized as owners, and that writs of possession issue putting them in possession.

K. Skinner, Judge. Proceeding by Lazu Block against Theoph-ileld Hirsch and Albery Mayer, executors of the succession of Herman Block, and others, for the nullity and rescission of an agreement. Judgment for defendants, and. plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyances <&wkey;295(l) — Evidence — Sufficiency.</p> <p>In suit by judgment creditors to have' a transfer of realty by debtor to his brother declared simulated and fraudulent, held, that judgment declaring the transfer simulated and void was warranted.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <&wkey;73(2) — Decisions Reviewable — Interlocutory Judgment-Motion to Dissolve Provisional Seizure.</p> <p>Judgment overruling motion to dissolve a provisional seizure is not appealable, in absence of showing of harm not compensable in money, being reviewable on the appeal in the main suit.</p>

King, Judge. Action by Mr. and Mrs. Cannon Monge, for use of their infant child, Mildred Monge, against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Judgment set aside and reformed.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; R. D. Webb, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. B. Dickinson against E. T. Robinson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Cemeteries <@==»15 — Dedication of Avenues and Open Space.</p> <p>Where lots in a cemetery were sold with reference to a plan, showing avenues and an open semicircle on which the lots fronted, the avenues and open semicircle, occupied by a large oak, which died, so that a monument was subsequently erected, went with the lots by implied dedication, and the parish priest could not remove the monument, sell a lot to his mother in the central part of the semicircle, and have a tomb constructed there, as against the complaint of lot owners.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Allen; Winston Overton, Judge.</p> <p>Lucius Pairs was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Contracts <&wkey;256 — Abandonment — Doubtful Damages.</p> <p>Where plaintiff and other parties entered, into a contract to form a corporation to revive a town lot enterprise, plaintiff cannot recover doubtful and speculative profits from the others for abandonment, where he was as lax in carrying out the agreement as were the defendants.</p>

Tkéard, Judge. Action by William Edenborn against the Avoyelles Cypress Company, Limited. From a judgment dismissing, on an exception of no cause of action, one of bis' demands made in a supplemental petition, plaintiff appeals.

Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Action by Laura McCarty, wife, against Lucius Stelly, husband, for a separation from bed and board, with prayer by defendant for separation and custody of children. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <&wkey; 105(2) — Delay in Transportation — Special Damages — Notice.</p> <p>Under Rev. Civ. Code, arts. 1930, 1933, and 1934, damages resulting from the washing away of a mat because of sudden rise in the- river was not such as reasonably entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract, whereby defendant railway was to carry stone which was to be used by plaintiff for sinking the mat against the bank of the river; and, to render defendant liable for damages due to delay in transportation, it must have been notified of the special circumstances before or at the time of entering into the contract.</p> <p>2. Carriers <&wkey;98-FAiLURE to Deliver-Liability eor Damages.</p> <p>Where, after arrival of shipments of rock to be used in sinking mat against bank of river, defendant refused, after prompt notice of the circumstances under which damage was really to occur, to deliver at the usual and proper place for plaintiff to unload until after loss had occurred, plaintiff could recover if said failure was the proximate cause of the loss.</p> <p>3. Carriers <&wkey;98 — Failure to Deliver-Damage — Proximate Cause.</p> <p>Though, after arrival of shipments of rock to be used in sinking mat against bank of river, defendant refused, after prompt notice of the circumstances under which damage was really to occur, to deliver at the usual and proper place for plaintiff to unload until after loss had occurred, defendant’s refusal was not the proximate cause of the damage due to mat being carried away by a sudden rise in tbe river, and defendant is not liable for sucb damage.</p>

Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Suit by Bessie Hicks against J. Elgee Hicks and others. From a portion of a judgment for plaintiff ordering partition in kind, defendants appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Insurance <®=»665(3) — Iron-Safe Clause —Violation.</p> <p>Evidence held to sustain a finding that an insured violated an iron-safe clause in a fire insurance policy by failing to produce or account for the books required.</p> <p>2. Insurance <§=»335(1) — Iron-Safe Clause —Warranty.</p> <p>An insured cannot be relieved from obligation to produce inventories and certain account books under an iron-safe clause, which was declared a warranty, by showing the value of the property destroyed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Rozene O’Quin against A. G. Evans for separation from bed and board. From a judgment fixing alimony, the plaintiff appeals, and defendant, answering the appeal, prays for a reduction of the amount.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Suit to quiet title by the City of New Orleans and others against the Union Lumber Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <&wkey;377 — Duty of Trainmen to Person on Track.</p> <p>Trainmen observing a person about to walk onto the track, have the right to believe that he will both see and hear approaching train in time to avoid accident.</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;3S7 — Crossing Accident-Proximate Cause — Negligence of Pedestrian.</p> <p>Where one, without looking or listening, walks onto a track and is struck by a train running on schedule time at ordinary speed, his negligence must be regarded as the proximate cause of his injury.</p> <p>3. Railroads <&wkey;370 — Duty of Railroad-Operation Through Town.</p> <p>Railroad operating its train backward through populated parts of a city or town, without proper lookouts, with tender in front of engine, was negligent.</p> <p>4. Railroads <&wkey;357— Operation Through Town — Duty of Railroad.</p> <p>Railroad operating within city limits, but in part of city that is not populated, is not held to the same strict accountability as when it operates through thickly populated city or town.</p> <p>5. Negligence <&wkey;83 — “Last Clear Chance.”</p> <p>The doctrine of “last clear chance” is not synonymous with the doctrine of “negligence.” [Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Last Clear Chance; Negligence.)</p> <p>6. Railroads <&wkey;390 — Accident—Liability of Railroad — Last Clear Chance.</p> <p>Railroad cannot be held liable for injuries to one on the track upon doctrine of last clear chance, where its negligence and that of person injured were concurrent and continued up to the moment of the accident.</p> <p>7. Railroads <&wkey;396(2) — Accidents — Presumption-Negligence.</p> <p>The mere happening of an accident causing injury to one walking on the track does not raise the presumption of negligence on the part of railroad company.</p> <p>8. Railroads <&wkey;3S3(l) — Use of Tracks — Exercise of Care —Duty to Look and Listen.</p> <p>A person about to walk upon the track must look and listen for approaching trains.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine; Henry T. Liver-man, Judge ad hoc. Action by Howell Riddick and others against W. M. Sepulvedo and others. From the judgment rendered, plaintiffs appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Homicide <&wkey;289 — Instructions — Issues.</p> <p>In a homicide case, deceased being one who interfered when accused was attempting to kill another, court did not err in refusing to instruct that deceased had no right to be carrying concealed weapon at the time, where accused testified that his pistol went off accidentally when deceased grabbed it.</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;726 — Argument of Counsel.</p> <p>A statement by district attorney to effect that attorney for defense had so veiled his argument as to admit that the best verdict he hoped to receive was one of manslaughter was not reversible error, being nothing more than an interpretation put upon the argument of the attorney for accused.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;726 — Remarks of Prosecuting Attorney — Argument.</p> <p>Where counsel for accused “ridiculed the meddlesome proclivities of the chief of police in the rOle of a prosecutor,” because he “was present during the trial, going in and out, showing great activity, and himself testifying to material facts, and reporting constantly to the district attorney,” an explanatory statement by district attorney that he himself had requested the services of the chief of police to assist him in connection with the evidence was not out of place.</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;730(16) — Harmless Error-Argument of Counsel.</p> <p>Where counsel for accused “ridiculed the meddlesome proclivities of the chief of police in the rOle of a prosecutor,” because he “was present during the trial, going in and out, showing great activity, and testifying to material facts, and reporting constantly to the district attorney,” an explanatory statement of district attorney that he had requested his services during the trial to assist him in connection with the evidence, if improper, was harmless, where the judge immediately admonished the jury to disregard it and decide the case according to the law and the evidence.</p> <p>5.- Criminal Law <&wkey;790 — Instructions.</p> <p>In a homicide case, it was not improper for the court to instruct “You are the judges of the law and evidence, but it is your duty to take the law from the court as charged to you,” notwithstanding Const, art. 179.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Frederick Tanner against the Eagle Bag Corporation. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge. Suit by the Segura Realty Company, Incorporated, against the Segura Sugar Company, Limited, in which P. H. Segura and wife and George R. Colgin and others file separate interventions. From the judgment defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>F. L. Harper was convicted of forgery, and he appeals.</p>

R. Land, Judge. Separate suits by D. H. Raines and Joe Herndon against C. E. Dunson and others to annul and cancel a mineral lease or leases, and in the alternative for judgment for stipulated cash consideration named therein.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <&wkey;355(l), 381(3) — Use of Road as Street — Invitation or Consent — Rights of Pedestrian — Negligence.</p> <p>Though a railroad company may not be able to prevent the use of its road as an ordinary road or street, it is not therefore to be presumed that it invite's or consents to such use, and it is known of all men that the ordinary road or street is much safer for pedestrian and vehicular use. Even, then, though a pedestrian may, without being a trespasser, choose a railroad as his route of travel, in preference to other routes which are open to Mm, he thereby subjects himself to certain risks, and in so doing is guilty of negligence which may be, and ordinarily is, much greater than that of the engineer who, using the road for the purpose for which it was built, fails to see' him, or to determine his condition, or to stop his locomotive, in the least time or distance within which, by the most alert exercise of his faculties and the means at his command, such seeing, determination, or stopping would be possible.</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;383(2) — Walking on Track —Contributory Negligence — Engineer’s Knowledge of Condition.</p> <p>When a pedestrian chooses so dangerous a route as a railroad, when a safer one is open to him, is equally oblivious to the danger after making the choice as when making it, and no more looks and listens at the one time than the other, his negligence in those respects, though attributable to the use of intoxicating liquor, will bar a recovery, by his heirs, of damages for injury and death resulting from his being run down by a locomotive, lawfully using the’ road, unless knowledge of his condition be brought home to the engineer as of a time which would have enabled him, with ordinary care, to avert the accident.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>3. Costs <&wkey;131 — Prosecution of Suit in</p> <p>Forma Pauperis.</p> <p>Under Forma Pauperis Act of 1912, plaintiffs, three negro children, owning nothing except household effects left by their deceased father inventoried at $194, where costs of suit for his death were $425, were entitled to prosecute suit in forma pauperis; and that friends or others are willing to come to their assistance detracts in no way from poverty within intendment of statute.</p>

Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Suits by the Palmetto Moss Factory and another and by Charles Meyer and another against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. From judgments for plaintiffs, defendant appeals, and plaintiffs move to dismiss.

Action by the Southport Mills, Limited, against the City of Baton Rouge and others. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendants applied for writs of certiorari and review.

Théard, Judge. In the matter of the Succession of Joseph Billiero. The claims of Anthony Vienna and others were denied, and their opposition to the account filed by Mrs. Frances L. Billiero, testamentary executrix, having been denied, they, appeal.

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermilion; William P. Edwards, Judge.</p> <p>Executory process by Mrs. Dupré Ransonet against Gustave Menard,' in which he filed a third opposition. Erom a judgment dismissing his opposition, he appeals.</p>

Pete Morgan was indicted for murder, his opposition to the State’s motion for a change of venue was overruled, and he was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged, and he appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Highways <&wkey;90 — Districts — Police Jury — Parish.</p> <p>Under Act No. 30, Ex. Sess. of 1917, § 2, and under Const, art. 291, police jury of parish may create road district to embrace the whole of the parish.</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;347 — Assessment Valuation-Local Purposes.</p> <p>Under Const, arts. 225, 226, and 281, and under Act No. 140 of 1916, §§ 10 and 13, as amended by Act No. 211 of 1918, the cash value fixed by board of state affairs for state assessment purposes shall be the actual cash value for all assessment purposes both local and state.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>3. Highways <&wkey;121 — Road District — Status.</p> <p>The board of supervisors or agency governing a road district is an independent corporation, and is empowered to levy its taxes according to whatever is necessary to meet the principal and interest of the bonds issued by it.</p> <p>4. Taxation <&wkey;309 — “Assess” — “Assessment.”</p> <p>The words “assess” and “assessment” have a broad or narrow meaning according to the sense or connection in which they are used, meaning, at times, the listing and valuing of property, and at other times including the calculation of the rate and amount of taxes thereon.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Assess; Assessment.]</p> <p>5. Taxation <&wkey;52 — Local Assessment — Constitutional Limitation — “Assessed Valuation.”</p> <p>The term “assessed valuation” within Const, art. 281, prohibiting subdivision of state from imposing special tax for purpose of meeting principal and interest due on bonds in excess of “ten mills on the dollar of assessed valuation of the property in such subdivisions,” is not the amount to be paid by taxpayers, but the listing and valuing of the property as a basis upon which taxes are to be collected.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Assessed Value.]</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., and Ó’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Théard, Judge. In the matter of the succession of J. C. Abrams, deceased. The opposition to the provisional account of the executor by the attorney for the absent heirs of legatees was maintained by the trial judge, and the executor appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Adam Avis and Dreux Thomas were indicted for burglary, and defendant Thomas was convicted, and he appeals.</p>

Ellis, Judge. Action by John A. Ballard, Tax Collector, against John F. Russell, for payment of state and parish licenses for peddling and hawking and for an injunction. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Fleury, Judge. Action by the Bank of Orleans, tutor, and others, against the Board of Commissioners of the Fourth Jefferson Drainage District. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Partition <&wkey;4 — Land —Personal Property — Noncompliance with Agreement.</p> <p>Where heirs, after having closed the partition of real estate, partitioned personal property under agreement whereby some of them, receiving more than their share, agreed to adjust matters with the others, the failure to comply with agreement did not affect the interest of the heirs in the real estate.</p> <p>2. Tenancy in Common <&wkey;15(5) — Adverse Possession — “Possessor in Good Faith”— Witness to Partition Act.</p> <p>Witness to act of partition who entered upon the land after having purchased a three-fifths undivided interest in the land knowing that he'did not have title to the whole of it, was not a “possessor in good faith,” within Civ. Code, art. 3479, as to the remaining two-fifths interest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Possessor in Good Faith.]</p> <p>3. Frauds, Statute op <&wkey;56(2) — Title to Land — Parol Testimony.</p> <p>Parol evidence was inadmissible to prove that purchaser of an undivided three-fifths interest in land had acquired title to all of it by-settling with the owners of the other two-fifths interest, since title to real estate must be in writing and recorded.</p> <p>4. Deeds <&wkey;91 — Sales — Construction— Law Applicable.</p> <p>Deed will be construed according to laws and usages of state in which the land is situated.</p> <p>5. Deeds <&wkey;lll — Sales — Construction— “Premises.”</p> <p>The word “premises,” when used in deeds of sale, generally refers to that which precedes the habendum (citing Words and Phrases, vol.</p> <p>6. pp. 5509, 5510).</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Premises.]</p> <p>6. Tenancy in Common &wkey;>15(7, 8) — Adverse Possession by Co-owner.</p> <p>Purchaser of undivided three-fifths interest in land who took possession as co-owner with the other owners of the remaining undivided two-fifths interest, without notice to the co-owners, did not acquire title of such interest by adverse possession, though he paid taxes, built house, and cultivated a small part thereof; he having possessed the land in name of and for co-owners, under Civ. Code, arts. 3446, 3489, 3490, and 3498.</p> <p>7. Tenancy in Common &wkey;>15(5) — Adverse Possession by Co-tenant.</p> <p>Co-owners, or owners in indivisión, cannot acquire title to property by prescription as against each other unless the possession is clearly proved to be hostile.</p> <p>8. Adverse Possession <&wkey;44 — Prescription —Continuous Possession — Abandonment.</p> <p>Title was not acquired by 30 years’ prescription under Civ. Code, art. 3500, where during such time it was several times abandoned, since such possession must be continuous and uninterrupted.</p> <p>9. Adverse Possession <&wkey;112 — Prescription — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>The burden of proof to establish prescription is upon him making the plea.</p> <p>10. Adverse Possession &wkey;>58 — Prescription — Intention of Possessor.</p> <p>To obtain title by prescription of 30 years, the intention to possess as owner as well as the possession of the land must be proven.</p> <p>11. Real Actions &wkey;>7(3) — Petitory Actions —Adverse Possession —Availability as Defense.</p> <p>In action tried as a petitory action alone, and not as a partition suit, the defense of prescription of 30 years under Civ. Code, art. 1305, is not available; such defense being available only in partition suits.</p> <p>12. Judgment <&wkey;252(l) — Conformity to Pleadings — Suit to Recover Land — Including Property Not Claimed.</p> <p>In action for undivided interest in land which passed to plaintiffs’ ancestor on partition of land of ancestor’s deceased father, where no particular portion of the land was sued for, the court erred in including in the judgment that portion of the land which fell to the mother in such partition proceedings.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>13. Tenancy in Common &wkey;>15(5) — Adverse Possession — Possession Under Notarial Aci^Co-owner.</p> <p>Purchaser’s possession under notarial act under Civ. Code, art. 3479, is not sufficient possession for prescription for ten years under article 3478, where vendor’s possession was not as owner of the whole, but merely as owner of undivided three-fifths interest with possession of the land as to the other two-fifths interest for his co-owners; such constructive possession being insufficient under article 3493.</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jeff D. Neely against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff obtained an order for devolutive appeal.</p>

Wilson, Judge. Benjamin F. Simms was convicted of having willfully neglected and refused to provide for the support of his minor children in necessitous circumstances, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the City of Shreveport, subrogee, against the Southwestern Gas & Electric Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Trespass <&wkey;40(3) — Petition subject to Exception for Vagueness in Description oe Land.</p> <p>Where, in an action sounding in damages for-the cutting of timber on land alleged to belong to plaintiff, it is conceded that “neither side had real, positive knowledge of what property the trees were cut on,” by reason whereof surveys were necessary, and the plat of survey, filed with the petition, fails to show the position of the land claimed by plaintiff, in its relation to a larger body in which that land is alleged to have been included for the purposes of such cutting, an exception of vagueness, addressed to the description of the land upon which the cutting is alleged to have been done, is well founded, and should have been maintained, with leave to amend.</p> <p>.2. Trespass <&wkey;20(l) — Owner oe Land Never in Possession Cannot Recover against One Cutting Timber Thereon.</p> <p>Where, in an action sounding in damages for the cutting of timber on land alleged to belong to plaintiff, it is also alleged, in effect, that the cutting was done by defendant under color of title, and that “defendant, being a possessor in bad faith,” is liable, etc., and plaintiff fails to allege possession in himself, either at the time of the cutting or at any other time, an exception of no cause of action is well founded, and should have been maintained and the suit dismissed.</p> <p>3. Appeal- and Error <&wkey;843(l) — Where Petition States no Cause oe Action, Other Exceptions Not Reviewed.</p> <p>Finding that an exception of no cause of action, filed in limine, should have been maintained and the suit dismissed, this court does not feel called upon to review the rulings of the trial court upon an exception subsequently filed, or upon the merits of the ease.</p> <p>O’Niell and Provosty, JJ., dissenting.</p>

On Rehearing. Certiorari to Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Executory process by Emil Sundberry against the Bertie Sugar Company, with intervention and third opposition by John H. Murphy. Judgment for plaintiff allowing claim by the third opponent was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeal, and Sundberry applies for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit.

King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Charles J. Bier. On opposition by W. T. Barry and others to the provisional account of George H. Rock, testamentary executor. From the judgment, opponent Bier and others appeal.

King, Judge. Action by Miss Bertha Jung against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company and the Fox River Butter Company. Judgment for plaintiff against the defendant Fox River Butter Company, demands against the other defendant rejected, and the defendant Butter Company appeals; and plaintiff answered the appeal asking increase in the judgment.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Railroads <@=»307(4), 312(1) — Grossly NEGLIGENT CAUSING INJURIES AT CROSSING.</p> <p>Railroad held grossly negligent in not keeping a flagman at a crossing, where its backing train injured plaintiff, or a bright light or lookout on the rear end of the train.</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;324(l) — Plaintiff not GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AT CROSSING.</p> <p>Plaintiff, injured at a railroad crossing, when the unlighted rear end of a cut of cars backed into him, held not guilty of contributory negligence, though he could have crossed safely, had ne walked faster, or started as soon as the train had left the crossing, before it backed down on him again.</p> <p>3. Damages <&wkey;134(2) — Amount on personal INJURY REDUCING EARNING CAPACITY.</p> <p>An expert machinist, capable of earning from $5 to $7.50 a day, but able to do only very light work at $2.50 a day since a railroad crossing accident which broke a rib, etc., held entitled to $3,000 damages.</p> <p>Monroe, C. .1., dissenting.</p>

King, Judge. Rule for alimony in a suit for separation from bed and board by Mrs. Christine A. La Follette Claris against Edwin L. Clark. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; H. C. Cage, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Mary Waters Smithers against Herbert B. Smithers. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Succession of Clarence C. Beird. From a decree declaring a document ineffectual as a will, Mrs. C. A: Mains appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Navigable waters <&wkey;46(3) — Right of purchase IN FORECLOSURE TO BATTURE.</p> <p>Where Red river ran through a section dividing it into a northeast part and a southwest part, and where “that part of section * * * west of Red river,” constituting part of a plantation, was mortgaged, purchaser at foreclosure was entitled to the batture as it gradually formed and became part of such land, as against mortgagor’s heirs.</p>

In the matter of the succession of Frank A. Von Phul, Mrs. M. E. Feldner, opponent of the final account of the administratrix, applies to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and review to the Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans.

In the matter of the succession of Mrs. Caroline Saur. Action by Edward. J. Heintz, executor, against Miss Julia Saur. Prom a judgment for defendant, the executor appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Municipal corporations <&wkey;376 —Duty OP MUNICIPAL CONTRACTOR TO REQUIRE BOND PROM SUBCONTRACTOR.</p> <p>A contractor to whom a sewerage and water board had awarded a contract was not obliged to exact a bond from subcontractors, and incurred no contractual obligation to parties furnishing material to a subcontractor, and no law imposed any obligation upon him in favor of such parties, for Act No. 134 of 1906, providing that the owner shall require of the contractor a bond for payment of furnishers of materials, etc., does not apply to the ease of contract between contractor and subcontractor.</p> <p>2. Municipal corporations <&wkey;347(2) — Subcontractor’s BOND GIVING NO RIGHT TO HIS MATERIALMEN.</p> <p>Where bond of a municipal subcontractor, although reciting it was made in favor of materialmen, was expressly conditioned “for the * * * performance of said contract and the payment of all subcontractors under said subcontractors,” one furnishing material to subcontractors had no right therein, in view of Giv. Code, art. 3039, as to strict construction of suretyship obligations.</p> <p>3. Municipal corporations <&wkey;376 — Payment BY CONTRACTOR TO SUBCONTRACTOR WITHOUT RESERVATION POR HIS MATERIAL-MEN VALID.</p> <p>A contractor is in no way to blame for having settled with subcontractors without having made a reservation for the claim of one furnishing material to the subcontractor, where he had no knowledge of the existence of the debt, and such party gave notice of it only some 60 days after completion of the work.</p>

Suit by Fred M. Dunbar against the Orleans Metal Bed Company to recover salary and expenses. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, and plaintiff, answering, prays that the award be increased.

H. Pavy, Judge. Proceeding by Armand Coreil, administrator of Kossuth Coreil, deceased, for distribution to certain parties as the heirs at law, with opposition by Mrs. Kossuth Coreil, widow of the deceased. Opposition dismissed, and opponent appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Municipal corporations &wkey;>863 — Commissioners OE EIRE DEPARTMENT OE NEW ORLEANS MAY CONTRACT DEBTS PAYABLE IN’ THE' XUTUBE.</p> <p>The board of commissioners of the fire de~ partment of the city of New Orleans created by Act No. 159 of 1912, being City Charter, § 17, with duties as prescribed by Act No. 58 of 1916, §§ 1-16, is not a “municipal corporation” under Act No. 32 of 1902, prohibiting contracting debts payable out of revenue for future years, but is a separate legal entity from such city, not created by or under authority of its commission council, or Charter, § 1, and is not. within the constitutional amendment proposed by Act No.. 4 of 1916 (Ex. Sess.) §§ 12, 20, prohibiting such city from incurring debts without sufficient funds in the treasury at the time to meet the same.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Municipal Corporation.]</p> <p>Dawkins, J., dissenting.</p>

Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition to Twentieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne; H. M. Wallace, Jr., Judge. A. Lirette and others were convicted under Extra Session Acts 1917, Act No. 6, of infringing upon oyster leases granted by the Department of Conservation, and they apply for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

D. King, Judge. Action by L. Lamar Thompson against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company. Plaintiff died before trial, and his mother, Mrs. Anna B. Thompson, a widow, was substituted as party plaintiff. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Fraudulent conveyances <&wkey;182(l) — Creditors CANNOT RECOVER FOR DEPRECIATION IN VALUE FROM FRAUDULENT PURCHASER.</p> <p>Claimed fraudulent purchaser of bank stock from a debtor held not liable to the creditors for a loss to them resulting from a decline in value of the stock during suit which they brought to have sale declared annulled as fraudulent, or to have it revoked as a fraudulent conveyance, which suit the purchaser was entitled to resist.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Claude S. Newman and others against J. A. Majors. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

T. Cunningham, Judge. Action by T. T. Norwood against the Lake Bisteneau Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. On motion to dismiss because amount in dispute was less than jurisdictional amount in the Supreme Court.

Action by Eugene Shexneider against the Simon Rice Milling Company. A judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and plaintiff brings certiorari.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by David S. Brewer and others against Widow Annie E. Brewer. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Suit by Peter J. Flanagan, Public Administrator, as administrator of the estate of Emma Williams, deceased, against the Land Development Company of Louisiana, Limited, to annul a tax sale, in which by amended complaint the subsequent discovery of deceased’s nuncupative will and plaintiff’s having been duly appointed dative testamentary executor thereunder were set forth.

Land, Judge. Action by Mrs. Indiana Roe, natural tutrix of Elizabeth and Carrie B. Hale, minors, and another, against W. T. Caldwell, in which, after judgment for plaintiffs and the dismissal of defendant’s appeal because of the death of plaintiff tutrix before the judgment was signed, W. T. Roe, husband of Elizabeth Hale, as dative tutor, and his wife, were authorized to prosecute the suit. Case reargued, and judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Landlord and tenant <&wkey;134(3) — Rights OF TENANT ON LEASE OF RESIDENCE.</p> <p>The lease of a residence contemplates the housing therein of the family of the lessee, the entertainment of his guests, and the entry therein of all persons whose relations with the occupants, whether of business or otherwise, require, or reasonably call for such entry.</p> <p>2. Landlord and tenant <&wkey;167(3) — Rights OF THIRD PERSONS ENTERING PREMISES.</p> <p>Third persons, occupying or entering leased premises, in the right of the lessee — as members of his family, guests, or callers — acquire no greater rights (than the lessee), as against the lessor, with respect to injuries that they may sustain by reason of his failure to make repairs for which, under the lease or the law, he may be bound.</p> <p>3. Courts <&wkey;95(l) — Common-law decisions OF LITTLE WEIGHT IN LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The civil law, with respect to the rights of landlord and tenant, being essentially different from the common law, the decisions of the courts administering the common law can throw but little light upon questions involving such rights, arising under the law and to be determined by the courts of this state.</p> <p>4. Landlord and tenant <&wkey;168(l) — Right OF TENANT TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURY THROUGH LANDLORD’S FAILURE TO MAKE REPAIRS.</p> <p>A lessee, who reports to his lessor that the leased premises are in a dangerous condition, for lack of repairs which it is the duty of the lessor to make, and which he promises to make, and who thereafter sustains personal injury by reason of the failure of the lessor to make the repairs, is not necessarily precluded from recovering damages for such injury, either because of his failure himself to make the repairs or upon the ground of his having voluntarily subjected himself to the known danger. His right to recover, in such case, depends largely upon his appreciation of the character and imminence of the danger and the extent to which the negligence of the lessor may have operated to compel him to accept the risk.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oowrt.) </p> <p>1. Criminal law <&wkey;057(l)t — Impeachment of verdict; statement of juror inadmissible.</p> <p>A statement made by a juror in a criminal case, while the case is under consideration and submission, and offered to be proved by his fellow jurors, on a motion for new trial, with a view of showing that he was incompetent by reason of prejudice, can have no other purpose than to impeach the verdict, and is properly excluded.</p> <p>2. Criminal law &wkey;>479 — Medical experts; TESTIMONY OF SURGEON AND CORONER AS TO CAUSE OF DEATH.</p> <p>A surgeon and acting coroner, who has held an inquest upon the body of a person slain by a gunshot, may testify as an expert as to the cause of death and the probability vel non of suicide.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <&wkey;960 — New trial; presence OF ACCUSED AT HEARING.</p> <p>The consensus of the criminal jurisprudence in this country is to the effect that the presence of the convict at the hearing of a motion for new trial is not required, and that, whether testimony be heard or not.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Albert Maneuso against the Joseph Chalona Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of .Washington; Prentiss B. Carter, Judge.</p> <p>L. V. Jacobs was convicted of nonsupport of his wife and minor child, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Adolph Wolff, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Shine Cole was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, and he appeals.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. In the matter of the Succession of Caroline Amelia Miller. From a judgment denying the claim of James B. Rosser, Jr., as a privileged creditor of the succession the claimant appeals.

Harry Wilson and another were convicted in the city court of violating a! municipal ordinance. On appeal to the district court the conviction was affirmed after a trial de novo, and they apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Divorce <&wkey;130 — Separation from bed and board; evidence; cruelty.</p> <p>In suit by wife for separation from bed and board, evidence held not to show such cruel and inhuman treatment as would warrant a separation.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Domicile &wkey;>5 — Of wife and child follows THAT OF HUSBAND.</p> <p>Though a wife refused to go to another parish with her husband before the birth of her child, or during its life, the domicile of the wife and child followed the husband and father into the other parish.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <&wkey;108(l) — Parent and cniLD <&wkey;17(l) — Minors; venue; punishment OF FATHER FOR NONSUPP.ORT.</p> <p>A father’s obligation is only to support his child srt his domicile, and he can be prosecuted for nonsupport only in that parish, though the child and its mother had remained in the parish of their former domicile.</p> <p>3. Infants i&wkey;16 — Minors; juvenile courts; question of fact not pertaining TO MERITS RE VIEW ABLE.</p> <p>Const, art. 118, allowing appeals from the juvenile court on questions of law only, does not, apply to a question of fact not pertaining to the merits of the case on which the judge has based a ruling.</p> <p>4. Infants <&wkey;16 — Minors; juvenile courts; domicile as question of law.</p> <p>Where the facts are undisputed, the question of domicile of defendant, as determining jurisdiction of juvenile court to prosecute for nonsupport, is one of law, reviewable on appeal.</p>

. Action by Eureka Homestead Society against William L. Clark, Jr. Judgment by default was entered against defendant. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the judgment was annulled, the case remanded, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Otere Pitre was convicted of an offense, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second. Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot,, Judge.</p> <p>Fred Martin was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Husband and wife <&wkey;129 (6) — Estoppel BY INVENTORY OF SUCCESSION; EFFECT AS CONVEYANCE.</p> <p>That a mother voluntarily consented that her property be inventoried as belonging to the succession of her husband, though strong evidence that it did so belong, does not convey property actually hers to the succession.</p> <p>2. Husband and wife <&wkey;129(6) — Estoppel; INCREASE IN TUTOR’S BOND AS DETRIMENT.</p> <p>That a tutor’s bond and the premium paid therefor were increased. by the mother’s permitting her property to be inventoried as property of the succession does not estop the mother from later claiming the property, though if it were intelligently done she could be charged with the increased cost of the bond.</p> <p>3. Husband and wife <&wkey;124 — Wife’s separate property; recovery after mingling.</p> <p>Evidence that a wife’s mule and mare were traded by her husband for other animals, some of which were later sold for cash and notes but without proof as to payment of the notes or disposition of the money, entitles the wife to judgment only for the money received and for that only against the community.</p> <p>4. Husband and wife <&wkey;265 — Wife’s separate PROPERTY; USE FOR COMMUNITY.</p> <p>Proof that cattle of the wife were used by the-husband for benefit of the community, without proof that they were sold, does not entitle the wife to judgment against the community for their value.</p> <p>5. Husband and wife <&wkey;265 — Wipe’s separate property; identification after mingling.</p> <p>If the particular animals belonging to the wife and used for the benefit of the community and their progeny can be identified, wife is entitled to recover them; otherwise■ she can recover a proportion of the stock of the community equal to the proportion originally contributed by her separate property.</p> <p>6. Husband and wife &wkey;s265 — Wife’s separate PROPERTY; RECOVERY FROM COMMUNITY.</p> <p>Where a wife sought to recover the value of her animals used for the community and the amount of a note taken for the sale of some, but failed to prove a sale of the other animals or the payment of the note, her right to recover from the community the particular animals and the note must be reserved.</p> <p>7. Husband and wife <&wkey;276(7) — Community estate; claims of wife.</p> <p>Where the community was solvent and all its debts had been paid except claim of the wife, the community need not be reopened for settlement, but the wife can be given judgment directly against the minors for one-half the amount of her claim. '</p>

Em-met Hingle, Judge. Action for an injunction, etc., by Charles W. Buckley against James Ray Geraty. Judgment -for plaintiff, maintaining the injunction, confirming the appointment of the receiver and liquidator, and rejecting defendant’s demands in reconvention, and defendant appeals.

F. Brunot, Judge. Proceedings by the State, on relation of the Board of Commissioners of the Caddo Levee District and others, against Ered J. Grace, Register of State Land Office, and others. From a judgment making absolute a writ of mandamus commanding the Register of the Land Office and defendant State Auditor to cancel a patent held by defendant Douglas and to issue a certificate of conveyance to the Board of Commissioners of Cad-do Levee District, defendants appeal.

Bernard; E. Emmet Hingle, Judge. Opposition by Manuel Oscar Buras and another to the final account filed by Ernest Albin Pellón, as dative testamentary executor of Ernest Pellón, deceased. Oppositions maintained, and the dative testamentary executor appeals.

T. Cunningham, Judge. Suit for injunction by Mrs. F. H. Chopin against J. H. Freeman, Tax Collector, and others. Judgment for defendants dissolving the injunction and dismissing the suit, motion for new trial denied, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>"Action by Miss Harriet Boulden against the Shreveport Railways Company. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Suit for partition by licitation by a major heir of Louis C. Tortorich, deceased, praying for a sale of the property by auctioneer appointed by the court, in which the trial judge struck the name of Guy L. Deano, the auctioneer named at a family meeting, and inserted the name of another auctioneer, and after the denial of his motion for a new trial, Guy L. Deano applies for writs of mandamus and certiorari.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; H. C. Cage, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Paul Clark against William A. Bisso. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

Proceeding against Mr. and Mrs. A. O. Pons in the mayor’s court of town of Abita Springs, for nonpayment of a license for peddling milk. Exception to the jurisdiction overruled, defendant husband convicted, and both defendants apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Bills and notes <&wkey;95 — Consideration ; exchange oe notes.</p> <p>One promissory note is a good and sufficient consideration for another given in exchange therefor.</p> <p>2. Bills and notes <&wkey;362 — Purchaser EROSI BONA EIDE HOLDER; RIGHTS OE TRANSFEREE.</p> <p>The holder and owner of a negotiable promissory note, accquired for good and sufficient consideration, may use it for the extinguishment of his obligations, and when so used his transferee is entitled to recover' the amount thereby called for, as is also the transferee of his transferee, even though the latter acquires the instrument after maturity.</p> <p>3. Bills and notes <&wkey;348, 404(1) — Unreasonable DELAY IN DEMANDING PAYMENT OE DEMAND NOTE.</p> <p>Seven months is an unreasonable time for a national bank in a failing condition to delay demanding payment of a demand note, and another bank, which after such delay takes over its assets and agrees to pay its debts, is not a holder in due course of the note so acquired.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Action by Thomas James, natural tutor of Thomas A. James, and others, minors, against the St. Charles Hotel Company. From a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermillion; W. W. Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by the State against Antonie Dalcour. Prom judgment rendered, defendant appeals.</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Application by E. R. Bernstein for writs of certiorari and prohibition to prohibit R. T. Layne from proceeding against him by summary rule to compel an accounting for funds held in his hands as trustee or conventional sequestrator for the benefit of whoever might be successful in actions between D. H. Raines and Joe Herndon, and C. E. Dunson and others.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Criminal law &wkey;>785(9) — Instructions; INTEREST OF WITNESS.</p> <p>In a homicide case, court did not err in instructing jury to consider the interest or lack of interest that any witness might have in the outcome of the trial in arriving at weight to be given his testimony.</p> <p>2. Criminal law &wkey;>811(6) — Instructions; CALLING ATTENTION TO DEFENDANT’S INTEREST.</p> <p>Where court in homicide case instructed jury, concerning weight to be given evidence, to consider the interest or lack of interest that any witness might have in the outcome of the trial, a subsequent instruction to judge the testimony of defendant by the same general rules that govern the testimony of other witnesses did not direct the jurors’ attention too pointedly to defendant’s interest in the trial, a matter which was apparent to the jury.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <&wkey;561(l), 1134(3) — Review; REASONABLE DOUBT.</p> <p>That accused is entitled to benefit of any reasonable doubt of his guilt is a principle of law, but the question whether there was or was not a reasonable doubt is a question of fact, of which the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction on appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Bills and notes <&wkey;164 — Negotiability; PROVISION AS TO APPLICATION OF BANK BALANCE TO NOTE.</p> <p>Note, giving bank payee upon default of payment “the right immediately to apply any sum or balance to my credit, to the payment of said note, interests and costs,” held negotiable.</p> <p>2. Bills and notes <&wkey;155 — Negotiability of note maturing upon failure to respond TO CALL FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITIES.</p> <p>Note secured by pledge of specified securities, “with the right to call for additional security should the same decline, and on failure to respond, this obligation shall be deemed to be due and payable on demand,” held negotiable, as against objection that time of payment was contingent and therefore uncertain.</p>

Gilbert, Judge. Partition suit by Theophile Larose ¿gainstClay Naquin and others, in which the' property was sold by consent under order of court and the proceeds placed in the hands of the sheriff. Decree entered, fixing rights of parties, and new trial granted as to certain matters, and all the defendants except Mrs. Elvire Naquin appeal. On motion by Mrs. Mvire Naquin and Etienne Naquin, defendants, to dismiss appeal.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; R. D. Webb, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Barney X. Wemple against the Producers’ Oil Company, as assignee of an oil and gas lease. Judgment for plaintiff, and he appeals.</p>

R. Land, Judge. Suit for injunction by Houston Ice & Brewing Association against the Murray Oil Company, Incorporated. Injunction refused, and plaintiff applies for mandamus to compel its issuance. Alternative writ issued and made peremptory.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>1. Appeal and error <&wkey;374(4) — Police juries EXEMPT PROM FURNISHING APPEAL BONDS.</p> <p>Under the Act No. 173 of 1902, providing that state, parish, and municipal boards or commissions exercising public power or administering public functions shall not be required to furnish bonds in judicial proceedings, police juries are exempt from the furnishing of appeal bonds.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <&wkey;>374(4) — Refusal to GIVE APPEAL BOND NOT WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL WITHOUT BOND.</p> <p>An administrative body, exempt by law from the furnishing of bonds in judicial proceedings, does not, by failing or declining to comply with an order of appeal that attempts to require an appeal bond, waive the right to an order of appeal without bond.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Counties <&wkey;218 — Parishes; suit or defense BY PARISHES AND POLICE JURIES IN THE NAME OF POLICE JURIES.</p> <p>Parishes and police juries alike are political corporations, and, as such, either may appear or be brought into court in matters affecting the affairs of the parishes, or the administration of those affairs by the police juries; although, as is usually the case, the real party in interest being the parish, it would appear to be simpler and more logical for a parish to sue, or be sued, in its own name, rather than in the name of its police jury.</p> <p>4. Counties <&wkey;16(2) — Parishes; division OF OLD PARISH AND NEW PARISH CREATED THEREFROM OF BALANCES ON HAND.</p> <p>By section 13 of Act No. 177 of 1908, the balance on hand in the treasury of the old parish of Catahoula on January 1, 1910, after-payment of the current expenses of the parish for 1909, and the debts which fell due in that year or had fallen due in previous years, was required to be divided between the parish of La Salle, carved by the act out of the old parish of Catahoula, and the parish of Catahoula, as existing after that date; and debts incurred for public improvements located in either of the new parishes and falling due after January 1, 1910, were required to be paid by the parish in which such improvement was located. Hence a balance on hand upon that date which was used in payment of debts to fall due in April, 1910, and April, 1911, for a bridge located in the parish of Catahoula, as continued in existence, was subject to division with the parish of La Salle,, and that parish, through its police jury, is entitled to recover its proportion thereof from the parish of Catahoula, represented by its police jury.</p>

Suit by Smith Bros., Company, Limited, against Riehheimer & Co., wherein the National Bank of the Republic intervened for property seized under writs of attachment and sequestration. From judgment for the intervener bank and the trustee of defendant’s bankrupt estate, the trustees of plaintiff’s bankrupt estate appeal.

Allen Bordelon, Judge. Action by George Wiley against George Stewart. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Judgment set aside, and judgment ordered for plaintiff.

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Kapides; W. E. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>James Smith was convicted of rape, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Puritan Company against J. P. Clarkson and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant Clarkson appeals.</p>