Volume 145 — United States Reports

Held: .That if the tax could be said to affect interstate commerce in any • • way it did s'o • incidentally, and so remotely. g.s not to amount to a regulation of such commerce; *2 (2) That under the circumstances the complainants could not resort to the court, simply on the ground that the authorities had refused to issue á new license without the payment of the stipulated tax.

Held: void by the court below for this reason. Sessions v. Romadka, 21 Fed. Rep. 124 ; but the court held that the defect was. within the remedial reach of a disclaimer. .Thereupon, on the 30th of July, 1884, John-TI. Sessions, the complainant, filed a disclaimer of the first, second and fourth claims. All infringement had ceased a year before this disclaimer was filed.

Held: That the sheriff’s deed for the land sold for taxes, being regular on its face, and purporting to convey the title to the land described in it, was sufficient color of title to meet the requirements of the statute of limitations of the State of Illinois, without proof of a judgment for the taxes; 2) That the book of land-entries in the county clerk’s office furnished by the auditor to the county clerk for the…

Held: That the occupation of the Quincy road by the receivers under the order of court created no relation which obliged them to pay rent therefor under the lease; (2) That no equities existed which called upon the court to divert the proceeds' of the sale or the net earnings of the property while in the receivers’ hands, and apply them to the payments prayed for by the intervenors *84 (3) That the action of the court in…

Held: That, the circumstances in the latter ca.se being similar to those in the former, the receivers were entitled to a reasonable time to ascertain the situation of the leased railroad before they could be held to have assumed the lease; (2) That the time taken by them in deciding not to assume it was a reasonable time; .

This was a bill in equity filed January 3, 1888, by Henry K. Willard against Joseph C. Willard, under the act of August 15, 1876, c. 297, (which is copied in the margin,1) for partition of land in the city of Washington, bounded on Pennsylvania Avenue on the south, Fourteenth street on the east, and F street on the north, containing more than 33,000 square feet, and with the building, thereon known as Willard’s Hotel.

Held: that, notwithstanding such indirect effect, this court has no jurisdiction, the amount directly in dispute in this action being only the usurious sum. This was an action of assumpsit by the plaintiff in error against Jacob M. Gay upon four promissory notes, made by. Gay, amounting to $8500, with interest- at eight per cent,' payable annually, with all costs of collection, including ten per cent attorney fees.

The court stated the-case as follows: In 1887, appellee was in possession of the property of. the Toledo, Columbus and Southern Railway Company, as receiver, having been duly appointed such receiver by the Circuit Court of the United States for the .Northern District of Ohio, in a foreclosure suit brought by the American Loan and Trust Company.

The court stated the case as follows: v This was an action to recover the amount of certain coupons cut from bonds issued by' the city of Denison “ for the reduction of and cancellation of the outstanding city scrip, and for th¿ improvement of streets,” etc. The charter of the city, adopted March 7, 1873, conferred upon it power (sec. 27). “ To borrow money on the credit' of the .city, and issue bonds therefor to an amount not to exceed $50,000.

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN "DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS. The court stated the case as follows: These were bills in equity filed by William. H. Gaines and wife, on the 23d of May, 1884, against the appellants, respectively, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, all seeking the same relief, and couched, mutatis mutandis, in substantially the same language.

Held: upon the authority of Miller v. Brass Company, that if the patentee had the right to a reissue if applied for in reasonable time, he had lost it by his unreásonable delay. Said the court, speaking by Mr. Justice "Woods: “He has rested supinely until the use of the fish-plate joint has become universal, and then, after a lapse of fifteen years, has attempted by a reissue to extend his patent to cover it. .

The court stated the case as follows : This was an application for a writ of-mandamus on behalf of the New York -Electric Lines Company, a New York corporation, to compel the commissioner of public works of New York City to give it "written permission to make excavations and open up the streets and pavements of the city for the purpose of laying its wires and other conductors of electricity underground, and of making its underground, electrical connection's, in accordance,…

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>Mr. M. E. Olmstead for plaintiff in "rror.</p>

Held: that the declaration did not contain or implyany contract whereby the corporation was bound to prosecute claims or sell securities.

<p>Payments of bonds secured-by .a mortgage of real estate in Virginia, made in that State during the civil war to the personal representatives of the mortgagee who had deceased, partly in Confederate notes and partly in Virginia bank notes issued prior to the war, are held to have been made and received in good faith, and the transactions to have been known to the children of the deceased, and to have been accepted and acquiesced in by them for so long a time as to preclude any interference in their behalf by a court of equity.</p>

<p>When, in an action to recover an instalment of rent, the judgment below is for less than $5000, this court is without appellate jurisdiction although the judgment involved the existence and validity of the contract of lease, and thus indirectly an amount in excess of the jurisdictional .limit.</p>

Held: invalid,- although it was applied' for within less than a year after the granting of the. original patent.

<p>APPEAL PRÓM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED" STATES POR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OP NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This is an action at law, Brought in January, 1888, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, by John ~W. S. Earnshaw against John Cadwalader, collector of customs for the district of Philadelphia, to recover ‘$71.61, as an alleged excess of duties exacted by the collector on three importations of iron ore, made in February and April, 1887, by the plaintiff, into the port of Philadelphia, from Porman, Spain. ■ The case was tried…

The court stated the case as follows: This proceeding was originally instituted by the filing of a petition before the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, to compel the latter to withdraw from its lines of road, upon which business competitive with that of the petitioner was transacted, the so-called “ party-rates,” and to decline to give such rates in future upon such…

Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892), is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that created one of the most important rules of evidence in American and British courtrooms: an exception to the hearsay rule for statements regarding the intentions of the declarant. Decided in 1892, the Hillmon case was authored by Justice Horace Gray, and its holding has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), and adopted by many other jurisdictions.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ' MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The court stated the case as follows :</p> <p>This was a bill in equity for the infringement of letters •patent No. 303,374, issued August 12, 1884, to John Hoyt, for a rag engine for paper making. “This invention,” said the patentee in his specification, “relates to engines for beating rags, and similar fibrous material into pulp for the manufacture of paper. In these machines a beater-roll set with kni\ js •around its periphery is used, in combination with a bed-plate also set with knives, the said parts being placed in a tank or vessel in which a constant circulation .of the material to be pulped is maintained.</p> <p>“Heretofore ordinarily the material has béen circulated horizontally around an upright partition termed a ‘ mid-fellow/ and the beater-roll and bed-plate have been placed in the alley or channel between this mid-fellow- and one side óf the tank. The beater-roll lifted the material over a sort of dam,, (termed a c back-fall,’) and the material then flowed by the action of gravity around the mid-fellow and entered again between the beater-roll and the bed-plate. It has, however, been proposed to dispense with the mid-fellow and have the material turned under the back-fall and bed-plate. In either case, however, the circulating force is that of gravity due to the piling up of the liquid or semi-liquid on the side of the back-fall opposite from the beater-roll. Consequently the flow is comparatively feeble, and it is necessary to use a large quantity of water in order to prevent the fibre in suspension from depositing. In the present invention a much more rapid and vigorous circulation is maintained. ' The beater-roll is placed at one end of the vat, which is of a depth sufficient to contain it, and the other part of the vat is divided by a horizontal partition or division, which extends from the beater-roll nearly to the other end. The material to be pulped is carried around by the beater-roll, and is delivered into the upper section above the partition. It .flows over the partition, then passes down around the end of the samp, and returns through the lower section of the vat to the beater-roll. The bed-plate is placed at the bottom of the vat under the beater-roll. The beater-roll not only draws in the material, creating a partial vacuum in the lower section of the vat, but delivers it into the upper section with considerable force, impelling it forward very rapidly. By the aid of this more rapid as well as more vigorous circulation not only is the material returned more quickly, and therefore acted upon more often. by the beater-roll in the same time, but it may be worked with a much less quantity of water, and thereby very important advantages may be secured. These advantages are, first, in the improved quality of the product, for when a considerable body of the fibrous material is drawn between the knives the different pieces are rubbed together and thus disintegrated without destroying the length and felting quality of the fibre, whereas when the pulp is thin the pieces are ground individually, as it' were, between the knives, and the integrity of the fibre in large measure destroyed; secondly, in the greater quantity of pulp which. can be prepared in a medium of given size, owing to the larger proportion of fibrous material in the charge; and, thirdly, in avoiding the liability of the fibrous material depositing out of the liquid and lodging in the channels. . . .</p> <p>“ The operation of the engine is as follows: The beater-roll and bed-plate knives being adjusted properly, the vat .is filled with the rags or fibrous material to be pulped and the proper quantity of water. The beater-roll being revolved at the proper speed — say, for a roll four feet in diameter, at the speed of one hundred and twenty revolutions per minute — the rags and liquid are drawn .between the knives, are carried up by the beater-roll, and thrown over the edge of the place P. They flow around the partition. N with considerable veloc-. ity and return again ‘ and again to be acted upon by the. knives. ■ The roll is revolved until the pulp is properly reduced.</p> <p>“ Modifications may be made in details of construction without departing from the spirit of the invention, and parts thereof can be separately used if desired.”</p> <p>The claims alleged to have been infringed were as follows :</p> <p>“ 1. The; improvement in beating rags to pulp in a rag engine having a beatér-roll and bed-plate knives, consisting in circulating the fibrous material and liquid in vertical planes, drawing the same between the knives at the bottom of the vat, carrying it around and over the roll "and delivering it into the upper section of the vat, substantially as described.</p> <p>“ 2. A rag engine for paper-making, comprising the vat, the beater-roll mounted on a horizontal shaft in one end of the vat, and the horizontal partition dividing the body of the vat into an upper and a lower section or passage, the fibrous material and liquid being carried from the lower section between the knives and delivered over the top of the beater-roll into the upper section or passage, substantially as described.” '</p> <p>The device employed by the defendant was manufactured under letters-patent No. 347,043, issued August 10, 1886, to John H. Horne, the defendant. With relation to the peculiar feature of his invention he stated in his specification as follows : “ One great difficulty hitherto in the construction of these engines, whatever may be the path of travel given to the. material contained in them, consists in the fact that the various fibres or bunches of fibre, after being placed within the engine, maintain concentric paths of movement with respect to each other. Thus a piece of stock located near the sides of the tub, or one placed near the mid-feather, will continue to travel in concentric paths until the engine is emptied, except in case manual labpr is applied with a paddle to disturb their courses and compel them to deviate therefrom; hence it is obvious that' the fibre travelling the more rapidly will be reduced more quickly, and the ‘stuff’ is of uneven quality. ... .</p> <p>“ The essential object of my invention is to effect a change in the course of the material ih the engine automatically and obliquely to the longitudinal axis of the .engine during each complete passage thereof around the tub, and thereby thoroughly mix the stock. Thus the particles which are nearest the mid-feather in one passage about the tub, and which therefore travelled the fastest, are directed and changed obliquely across the engine prior to their passage about the roll, and hence they will emerge and are located near the side. Such stock will consequently travel the slowest during the next passage around the tub, since it remains contiguous to the retaining-walls of the latter. This mixing and stirring of the material within the tub is effected primarily by the shape of the tub in cross-section, the width of which is equal to the active face of the roll, or thereabouts, the latter located in one end thereof. Thus to effect the'desired change in the path of movement of the stock the proportions of the tub are altered, and in cross-section the two passages formed in the tub by the mid-feather are twice as deep' as they are wide, or thereabout. Again, the stock is permitted to fill the entire width of the engine just, prior to its entrance beneath the roll, and also immediately after leaving the same; hence the mid-feather terminates a short distance before reaching the roll, and the stock, as it approaches the latter, as before premised, is permitted to spread out and fill the entire width of the engine. . . . After the passage of the stock between the roll and the bed-plate, the particles composing it are directed upon and over the back-fall, which here extends entirely across the engine and in front of the roll, but contracts' as it extends away from the latter, until it unites with the mid-feather, whence it is continued downward between the latter and the side of the engine to the bottom of the tub. This contraction of one-half its width again restores the mass of . stock to a general vertical position, and the latter is so maintained until just prior to its return passage beneath the roll. Thus it will be evident that the fibres composing the material in process of being pulped cannot travel in continuous concentric paths of movement, but are changed and forced obliquely of the engine, ■ whereby' a thorough mixing of the stock is automatically effected by the spiral motion imparted to it both before-and after leaving the roll.” . ' .</p> <p>The case was heard in the Circuit Court upon pleadings and proofs, and a final decree entered .dismissing the bill upon the ground that the defendant had not infringed the plaintiff’s patent. 35 Fed..Rep. 830. From this decree the plaintiff appealed to this court.</p>

Held: That this ruling of the state court raised a Pederal question; (2) That the permission thus given by the President to the conveyance, after its execution and delivery, was retroactive and was equivalent to permission before execution and delivery, as no third parties had acquired an interest in the lands. The court stated the case as follows.

Held: That P. was chargeable with notice that the power and the quitclaim deed were intended as devices to evade the law against the assign- - ■ ment of the scrip, and that he acquired no title through them ; (2) That he acquired no additional rights through the confirmatory acts of Congress; (3) That having no right to locate the scrip for his own benefit, he must be deemed to have located it for P. and as her…

Held: That it was doubtful whether the widow of G. was entitled to the benefit of the act of June 15,1880: but that, without deciding that question, (2) In view of the rapid and enormous increase in value of the tract, and her -knowledge of all the circumstances; which must be assumed from.her near residence to the property, a court of equity .would not disturb a title legally perfect, created by the General Government…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TH-E UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOI?</p> <p>This was a bill in equity, filed July 6,1887, by the St. Louis, Yandalia and Terre Haute Railroad Company, a corporation of Illinois, against the Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company, a corporation of Indiana, to set aside and cancel a conveyance of the plaintiff’s railroad and franchises to the defendant for a term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years. ,The bill contained the following allegations :</p> <p>That the plaintiff was incorporated by a statute of Illinois of February 10, 1865, amended by a statute of February 8, 1867, to construct and maintain a railroad from the left bank of the Mississippi River opposite- St.- Louis eastward through the State of Illinois to a point on the Wabash River, convenient for extending its road to Terre Haute in the State of Indiana ; and was not authorized by its charter, or by any law of Illinois, to lease its railroad, or by any other contract or conveyance to part with the entire possession, control and use of its property and franchises, or to deprive itself of and vest in others the power of control in the management of its said road and other property and in the exercise of its franchises, including the right to impose and collect tolls for the transportation of passengers-and freight, indefinitely, or for any fixed period of time.</p> <p>That the defendant was incorporated by a statute of Indiana of January 26, 1847, amended by a statute of March. 6, 1865, to construct and maintain a railroad from some point on the western line of the State of Indiana eastward through Terre Haute to Indianapolis; and was not authorized by its charter, or by any law of Indiana, to make or accept any lease, contract or other conveyance by which it should acquire or obtain, either indefinitely or for a fixed time, the ownership, management or control of any railroad located beyond the limits of Indiana.</p> <p>That the plaintiff proceeded to construct, and on or about July 1, 1870, completed the construction and equipment of its road; that in order to obtain money for this purpose, on April 6, 1867, it executed a mortgage or deed'of trust of all its railroad, property and franchises, to secure the payment of bonds amounting to $1,900,000, and agreeing to set apart annually from its earnings the sum of $20,000, as a sinking fund for payment of the' bonds; that on March 13, 1868, it executed a second mortgage to secure the payment of additional bonds to the amount. of $2,600,000; that all the bonds aforesaid were sold, and outstanding and unpaid; and that no sinking fund had been created, as provided for in the first mortgage.</p> <p>That on February 10. 1868, the plaintiff and the defendant executed a pretended lease, (set forth in the bill, and copied in the margin,1) of the plaintiff’s railroad, property and franchises to the defendant- for nine hundred and ninety-nine years, the defendant retaining sixty-fivé per cent of the gross receipts, and the rest to be applied to the payment of interest on the mortgage bonds, and any surplus paid to the plaintiff.</p> <p>That on January 12, 1869, the plaintiff’s board of directors passed a resolution, undertaking to authorize its president to change the terms of said lease so that the defendant should be allowed seventy, instead of sixty-five per cent of .the gross receipts, .“ but if the working and maintenance expenses of said road shall be less fhan seventy per cent of the gross. receipts afqresaid, then all of such excess shall be paid over to ” the plaintiff.</p> <p>That by a-statute of Illinois of February .16, 1865, in forc^ at the time of the execution and delivery-of the pretended lease, it was ,not lawful for any railroad company of Illinois, or its directors, to consolidate its railroad with any railroad' -out of the State, or to leáse its railroad to any railroad company out of the State, or to lease any railroad out of the State, without the written consent of all its stockholders residing within the State; and that fifty-nine of the plaintiff’s stockholders ^residing in Illinois never consented to or ratified' the lease.</p> <p>That, on the completion of the plaintiff’s road, the defendant took possession of and had ever since operated it, and had received, in tolls and otherwise, more than $21,600,000; that the pretended lease was void, for want of lawful power in' either party to enter into it ¿ that the defendant, by taking possession of the plaintiff’s railroad and property without right, became in equity a trustee of the plaintiff, and liable to account to it for the property and for all tolls and emoluments which the defendant had, or ought to have, collected and received therefrom, and to restore the property to the plaintiff; that the defendant had refused, though requested, to turn over to the plaintiff the road and property, or the income thereof, and had thus rendered the plaintiff unable to. establish a sinking fund, as required by the first mortgage; and that great and irreparable injury would be done to the plaintiff and its stockholders unless it was restored to the possession and control of the railroad, property and franchises.</p> <p>That at the time when the lease was executed by the plaintiff its officers''Supposed that it had lawful power to do so; but that it had recently been advised by counsel that it had ho such power, that it was its duty at once to repudiate this' pretended lease and to resume the possession, control and use of its property and franchises, and that it had rendered itself liable to have its charter forfeited by the State; that the present income was more than sufficient to pay the interest on-the bonds and to establish a sinking .fund ; and that, by reason of the failure to establish a sinking fund, proceedings might at any time be instituted, to.-fore close the. first mortgage.</p> <p>Tfyafc the taking -of-long-and .complicated accounts, covering a period of nearly seventeen years and involving a great many items, was necessary for the protection and enforcement of the plaintiff’s rights; that the pretended lease was a cloud on the plaintiff’s title; that a court of law‘had no jurisdiction adequate to take the account or to cancel the lease; and that the defendant was daily withdrawing' large sums of money from the jurisdiction of the court to the irreparable injury of the plaintiff.</p> <p>The bill, as originally framed, prayed for a cancellation and surrender of the lease, for a return of the railroad and other property held under it, for an injunction- against disturbing tjie plaintiff in the possession and control thereof, and for an account-of the sums which the defendant had received, or with due diligence might-have received, from the use and operation of the railroad and property; or, if the lease should be held valid, for an account of the sums due under the lease; and for further relief.</p> <p>The defendant demurred to the bill, for want of equity, for laches, for multifariousness, and because the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. The. Circuit Court sustained the demurrer on all these grounds, as stated.in its opinion reported in 33 Fed. Rep. 440. . The plaintiff thereupon, by leave of court, amended the bill, by striking out the prayer for alternative relief in case the lease should be held valid. The defendant demurred to the amended bill, on the same grounds as before, except - multifariousness. The court, delivering no further opinion, sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill ;■ and the plaintiff appealed to this court.</p>

<p>APPEALS • PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On May 17, 1887, William. Aerkfetz, being under twenty-one years of age, by Frederick Aerkfetz, his next friend, commenced this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan against .the defendants in error, receivers duly appointed and in possession of the Wabash Railroad, to recover damages for personal injuries, caused, as alleged, by their negligence.

The court stated the case as follows: On March 16, 1887, the plaintiff in error, defendant below, then a citizen and resident of Wisconsin, purchased of the plaintiff, in Chicago, 1125 gallons of sherry wine, and 1100 gallons of port wine, at an agreed price of $5287. The purchase was on ninety days’ credit, and the wine was delivered to defendant in that city.

APPEAL PROM THE_ SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA. The court stated the case as follows:. Oh July 25,1884, appellee, plaintiff- below, commenced its potion in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the' Territory of Arizona to recover of defendant the sum of $25,000 for 210 tons of silver-bearing ore, mined and removed from the Alta mine, situated in the Harshaw mining district, in Pima County, Arizona.

Held: that the defendants were entitled to have it submitted to the jury whether the other directors and officers of the Albion Bank might not, in the exercise of reasonable and proper care, have ascertained that these moneys had been deposited to the credit of the Albion Bank, and whether they would or woul'd not have accepted such deposits as the return of the moneys to the bank.

ORIGINAL. This was a petition for a writ of mandamus to the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the' Southern District of-New York to command them to take jurisdiction against the Quincy' Mining Company upon a bill in equity, filed in that court on September 3, 1891, by the petitioner, described in the bill as a citizen of Massachusetts, in behalf of himself and other stockholders of the Quincy Mining Company, :against “ the Quincy Mining Company, a…

Held: that such a law could not invalidate such a conveyance so far as citizens of other States are concerned, it is clearly valid so far as it makes the conveyance an act of insolvency, sufficient to support an adjudication of insolvency, and the appointment of a trustee or assignee to take and distribute among creditors any property which may lawfully come to his possession.

Held: That H. & Co. and their licensees, after the expiration of the ten years, were entitled to the same absolute use of the wire which they enjoyed before the wire was given up to the company, on payment of $600 per annum, payable quarterly; (2) That the facts disclosed no hardship which would justify a court of eqiiity, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, to refuse the relief asked for; (3) ' That the…

Held: that while, as between E. and N., the mortgage was to be regarded as collateral security for loans made to E. by N., the assignment to U. was absolute as a security for the "indebtedness of .N. to IT., without regard to the indebtedness of E.- to N., and that a suit in equity to put a different construction upon it was wholly- without merit. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP ARKANSAS, The court stated the ease as follows: The appellees Belding and wife, being in. possession of a •tract of land within the Hot Springs Reservation, now known as lot nine, block sixty-eight, in the rCity of Hot Springs, Arkansas, leased the' same, April 24,. 1814, to Frank’Flynn .for the term of five years at- an annual rent of two hundred-dollars ; the rent to .cease whenever the lessors…

Held: in a case similar to the present one, that G-lenn could not maintain an action in the court below in his1 own name as trustee. Since the decision in Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319 and Glenn v. Liggett, 135 U. S. 533 , the only questions open for consideration in the present case relate to limitation and to the right of the plaintiff to bring this action in his own name as trustee.

ORIGINAL. This case is reported in volume 143 U. S. pages 359 to 370, No decree was entered, the court observing (page 370): “We think we have by these observations, indicated as clearly as is possible the boundary between the two States, and upon these principles the parties may agree to a designation of such boundary, and such designation will pass into a final decree..

<p>Under the laws of Texas, for the purchase of a portion of its unappropriated lands, an applicant could acquire no vested interest in the land applied for, that is, no legal title to it, until the purchase price was paid and the patent of the State was issued to him; but he had the right to. complete the purchase and secure a patent within the prescribed period, which right is designated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State as a vested right that could not be defeated by subsequent legislation, and is a valuable right, which could be assigned.</p> <p>The measure of damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of such a vested right by the purchaser is the difference between the contract price and the saleable value of the property.</p>

<p>Land which, at the time of the grant of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365, c. 217, of public lands to the N orthern Pacific Railroad Company, was segregated from the public lands within the limits of the grant by reason of a prior preemption claim to it, did not, by the cancellation of the preemption right before the location of the grant pass to the company, but remained part of the public lands of the United States, subject to be acquired by a subsequent preemption settlement'followed up to acquisition of title.</p>

Held: in, 1884, in Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 U. S. 293 , that the heirs at law of a person, whose life interest in real estate was confiscated under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862, took at his death by descent from him and not from the United States under the act, and, in 1887, in Shields v. Schiff, 124 U. S. 351 , 355, that the confiscation act of July 17, 1862, construed in connection with the joint resolution of…

The court stated the case as follows: This was an action brought in the- Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to recover duties alleged to have been paid under protest upon three importations of tiles by the steamships Canada, Furnesr sia and Rhaetia, entered at the port of New York in 1886. The. case was tried by the Circuit Court (Lacombe, J.) and a jury in October, 1888.

<p>error to the supreme court of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That equity has jurisdiction, where a person has been induced, by fraudulent representations, to enter into a partnership, to rescind the contract at his instance, and put an end to it ab initio ; (2) That if the case, upon the evidence, did not entitle complainants to a return of their capital, and to be placed in the same situation, as far as practicable, as if they had never entered into the partnership, but did…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE’ EASTERN DISTRICT OF FENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas J.. Meehan, a citizen oí Maryland, against -John K. Valentine, .executor of William G. Perry, both citizens of Pennsylvania, alleging Perry to have ■ been a partner with Lawrence W. Counselman and Albert L. Scott, under the name of L. W. Counselman & Co., and counting on promissory notes of various dates from August 1Ó, 1883, to November 25, 1884, signed by that firm, endorsed to the plaintiff, and amounting in all to about-$10,000, with interest. The defendant denied that Perry was a partner in the firm;</p> <p>At the trial, the plaintiff put in evidence the- following agreement:</p> <p>“ L. W. Counsefinan. Albert L: Scott.</p> <p>“ Office of L. W. Counselman & Co., oyster and fruit packers, corner Philpot and Will streets.</p> <p>“ Baltimore, Md., March 15, 1880.</p> <p>- “ For and in consideration of loans made and to be made to us by Wm. G. Perry, of Philadelphia, amounting in all to the sum of ten thousand dollars, for the term of one year from the date of said loans, we agree to pay to said Wm. G. Perry, in addition, to the interest thereon, one tenth of the net profits over and above the sum of ten thousand dollars on our business for the year commencing May 1st, 1880, and ending May 1st, 1881, — i.e. if our net profits for said year’s business exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars, then we are to pay to said W. G. Perry one tenth of said excess of profitsAver and above the said sum of ten thousand dollars; and it is further agreed that if our net profits do not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars, then he is not to be paid more than the interest on said loan,- the same being added to notes at the time they are given, which are to date from the time of said loans and payable one year from date.</p> <p>“L. W. Counselman & Co.”</p> <p>Also the following endorsement thereon; “ March 2, 1881; This, contract and agreement is to continue one year'longer on the same basis — i.e. from May 1st, 1881, until May 1st, 1882. L. W.- Counselman & Co.”</p> <p>Also three further rehewals of the„agreement from year to year, the first of which was hy letter,- dated March 18, 1882, from L. ~W. Counselman & Co. to Perry, with the same heading as the original agreement, and saying: “We hereby renew the agreement made with you May 1, 1880, which is to the effect that we will guarantee you-ten per cent interest upon loans amounting to $10,000, and that if the net' profits of our business is over $10,000 -for the year commencing May 1, 1882, and ending April 30th, 1883, we.will in lieu of the ten. per'cent interest give you ten per cent of the profits. We have two propositions for partnership May 1st, and if we accept either we will then, if you desire, return your loan.”</p> <p>The other renewals, dated April 4, 1883, and March 15, 1884, were substantially like the original agreement of March 15, 1880, except that in the agreement of April 4, 1883, the rate of interest was specified as six per cent.</p> <p>The plaintiff, further offered in evidence six promissory notes, amounting in the aggregate to $10,600, given by the firm to Perry in the months of March, May and June, 1884.</p> <p>The plaintiff also called Scott as a witness, who testified that the firm was composed of L. W- Counselman and himself ; that it was engaged in “ the fruit and vegetable packing and oyster business” in Baltimore; -that Perry was in the stationery business in Philadelphia; that the $10,000 mentioned in the agreement was paid by him to the firm, receiving their notes for it, and remained: in the business throughout, no part of it haring been repaid; that from time' to time he lent other sums to the firm, which were repaid ; that he was an intimate friend of the witness, and' visited him every few weeks; that these visits were not specially connected with the business, though on such occasions Perry “ usually went down to the place of business and talked business; ” that he annually asked and received from the firm accounts of profit .and loss; that the accounts showed an annual profit, which varied from year fo year, amounting for the second year to $11,000 or $12,000; that it being- then found ’ difficult to tell at the end of the year exactly what the profits would be, it was agreed with Perry that he should thenceforth receive $1000 each year, leaving the final settlement until the whole business was settled up; and that he received under the agreement about $1500-thé first year and $.1000 each subsequent year. On cross-examination, the witness stated that the firm made an assignment to the plaintiff for the benefit of creditors on April 30, 1885; that their liabilities were from $60,000 to $70,000,.about half of which’was with collateral security, and he did not know whether it had been paid out of such security; that the assets realized less than $2000; that, so far as he knew, no dividend had been paid; and, in regard to the $10,000 received from Perry, the witness testified as follows: “ Q. Mr. Counselman and yourself did owe this $10,000 to the estate of Mr. Perry, did you ? A. They had my notes for it. Q. Did you or did you not owe it ? A. It was capital he had in the business the same as ours. We owed it to him. Of course we owed it to him if we did not lose it.”</p> <p>At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground-that there was no evidence to show that Perry was liable as a partner. The. court so ruled, and ordered a nonsuit. 29 Féd. Pep. 276. The plaintiff duly excepted to the ruling, and sued out this writ of error.</p>