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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
17-DEC-2019
09:27 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAII,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH PITTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 09-1-0097)
DECEMBER 17, 2019
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
The defendant in this case was convicted of attempted
murder in the second degree in connection with the stabbing of
his longtime friend. After trial, the defendant made several
motions, including a motion for new trial contending that the
jury during its deliberations conducted an improper examination
of his clothing to search for evidence of blood, and as a result
several jurors discovered “stains” that had not been introduced
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as evidence during trial. The circuit court denied the motions,
and the defendant was subsequently sentenced to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The defendant
appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals and the case was
transferred to this court upon request.
On review, we conclude that the jury’s discovery of
the stains constituted an outside influence that may have
tainted the jury’s impartiality. Because we find that the
jury’s discovery was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
judgment of conviction is vacated and the case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Arrest & Pretrial Motions
On December 22, 2008, longtime friends Jason Brown and
Joseph Pitts were driving to the airport to pick up a mutual
friend. On the way to the airport, Brown and Pitts made a stop,
during which time Brown was stabbed in the neck and arm. Pitts
was taken into custody by officers of the Honolulu Police
Department later that night and released pending investigation.
Pitts was subsequently charged in the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit (circuit court) with attempted murder in the second
degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 705-500
(1993), 707-701.5 (1993), and 706-656 (Supp. 2008).
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Prior to trial, Pitts filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment, contending that the State failed to present to the
grand jury a prior statement made by Brown describing the
assailant as “an older black man” whom he did not know “but
could identify him if he saw a picture.” Pitts argued that
because he had known Brown for almost twenty years the statement
was clearly exculpatory. The circuit court denied the motion,
concluding that because another witness, James Igawa, identified
Pitts during the grand jury proceeding, Brown’s statement was
not clearly exculpatory.1 At the same hearing, the court granted
Pitts’ separate motion to preclude Igawa from testifying at
trial to an identification of Pitts, ruling that Igawa’s
pretrial identification was the result of an impermissibly
suggestive drive-by identification made while Pitts was
handcuffed next to a police car. Igawa, however, was allowed to
describe what he saw during the incident and testify to the
statements he gave to police.
B. Trial
During jury selection, a prospective juror, responding
to a question from defense counsel, shared her thoughts about
the composition of the jury pool:
1
The Honorable Glenn J. Kim presided over all the circuit court
proceedings referenced in this opinion.
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[PROSECTIVE JUROR:] [F]or a long time I’ve been very
concerned about if a black man in America can have a fair
trial because, you know, it’s supposed to be a jury of your
peers . . . . I guess it’s just been interesting . . . it
doesn’t look to me like there’s any black people in the
entire pool, so that just kinda concerns me.
But, on the other hand, you guys obviously are not
going to be able to get an entire pool of black people, of
black men who are in his age range who have the same
experience. . . .
Defense counsel asked the prospective juror whether she had any
biases, leading to the following:
[PROSECTIVE JUROR:] I might say that I have a bias against
the status quo, and that is just that, you know, people who
are minorities have to fight harder to be in an equal
position, so that would be a bias, yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Do you feel that you could be a strong
juror in this case?
. . . .
[PROSECTIVE JUROR:] Yes, I think so. But also as a
scientist, I’m open to debate and providing sides, multiple
sides of the story and, you know, coming to a conclusion
based on that, so I would be open to hearing what other
people have to say. But I also have very strong
convictions myself and I can hold onto those.
After this exchange, the State used a peremptory challenge to
excuse the prospective juror. The defense did not make an
objection.
Before the evidentiary portion of the trial commenced,
Pitts made an oral motion to preclude admission of evidence
that, during his release from custody, he allegedly accused
Brown of raping or sleeping with his then girlfriend and
demanded an apology. The State admitted in the hearing on the
motion that there was no evidence that prior to the stabbing
Pitts thought Brown had been sleeping with his girlfriend.
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Without such evidence, the circuit court concluded, introduction
of Pitts’ alleged accusation and demand for an apology were not
relevant to the crime and the “probative value was so thin” that
it was “outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The
court accordingly granted Pitts’ motion.
The State called security officer Bernard Prescott who
testified that during his shift at “Kaiser Moanalua Hospital”
(Kaiser Hospital) on December 22, 2008, at approximately 11:00
p.m., he was approached by an African-American male wearing a
black shirt and carrying a black jacket. This individual, whom
Prescott identified as Pitts, was later arrested by police.
Prescott described Pitts’ movements in and around the hospital
lobby area and stated that he did not see any blood on his face
and visible hand or that he had a weapon of any kind.
Keola Guadiz testified that he encountered Pitts
outside of Kaiser Hospital on that evening at around 11:00 p.m.
Guadiz stated that Pitts asked him for a ride, and he described
Pitts’ demeanor as nervous. He testified that he saw no other
“black men” in the area that night and that he did not see any
blood on Pitts’ face or hands.
James Igawa testified that on the night of the
incident he was sitting in his car when a red car parked in
front of him about two and a half car-lengths away. About five
minutes later, stated Igawa, he heard screaming and commotion
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coming from the car and saw the passenger get out of the car on
the passenger side and get back in. The passenger then appeared
to be “throwing punches” at the driver, he recounted. Igawa
testified that he observed two heads going back and forth, with
the passenger lunging at the driver. According to Igawa, the
passenger got out of the car, the driver started making noise,
and the driver jumped out of the car backwards and ran down the
street when the passenger reentered the car. Igawa testified
that the passenger then got out of the car, looked back in the
car and grabbed some items, and began walking slowly up the
sidewalk in the opposite direction from the driver. Igawa
stated that he then called 911.
Igawa described the passenger as a black male who was
“tall . . . wearing black--dark black clothes; long, long black
pants; looked like a long black sweater of some sort; kinky
hair,” and had a “kind of [a] swaggering” walk. Igawa testified
that he did not see another “black man dressed in all black
clothing” in the area. The State played an audio of Igawa’s 911
call in which he described the possible suspect as wearing dark
clothes “[l]ike long-sleeve black pants, long-sleeve black
shirt.”
Officer Antwan Stuart testified that on that date he
arrived at Kaiser Hospital about 11:30 p.m. The officer
testified that he found and detained an African-American male
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that fit the description of the subject “to a T,” whom he
identified as Pitts. Officer Stuart stated that the only blood
he saw was on the sleeve of the jacket Pitts was carrying.
Officer Stuart further testified that he did not see any blood
on Pitts’ face or hands and that Pitts did not appear injured.
The officer identified the jacket Pitts was carrying and the
clothes that he was wearing when he was arrested, and these
items were admitted into evidence.
Evidence Specialist Autumn Sunaoka testified to taking
pictures of the crime scene and the clothing recovered from
Pitts, swabbing Pitts’ hands for evidence, and photographing his
hands. The State also introduced several photographs of the
interior of Brown’s car, including photographs of the passenger
side of the vehicle, which Sunaoka testified showed, “small
blood-like spots on the seat.” Sunaoka testified that she did
not see any “visible stains or blood-like spots” on Pitts’
pants, black shirts, shoes, socks, or shoelaces when she
photographed them.2
Jason Brown testified that his relationship with Pitts
was very close, calling Pitts his “family” and “brother.”
According to Brown, he and Pitts met when Brown was 16 or 17
years old, sometime around 1991. Brown testified that on
2
Midway through Sunaoka’s testimony, Pitts waived his right to
counsel and continued pro se throughout the remainder of the trial.
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December 22, 2008, he picked up Pitts in his car to drive to the
airport to pick up their mutual friend. On the way, Brown
testified, Pitts asked him to make a stop to speak to a person
called “Niki,” and he pulled over near where Niki lived and
parked under a tree.
According to Brown, Pitts got out of the car when they
pulled over, and Brown lit a cigarette. Brown testified that he
was looking forward and exhaling when he was first hit, which
Brown said was within about two minutes of parking. Brown said
that he turned and saw Pitts, at which time he put his arms up
and began kicking, trying to get away, and he pulled himself out
of the driver side window. Brown testified that he was
initially stabbed in the neck and then stabbed in the arm when
he put his hands up to protect himself. After pulling himself
out of the car window, Brown testified, he ran down the hill
toward a guard shack holding his bleeding neck and screaming for
help. Brown stated that he told the security guards at the
guard shack that “[t]here’s a black guy up there that just
stabbed me.” Brown said that he was positive that Pitts was the
person who attacked him and that he did not see anyone else on
the street.
Brown was transported to Queen’s Hospital. When he
awoke in the hospital, Brown recalled, Detective Kon was asking
him for a statement, and he asked the detective to return later.
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At the time Detective Kon returned, Brown continued, he was
requesting either a statement or Brown’s signature on a paper.
Brown stated that he signed the paper although he could not even
see or read it because he needed to rest. Brown also testified
that he did not remember speaking with an officer named Jonathan
Locey at the hospital, did not remember making statements
identifying his assailant as “an older black guy,” or remember
responding to Officer Locey’s questions about whether he knew
his assailant and could identify him.
Brown was asked by the prosecutor about a conversation
that he purportedly had with Pitts following his release from
the hospital:
[PREOSECUTOR:] Okay. Let me just--let me just, um, direct
your questioning here.
So you talked to him. Did you ever ask him why he
stabbed you?
. . . .
[BROWN:] Yes.
[PROSECUTOR:] You asked him, “Why did you stab me?”
[BROWN:] Right.
[PROSECUTOR:] And did he respond?
[BROWN:] His response was, “All I wanted was an apology.”
[PROSECUTOR:] I’m sorry? Can you--
[BROWN:] “All I want is an apology. Why don’t you just
apologize.”
[PROSECUTOR:] So that’s what he told you when he--when you
asked him, “Why did you stab me?”
[BROWN:] Right.
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[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. And at that point, when you were
talking to him, did you already know what he wanted an
apology for?
Brown explained that he found out after the stabbing “[w]hat
[Pitts] wanted an apology for,” from “Jamie.” The prosecutor
then again elicited Brown’s account of Pitts’ statements
regarding the alleged apology:
[PROSECUTOR:] So when you asked him, “Why did you stab me,” he
said, “All I want is an apology.”
[BROWN:] Right.
[PROSECUTOR:] Just apologize.
[BROWN:] He said, “You know what you did. Just apologize.”
[PROSECUTOR:] So before you picked the defendant up on
December 22, 2008, did you know why he was mad at you?
[BROWN:] I didn’t know he was mad at me.
The following morning Pitts orally moved to strike all
references of an “apology” that the State elicited from Brown.
The circuit court agreed with Pitts that leaving the reference
to an apology for speculation in the jury’s mind was prejudicial
to him and asked the prosecutor for any argument or explanation:
THE COURT: . . . . I will tell you right now, if there had
been an objection, I would have cut you off at the pass
because I agree with Mr. Pitts that you’re leaving that for
speculation in the jury’s mind is prejudicial to him.
So do you have--do you have anything you want to add
or you want to argue this point?
[PROSECUTOR:] Well, Your Honor, I--I--all I wanted to do is
get out from the victim any conversation he had with the
defendant regarding the stabbing. And I knew that I wasn’t
going to get into the actual allegations of the rape, and I
stopped there. And I--
THE COURT: All right.
[PROSECUTOR:]--just didn’t think that would be a problem,
Your Honor.
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The judge further agreed with Pitts that the evidence had been
precluded. The circuit court granted Pitts’ motion to strike
the testimony of “an apology for something” and instructed the
jury as follows:
[COURT]: All right. . . . I have an instruction for you at
this point.
All this testimony yesterday from Mr. Brown having to
do with his testimony that the defendant, Mr. Pitts, was in
contact with him after the stabbing in this case demanding
an apology for something is stricken from the record.
I’m striking it from the record. Anything to do with
this alleged apology you are to disregard. All right?
Dr. Frederick Yost testified that on the night of the
incident he treated Brown for three wounds, the main wound being
to Brown’s external jugular vein, which was located on the left
side of his neck and bleeding intermittently. He testified that
the pressure in a vein is lower than in an artery and would tend
to flow continuously, and that a vein would theoretically bleed
more while a person was lying down or breathing heavier.
Officer Jonathan Locey testified that at about 11:50
p.m. that evening he arrived at Queen’s Hospital to obtain a
statement from Brown. The officer testified that he located
Brown in the emergency room lying down on his back wearing an
oxygen mask with his eyes mostly closed and being tended to by
staff. According to Officer Locey, he asked Brown who had
stabbed him and Brown replied, “An older black guy.” Officer
Locey said that Brown appeared to nod his head “no” when he
asked Brown whether he knew his assailant and appeared to nod
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“yes” when asked whether he could identify the person. Officer
Locey clarified that Brown never verbally stated that he did not
know who stabbed him or that he could recognize his assailant if
he saw him again.
Paulette Utu testified that Brown ran to her security
guard shack with a bleeding neck. She stated that all Brown
said when she got to him was, “Black man, red car. Black man.”
The State also played a recording of Utu’s 911 call in which a
voice is heard asking, “So all he’s saying is it was a black
guy?” to which another voice replies, “Yeah.”
David Esaki testified--as an expert in DNA analysis--
that he tested stains on a black jacket recovered from Pitts and
found blood stains on the sleeve and shoulder. One stain tested
positive for blood that matched Brown’s DNA, Esaki indicated,
and the other stain only revealed a partial DNA profile. Esaki
stated that he did not have a reference sample from Pitts to
test, and that he did not test Pitts’ pants or black shirt for
the presence of blood. Esaki further testified that he
processed swabs from Pitts’ hands and did not find blood, but
found DNA from two unknown individuals, one of which was a
female.
During his presentation of the evidence, Pitts called
Detective Darryl Kon, who testified that he spoke to Brown in
the hospital at approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning following
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the stabbing. Detective Kon testified that Brown “[b]asically
[] said, What complaint? I didn’t make a complaint,” and that
when he returned at a later time Brown did not want to make a
statement, and instead “he signed a 172, a withdrawal of
complaint.”3 When asked whether the case was reopened as a
result of threats to the department by Brown’s father, Detective
Kon replied, “It’s hearsay. I wasn’t in on that meeting, but
that is what I understood.”
Pitts in his testimony described his relationship with
Brown: “That is my brother. Literally like a brother from a
different mother. That’s my brother.” According to Pitts, on
the evening of December 22, 2008, Brown picked him up, and Pitts
told him he needed to make a stop to sell drugs. Pitts stated
that when they parked, he got out of the car to look for the
person to whom he was supposed to sell the drugs. However,
Pitts testified, he heard a scream and when he got back to the
car, Brown looked at him and then headed in one direction, while
some other people were headed in a different direction. Pitts
stated that two people were running from the car after the
stabbing that night and that one person was a black male wearing
a black hoodie. Pitts stated that he grabbed the jacket from
3
Detective Kon stated that the second time he visited Brown to get
a statement, he told Brown, “I have to get a statement now, get a 172, or
I’ll be written up for insubordination.”
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the car and headed down to Kaiser Hospital where he was
ultimately encountered by Officer Stuart.
C. Closing Arguments
In closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that
Pitts came up with his defense after reviewing the police
reports and the evidence in the case:
Now, the defendant does not have to put on a case at all.
It’s the State’s burden. After looking at all the facts,
after looking at the police reports and the evidence that’s
in this case, the defendant comes up with an idea. It
wasn’t me. It was somebody else. I didn’t do this.
No objection was made. In his closing argument, Pitts attacked
the State’s evidence, focusing on the lack of blood found on his
person or clothing. Pitts argued that the blood that should be
on the passenger’s seat of the car “must be on the person that
stabbed [Brown]” and that there was no blood on him, no blood on
his hands, and no blood on his shirt because he did not commit
the stabbing. Pitts further questioned how it would be “humanly
possible” for him to “multiply stab somebody and come out with
no blood.”
Following jury deliberations and before the verdict
was returned, the circuit court informed the parties that the
jury had requested--via a communication--two pairs of gloves to
examine “the pants” that had been admitted into evidence. Pitts
and the State did not make an objection. The verdict was then
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received, and the jury found Pitts guilty as charged; Pitts was
sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
D. First Appeal and Motions on Remand
Prior to sentencing, Pitts, who had proceeded pro se
since midway through the State’s case, requested the appointment
of substitute counsel to assist him with his post-verdict
motions and for sentencing. State v. Pitts(Pitts I), 131 Hawaii
537, 540, 319 P.3d 456, 459 (2014). The circuit court denied
Pitts’ request.
Id. On appeal, the ICA concluded Pitts’ appeal
was without merit and affirmed his conviction.
Id.
On certiorari review, we held that a defendant who has
exercised the right to self-representation at trial but
expressly requests counsel for post-verdict motions or for
sentencing has a right to counsel. Id. at 543,
319 P.3d at 462.
Accordingly, we vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and
remanded the case to the circuit court to allow for the
appointment of substitute counsel for the purpose of allowing
the filing of a motion for new trial and for resentencing.
Id.
at 544,
319 P.3d at 463.
On remand, Pitts filed two new trial motions, each of
which were later amended.4 The first motion contended that the
4
At Pitts’ request, only the amended version of the motion for new
trial based on prosecutorial misconduct was considered; both motions for new
trial based on juror misconduct were considered.
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prosecutor committed misconduct by (1) arguing that Pitts
benefitted from being at trial, (2) commenting on Pitts’
testimony, guilt, and credibility as a witness and the
credibility of other witnesses, (3) eliciting testimony of a
motive that was prohibited in motions in limine, and (4) stating
Igawa’s description matched Pitts “to a T.”5 Pitts argued that
the prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial and was so
egregious as to bar reprosecution.
The second motion for new trial was primarily based on
juror misconduct. Pitts contended that the jury improperly
investigated the clothing he was wearing at the time of his
arrest, thereby “supplementing the evidence in the case with an
unsubstantiated finding that the clothes had Jason Brown’s blood
on them,” which was contrary to the evidence at trial. Pitts
maintained that his constitutional right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury was violated by the jury conducting an
investigation that was outside of the scope of the evidence
presented at trial.
At the hearing, the circuit court initially denied a
motion to continue to allow Pitts time to file a motion to
recuse the presiding judge. The court also denied the new trial
5
The motion also included arguments that have not been raised on
appeal.
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motion based on prosecutorial misconduct, finding that there
were insufficient grounds to support the motion.
With regard to the motion for a new trial based on
juror misconduct, Pitts called one of the trial jurors (Juror
no. 9) to testify. Juror no. 9 testified that during
deliberations the jurors requested scissors to cut open the
packaging containing Pitts’ clothing, and three of the jurors
examined Pitts’ shirt and pants for blood. Juror no. 9 stated
that the jurors examined the pants “[f]irst, outside, and then
turned inside out.” Juror no. 9 testified that the jurors found
small spots on the inside of the pants and that the jurors
“determined” that the spots “must be blood.” However, as to her
own belief, Juror no. 9 testified that she did not know what the
spots were. According to Juror no. 9, four jurors looked at the
stains, including herself.
The circuit court orally denied the motion and in its
written order found the following: the jury had properly
received for its consideration a pair of pants and a shirt in a
sealed plastic bag; the pants and shirt were properly admitted
into evidence; the jurors requested and received scissors and
gloves to remove and examine the pants and shirt; the jurors
examined the pants and shirt on the outside and then inside out;
Juror no. 9 observed four jurors examining the pair of pants;
the jurors observed three small stains on the pants, but Juror
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no. 9 did not know what the stains were. Based on these
findings, the court concluded that “[t]he jury was not precluded
from examining exhibits during deliberations”; that it was
reasonable and diligent for the jury to visually examine the
clothing; that the jury did not consider extraneous prejudicial
information; and that the defendant failed to show that the jury
obtained or used evidence that had not been introduced at trial,
and the court denied the motion.6
Pitts was sentenced to life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole. Pitts appealed, and the request to
transfer the case from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
to this court was granted on August 10, 2018. On appeal, Pitts
challenges the circuit court’s denial of the two new trial
motions, the motion to continue, and his pretrial motion to
dismiss the indictment.7 Pitts also argues that his right to a
jury of his peers was violated.
6
The court’s oral denial of the juror misconduct motion also
appeared to include Pitts’ argument at the hearing that Juror no. 9 was
“pressured” into changing her vote by other jurors.
7
The State contends that this court’s decision in Pitts I should
be considered “law of the case” because Pitts argued in his first appeal that
the jury committed misconduct during deliberations and that the circuit court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, and that this court
did not find error on these issues. The “law of the case” doctrine provides
that “a determination of a question of law made by an appellate court in the
course of an action becomes the law of the case and may not be disputed by a
reopening of the question at a later stage of the litigation.” Hussey v.
Say, 139 Hawaii 181, 185, 384 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2016).
In Pitts I, we concluded that Pitts’ right to post-verdict
counsel had been violated, and we vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and
(continued . . .)
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Denial of Motions for New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct and
Motion to Dismiss Indictment
A trial court’s granting or denial of a motion for new
trial, including one premised on juror misconduct, will not be
disturbed absent abuse of discretion. State v. Kim, 103 Hawaii
285, 290, 81 P.3d 1200, 1205 (2003). A motion to dismiss an
indictment is similarly reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Akau, 118 Hawaii 44, 51,
185 P.3d 229, 236 (2008). The
trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds the
bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or
practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Kim,
103 Hawaii at 290,
81 P.3d at 1205.
B. Constitutional Violations
Questions of constitutional law are reviewed under the
right/wrong standard. State v. Pratt, 127 Hawaii 206, 212, 277
P.3d 300, 306 (2012).
(. . . continued)
remanded the case to allow for the appointment of substitute counsel for the
purposes of filing a motion for new trial and for resentencing. 131 Hawaii
at 544,
319 P.3d at 463. By doing so, we noted, we sought “to place Pitts in
the position he would have been in had the constitutional violation never
occurred.”
Id. at 544 n.6,
319 P.3d at 463 n.6. Thus, there was no
determination of “law” with respect to the issues presented in this appeal to
which the law of the case doctrine may be applied. We accordingly address
the merits of Pitts’ appeal.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Juror Misconduct
The United States Constitution and the Hawaii
Constitution guarantee the accused in serious criminal cases a
fair trial by an impartial jury.8 State v. Kim, 103 Hawaii 285,
290-91, 81 P.3d 1200, 1205-06 (2003). “Because the right to an
impartial jury in a criminal trial is so fundamental to our
entire judicial system, it therefore follows that a criminal
defendant is entitled to twelve impartial jurors.” State v.
Gabalis, 83 Hawaii 40, 45,
924 P.2d 534, 539 (1996) (quoting
State v. Furutani, 76 Hawaii 172, 179,
873 P.2d 51, 58 (1994)).
“Thus, the trial court must grant a new trial if any member . .
. of the jury was not impartial; failure to do so necessarily
constitutes an abuse of discretion.”
Id.
On appeal, Pitts contends that it was juror misconduct
for three jurors to examine his pants, find bloodlike stains,
and change their votes to “guilty” as a result. This conduct
8
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed[.]” Article I, section
14 of the Hawai‘i Constitution provides in relevant part that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury of the district wherein the crime shall
have been committed[.]”
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violated his right to due process, Pitts argues, and the circuit
court erred in not granting his motion for a new trial.
1. The Jury’s Examination of Pitts’ Pants Led to the Discovery of
New Evidence of “Stains”
Inherent in a defendant’s right to a trial by an
impartial jury is the requirement that the jury be free from
outside influences. State v. Keliiholokai, 58 Haw. 356, 357-58,
569 P.2d 891, 893-94 (1977). Accordingly, the jury’s verdict
must be based upon evidence received in open court and not from
outside sources. Id.; see State v. Chin, 135 Hawaii 437, 447,
353 P.3d 979, 989 (2015) (“Contact between witnesses and jurors
is ‘generally improper’ because it raises a fundamental concern
of whether the jury reached ‘their verdict based solely on the
evidence presented at trial’ . . . .” (quoting Dillard v. State,
3 A.3d 403, 408-09 (Md. 2010))). For, as this court has stated,
“The function of the jury in rendering an accurate verdict based
on the facts presented at trial is paramount in upholding the
truth seeking function of the judicial system.” State v.
Flores, 131 Hawaii 43, 56,
314 P.3d 120, 133 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted).
Our cases demonstrate that outside influences may
improperly taint jury deliberations in a variety of
circumstances, including the inadvertent exposure of the jury to
items not properly introduced into evidence. In State v.
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Estrada, the jury discovered the defendant’s fingerprint
exemplar, which had been accidentally included in one of the
State’s exhibits, during deliberations along with the exemplars
of two other individuals. 69 Haw. 204, 220-21,
738 P.2d 812,
824 (1987). On appeal, we determined that the defendant’s
fingerprint exemplar that the jury received was inadmissible
evidence of an unrelated crime.
Id. at 221,
738 P.2d at 824.
The jury was therefore in possession of an item that had not
properly been admitted into evidence for the jury’s
consideration. See
id. Because there was no “overwhelming,
uncontradicted evidence of guilt,” we concluded that the jury’s
exposure to the inadmissible evidence was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id.
In State v. Joseph, the jury received for its
examination a properly admitted wallet that contained a straw,
which had not been independently introduced into evidence, and a
list of numbers, which an officer testified was in the wallet
but had not otherwise been admitted into evidence. 77 Hawaii
235, 238-39, 883 P.2d 657, 660-61 (App. 1994). The circuit
court had allowed the jury to examine the list but instructed
the jury that it could not consider the straw as evidence in
reaching its verdict.
Id. at 238 n.6, 239-40,
883 P.2d at 660
n.6, 661-62. The ICA held that the trial court properly
instructed the jury to not consider the straw in its
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deliberations because the State had not laid a proper foundation
for the straw’s introduction, the straw was not in evidence, and
exposure to the straw constituted an outside influence. Id. at
238-39, 883 P.2d at 660-61. For these same reasons, the ICA
held that the jury was erroneously allowed to examine the list
of numbers as it was not properly introduced into evidence.
Id.
at 238 n.6,
883 P.2d at 660 n.6.
Our cases have also found the sanctity of jury
deliberations infringed when a juror’s conduct has introduced an
outside influence into the jury room. In State v. Williamson,
jurors had asked for a dictionary to look up the definitions of
the words “entrapment” and “preponderance.” 72 Haw. 97, 99,
807
P.2d 593, 595 (1991). After the court denied the request, a
bailiff discovered a dictionary in the jury room, and the
foreperson was questioned by the trial court as to whether the
dictionary was used.
Id. at 99-101,
807 P.2d at 595-96. The
foreperson responded that the dictionary was not used at all
during deliberations because the jury’s questions had been
clarified the day before the dictionary was brought into the
jury room.
Id. at 101,
807 P.2d at 595-96. The trial court
denied the defense’s motion for mistrial and did not question
any of the other potentially tainted jurors.
Id. at 101,
807
P.2d at 596.
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In vacating the trial court’s judgment, we noted that
the dictionary’s definition of “preponderance” differed from the
court’s instructions. Id. at 104,
807 P.2d at 597. Because the
dictionary definition placed a higher burden on the defendant in
proving an entrapment defense, this court stated, the defendant
would have been substantially prejudiced if any of the jurors
could have been influenced by the dictionary’s definition.
Id.
We highlighted the problematic aspect of the juror’s conduct,
which was the potential to “infect[]” the jury’s consideration
of information provided by the court with “extraneous”
information. See id.; see also Lopez v. Sears Roebuck and Co.,
70 Haw. 562, 562-64,
777 P.2d 715, 715-17 (1989) (holding that
it was improper for the jury foreperson to conduct an
unauthorized, independent observation of the defendant’s
assembly process and report his observations to the jury).
Just as the law requires that items exposed to the
jury must have been properly received in evidence in open court,
our caselaw has defined the limits of acceptable jury conduct
when examining exhibits in evidence. In State v. Pauline,
during trial, but outside the presence of the court and counsel,
the jury was allowed to view a vehicle’s trunk that the
defendant had allegedly used to transport the victim. 100
Hawaii 356, 362-63, 60 P.3d 306, 312-13 (2002). At the viewing,
the trunk hood was opened and closed by detectives at the
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jurors’ request. Id. at 363,
60 P.3d at 313. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the jury had conducted an improper
experiment in violation of his due process rights.
Id. at 379,
60 P.3d at 329.
In demarcating the line between acceptable and
improper jury conduct with regard to exhibits in evidence, this
court stated that the jury may “carry out experiments within the
lines of offered evidence or which amount to no more than a
careful examination of the evidence which was presented in
court.” Id. at 380,
60 P.3d at 330 (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting People v. Cooper,
95 Cal.App.3d 844, 853-54
(1979)). We explained that experiments are generally prohibited
“where the result is the production of ‘new’ evidence” for which
it “is not possible for the party injured to meet, answer, or
explain.” Id. at 379,
60 P.3d at 329 (quoting Cooper,
95
Cal.App.3d at 853). Analyzing the facts in Pauline against this
standard, we found that “the only potential bearing [that] the
‘experiment’ had on [the defendant’s] guilt was whether [the
victim’s] body could fit in the trunk,” and the jury had already
viewed the trunk without the trunk cover, photographs of the
trunk with the hood closed, and the dimensions of the trunk as
evidence. Id. at 380,
60 P.3d at 330. Thus, we concluded, the
opening and closing of the hood did not produce new evidence.
Id.
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As our holding in Pauline illustrates, the critical
inquiry with regard to a jury’s examination of evidence is
whether the jury’s conduct resulted in the production of new
evidence. See id. at 379,
60 P.3d at 329. This court’s
decisions have thus vigilantly protected the integrity of jury
deliberations against the risk of outside influences.
In the present case, Juror no. 9 testified that four
jurors, including herself, asked for a pair of scissors, cut
open the evidence bag containing Pitts’ pants, examined the
pants on the outside and then inside out, and found three small
stains on the inside. Juror no. 9 testified that they did this
because they “were looking for blood” on the pants and that
their examination resulted in the discovery of “small drops, and
they determined it must be blood.” In its findings of facts,
the circuit court found that the jurors asked for and received a
pair of gloves for a closer examination of the pants and shirt;
examined the pants on the exterior side and then inside out;
four jurors were observed by Juror no. 9 examining the pants;
and that these jurors observed three small stains on the pants.9
9
The circuit court in its conclusions of law cited State v.
Kassebeer, 118 Hawaii 493, 506, 193 P.3d 409, 422 (2008), for the proposition
that “[t]he jury is not precluded from examining exhibits during
deliberations.” The issue in Kassebeer dealt with whether the court erred in
the first instance by allowing a weapon in the jury room. See
id.
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Unlike the examination of the trunk in Pauline, here
the jury’s examination resulted in the discovery of new evidence
in the form of three small stains on the pants which introduced
an outside influence that could have tainted the jurors’
impartiality. During trial in this case, there was no evidence
that blood was found on Pitts or on the clothes that he was
wearing. Because the jurors were actively trying to supplement
the evidence presented at trial with information not provided at
trial or by the court, the jurors’ actions were similar to the
actions taken by jurors in Lopez and Williamson. See Lopez, 70
Haw. at 564,
777 P.2d at 717 (jury foreperson conducted an
unauthorized view of the defendant’s store and related his
observations to the jury); Williamson,
72 Haw. at 103,
807 P.2d
at 596 (juror improperly obtained definitions differing from
those supplied by the court). Thus, the jurors’ examination was
neither within the lines of offered evidence nor merely
cumulative to the evidence already presented at trial. See
Pauline, 100 Hawaii at 380,
60 P.3d at 330.
Further, because the evidence was discovered for the
first time during jury deliberations, it was evidence that had
not been presented in court, for which no foundation had been
laid, and which had not been properly admitted into evidence.
See Estrada, 69 Haw. at 221,
738 P.2d at 824; Joseph, 77 Hawaii
at 239,
883 P.2d at 661. Therefore the stains were an outside
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influence and constituted evidence that Pitts did not have the
opportunity to meet, answer, or explain.10 See Pauline, 100
Hawaii at 379-80, 60 P.3d at 329-30.
In a Florida case with analogous facts to this case,
Williams v. State, a witness saw a man break the window of a
business with his “naked hand” and reported the crime. 448
So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). The defendant was
arrested shortly thereafter and identified as the suspect by the
witness.
Id. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was
wearing gloves, which were received into evidence.
Id.
During trial, the defendant’s defense was that he was
misidentified because the person who broke the window would have
injured and bloodied his hand, and there was no evidence that
the defendant’s hand was injured or bleeding at the time of the
arrest. Id. However, during jury deliberations, the jury
discovered a piece of paper with a stain on it in one of the
fingers of the glove and asked the trial court whether they
could consider the “bloody piece of paper” in their
10 As our cases provide, the jury’s receipt of an outside influence
is not to be condoned merely because the vehicle for its discovery is
properly admitted evidence. By way of analogy, if the jurors in this case
had presented their discovery to the court and asked if they could consider
the stains in their deliberations, the circuit court, as in Joseph, would
have been required to specifically instruct the jurors that they could not.
See Joseph, 77 Hawaii at 238, 883 P.2d at 660 (“The law requires that items
exposed to the jury must have been properly received in evidence in open
court. In our view, the straw was not properly received in evidence.”
(citation omitted)).
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deliberations. Id. The trial court denied defense counsel’s
motion for mistrial and allowed the jury to consider the paper
it had found.
Id.
On appeal, the appellate court found that the jury’s
discovery of the stained paper was “a total surprise with no
opportunity for discovery, defense or cross-examination as to
it.” Id. The appellate court noted that the paper was never
tested to determine whether the stain was blood, and if it was
blood, whether the blood belonged to the defendant.
Id.
Further, the appellate court concluded that “[t]he ‘bloody’
paper effectively destroyed [the defendant’s] closing argument,
and his counsel had no opportunity to even try to rebut or
explain it, even had [counsel] been in a position to do so.”
Id.
As in Williams, the stains on Pitts’ pants were first
discovered by the jury, the stains were not tested “to determine
if the stain[s] [were] blood and, if blood, that it was
[Brown’s] blood.” Id. Under our caselaw, the jurors were
exposed to an outside influence not presented at trial, which
Pitts did not have the opportunity to meet, answer, or explain.
See Pauline, 100 Hawaii at 379,
60 P.3d at 329. The circuit
court thus erred in finding the jurors’ conduct permissible
merely because the pants had been received in evidence, failing
to recognize the misconduct in discovering the stains, and
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concluding that the jury was not exposed to an outside
influence.
2. The Jury’s Discovery of “Stains” on Pitts’ Pants Was Not
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
“If the jury conducts an experiment that produces
‘new’ evidence, the court must then examine whether the
defendant was thereby denied his or her right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury.” Pauline, 100 Hawaii at 380, 60 P.3d at 330
(citing Keliiholokai,
58 Haw. at 358,
569 P.2d at 893-94).
We have previously stated that a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice is raised when the nature of an outside
influence is such that it “could” substantially prejudice the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. See Williamson, 72 Haw. at
102,
807 P.2d at 596; Lopez,
70 Haw. at 564,
777 P.2d at 717.
“To overcome the presumption of prejudice, the State must prove
that the outside influence on the jury was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Chin, 135 Hawaii 437, 448,
353 P.3d
979, 990 (2015). This requires the trial court to investigate
the totality of the circumstances to determine the impact of the
outside influence on the jury’s impartiality. Id. at 443,
353
P.3d at 985.
In Williamson, this court determined that the
defendant would have been substantially prejudiced if “any” of
the jurors could have been influenced by the dictionary
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definition of “preponderance.” 72 Haw. at 104,
807 P.2d at 597.
Because the trial court only questioned the foreperson, we
concluded, the court could not be sure that the juror who
brought in the dictionary was not affected by independently
looking up the word.
Id. Further, we were not convinced that
no other jurors were potentially influenced by the extraneous
definition considering that a juror felt it necessary to bring
the dictionary into the jury room.
Id. Similarly, in Lopez,
although it was not clear that the foreperson’s investigation
and comments to other jurors affected the verdict, we concluded
that the foreperson’s actions could have influenced the outcome
of the case, requiring a new trial.
70 Haw. at 564,
777 P.2d at
717.
This court has reached the same conclusion in cases in
which only one juror’s impartially has been potentially tainted
by an outside influence. In State v. Chin, the jury foreperson
approached one of the defendant’s witnesses, inquired about the
possibility of employment, and handed the witness his business
card. 135 Hawaii at 440-41, 353 P.3d at 982-83. The witness
had no further communication with the foreperson and related the
encounter to defense counsel.
Id. We concluded that the
contact between the foreperson and the defendant’s witness was
an outside influence that could have substantially prejudiced
the defendant. Id. at 447-48,
353 P.3d at 989-90. Because the
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trial court failed to conduct an inquiry into the totality of
the circumstances, we held that there was no showing by the
State that such misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 449, 353 P.3d at 991.
In this case, Pitts’ defense focused on the lack of
evidence indicating that blood was found on his person or the
clothing that he wore the night of the stabbing. Pitts
repeatedly cross-examined the State’s witness about whether they
had noticed blood on his person or clothing on the night of the
stabbing, and he argued during closing arguments that the blood
that should be on the passenger seat “must be on the person that
stabbed [Brown] because it ain’t on that seat.” Pitts contended
that the lack of blood found on him and his clothing showed that
he was not the person who attacked Brown. Thus, the
nonexistence of the evidence of blood on Pitts’ clothing was
essential to his defense and credibility.
The jury had heard testimony and seen photographs
that, though the majority of the blood was on the driver’s side,
there were small blood-like spots on the passenger seat. From
this evidence, the jurors could have inferred that if Pitts were
the attacker, as the State contended, then there might be blood
on his clothing. Juror no. 9’s testimony that the jurors were
actively searching Pitts’ clothes for blood confirms the
likelihood of this inference.
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Having found three small stains on the inside of
Pitts’ pants, the jurors could have concluded--as Juror no. 9’s
testimony suggests that they did--that the stains on Pitts’
pants were blood. This in turn would have had the effect of
completely undermining Pitts’ defense and credibility. The harm
from this discovery cannot be overstated given that the stains
were not tested “to determine if the stain[s] [were] blood and,
if blood, that it was [Brown’s] blood.” Williams v. State, 448
So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Further, the evidence of Pitts’ guilt was not
overwhelming. No weapon was recovered and no evidence was
presented of blood found on Pitts’ person or the clothing he was
wearing. Because Brown was the only person that positively
identified Pitts as the attacker, this case depended heavily on
the credibility of Brown and Pitts, negating against a finding
of harmlessness. Cf. State v. Underwood, 142 Hawaii 317, 329,
418 P.3d 658, 670 (2018) (“When a conviction is largely
dependent on a jury’s determination as to the credibility of a
complainant’s testimony, we have held that the evidence of the
offense is not so ‘overwhelming’ that it renders the
prosecutor’s improper statements harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
The State argues that the discovery of the stains was
duplicative of the evidence presented at trial inasmuch as blood
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was found on Pitts’ jacket. However, Pitts testified that he
grabbed the jacket from the car after the stabbing and there is
no persuasive evidence of the assailant wearing a jacket at the
time of the stabbing.11 Accordingly, the stains on Pitts’ pants
viewed by the jurors were not cumulative evidence but instead
resulted in the likely inference that the stains were of Brown’s
blood.
Accordingly, the evidence and arguments presented at
trial and Juror no. 9’s testimony that the jurors were looking
for blood on Pitts’ clothing, all indicate that the discovery of
the three stains on the inside of Pitts’ pants could have
potentially tainted the impartiality of any or all of the four
jurors exposed to the stains, thereby significantly prejudicing
Pitts’ defense.12 Based on the totality of the circumstances in
11 The State’s argument is premised on the assumption that Pitts was
wearing the jacket at the time of the offense. Igawa testified that the
person he described getting out of the car was wearing what “looked like a
long black sweater of some sort,” and his 911 phone call, which was played
for the jury, indicates that he identified the possible suspect as wearing a
“long-sleeve black shirt.” The clothing that Pitts was arrested wearing
included two black shirts, one long and one short, and Igawa did not testify
about the jacket admitted into evidence. Igawa’s testimony thus does not
resolve whether Pitts or anyone else was wearing the jacket during the
offense.
The State also argues that the lack of blood on Pitts’ clothing
was not persuasive in light of Dr. Yost’s testimony regarding Brown’s wounds.
However, the jury’s discovery of the stains, if inferred to be blood, did
more than affect the persuasiveness of Pitts defense: it directly
contradicted and “effectively destroyed” it. Williams, 448 So.2d at 50.
12
The circuit court having found no misconduct, did not seek to
question whether any of the other three jurors who had examined the stains
could have been influenced by what they viewed or whether any of the other
jurors could have been potentially influenced.
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this case, it cannot be said that the jury’s exposure to the
stains on Pitts’ pants was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.13
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
It is the prosecutor’s “duty to seek justice, to
exercise the highest good faith in the interest of the public
and to avoid even the appearance of unfair advantage over the
accused.” State v. Rogan, 91 Hawaii 405, 412, 984 P.2d 1231,
1238 (1999) (quoting State v. Quitog, 85 Hawaii 128, 136 n.19
938 P.2d 559, 567 n.19 (1997)).
Pitts asserts that multiple instances of prosecutorial
misconduct occurred, and the circuit court thus erred in denying
his new trial motion on this ground.14
1. Eliciting Inadmissible Evidence of an Apology in Violation of
the Circuit Court’s Motion in Limine Ruling
Pitts asserts that the prosecutor elicited
inadmissible evidence of a motive in violation of the circuit
court’s motion in limine ruling. In State v. Pacheco, during
13
Pitts also argues that his motion for new trial should have been
granted because Juror no. 9 voted guilty based on coercion by other jurors.
In light of our disposition regarding the motion for new trial based on juror
misconduct, we do not address the contention as to juror coercion. For the
same reason, we also do not address whether the circuit court erred when it
denied the motion to continue.
14
Pitts argues that the prosecutor committed the following
instances of misconduct: (1) improperly eliciting inadmissible evidence, (2)
improperly commenting on Pitts’ right to be present at trial, (3) improperly
commenting on the credibility of witnesses, and (4) distorting, manipulating,
and misrepresenting evidence at trial and during closing arguments. In light
of our disposition in Part III.A, supra, we address Pitts’ first two
contentions to provide guidance to the parties and the court on remand.
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motions in limine, the defense sought to exclude any evidence of
prior criminal convictions. 96 Hawaii 83, 88-89, 26 P.3d 572,
577-78 (2001). The circuit court ruled that the prosecutor
could refer to a specific theft arrest and conviction but could
not refer to it as “a crime of dishonesty.” Id. at 89,
26 P.3d
at 578. Nevertheless, the prosecutor asked the defendant during
cross-examination, “Why should this jury . . . believe a thief
like you.” Id. at 91,
26 P.3d at 580. And, during closing
arguments, the prosecutor twice referred to the defendant’s
prior theft crime as “a crime of dishonesty” and argued that
there was no reason for the jury to believe “a convicted thief.”
Id. at 92,
26 P.3d at 581. On appeal, we stated that the
prosecutor had committed misconduct by violating the circuit
court’s express in limine ruling. Id. at 98-99,
26 P.3d 587-88;
see also State v. Pemberton,
71 Haw. 466, 473-77,
769 P.2d 80,
83-85 (1990) (holding that it was misconduct for prosecutor to
attempt to introduce inadmissible evidence despite the trial
court repeatedly sustaining defense counsel’s objections).
In this case during motions in limine the circuit
court precluded the State from introducing evidence that after
Pitts’ initial release from custody, Pitts accused Brown of
sleeping with his girlfriend and asked for an apology. The
circuit court concluded that the probative value of an alleged
motive related to Pitts asking for an apology was outweighed by
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the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. However, the
prosecutor specifically directed the questioning to elicit from
Brown testimony regarding the reason for the stabbing, and the
term “apology” or “apologize” was used in succession eight times
by the prosecutor and Brown in reference to that reason.
The circuit court confirmed the impropriety of the
prosecutor’s line of questioning when Pitts objected the
following day, stating that it would have sustained an objection
if one had been made because the prosecutor’s questioning was
“leaving that for speculation in the jury’s mind [and it was]
prejudicial to him.” In other words, the questions regarding an
apology allowed the jury to infer that Pitts had a reason for
stabbing Brown. When the court asked the prosecutor to explain
the basis of the questioning, the prosecutor stated that “all I
wanted to do is get out from [Brown] any conversation he had
with [Pitts] regarding the stabbing” and not to get into the
“actual” allegations of rape. Yet obtaining any conversation
regarding the stabbing circumvented the court’s in limine ruling
to preclude any testimony regarding an apology. The court
thereafter sought to cure the prejudice by instructing the jury
that testimony of the previous day as to Pitts “demanding an
apology” and “[a]nything to do with this alleged apology” was to
be disregarded; however, the cautionary instruction may have
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only had the effect of highlighting that the “apology” had been
demanded “for something.”
The nature of the prosecutor’s line of questioning was
particularly problematic because the inferences taken from the
testimony concerned the main issue in the case: the identity of
Brown’s attacker.15 Brown was the only person who positively
identified Pitts as the assailant, but Pitts testified that a
third, unidentified black male committed the stabbing. Given
this conflicting testimony, the State’s most difficult hurdle in
its case against Pitts was convincing the jury that Pitts
suddenly and without reason attacked his friend of almost twenty
years.16 The testimony of an alleged apology invited the jury to
infer that Pitts had a motive to stab Brown, making Brown’s
testimony regarding the attacker’s identity more believable. In
turn, speculation about an alleged apology would weigh heavily
on Pitts’ credibility and impair his defense.
15 The State argues that this was not misconduct because the
prosecutor did not elicit testimony that Pitts accused Brown of sleeping with
Pitts’ girlfriend. However, the circuit court ruling clearly precluded the
State from eliciting testimony that Pitts demanded an apology after his
release from custody without regard to its substance. As the court’s
comments and cautionary instruction make evident, the alleged apology had to
be for “something” and that something in the jury mind’s was likely Pitts’
motive.
16
Similarly damaging to Pitts was the inference that he had a
reason to be “mad” at Brown before the stabbing, which could be inferred from
the Prosecutor’s question to Brown, “So before you picked the defendant up on
December 22, 2008, did you know why he was mad at you?” (Emphasis added.)
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Because of our determination regarding the motion for
a new trial based on the juror misconduct, we need not determine
whether this introduction of inadmissible evidence would require
granting Pitts a new trial. We emphasize, however, the
obligation of counsel to comport with rulings of the court and
“to avoid even the appearance of unfair advantage over the
accused.” Rogan, 91 Hawaii at 412, 984 P.2d at 1238.
2. Improper Statement on Pitts’ Right to Review Evidence and
Prepare a Defense
Pitts also contends that the prosecutor improperly
argued that “[Pitts] listened to the testimony and then came up
with his” defense because this argument “d[id] not tie Pitts’
testimony in with any other evidence in the case.”17
Generally, a prosecutor has wide latitude on
commenting on the evidence during closing argument, including
drawing reasonable inference from the evidence. State v.
Basham, 132 Hawaii 97, 112, 319 P.3d 1105, 1120 (2014).
“Because the prosecutor’s argument is likely to have significant
persuasive force with the jury, the scope of argument must be
consistent with the evidence and marked by the fairness that
should characterize all of the prosecutor’s conduct.”
Id. at
17 While Pitts frames this argument as a comment on Pitts’ right to
be present at trial, we address only the general propriety of the
prosecutor’s statement.
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115, 319 P.3d at 1123 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
State v. Klinge, 92 Hawaii 577, 592, 994 P.2d 509, 524 (2000)).
Therefore, a prosecutor’s comment on matters “outside the
evidence” is improper. State v. Walsh, 125 Hawaii 271, 290,
260
P.3d 350, 369 (2011) (quoting State v. Tuua, 125 Hawaii 10, 14,
250 P.3d 273, 277 (2011)). And a prosecutor’s comments may not
infringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights.
Id. at 284,
260 P.3d at 363.
Here, the prosecutor contended that Pitts’
identification defense was the result of Pitts having reviewed
the police reports and the evidence in the case:
Now, the defendant does not have to put on a case at all.
It’s the State’s burden. After looking at all the facts,
after looking at the police reports and the evidence that’s
in this case, the defendant comes up with an idea. It
wasn’t me. It was somebody else. I didn’t do this.
Thus, according to the prosecutor, Pitts had “come[] up” with
the “idea” of his identification defense based on his review of
the police reports in the case and after “looking at all the
evidence that’s in the case.” Not only was there no evidence
presented at trial from which the prosecutor could have
reasonably inferred that Pitts’ identification defense
originated after or as a result of reviewing the police reports
and the evidence in the case, but more fundamentally such
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comments are a clear infringement on a defendant’s
constitutional right to prepare and present a defense.18
This court has stated on numerous occasions that
“[c]entral to the protections of due process is the right to be
accorded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.” State v. Tetu, 139 Hawaii 207, 219, 386 P.3d 844, 856
(2016) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Kaulia, 128
Hawaii 479, 487,
291 P.3d 377, 385 (2013)). It is well
established that “all defendants must be provided with the basic
tool[s] of an adequate defense.”
Id. (internal quotations
omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Scott, 131
Hawaii 333, 352,
319 P.3d 252, 271 (2013)). An essential
component of the basic tools is the process of discovery, which
promotes “fairness in [our] adversary system.”
Id. (quoting
State v. Valeros, 126 Hawaii 370, 379,
271 P.3d 665, 674
(2012)); see also Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 16 (2012)
(requiring the disclosure of prescribed materials by the
prosecution and defense); Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 77
(1985) (“[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State
proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain
18 The State concedes that, “[n]aturally, a defendant would look at
all the facts, including police reports and evidence the prosecution obtained
in forming a defense.”
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that [the defendant] has access to the raw materials integral to
the building of an effective defense.”).
The State acknowledges that the prosecutor in this
case “referred to all facts, police reports and evidence in this
case” but maintains that “[i]nsofar as there was no reference to
Pitts’ right to be present at trial, there was no misconduct.”
However, the prosecutor’s comments were an attack on Pitts for
being a defendant as it penalized him for reviewing the police
reports and evidence in the case and for the defense raised.19
See Basham, 132 Hawaii at 118, 319 P.3d at 1126 (“Generic
arguments by the prosecutor that defendants, by virtue of being
defendants, have no reason to tell the truth or have the
greatest incentive to lie also transform a defendant’s decision
to testify at trial into an ‘automatic burden on . . .
credibility.’” (alteration in original)).
19 As we explained in Walsh:
[T]he prosecution is free to refer to the specific
inconsistencies and contradictions in a defendant’s
testimony or with other evidence, without referring to [the
defendant’s right to review the evidence presented against
the defendant]. Even in cases where there are no
inconsistencies, the “close or perfect symmetry between a
defendant’s testimony and other witnesses’ testimony, or
other evidence of tailoring, may prompt the jury’s
scrutiny.” [State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, (N.J. 2004)].
Prosecutors may already cite to specific facts indicating a
defendant’s lack of trustworthiness; there is no reasonable
justification for placing a tailoring burden on testimony.
Walsh, 125 Hawaii at 295, 260 P.3d at 374.
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The prosecutor’s argument in this case thus wrongly
infringed on Pitts’ constitutional right to conduct discovery,
present a defense, and be afforded a fair trial. See State v.
Davis, 63 Haw. 191, 196,
624 P.2d 376, 479 (1981) (the
enlargement of pretrial discovery under the penal rules is
“designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal
trial”). Because of our disposition in this case, we need not
determine whether the improper closing argument constituted
plain error.
C. Denial of Right to Jury of Peers
Pitts asks this court to review as plain error his
assertion that he was denied his right to a jury of his peers
when a prospective juror who expressed concern about the lack of
African-Americans in the jury pool was peremptorily dismissed.20
Article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the equal protection of law.21
20
We do not address Pitts’ argument that African-Americans were
systematically excluded from the jury list as the record in this case is
clearly insufficient to support this assertion.
21
Article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution provides as
follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor be denied the equal
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person’s civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or
ancestry.
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State v. Batson, 71 Haw. 300, 302,
788 P.2d 841, 842 (1990). As
such, “[i]t is impermissible to exercise peremptory challenges
in a manner which discriminates on the basis of such categories
as race, religion, ancestry, or gender.” State v. Daniels, 109
Hawaii 1, 5,
122 P.3d 796, 800 (2005) (Caucasian males); see
State v. Levinson,
71 Haw. 492,
795 P.2d 845 (1990)) (women);
Batson,
71 Haw. at 302,
788 P.2d at 842 (same ethnic minority as
defendant). Our precedent requires that the defendant first
make a prima facie showing that “the challenged juror is a
member of a protected group, that the opposing party exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove the juror, and that the facts and
circumstances surrounding the exercise of the peremptory
challenge raise an inference of discrimination.” Daniels, 109
Hawaii at 5,
122 P.3d at 800.
In this case, the juror was allegedly excused based
not on her ethnicity, gender, or membership in another protected
group, but rather on her expression of concern about the lack of
African-Americans in the jury venire. Our caselaw does not
prohibit peremptory challenges against jurors unless the
challenge is based on the prospective juror’s membership in a
protected group. Nonetheless, a court’s inherent authority to
administer justice would likely allow intervention when the
specific circumstances of a peremptory challenge threatened the
integrity of the judicial system. Cf. Alakai Na Keiki, Inc. v.
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Matayoshi, 127 Hawaii 263, 283, 277 P.3d 988, 1008 (2012)
(“[A]lthough the exact nature of the ‘judicial power’ is not
defined in the constitution [of Hawaii], the ‘inherent power of
the court is the power to protect itself[ and] the power to
administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been
granted or not . . . .” (quoting State v. Moriwake,
65 Haw. 47,
56,
647 P.2d 705, 712 (1982))).
Thus, a court concerned that a peremptory challenge
exercised upon a prospective juror appears to discriminate on a
prohibited basis has the authority to request that counsel
provide a reason for the exercise of the challenge. See
Levinson, 71 Haw. at 499,
795 P.2d at 849 (holding that the
right to serve on a jury “cannot be taken away for any of the
prohibited bases of race, religion, sex or ancestry”);
Matayoshi, 127 Hawaii at 283, 277 P.3d at 1008.
D. Denial of Motion to Dismiss Indictment
“[W]here evidence of a clearly exculpatory nature is
known to the prosecution, such evidence must be presented to the
grand jury.” State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 241, 245,
589 P.2d 517, 520
(1978).
Pitts argues that evidence that Brown did not
initially identify Pitts as his attacker was clearly exculpatory
and should have been presented to the grand jury. Although
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Brown may have initially indicated that he did not know his
attacker, he subsequently identified Pitts as the assailant.
The State also presented the testimony of Igawa--whose testimony
before the grand jury identified Pitts as the attacker22--as well
as the testimony of Officer Campbell, who assisted in arresting
Pitts after the incident. While Brown’s failure to initially
identify Pitts as his attacker may bring into question Brown’s
credibility, this evidence is not clearly exculpatory in light
of the other evidence presented to the grand jury that
inculpated Pitts, particularly Brown’s subsequent identification
of Pitts. See Bell, 60 Haw. at 253,
589 P.2d at 524-25
(concluding that the victim’s failure to identify the defendant
at the lineup reflected on the victim’s believability but was
not clearly exculpatory because the victim previously identified
the defendant outside the police station). Therefore, the
circuit court did not err in denying Pitts’ motion to dismiss
the indictment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because it cannot be said that the several jurors’
discovery of the stains on Pitts’ pants during deliberations was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate the circuit
22 As previously noted, Igawa’s identification of the assailant was
precluded at trial, but his description of the person was permitted. See
supra Part I.A.
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court’s Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, filed November 9,
2016, and remand the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Walter R. Schoettle /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for appellant
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Sonja P. McCullen
for appellee /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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