Volume 147 — United States Reports

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion,</p>

Held: that the creditor was not thereby precluded *37 from proving his debt against the bankrupt; and that an endorser of the note of the bankrupt to the creditor, on which the judgment was founded, was not discharged from his liability as endorser by reason of the levy being declared in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt law, Rev. Stat., § 5084, and § 5021 as amended by the act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 178 , 181.

This was a bill in equity to enjoin an action at law for the recovery of the possession of eleven sections of school lands ■in Shackleford County, Texas, and for .the cancellation and annulment of certain patents for the same issued to the defendant Becker.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT. OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>This was an appeal from a decree requiring the appellant to surrender for cancellation seventy-five bonds of one thousand dollars’ each, purporting to have been executed by the town of Lansing, and dismissing a cross-bill filed by Lytle to compel the payment of the overdue coupons attached to such bonds.</p> <p>By an act of the legislature of New York, passed in 1869, Laws of 1869* 2203, c. 907, it was provided that whenever a majority of the taxpayers of any municipal corporation, owning or representing a majority of the taxable property, should make application to the county judge, stating their desire that such corporation should issue its bonds to an amount not exceeding 20 per cent of the taxable property, and invest the same in the stock or bonds of such railroad company as might be named in the petition, it became, the duty of such county judge to order a notice of such petition to be published, and to take proof as to the number of taxpayers joining in the petition, and the amount of taxable property represented by the petitioners. In pursuance of this act, in December, 1870, petitions of certain taxpayers of the town of Lansing were presented to the county judge of Tompkins County, who caused the proper notice to be published, proceeded to take proofs, and on March 20, 1871, adjudged and determined that the petition was duly signed by a majority of the taxpayers of the town of Lansing; that the petitioners represented a majority of the taxable property; that the sum of $75,000, mentioned in the petition, did not exceed 20 per cent of the whole taxable property of the town; and that all the requirements of law respecting the issuing of town bonds, to the amount of $75,000, and for the investment of the same in the stock or bonds, or both, of the “ Cayuga Lake Eailroad Company,” had been fully complied with. He thereupon appointed three freeholders and taxpayers of said town as commissioners, whose-duty it would be to execute such .bonds and to discharge all such other duties as should be required of them as such commissioners. On March' 27, 1871, a writ of certiorari was sued out of the Supreme Court to review these proceedings, and in May, 1872, the general term of such court ordered and adjudged that all the proceedings in relation to the issuing of these ■ bonds should be reversed, annulled and held for naught, for the reasons that the Cayuga Lake Eailroad Company was not a legal corporation that the articles of association failed to state the name of each county through or into which, the road was intended to be made; that no •valid charter was produced before the county judge; that the petition did not direct whether the money was to be invested in stock or bonds ; and that it was not shown that a majority of the taxpayers had signed the petition. People v. Van ValTcenburgh, 63 Barb. 105.</p> <p>In some way — though exactly how did not clearly appear — the railroad company induced the commissioners to issue and deliver to them these bonds, for which they received a certificate for an equivalent amount of railroad stock. The allegation of the bill in this connection was that the officers of the railroad' company fraudulently and by false, pretences procured the commissioners to deliver the bonds, by representing and inducing them to believe that their action would not in any way injure or affect the town, and also by presenting to them an undertaking of the company to indemnify and save them harmless from the consequences of their act. It was further alleged that the stock of the company received in exchange for these bonds was of no value ; that the company had ceased to do business, and was insolvent; and that the town was ready to deliver up the stock in exchange for the cancellation of the bonds.</p> <p>It appears that these bonds, when delivered to the railroad-company, were pledged by it to Leonard, Sheldon & Foster, a banking firm in New York City, as collateral security for a loan of $50,000 to the railroad company ; that this loan wasafterwards transferred to Elliott, Collins & Co., bankers at Philadelphia, to whom the bonds were also turned over as collateral ; that this latter company also had authority from the railroad company to sell them for the company at the price of from seventy to eighty cents on the dollar; and that in February, 1873, the firm sold them, deducted from the proceeds the amount of their loan, and left a balance of $4745.83 to the credit of the railroad company. It did not appear to whom Elliott, Collins & Co. sold the bonds; but subsequently an action was brought in the United States Circuit Court against the town upon these bonds by one John J. Stewart, in which action a verdict was rendered on December 19, 1878, for the defendant. The judgment in favor of the town was after-wards, and on June 30, 1882, affirmed by this court. Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505. In February, 1882, the bonds appear to have been sold by Stewart tó one Prackenridge, who afterwards, and in May, 1884, sold them to Lytle, the plaintiff in this suit, for an interest in a ranch.</p> <p>This action was begun by the town of Lansing in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in May, 1887, for the purpose of obtaining the annulment and cancellation of the bonds, compelling the defendant Lytle to deliver them úp for cancellation, and also enjoining him;from transferring them pending the suit. Lytle removed the action to the Circuit Court of the United States, and filed a cross-bill to compel the payment of the bonds. In March, 1889, the court rendered a decree in favor of the town of Lansing, 38 Fed. Rep. 204, from which Lytle took an appeal to this court.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>This was a-libel by the owners of the British barque Helen against the American steamship City of New York for a collision, which occurred on the evening of June 28,1879, off the New Jersey coast between Barnegat and Absecon, and resulted in the sinking of the Helen, and the total loss of the vessel and cargo. The District Court found both vessels to have been in fault, and decreed an apportionment of damages. 15 Fed. Bep. 624. Both parties appealed to the Circuit Court, by which the decree of the District Court was reversed, the City of New York found to have been solely in fault, and a final decree entered for the libellants for $60,223.12, including costs. 35 Fed. Bep. 604. From this decree the owners of the steamship appealed to this court. The following facts and conclusions of law were found by the Circuit Court:</p> <p>“ 1. The British barque Helen, an iron vessel of 282 tons register, while on a voyage from Havana to New York City, loaded with sugar, was sunk by collision with the steamship City of New York, June 28, 1879, about 10.50 p.m. The captain and three; of the seamen of the barque were drowned when the vessel sank.</p> <p>“ 2. The collision took place at a point off the coast of New. Jersey six and one-quarter miles from shore, in 10 fathoms of water, 12 and % miles from Barnegat light-house and 9£ miles from Tucker’s Beach light-house.</p> <p>“The city of New York was a wooden 'steamship 242 feet long and 1715, tons register, having a .left-handed propeller, and was bound on a voyage' from; New;. York; to Havana. Her full speed was about 12 ¿áid when going at'full speed her headway could. hot' be 'Stopped. by. reversing her engines within a distance of an 'eighth;of a mile.- \</p> <p>“ 3. On the night in question the wind, wgis'.bloyfipg' strong from the south-west or the south-south-west. About half an hour preceding the collision the night became foggy; so much so that vessels could not discover one another at a distance of one-eighth of a mile. During this time and until within about three or four minutes before the collision the vessels had. been approaching each other, the course of the steamer being about S. by "W. {- W. and the course of the bai’que being about N.E. The steamship was going about 11 knots an hour, which was all the speed she could make against the wind. The barque was going about i knots an hour, and each vessel kept her respective course until she heard the fog signal of the other.</p> <p>“ é. During the half hour preceding the collision three seamen were on the deck of‘ the barque besides the mate, one seaman being at the wheel and two on the lookout forward, alternately blowing the fog horn, and the barque’s lights were properly set and burning. During the same time the navigation of the steamer was in charge of her second mate, her quarter-master was at the wheel, her engine was in charge of a competent engineer, she had a lookout on the forward deck, and hey regulation lights were properly set and burning. The lookout on each vessel was vigilant. Each vessel observed the proper fog signals. The steamer maintained her full speed against the wind until her engines were reversed, just before she struck the barque.</p> <p>• “5. Before either vessel discovered the other those in charge of each heard the fog signals of the other. At about two minutes prior to the collision those in charge of the steamer first heard the fog horn of the barque, and from the apparent direction of the sound thought she was one point off the steamer’s starboard bow. Immediately upon hearing the fog horn the mate ordered' the wheel of the steamer put to starboard and hard-a-starb'oard. The order was promptly executed and the steamer .proceeded on under full speed until those in charge discovered the sails of the barque. The steamer had run under hard-a-starboard helm at least a minute before the barque was seen. Those in charge of the steamer then discovered that the barque’s course was eastward, across the steamer’s bow. The steamer then sounded successive whistles of alarm, and those in charge saw the barque luffing to the starboard. Thereupon the mate immediately ordered the steamer’s engines reversed and her wheel ported, and this order was promptly executed, but she was then close to the barque, probably not to exceed 150 feet, and her headway could not be stopped in time to avoid a collision, and the steamer struck the barque on the barque’s port side, her stem striking just forward of the barque’s mizzen rigging,- with such force that she penetrated the barque a distance of five feet, and the barque sank almost instantly.</p> <p>“ The whistle of the steamer first heard by those in charge of the barque indicated to them that the vessels were quite near to each other. They thought the steamer was approaching, bearing abeam on the barque’s port side. Immediately after they saw her masthead light and then her green light, whereupon the mate told the wheelsman to port the wheel, and called to those below to save themselves. The man at the wheel had hardly got the wheel over when the steamer struck the barque. During the time the steamer was running under her hard-a-starboard wheel she changed her course to the eastward three or four points, and the barque after she luffed changed her course one or two points by the time the vessels came together.”</p> <p>The sixth finding relates only to the, damages, and is immaterial.</p> <p> “ Conclusions of Law. </p> <p>“ 1. The steamer was guilty of fault in violating the 21st rule, because she did not slacken her speed when she heard the fog signals of the barque, and also because she did not go at a moderate speed when in a fog, and also because she changed her course and kept on at great speed after she heard the barque’s fog horn before seeing her.</p> <p>“ 2. The barque’s change, of course was an error in extremis.”</p>

On November 3,1888, appellant, as plaintiff, filed its bill in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the Territory of New Mexico, to restrain the defendant, sheriff, and ex officio collector of Bernalillo County, from the collection of the regular territorial, county, and city taxes assessed and levied upon its property for the year 1888. The ground upon which the injunction was sought was, generally speaking, inequality and discrimination in the assessment.

Held: under and according to the laws of Missouri, in said county on the 12th day of March, 1867, at which election five hundred and ten votes were duly and legally cast in favor of making the subscription to the said company and of issuing therefor the bonds herein described, and only ninety-eight votes were cast against the said subscription and issue of bonds.” The answer admitted the issue of the bonds, but alleged…

This, was an action of trespass on the case,, brought October' 19, 1S86, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, by Prentice, a citizen of Ohio, against the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern. Railway Company, a corporation of Illinois, to recover damages for the wrongful acts of the defendant’s servants. The declaration alleged, and the evidence introduced at the trial tended to prove, the following facts: The plaintiff was a physician.

Held: though it was her intention to charge such estate, that such intention did not take effect, as it was not expressed in the contract itself. In the caso cf Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328 , 335, the same question was elaborately considered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Held: ' That a vendor’s lien existed on the property for thq complainants’ benefit which could be enforced by them for the balance due them on the purchase money; (2) That George Lyle was not a necessary party to the proceedings to enforce it ; (3) That there was an error in the master’s computation, which made it necessary to remand the case. .

<p>error to the supreme court OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the court - had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provision in the act of August 13, *151 1888, 25'Stat. 433, 434, e. 866, that such court shall not have cognizance of a suit to recover the contents of a promissory note in favor of an assignee or subsequent holder, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court if ,no assignment had been made.

Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court which held that the Secretary of the Interior violated the Due Process Clause when revoking a railroad corporation's right of way over public lands.

Held: that that was á good defence, and that there was nothing to justify the failure to pay the premiums. The cases of Manhattan Life Ins. Go. v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 156 ; Whitehead v. New York Life Ins. Go., 102 N. Y. 143 ; and Garner v. Germania Life Ins. Go., 110 N. Y. 266 ; distinguished. This was an action to recover on a policy of life insurance.

This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado by a citizen of Connecticut against the county of Lake, a municipal corporation of Colorado, upon coupons for interest of six bonds for $500 each, part of a series of ten bonds, issued by the county on July 1,1881, payable to bearer in twenty years, and redeemable at the pleasure of the county after ten years, and containing this recital: “ This bond is one of a series of five…

Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238 (1893), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a person should not receive compensation for injuries sustained when he is experienced in his work and there is no evidence of negligence or extenuating circumstances.

This was a suit in equity to determine the respective rights of the adtalt and minor heirs of Edward Bernier,-at the time of his death, to certain real property in Michigan, held by him under a homestead entry, and to compel the conveyance from the minor heirs, and the defendant who has acquired an interest from one of them, of an undivided half of the premises, to-the complainants.

. This was a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, by the city of New Orleans, suing as residuary legatee under the will of John McDonough, deceased, against the- deputy surveyor general of the United States for the State of Louisiana, to enjoin him from surveying and locating a new back line or rear boundary of a French grant, and .-from dividing into sections lands alleged to belong to the plaintiff north of, and contiguous to,…

Held: that the Circuit Court of the United States had jurisdiction to review items disallowed by the First Comptroller before March 3, 1887, although, by § 2 of the act, jurisdiction was withheld of claims which had theretofore “.been rejected, or reported on adversely, by any court, department or , commission authorized to hear and determine the same.” Items for marshal’s fees for distributing venires; and for amounts…

Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the United States Constitution's Appointments Clause. The Court declared Congress may expand the duties of an existing office without rendering it necessary that the incumbent again be nominated, confirmed and appointed as long as the new duties are "germane" to those already held by the office.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES EÓR THE DISTRICT OE NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the acts of' the parties indicated that the services of the plaintiffs should be estimated according to the rule of quantum meruit, and not according to the schedule of charges of the American Institute of Architects, and that they were entitled to recover $8000 a year for six years’ services. Held, that that was a proper and reasonable decision.

. Motion to dismiss, or 'affirm. This was an action commenced October -26, 1886,.in. the Supreme Court of the city, county; .and State of'New York, by'John Glenn, as trustee,, against David J. Garth, Robert A. Lancaster, and Samuel J. Harrison, impleaded with others, to recover the amount of two assessments made by-the courts of the State of Virginia upon the stock and stockholders of the National Express and Transportation Company, a corporation of that State. .

-THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. This was a bill in equity filed by the Northeastern Railroad Company of South Carolina against the treasurer and sheriff of Charleston, Berkeley, Williamsburg and Florence Counties, through which the plaintiff’s road passes, to enjoin them from issuing executions against or seizing the property of the plaintiff for the purpose of collecting a tax based upon an assessment alleged to be unconstitutional and void.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.</p>

Held: that the offer was too vague. A married woman was codefendant in an action of trespass to try title in Texas. Her interest was a community interest in the property by virtue of a conveyance to her husband. Held, that a personal judgment in damages for use and occupation, and for costs, could not be rendered . against her.

states the case and decision as follows: ' “A;tenant cannot maintain an action against his landlord for ad injury caused by falling upon a stair in the tenement, the tread of which has been sawed out and left unsupported by a-previous tenant,-there having been full opportunity to examine the stair at the time of hiring, and no warranty of the fitness of the tenement -having been given by the landlord; the only evidence of knowledge on the part of the landlord being that he…

Held: that the United Lines Company did not occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser of the property; that full notice of the equities and claims of the plaintiff was given to it before it purchased the • property at *443 the foreclosure sale; that it acquired the rights of the bondholders under the $10,000,000 mortgage, and nothing more; that as to the suggestion that receivers’ certificates were created pursuant to…

Held: .upon any sound theory, that the privilege of obtaining by lot or *466 chance a larger sum than the principal, interest and premium, which the holder was sure to get in any event, imparted to the loan the character, object and accompaniments of a mere lottery scheme, in violation of the constitution and laws of the State of New York. Judge Finch dissented.

' ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS. This action was commenced in the District Court of Eice County, Kansas, August 10,1885, by the plaintiffs in error, and in the following month, after the pleadings were filed, was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.

This was an action of "replevin commenced in the District Court of Alturas County, Territory of Idaho, on December 12, 1887, by Josiah Barnett against P. H. Kinney to recover the possession of certain goods and chattels mentioned in the complaint and for damages and costs.

ORIGINAL. The petitioner libelled the yacht Lurline and claimant in the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of New York, to enforce a state law lien under a maritime contract for repairs. Judgment having been rendered in favor of the petitioner, the claimant appealed to tlf1’ Circuit Court' of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

<p>The Fi-f th Amendment to the Constitution operates exclusively in restriction of Federal power, and has no application to the States.</p> <p>A controversy as to the good faith -of a transaction by which the title to the property which forms the subject of this- litigation was transferred to the plaintiff-in error is held to involve no Federal question.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The appellants imported into the port of New York, by the steamship Alaska, several cases containing knit woollen undershirts,. drawers and hosiery. The collector assessed duty- on them, under paragraph 396 of § 1 of the tariff act of October 1,1890, 26 Stat. 567, 597, c.02'14, as “ wool wearing apparel.” The appellants protested, claiming-that the articles were dutiable only under paragraph 392 of the same act, as “ knit fabrics made on frames.” On this protest, the board of general appraisers, reversing the decision of the collector, held that the merchandise-should have been classified as contended by the importers, under paragraph 392, and not under paragraph 396. Thereupon the collector made application to the United States Circuit Court, for the- Southern District of New York, for a review of the matter. Additional- testimony was taken as authorized ■ by the statute, and, on 'hearing, that court reversed the decision of the.board of general appraisers and sustained the ruling of the collector. 46 Fed. Eep. 510. From this decision appellants appealed to this court. Paragraphs 396 and 392 are as follows:</p> <p>“ 396. On clothing, ready made, and articles of wearing apparel of every description, made up or manufactured wholly or in part not specially provided for in this act, felts not woven, and not specially provided for in this act, and plushes and other pile fabrics, all the foregoing, composed wholly or in part .of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals the duty per pound shall be four and’ one-half times the duty imposed by this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first-class, and in addition thereto sixty per centum ad valorem.”</p> <p>“392. On woollen or worsted cloths, shawls, knit fabrics and all fabrics made on knitting machines or frames, and all manufactures of every description made wholly or in .part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals, not specially provided for in this act, valued at not more than thirty cents per pound, the duty per pound shall be three tildes the duty imposed by this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first-class, and in addition thereto forty per centum ad valorem; valued at naore than thirty, and not more than forty cents per. pound, the duty per pound shall be three and one-half times the duty imposed by this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first-class, and in addition thereto forty per centum ad valorem; valued at above forty cents per pound, the duty per pound shall be four times the duty imposed by this act on á pound of unwashed wool of. the first-class, and in addition thereto fifty per centum ad valorem.”</p>

This was an action of trespass to try title, brought Eebruary.28, 1889, in the District Court of Bexar County, Texas, against David S. Stanley and three other defendants, by Mary U. Schwalby, whose husband, J. A. Schwalby, was afterwards made a party plaintiff, to recover a certain parcel or lot of ■ land in;the city of San Antonio.

This case is submitted on a motion to dismiss or affirm. The facts are these: Defendant in error, the Western Land Company, on August 21, 1887, filed its petition in the District Court of O’Brien County, Iowa, to recover from the defendant Hamblin, now plaintiff in error, the possession of .the north-' east-quarter of section 1, township 95 north, range él west, fifth principal meridian.

This was a bill in equity, filed June 29, 1888, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, by Gilbert M. Richardson, a citizen of New Tork, against Francis B. Fleitas, a citizen of Louisiana, and residing in that district, for a seizure and sale of mortgaged lands in the parish of St. Bernard in that district, under executory process, in accordance with the provisions of the Louisiana Code of Practice, the material parts of which are…

Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 550 (1893), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, under the Louisiana Code, a husband's liability to his wife for her separate property received by him under the marriage contract is considered a debt secured by a mortgage on his lands. This liability may be enforced by the wife through a direct suit against her husband. The Court also held that the liability may be extinguished by the husband's discharge in bankruptcy.

Held: that P, on taking out letters testamentary in Pennsylvania, was entitled, as executor, and upon filing a copy of those letters,' to maintain a bill in equity against the New Jersey administrator in'the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, tó; recover those • proceeds, with interest, and costs. *558 This was a bill in equity, filed August 11, 1881, in the Court of Chancery of the State…

Held: suit could only be brought in the county where the defendant could be found; which was the provision of section 5 of Article 1 of the Revised Statutes of 1845, page 805, which provision was abrogated by § 1 of Article 4 of the Session Acts of 1849, page 76, providing that if all the defendants were non-residents of Missouri, and an action would lie against them; it might be brought in any county, Avhich latter…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAR FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA.</p> <p>This was an action commenced by Taylor and Bidwell against Brown and Young, impleaded with others, in .the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, of the Territory of Dakota, within and for the county of Moody, July 17, 1885, and in which an amended complaint was served March 1, 1886. The prayer of the complaint was that certain deeds should. be adjudged and declared. clouds on the plaintiff’s alleged title to one .hundred and sixty acres of land therein described, and be decreed null and void and of no effect, and that the plaintiffs should be decreed to be the legal owners of the property. Young and Brown were the only parties served. They answered separately, requested separate findings in their favor,, and the court found separately, as to and against each of them, whereupon each moved for a new trial, and, their motions being overruled and judgment'being entered against them, took separate appeals to the Supreme Court of the Territory.</p> <p>The cause was tried by the District Court upon the admissions- in the pleadings and the evidence adduced, and thereupon the court found, in brief, that on June 15, 1880, a patent issued to one Thomas K. West for the one hundred and sixty acres in question, and was duly recorded October 7, 1881; that on January 25, 1881, the patentee and. his wife conveyed to defendant Young forty acres of the tract for valuable consideration, the receipt of which was acknowledged; and that Young entered into actual possession of the forty acres on that date,, and had ever since occupied, used and cultivated the land, using and claiming the same in his own right adversely to all the world and especially as against the plaintiffs,, and had erected and made valuable, permanent improvements thereon.</p> <p>. That on August 13, 1881, West conveyed to his wife eighty acres of the tract by deed bearing - that date, acknowledging the-receipt of a valuable consideration, and recorded October 7, 1881; that on August 15, 1881, Mrs. West conveyed to defendant Brown the eighty acres-in consideration .of. the sum of $300, paid to her on that date • that Brown entered into. actual possession of the eighty acres August 15, 1881, claiming it in his own right and.title thereto under the deed to him, and occupied, used and cultivated the land, using-and claiming the same in his owrn right from, that date adversely.</p> <p>That oh June 15, 1885, by'deed recorded that day, West and his wife conveyed the whole one hundred and sixty acres to Young..for a valuable consideration, the receipt of which was acknowledged, and on the last-mentioned date, Young entered into actual possession of the premises, claiming them-in his .own right and title thereto, and that since that date Young occupied and used the land, and had been in actual -possession of. the whole of it, using and claiming.the same adversely. '</p> <p>That West and his wife on June 17, 1885, and from August 15, 1881,' wére not in the actual possession or ■ otherwise of either the forty or the eighty acres; that West and his wife,' on June 17, 1885, conveyed the land to C. E. Thayer, who, on June 19, conveyed the one hundred and twenty acres to the plaintiffs; that neither said Thayer nor his wife were on June 19, or at-any other time prior-to or since that date, and at the time of the delivery of the deéd to the plaintiffs, in actual' possession' of the forty acres, nor were they in actual possession •of any part of the said tract:</p> <p>That Thomas K. West was a Sioux Indian who had arrived at the age of twenty-one years and who had abandoned his. tribal relations and made satisfactory proof of such abandonment by taking an oath of allegiance 'to the United States government, and who was entitled, under sections 15 and 16 of chapter 131 of the Laws of the United States, passed March 3, 1875, entitled “An act making appropriations to 'supply deficiencies in the appropriations for fiscal years ending June 30, 1875, and prior years, and for other purposes,” to enter a .homestead under the laws of the United States, and had en-' leered said land under said laws and duly proved up on the • same and received, the patent referred to.</p> <p>h?hat the deeds to Young, Alfred Brown, and Sophia West, were made within five years from the date of the patent to West by the United States; that the adverse possession of Brown and Young was entirely founded on conveyances that were absolutely null and void; and that the possession of Brown and Young of the premises and the improvements made thereon were made with full notice that West was an Indian, as previously found.</p> <p>The court stated the following conclusions of law:</p> <p>“ I. That the land described in said patent was absolutely inalienable prior to the 16th day of June, 1885; that the deeds from Thomas K. West to Timothy Young, of January 25, 1881, June 15, 1885, and from Thomas K. West to Sophia West, of August 13, 1881, and from Sophia West to Alfred Brown, of August 15, 1881, are null and void.</p> <p>*“11. That the deed from Thomas K. West and Sophia West to C. E. Thayer on the 17th day of June, 1885, and the deed from C. E. Thayer and wife to S. S. Taylor and S. A. Bidwell are good and valid conveyances, and conveyed the title of said premises to the said plaintiffs.</p> <p>“III. That the plaintiffs, S. S. Taylor and S. A. Bidwell, ' are the owners of said premises.”</p> <p>The Supreme Court of the Territory reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. The opinion will be. found in 5 Dakota, 335.</p>

This ivas an action brought February 13, 1886, in a court of the State of Kansas, by Elbridge G-. Blunt, a citizen of Illinois, against Bau'serman, a citizen of Kansas, and administrator of James G. Blunt, deceased, upon a promissory note for $3204.34, made ,by James G. Blunt at Chicago, Illinois, July 1, 187.5, and payable to Elbridge G. Blunt in one day after date, with interest annually at the rate of ten per cent.

This was a petition to recover for services as marshal of the United States for the Southern District' of Illinois in executing certain warrants of commitment of prisoners, to the penitentiary at Chester,' Illinois. The claims were.‘for travel fees in the service of the warrants, and were disallowed- by the comptroller upon, the ground that a claim for mileage had already been allowed for as “ transportation ” for the deputies .who executed the writs.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS. '</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

■ This was a petition for. per-diem fees as clerk of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States for the District of BhodeTsland.

<p>A clerk of a District Court is entitled to charge for entering orders approving marshals’ accounts.- United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 1Ü9, approved. .</p> <p>He is also entitled to charge for certifying copies of such orders to be forwarded to the department with the accounts, but not for the seals affixed to sue i copies unless such authentication is required' by the Treasury Department.</p> <p>He is alsp entitled to charge for copies of orders for marshals to pay supervisors'of elections, without regard to the necessity for such orders, or the power of the court to make them.</p> <p>He is also entitled to a fee for filing a marshal’s account with vouchers attached, but -not to a separate fee for filing each voucher.</p> <p>He is also entitled to fees for recording,' after the determination of a prosecution, all the proceedings relating to it, including the order of commitment.</p> <p>United States v. Harmon, 147 TJ. S. 268, affirmed to the point of the power . of the Treasúry to determine whether the several allowances increase his salary beyond the maximum compensation.</p>

This was a petition by H. H. King, whose Christian name is not given, to recover certain fees as clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia. To his petition was annexed a schedule of 23 items, running through four years of service, which had been disallowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury, amounting in the aggregate to $595.65.

This was a petition by the District Attorney of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia for services rendered in conducting examinations of persons charged with crime before United States commissioners upon the same days that attendance upon the Circuit or District Courts was charged. The court found as a conclusion of law that the. plaintiff was entitled to recover, and awarded judgment in his favor for $215. The United States appealed. .

This was a petition for fees by the cleric of the- District and Circuit Courts of the United States for the "Western District of North Carolina. The petition averred that the accounts had been duly presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury, and payment thereof refused, although such accounts had been duly presented and approved by the court in accordance with law.

This was an action by a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio for docket fees, and for fees for taking the acknowledgment of sureties upon recognizances^ The court rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner for $336.75, and the United. States appealed.

This was a petition by the clerk of the District Court for the "Western District of Pennsylvania for payment of certain .fees which. had been disallowed in the settlement of his accounts by the officers of the Treasury. Petitioner averred the approval of his accounts by the court, and that his whole compensation, if said fees were paid, would not exceed the-maximum compensation of $3500.

Held: in Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How, 427 , that the evidence and the exceptions thereto constitute no part of the record, • unless incorporated in a bill of exceptions signed and sealed by the presiding judge. See also Pomeroy v. Bank of Indiana, 1 Wall. 592 .