Volume 148 — United States Reports

Held: that materials and supplies furnished at the home port are.only liens, by force of the State’s statutes, and therefore'do not stand-on the same footing'with maritime liens, so that their priority depends upon whether they attach before or after the.mortgage lien commenced.

This ivas a suit in equity, commenced in June, 1885, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, to quiet the title of the complainant to certain real property described in the bill as the southeast -J of section No. 31, township No. T> north, of range 8 east, of the 6th principal meridian, in Nuckolls County, State of Nebraska, to which the defendant, a citizen of that State, claimed some adverse interest and title.

Held: rather, that the legislation wms in view .of existing law, and that the real intent was that specifications as to. the construction should *36 bs subject to the State, and that- the construction should be in accordance with the laws of the State in force at the time the obligation to construct should become binding.

Held: That the relation between the banks as to uncollected paper was 'that of principal and agent, and that the mere fact that a sub-agent of the Ohio Bank had collected the money due on such paper was not a commingling of those collections with the general funds of the Ohio Bank, and did not operate to relieve them from the trust obligation created by the agency, or create any difficulty in specially tracing them; (2)…

On March 21, 1887, Samuel Rich, a clothing merchant of Leadville, Colorado, executed to the appellants, May and Hirscb, an instrument conveying certain personal property, which instrument was called a chattel mortgage, and .was duly acknowledged and recorded. The instrument sets forth, in Separate paragraphs, nine notes to the Carbonate Bank of Leadville, thé payment of eight of which were endorsed or guaranteed by May or Hirsch, severally.

Held: that the ruling was right. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. D. P: Dyer, (with whom was Mr. Devoid Goldsmith on the brief,) for plaintiff in error. Mr.-James 0. JBroadhead for defendant in error. *72 Mr. J ustice Brewer delivered the

<p>By the acts of July 22, 1854, c. 103, § 8, and July 15, 1870, c. 292, a private claim to land in Arizona under a Mexican grant, which has been reported to Congress by the surveyor .general of the Territory, cannot, before Congress has acted on his report, be contested in the courts of justice.</p>

Held: that this was a sufficient authentication of the judgment of the President and that there was no ground for treating the order as null and void for ,: 'want of the requisite approval. When a court-martial has jurisdiction, errors in its exercise cannot be reviewed in an action against.the United States by the officer courtmartialed to recover salary.

Held: owned and used in the streets and-public places of the city of St. Louis 1509 telegraph poles, and praying to recover the sum of $22,635 therefor.

ORIGINAL. This was a petition by the Commonwealth of Virginia to this court for a writ of mandamus to the Honorable John Paul, District Judge of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, and holding the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, to command him to remand to the count}7 court of Smyth County in Virginia an indictment against Joseph II.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in a suit brought by him to recover back the purchase money, that such refusal by the State raised no Federal question. *138 This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error upon the ground, that no Federal question was involved.

In the call of the docket this case was reached on the 17th of October, 1892, and was then dismissed pursuant to the tenth rule, on the ground .that the record was not printed.

This was a petition, filed in the Court of Claims on October 23, 1889, by the State of Indiana against the United States, to recover the sum of $412,184.97, alleged to be due to the State of Indiana out of moneys received by the United States from sales of public lands in that State. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition. 28 C. Cl.-. The petitioner appealed to this court.

ORIGINAL. The petitioner, a prisoner confined in the jail of tlie District of Columbia, under a sentence of death, by his attorneys, moved for a writ of error from this court to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus, which had been prayed for in a petition to that court. The substance of the averments in the petition is printed in' the margin.* 1

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>This was a petition to this court by Howard J. Schneider, and Jeremiah M. Wilson, William E. Mattingly, and A. A. Hoehling, Jr., his attorneys, and in his behalf. The allegation? in the petition were substantially identical with those in the petition set forth in the margin in In re Schneider, Petitioner, (No. 1) ante, 1§7. The prayer was as follows:</p> <p>“Wherefore your petitioners pray that the writ of habeas corpus issue to Jerome B. Burke, the warden of the United States jail, in the District of Columbia, commanding him to produce the body of the petitioner, Schneider, in court forthwith, together with the cause of his detention as a prisoner by said warden, and that petitioner, Schneider, may be discharged and set at liberty ;• and petitioners furthermore pray that the writ of certiorari may issue to John B. Young, clerk of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, commanding him to certify to this court all the proceedings of record of the United States against ’Howard J. Schneider in that court, to the end that the errors therein, as set forth in this petition, may be fully corrected by this court.”</p> <p>The samé reasons were given as were given there for the action of the attorneys in uniting in the petition, and' for its non-verification by Schneider.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM , THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

To make a tax sale valid, observance of every safeguard to the owner created by statute is imperatively necessary. This action, was brought by the plaintiff, a subject of the Emperor of Germany, against the defendant, a citizen of Oregon, to recover the possession of lots 3 and 4, in block E, in the town of Portland.

,) “such serious interruption to the common and necessary use of property as will be equivalent to a taking within the meaning of the Constitution.” “ The cases which hold that remote and consequential injury to private property by reason of authorized public improvements is not taking such property for public use have' *188 many of them gone to the utmost .limit of that principle, and some beyond it, though the principle is a sound one in its proper application to many…

<p>Tkis case is affirmed on the authority of United States v. Alexander, ante, 186.</p>

Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893), is a United States Supreme Court criminal case involving the knowledge requirement in an obstruction of justice case. It was the first Supreme Court case involving interpretation of obstruction of justice statutes (currently United States Code Section 1503). Chief Justice Fuller wrote, "a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he knew of or had notice that justice was being administered in such court".

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>No appeal from findings of fact and of law and the decision.of the Court of Claims thereon made upon a claim transmitted to it by the head of a Department with the consent of the claimant, and reported to that Department by the court under the provisions of the act of March 3, . 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, lies to this court on the part of the claimant.</p>

<p>This court, in Goode v. Gaines, (145 U. S. 141,) on an appeal by the defendant in a suit in equity, from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of-Arkansas, reversed the decree, and ordered that each party pay one-half of the costs in this court, and the mandate recited the decree of this court, and remanded the cause “ for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity with the opinion of this court,” and commanded that such further proceedings be had in the causo, “ in conformity with the opinion and decree of this court, as, according to right and justice and the laws of the United States ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding.” The Circuit Court had decreed that the, title of the defendant to a lot of land be divested out of him, and bo vested in the plaintiffs, and- that a master take an account of rents on the lot, taxes paid and improvements placed on it. This court held that no error was committed in any matter relating to the title or possession of the land, but that error was committed, in acting on the report of the master, in allowing the plaintiff’s for rents which accrued before the filing of the bill. On the presentation of the mandate to,the Circuit Court, with a proposed decree thereon, the defendant filed exceptions, and the Circuit Court entered an order allowing the defendant to take further testimony in support of his exceptions, “ byway of defence to the title to the land in controversy,” and set the cause down upon the issues formed by the .pleadings and exceptions as to the title to the land, and sustained the exceptions, and overruled a petition of the plaintiffs for a writ of possession. This court awarded a mandamus for the entry of the-proposed decree, and for a writ of possession.</p> <p>This court had not disturbed the findings and decree of the Circuit Court in regard to the title and possession, but only its disposition of the matter of accounting. ,</p> <p>The mandate and the opinion, taken together, although they used the word “ reversed,” amounted to a reversal only in respect to the accounting, and to a modification of the decree in respect of the accounting, and to an affirmance of it in all other respects.</p> <p>The construction of the intent and meaning of the opinion of this court was not a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion by the Circuit Court, and the case is a proper one for a mandamus by this court.</p>

This was an action brought by William B. Bowie in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against Frank Hume as indorser upon a promissory note. The defendant pleaded to the declaration, issue was joined, and on the trial of the cause a verdict was rendered May 25, 1888, in favor of the defendant. During the trial various exceptions were reserved to the rulings and instructions of the court, which were duly noted at the time by the presiding justice upon his minutes.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO.</p> <p>On September 12, 1887, the defendant in error filed his petition in the court of common pleas of Holmes County, Ohio, to'recover from the defendant, the Pennsylvania Company, the sum of $10,000. On October 3, the defendant answered. On March 2, 1888, it filed a petition for removal to the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio. On March 21, a motion was made to strike this petition from the files, which, on March 27, was sustained. At the May term, 1888, a trial was had, both parties appearing. A verdict was returned by the jury for $6000, upon which judgment was duly entered. Thereafter a petition in error was filed in the Circuit Court of Holmes County to reverse such judgment. To this petition in error were attached two transcripts; one of the record in the court of common pleas, and the other of a certain journal ■entry of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio. This journal entry was as follows:</p> <p>“ George S. Bender, Administrator,</p> <p> vs. </p> <p>The Pennsylvania Company.</p> <p>“ Tuesday, March 6, 1888.</p> <p>“ This day came on to be heard the petition of the defendant for an order for the removal of this case from the court of common pleas, of Holmes County, Ohio, and, it appearing to the court that the defendant has filed in this court its petition, bond and affidavit under the 2d section of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887,.entitled ‘An act to determine the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of the United States and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts and for other purposes,’ etc., from which it appears to the court that said affidavit is in' compliance with said 2d section of said act of Congress, and that said bond is sufficient and satisfactory,.and that said defendant by its petition, affidavit and bond has shown that it is entitled to remove cause to this court.”</p> <p>In that court a motion was made to strike the petition in error from the files; which .motion was sustained. Thereupon the defendant'filed its petition in error in the Supreme Court of the State to reverse this ruling. On May 17, 1892, that court sustained the ruling of the Circuit Court and affirmed the judgment, to reverse which judgment of affirmance plaintiff in error sued out a writ of error from, this court. The case is - now submitted on a motion to dismiss.</p>

Held: that the decree-in favor of the corporation was not a final decree from Which an appeal could be taken to this court, and that this appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM' THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: under § 4887 of the Revised Statutes, that; as the Canada act was in force when the United States patent was applied for and issued, and the Canada extension was a *274 matter of right,' at the option of the patentee, on his payment of a required fee, and the fifteen years term of the Canada patent had been continuous and without interruption, the United States patent did not expire before the end of the fifteen…

Held: that a case for a reformation of the deed was clearly made out, unless, indeed, the defendant should be able to show some good reason why such admitted or established facts are not entitled to their apparent weight.

Held: the identity of the land conveyed, or the construction of the instrument under which the party in possession claims title. ' • On the facts in this case, as detailed in the

By the act of August 11, 1888, 25 Stat. 400, 411, o. 860, Congress, among other things, enacted: “The Secretary of War be, and is hereby, authorized and directed to negotiate for and purchase, at a cost not to exceed one hundred and sixty-one thousand, seven hundred and thirty-three dollars, and thirteen cents, lock and dam number seven, otherwise known as ‘the Upper Lock and Dam,’ and its appurtenances, of the Monongahela Navigation Company, a corporation organized under…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE TERRITORY OE WASHINGTON.</p> <p>It appears from the record, in this case- that on October 20, 1882, at Walla Walia, in Washington Territory, Levi Ankeny, the plaintiff in error, entered into a contract with Yan Burén Clark, the defendant in error, by which Ankeny agreed to sell and convey to Clark two quarter sections of land in Walla Walla County in consideration of 12,000 bushels of wheat, to be delivered in three annual instalments of 4000 bushels each, and of the assumption by Clark of a mortgage of $3000 on the land. This contract was evidenced by three written instruments as follows:</p> <p>. 1. A bond from Ankeny to Clark in the penal sum of $10,000 conditioned to convey the land to Clark upon his paying the consideration according to agreement.</p> <p>2. A “ wheat note” from Clark to Ankeny, which reads as follows:</p> <p>“Walla Walla, W. T., Oot. 20, 1882.</p> <p>“For value received I promise to pay to Levi Ankeny or order twelve thousand (12,000) bushels of good, merchantable wheat, said wheat to be delivered to the owner of this note at an;y railroad, station in Walla Walla County, Washington Ty., and payments to be made as follows : On or before Oot. 15th, 1883, four thousand (4,000) bushels; on or before Oct. 15th, 1S84, four thousand (4,000) bushels; and on or before Oct. 15th, 1885, four thousand (4,000) bushels; the owner of this note to furnish sacks for said wheat.”</p> <p>3. A chattel mortgage from Clark to Ankeny to secure the payment of the wheat note.</p> <p>'Under this agreement, Clark entered into possession of the land and continued in posséssion of it until the fall of 1886.</p> <p>In performance of this contract, Clark, in December, 1883, delivered to Ankeny 4167 bushels of wheat, and in September, 1885, he delivered 8600 bushels,’making 767 bushels more than the contract called for. Ankeny accepted this wheat in fulfilment of the contract.</p> <p>After the delivery of the wheat to Ankeny, Olark demanded a deed for the land. This Ankeny neglected to give, putting Clark off from time to time upon one pretext or another, until Clark, becoming impatient, finally insisted either upon a deed to the land or payment for his wheat. Clark was then referred by Ankeny to the latter’s attorneys, who informed him that he could have a warranty deed to tire quarter on the even section and a quitclaim deed to the quarter on the odd section, or the railroad land, as it- was called, and they further informed him that if the Northern Pacific Eailroad Company should not get title to the odd section and he should be obliged to procure title from the government, Ankeny would pay the necessary expenses of obtaining title, in that way. This does not seem to have satisfied Clark, and on November 16, 1886, he served upon Ankeny the following notice:</p> <p>“ Walla Walla, W. T., Nov. 16, 1886.</p> <p>‘Levi Ankeny Esq., Walla Walla,.W. T.</p> <p>“ Dear Sir : I have performed my part of the contract in the purchase of the land described in your bond to me. I have learned that you have-no title to one hundred and sixty acres of it. You have refused'to give me anything more than a quit-claim deed to this part of the land. I cannot accept su.ch a deed. It was not what the contract called for. Unless within five days from this date you convey a perfect title to me to the whole of the land described in the bond by a good and .sufficient conveyance I will, at the end of that time, abandon this land and surrender the possession to you and look to you for such compensation as the law allows me on account of violation of the contract.</p> <p>“ Resp’y, V. B. Clark.”</p> <p>Ankeny seems to have paid no attention to this notice, and Clark, several days thereafter, taking a witness with him, went to Ankeny’s bank and formally surrendered possession of the land to Ankeny. Clark then abandoned possession' of the land and has not occupied it since.</p> <p>Subsequently to all this, and on the 19th day of March, 1887, Clark brought this action in the District Court of the First District to recover from Ankeny the value of 12,767 bushels of wheat delivered under the contract. The case was tried before a jury, who, upon the direction of the court, brought in a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment was given upon the verdict.</p> <p>The defendant took the case in error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The case is now before this court on error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington.</p>

Held: that the mere institution of a suit does not of itself relieve a person from the charge of laches, and that if he fail in the diligent prosecution of the action, the consequences are the same as though no action had been begun. Hawes v. Orr, 10 Bush, 431 ; Erhman v. Kendrick, 1 Met. (Ky.) 146, 149; Watson v. Wilson, 2 Dana, 406 ; Ferrier v. Buzick, 6 Iowa, 258 ; Bybee v. Summers, 4 Oregon, 351, 361.

Held: can exercise- no appellate jurisdiction, except .in the cases, and in the manner and form, defined and prescribed by Congress. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321 , 227; Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch, 307 , 314; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103 , 119 ; United States v. Young, 94 U. S. 258 ; The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381 ; National Exchange Bank v. Peters, 144 U. S. 570 , 572.

<p>A complaint which avers that the plaintiff was, at the several, times named therein, “ and ever since has been and still is a resident of the city, county and State of New York,” is not sufficient to give the Circuit Court of that circuit jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship of the parties, when the record nowhere discloses the plaintiff’s citizenship.</p>

The appellant brought this suit against the United States under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359. The amount claimed exceeded the sum necessary to give this court jurisdiction on appeal. The bill was dismissed June 27, 1892. The application for appeal was made August 9, 1892.

Argument in this case was' commenced by the counsel for the plaintiff in error. At the close of his opening the court declined to hear further argument.

Held: from time immemorial, that the intent of the law makers must be looked for and followed in the construction of the statute, though it limit or even contradict the literal wording of the statute, and that if the language will admit of it, a construction must be given conformable to reason, justice Qand '•the public convenience and welfare.

Held: under the treaty of November 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 , a considerable body.of lands situated in the States of North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia and Alabama. *435 On the 27th of December, 1817, a treaty between the United States and “the chiefs, headmen and warriors of the Cherokee Nation east of the Mississippi River and the chiefs, headmen and warriors of the Oherokees on the' Arkansas River, and their deputies,” was…

This was a bill in equity to recover damages for the infringement of two letters patent for improvements in machines for pouncing hats, viz., patent No. 97,178, issued November 23, 1869, to Rudolph Eickemeyer, and patent No. 220,889, issued October 21, 1879, to Edmund B. Taylor.

■ On April 30, 1891, the appellant filed his complaint in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Territory of Oklahoma.

<p>ERROR TO THE .CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss: The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), was a suit brought before the Supreme Court of the United States that sought to settle two questions: What is the correct boundary between the two states and, if the boundary was inaccurately set, can the state ask the court to change it? Does an agreement setting the boundary between two states require approval of Congress under the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution? When two states have a controversy between each other, the case is filed for original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Held: and, after said election, had obtained the bonds illegally and fraudulently, etc. The answer also sets out proceedings had in the county court after the bonds were issued, and reports made to it in relation thereto, which are made exhibits to the answer, and which, it is claimed, show that the bonds were not issued in conformity to law.

Held: and before trial upon either of the indictments on which the-requisition proceedings were based, the grand jury of the county, on October 6, 1891, found a nevv indictment against him for the crime of forgery, naming him therein as Sidney Lascelles, which was his true and proper name. Thereafter he was put upon his trial in the Superior Court of the county of Floyd upon this last indictment.

In equity, -to restrain the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill, from which the plaintiff appealed.The case is stated in the opinion,

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT "COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR' THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. •</p> <p>In equity to"" restrain the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill, from which plaintiff appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT .COURT OP fHE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP COLORADO.</p> <p>This case arose upon demurrers and a plea to a bill in equity filed by the United States against the Union Pacific Railway Company, and 113 other corporations and individuals, to procure the surrender and cancellation of certain land patents issued to the Kansas Pacific Railway and the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, and for a decree declaring all conveyances of such lands clouds upon the title of the United States.</p> <p>The bill averred in substance that, by an act of Congress of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, c. 120, incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, such company was authorized to construct a road from a point on the one hundredth meridian longitude, between the south margin of the 'valley of the Republican River and the north margin of the valley of the Platte River, in the Territory of Nebraska, to the western boundary of Nevada, and ivas granted every odd-numbered section of land amounting to five alternate sections of land per mile, afterwards extended to ten sections by the act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356, c. 216, on- each side of said railroad, on the line,thereof, and within the limits of ten miles, (subsequently increased to twenty,) on each side of the road; and that whenever the company should have completed forty consecutive miles of its road, (afterwards reduced to twenty, by the same act of 1864,) patents should issue for such public lands as had been granted to it, and had been earned in accordance with the provisions of the act.</p> <p>By the same act it was further provided that the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, which had been chartered by the Territory of Kansas, in 1855, was authorized to construct a line of road from the Missouri River, at the mouth of the Kansas River, to the aforesaid point, on the-one hundredth meridian. The corporate name of the said Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company of Kansas was, subsequently to ¡the passage of this act, changed to that of tiie Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division. ■ •</p> <p>On July 3, I860, Congress passed another act, 14 Stat. 79, c. 159, amending those of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864, and providing that the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division, should be authorized to so change the line of its definite location as to connect with the Union Pacific Railroad at a point not more than fifty miles westward from the meridian of Denver in Colorado.</p> <p>The bill further averred that after the passage of this act of July 3, 1866, the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division, so changed its line of definite location as to make the same extend from its point of beginning at Kansas City, Missouri, westward, and substantially in a direct line to the city of Denver, Colorado, and from that point northward and substantially in a direct line to a connection with the Union Pacific Railroad at Cheyenne, Wyoming, and proceeded to build its road on that line towards Denver.</p> <p>Before the Union Pacific had completed its line to Denver, and on March 3, 1869, Congress passed another act, 15 Stat.' 324, c. 127, authorizing the Union Pacific' Railway Company, Eastern Division, to contract with the Denver Pacific.Railway and Telegraph Company, a Colorado corporation, for the construction, operation and maintenance of that part of its line of railroad and telegraph between Denver and its point- of connection with the Union Pacific Railroad at Cheyenne, and to adopt the road-bed already graded by the said Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company as said line, and to grant to said Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company the perpetual use of its right of 'way and depot grounds, and to transfer to it all its..rights and privileges subject to all the obligations pertaining to said part of its line. It was also made the duty of suc.h road to extend its railroad and telegrapn to a Connection at the city of Denver, so as to form with that part of its line herein authorized to be constructed a continuous line of railroad and telegraph- from Kansas City, by way of Denver, to Cheyenne. It was further declared, section 2, that “all the provisions of law for the operation of the Union Pacific Railroad, its branches and connections, as a continuous line, without discrimination, shall apply the same way as if the ■ road from Denver to Cheyenne had been constructed by the said Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division.” It was further provided that each of. said companies should receive patents to alternate sections of land along .their respective lines of road, as therein defined, in like manner and within the same limits as provided by law in the case of lands granted to the Union Pacific Railway Company, .Eastern Division. Upon the same day, a joint resolution was passed, 15 Stat. 318, authorizing the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division, to change its name to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company.</p> <p>In pursuance of these acts the new Kansas Pácific Railway Company entered into a contract with the Denver Pacific of the nature and for the purpose set out and authorized by the acts, and, in pursuance thereof, the Kansas Pacific completed its line to Denver, and the Denver Pacific completed its line from Denver to Cheyenne.</p> <p>The bill thereupon charges that, in procuring the passage and accepting the terms of the act of March 3, 1869, the Kánsas Pacific abandoned its intention of building a line of road to connect with the Union Pacific at Cheyenne, and, therefore, that Denver became the terminus of its road, and the company surrendered all its rights to that portion of the land grant lying beyond its terminus at Denver, and, by operation of this act, sections of public land within prescribed limits were granted to the Denver Pacific as a new and independent grant; that the Kansas Pacific and the Denver Pacific having completed their lines of road, they respectively became entitled to certain portions of the land grant- independently of each other, notwithstanding the fact that, through their connections at Denver, they formed a continuous line of railway from Kansas Cfi$ to Cheyenne; and their rights to public lands, under the several acts aforesaid, extended only laterally along thelines of said roads respectively, and were comprised and limited by lines drawn througli the terminus of each of said roads at right angles to the general direction of the lines of said roads. The bill then referred to a map, Exhibit A, as showing the lines of said roads as connected at the city of Denver, their'general courses and directions as they extend eastwardly and northwardly from the city of Denver, - and the lines by which the rights of said respective companies to public ■ lands, under the acts aforesaid, are limited; that west of the legal terminal limit of the Kansas Pacific land grant, and south of the legal terminal limit of the Denver Pacific land, grant, lies a large triangular tract of land of about 200,000 acres, substantially within a radius of 20 miles of the point of connection of the two roads at Denver, which the bill alleges was not within the legal limit of the land grant to either of the two companies, and to the odd-numbered sections of which they asserted clainr, and for which they procu ,ed patents from the Interior Department, the surrender and cancellation of which said patents it was the object of the. bill to secure.</p> <p>The bill further alleged the consolidation, in January, 18S0, of the Kansas Pacific and the Denver Pacific and the Union Pacific Railroad Company into one-- corporation, under the corporate name of the Union Pacific Railway Company, which became the'successor in interest of the three prior corporations; that certain persons, who were made defendants to the bill, claimed title to certain lands' of‘this tract by direct or mesne conveyances from these companies, of the exact nature of which titles plaintiff is ignorant; that, under an act of March 3, 1887, providing for the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in- the construction of railroads, etc., the Secretary of the Interior ascertained that the lands described in the bill had been erroneously and illegally patented; as herein, set out, and thereupon made a demand upon the Union Pacific Railway Company, as-successor in interest to the others, for a reconveyance of the tracts of land so erroneously patented, which was refused: •</p> <p>The persons claiming title under these patents having been made parties to the bill, it prayed that the patents and other outstanding deeds and other evidences of title be decreed to be void and surrendered for cancellation as clouds upon the plaintiff’s title, and for such other relief as might seem proper.</p> <p>To this bill demurrers were filed by most or all the defendants, except one Standley, who filed a plea setting up divers statutes and decisions im the land, office upon which it is claimed the patents rested, but which need not be- specifically stated. Upon the hearing upon these demurrers, and plea, the court made an order sustaining them, 37 Fed. Rep. 551, and the plaintiff having elected to stand by its bill as originally filed, it was further ordered that the same be dismissed. Thereupon the plaintiff appealed to this court.</p>

This was a petition by the German Bank of Memphis, as successor of the German National Bank of Memphis, and the Chemical National Bank of New York, against the United States, to recover the amount of three registered bonds alleged to have been wrongfully cancelled by the Register of the Treasury under the following circumstances: In 1869, one Henry P. Woodward died in Shelby County, Tennessee, leaving a will in which he directed that certain insurance money due his estate…

Held: that this was not a voluntary payment, which could not be recovered back in whole or in part. On December 10, 1886, the defendants in error commenced suit in the District Court of the county of Salt Lake, Utah ,Territory, to recover from the defendants, now plaintiffs in <hror, the sum of $14,110 for breach of a contract of sale. Defendants appeared and answered.

<p>EEROS TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>The bonds issued by the city of Atchison, Kansas, January 1,1869, pledging the school fund, etc., of the city for payment were valid obligations.</p> <p>The legislation (ff Kansas relating to cities of the first class, and to cities of the second class, and tó Boards of Education, reviewed.</p> <p>■ On January 1, 1869, the Board of Education of the city ofAtchison issued $20,000.00 of bonds. They were in this form:</p> <p>“No.—. School Bond. $1000.00.</p> <p>“City of Atchison, State of Kansas.</p> <p>“ Know all men by these presents, that the city of Atchison, Kansas, for value received, is indebted to the bearer in the sum of one thousand dollars, which it promises to pay on the 1st day of January, a.d. 1884, at the National Park Bank, in the city of New York, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, on the 1st day of January and on the 1st day of July of each year upon presentation at the said National .Park Bank of the interest coupons hereto attached as they mature; the last instalment of interest payable with this bond. ' This bond is issued under and by virtue of -an act of the legislature of the State [of] Kansas, entitled ‘An act to organize cities' of the second class, approved February 28, 1868,’ and is secured by pledge of the school fund and property of said city of Atchison for the payment of the principal and interest thereof, as the same may become due.</p> <p>“ Dated at Atchison, this 1st day of January, 1869.</p> <p>“.(Signed) Jno. A. Martin,</p> <p>“ President of the Board of Education.</p> <p>“ W. F. Downs, Cleric.</p> <p>“ Countersigned:</p> <p>“ Frank Smith, Treasurer.”</p> <p>Each bond -had. interest coupons attached. On June 30, 1885, plaintiff, Francis Mi De Kay, claiming to be the owner of certain of these bonds and coupons, commenced- suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas. The defendant answered, a trial was had, and on June 6,1889, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $31,699.40, from which sum $1325 was thereafter remitted, as excessive interest. To reverse this judgment, defendant sued out a writ of error from this court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That the defendants were independent contractors, and not employés of the company; and as such were liable for injuries caused by their own negligence; (2) That having omitted to replace the buoy, although they knew of the necessity therefor and had ample time to do so, or otherwise to warn of the danger, they were guilty of negligence, and responsible for injuries resulting therefrom; (3) That there was no…

Held: . (1) There was no evidence showing, or tending to show,, that the agent *628 of the railroad had any actual knowledge of the contents of the trunk;' v (2) There was no evidence from which it could fairly b.e said that the agent had reason to believe that the trunk contained jewelry; ' (3) The agent was not required to inquire as to the contents of the trunk, so presented as personal baggage; (4) The company was not…

This was an action brought December 17, 1885, by Isaacs against the collector of the port of New Orleans, to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid, under protest, upon twenty-five cases of cigarette paper, and upon twenty-three cases of pasteboard covers for cigarette paper, both imported by the plaintiff in June, 1885; the paper at the port of New Orleans, and the covers at the port of New York and thence transferred in bond to New Orleans; and the two entered by…

Held: to come within the clause of the Tariff Act, which imposes a duty of seventy per cent ad *657 valorem on “smokers’” articles.” ' The jury having been instructed otherwise, the Judgment must be reversed, asid the case remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES EOR 'THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP TEXAS.</p> <p>Francois Giozza was indicted in the criminal district court of Galveston County, Texas, upon the charge of having pursued the occupation of selling spirituous, vinous and malt liquors in quantities less than one quart, without having first obtained a license therefor; and. was tried, convicted and fined in the sum of $450. He thereupon carried the case by appeal to the Court of Appeals of Texas, the court of last resort in criminal cases, which affirmed the judgment.. Subsequently he was arrested and held in custody by Patrick Tiernan, as sheriff of Galveston County, by authority of a capias issued by the criminal court, until the fine and costs were paid. Thereupon he applied for. and obtained from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>The petition for the writ set forth that by the laws of the State no person is permitted to obtain a license, to pursue the occupation of selling liquor, until such person has given a bond in the sum of $5000 payable to the State Of Texas, and containing, among other conditions, the condition in substance that the persons giving such bond will not sell spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or medicated bitters capable of producing intoxication, to any person, after having been notified in writing, through the sheriff or other peace officer, by the wife or mother or daughter or sister of such person, not to sell to such person; that such bond-may be sued on at the instance of any person so notifying and aggrieved by the violation of such condition in said bond, and such person so notifying shall be entitled to recover the sum of $500 as liquidated damages for an infraction off such condition, etc. And petitioner charged that it was not competent for the legislature of the State of Texas to impose the condition above stated as a condition precedent to the obtaining of a license to pursue said occupation,’and that the statute, in so far as it imposed such-conditions, operated as a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and deprived petitioner of his property without due process of law, and was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Petitioned further alleged that, in order to obtain a license to pursu' the occupation aforesaid, all persons desiring to engage therein are required to pay the occupation tax imposed thereon in advance, for a period not less than twelve months, and to pay the tax imposed by the State and by the' commissioners’ courts of the several counties, and by the cities and towns wherein such occupation is carried on, and to obtain a license from the county clerk of the county in which said occupation is carried on, for which license the sum of twenty-five cents is required to be paid, while all other persons pursuing all other occupations than the one pursued by petitioner are permitted by the laws of said State to pay bhe occupation tax on said occupations for eách three months or quarterly, and no persons pursuing other taxable occupations than that pursued by appellant in cities and towns are required to pay the occupation tax imposed by such cities or towns, as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to pursue such occupations, and no person pursuing any taxable occupation other than that '.pursued by petitioner are required to obtain, a license from such county clerk or to pay therefor any súm.</p> <p>Petitioner .charged that under the laws aforesaid he was denied the equal protection of the laws and deprived of his property without due process of law, and that those laws were repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States.</p> <p>The petition further averred that the laws of the State -of which petitioner complained had been pronounced and adjudged by the Court of 'Appeals to be valid laws, and not contrary to and not inhibited by the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>A copy-of the indictment was annexed to the petition, wherefrom it appeared that Giozza was charged with unlawfully and wilfully pursuing the occupation aforesaid, without first having obtained a license, and that he had not paid the tax thereon, and was indebted to the State in the sum of $300 occupation tax,-and to the county in the sum of $150 occupation tax, the commissioners’ court of Galveston County having levied a tax on said occupation of one-half the amount levied by the State thereon.</p> <p>The sheriff made due return that he held Giozza in his custody by the authority aforesaid, and attached thereto copies of the indictment, the capias, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals.</p> <p>Upon the hearing, the Circuit Court adjudged that Giozza was not unlawfully restrained of his liberty and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff, and he thereupon brought the case to this court by appeal.</p> <p>The statute in question .provided in its first section for the levy upon any person, firm or association of persons engaged in the occupation óf selling -spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or medicated bitters, of an annual tax of $300 for selling such liquors or bitters in quantities less than one quart. Under the second section the commissioners’ court had power to levy and collect taxes upon the occupations named, equal to one-half of the state tax, and cities and towns were empowered to levy an additional tax. By the third section, all the taxes were required to be paid in advance for a period of -not less than twelve months. The fourth section required the giving of a bond, as sufficiently stated in the petition. Under section five, the county clerks in the several counties were authorized to issue licenses upon payment by the applicant of all occupation taxes levied by or under the act. The evidence of the payment" of the taxes upon such application was the receipt of the county collector of taxes. For issuing the license the cleric was entitled to receive a fee of twenty-five cents for each license. Art. 3226a, 2 Sayles’ Tex. Civ. Stat. 124.</p> <p>Art. 110 of the Texas Penal Code reads: “ Any person who shall pursue or follow any occupation, calling or profession, or do any act taxed by law, without first obtaining a license therefor, shall be finéd in any sum not less than the amount of the taxes so due, and not nlore than double that sum;” and by Art. 112 it is provided that any person prosecuted shall have the right at any time before conviction to have the prosecution dismissed on payment of the taxes and cc.Js of prosecution, the procuring of the license, etc. Willson’s Cr. Tex. Stat. Part I, p. 47.</p> <p>Section 20 of article 16 of the constitution of Texas is as follows : “ The legislature shall, at its first session, enact a law whereby the qualified'voters of any county, justice’s precinct, tow'n or city, by a majority vote, from time to time, may determine whether the sale of intoxicating liquors shall be prohibited within the prescribed limits.”</p> <p>Section 42 of the same- article provides that “ the legislature may establish an inebriate asylum, for the cure of drunkenness and reform of inebriates.”</p> <p>It ivas contended also that the court should take judicial notice that in 1887 a ATote was taken upon a proposed amendment to the state constitution prohibiting the manufacture, sale and exchange of intoxicating liquors, except for medical, sacramental and scientific purposes, Avhichwas rejected by a large majority.</p>

<p>A defendant residing -within a State in which an action is commenced in a court of the State, is not entitled, under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, to have the suit removed to the Circuit Court of the United States.</p>

<p>In Texas, a married woman, who owns land in her own right, cannot convey it by her husband, as her attorney, under a power of attorney from her to him, without herself signing and acknowledging privily the deed, although her husband joins in the deed individually.</p> <p>Where a suit is brought in Texas by a married woman and her husband, to recover possession of land, her separate propertjq and the petition is endorsed with a notice that the action is brought as well to try title as for damages, it is error to admit in evidence against the plaintiffs such a power of attorney and deed, although there is an issue as to boundary and acquiescence and ratification.</p> <p>It does' not appear beyond a doubt that such error could not prejudice the rights of the plaintiffs.</p>

The Whitman Saddle Company, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of tbe laws of the State of New York, brought this bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, against Charles D. Smith and Benjamin A. Bourn,' citizens of the State of Connecticut, and doing business in the city of Hartford, under the firm name and style of Smith, Bourn & Co., for the alleged infringement of a patent for a “ design for…

<p>A federal question, suggested for the first time in a petition for a rehearing, after judgment in the highest court of a State, is not properly raised so as to authorize this court to review the decision of that court.</p> <p>The decision in the state court in this case clearly presented no federal question; as no right, immunity or authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States was set up by the plaintiffs in error, or denied by the Supreme Court of the State, nor did the judgment of the latter court necessarily involve any such question, or the denial of any such right.</p>

Held: with the United States, that under these provisions these claimants were entitled, not to the whole, but to “ a just proportion ” of this annuity provided for in the supplemental articles of September 27, 1833; and in this view we concur.