¶1Concurring Opinion
¶2“The definition of conversion in Indiana has remained virtually unchanged for many years.” I concur with Chief Justice Hoffman’s statement and the results reached by him in his opinion. However, it does appear to me that something might be gained here by re-examining the segmentation of conversion, and in so doing, separate those segments which are necessary from those which are not necessary to establish a prima facie case in conversion.
¶3The only question presented here on appeal is whether the *396appellant submitted sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of conversion.
¶4The appellant’s evidence in summary is that she rented an apartment from appellee in the month of September, 1967. Appellant was told that she could have one of the storage lockers in the basement of the apartment building. A storage locker was selected and cleaned out by the appellant. She stored certain items of personal property in the locker and placed a padlock on the gate. Thereafter, upon her return to the locker in the basement one day during the month of May, 1968, she found that the locker was empty. The appellee, through her agent, the apartment custodian, caused notices to be posted in the apartment building by the mail boxes. These notices advised all tenants occupying basement lockers of the intended action to be taken by the appellee, which was the cleaning out of all unclaimed lockers. Appellant testified that she had no knowledge of the notice. It does not appear anywhere in the evidence that the appellant was personally notified by the appellee or by the appellee’s agent, the custodian. It may be inferred from the evidence that some basement storage lockers had been unopened for a considerable length of time and that the appellee had purchased the apartment building recently and desired to put the basement storage lockers in order for the use of new tenants and for her own information. The appellee’s agent-custodian caused seven (7) locks to be broken on storage lockers in the basement. He made arrangements for two (2) junk men to carry away the contents. The custodian had an independent recollection of seeing appellant’s chiropractic table being carried out of the building by two junk men. Appellant’s trunk was found in the custodian’s apartment. The custodian testified that he had found it in the boiler room. The appellant told the appellee’s custodian that she valued the items taken from her locker and wanted them returned. She further testified as to the value of the items taken which could be replaced. Some items were irreplacable.
¶5*397The gist of “conversion” is the unauthorized assumption of the powers of the true owner. Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671, 673 (1924) ; 31 A. L. R. 995.
¶6Any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one’s property in denial of their rights or any dealing with the property of another which excludes the owner’s dominion is a conversion. Talich v. Marvel, 115 Neb. 225, 212 N. W. 540, 541 (1927) ; State v. Wilcox, 179 S. W. 479, 481 (Mo. 1915).
¶7The term “prima facie” has no narrow or restricted meaning synonymous with “inference” or “presumption.” A “prima facie case” is that which is received and continues until the contrary is shown, thereby standing unexplained and uncontradicted. “The words ‘prima facie’ when used to describe evidence, ex vi termini, imply that such evidence may be rebutted by competent testimony.” Frank Meline Co. v. Kleinberger, 290 P. 1042, 1043, 108 Cal. App. 60 (1930) ; Morrison v. Flowers, 139 N. E. 10, 12, 308 Ill. 189 (1923). See Words and Phrases for additional definition of prima facie case).
¶8The appellee did not present any rebutting or controverting evidence. At the close of appellant’s evidence, the appellee moved for a finding for the defendant-appellee. Therefore, the summary of the direct evidence given was all presented in support of appellant’s complaint for conversion.
¶9To establish a prima facie conversion case, the appellant had only to show by the evidence:
(1) That she had exclusive rights of possession in and to the personal property described in her complaint.
(2) A description of the personal property allegedly converted.
(3) Appellee’s exercise of dominion over said personal property in exclusion and in defiance of appellant’s rights to possession.
(4) That appellee’s acts were unauthorized or tortuous.
(5) Damages sustained as a result of the acts of appellee.
¶10The evidence clearly shows that the appellant established her possessory interest in the goods taken. The appellee broke *398the locks on appellant’s locker gate and had most of the contents thereof carried out of the apartment building by two junk men. This was all done without any authorization either implied or actual from the appellant. The only item of personal property which remained on the premises was appellant’s empty trunk. The appellant described the items of personal property taken from the locker and testified as to their value. She stated the approximate amount of her damages as a result of the conversion by the appellee. The wrongful taking of the appellant’s personal property from her locker by appellee did not require a demand for the return of the property before bringing suit. Appellee may be able to show that under the terms of the appellant’s lease that such taking was not wrongful and that appellee had a right to take possession of such stored personal property, but the record shows no such evidence. Salvation Army v. Ellerbush, 87 Ind. App. 682, 161 N. E. 638 (1928) ; First National Bank of Rensselaer v. Ransford, 55 Ind. App. 663, 104 N. E. 604 (1914).
¶11It is not important to appellant’s prima facie case that appellee posted a notice by mail boxes of tenants or that the appellee removed the articles of personal property from the locker in good faith. Kee v. Becker, 129 P. 2d 159, 54 Cal. App. 2d 466 (1942).
¶12There is no evidence showing that the appellant knew about the notice or that she would have had to act upon said notice if she had known of its existence.
¶13Evidence given by the appellant showing asportation and manucaption was indeed helpful to the court, but this evidence was not necessary to establish a prima facie case of conversion. Asportation and manucaption are not necessary elements of a prima facie conversion. West Yellow Pine Co. v. Stephens, 86 So. 241, 243, 80 Fla. 298 (1920).
¶14A demand for the return of personal property which has been the subject of a conversion may be a necessary element of a prima facie showing of conversion where a lawful taking *399is shown by the evidence, however, a formal demand is not necessary. The evidence presented by the appellant in the present case shows that she told the custodian that she valued the items taken and that she wanted them back. Even such a statement as this may be sufficient to constitute a demand when considered with all of the evidence presented. The appellant’s evidence set forth a prima facie unauthorized and unlawful taking. No demand is necessary in an unlawful conversion to establish a prima facie case. Certainly, no demand is necessary in either a lawful or unlawful taking where it appears from the evidence that such a demand would have been unavailing. In the present case, the only item of personal property left on the premises was the appellant’s trunk. All of the other items of personal property belonging to the appellant had been carried out by two junk men. Where such items of personal property came to rest is beyond conjecture or speculation. Ranier et al. v. Stephanoff, 81 Ind. App. 166, 141 N. E. 523 (1923) ; Hays v. Burns, 106 Ind. App. 374, 19 N. E. 2d 862 (1938).
¶15The appellant established a prima facie case for an unlawful conversion. It was error for the trial court to sustain appellee’s motion for judgment at the close of appellant’s evidence.
¶16Judgment should be reversed and cause remanded with instructions to sustain appellant’s motion for a new trial.
¶17Note. — Reported in 266 N. E. 2d 619.