Volume 15 — Appeals, District of Columbia

<p>Hearing on an appeal from an order or decree of the Supreme Court of thé District of Columbia, overruling exceptions to and ratifying and confirming a report of the auditor stating a method of accounting between the receiver of an insolvent building association and borrowing members.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>The proceedings which are brought here by this appeal seem to be in some measure only collateral to the cause in which they were had. In a suit instituted by one Jacob S. Redman against the appellee, the United States Building and Loan Association, which appears to be a body corporate ©rganized under the laws of the State of Virginia, Harvey T." Winfield was appointed receiver; but what the purpose was of the suit, or what the scope was of the duties of the receiver, we are not advised, further than that it became párt of the duty of the receiver to settle with such persons bs had received loans or advances of money from the association. On the day of his appointment he filed a petition Ita which he requested instructions from the court as to the method to be pursued by him in such settlement. In this petition he said:</p> <p>“Members of the defendant association who have also received loans or advances upon their stock generally desire to repay and settle up such loans and advances at once, and a number have applied to this receiver to learn, how much money is required of them in order to make such settlements and obtain releases of the mortgages or deeds of trust upon their property, and the receiver desires instructions from the court as to the method to be employed in determining the indebtedness of the .aforesaid members of the defendant association.”</p> <p>The court, however, instead of directly giving any instructions, referred the cause to the auditor “ to state an account of the amounts due by the various members of the defendant association who have received from time to time loans or advances from said association, repayment of which has been and is secured by bonds and deeds of trust, in order that said loans or advances may be at once paid to, settled, and collected by the receiver herein.”</p> <p>In other words, it referred it to the auditor to determine the method of accounting in the first instance.</p> <p>The auditor made his report; in which, after consideration of the act of incorporation of the association and of its by-laws, and of the character of the transactions between the association and those who borrowed from it, he said:</p> <p>“I think that under the conditions in this case we are limited to one of two methods of accounting:</p> <p>“1st. To charge the sum advanced with interest and apply as partial payments the dues on stock and interest paid, omitting the premium ; or—</p> <p>“ 2d. To treat the eighty-four months named in the bond as the conventional period of payment, charging that number of the stipulated sums and giving credits for the payments made.</p> <p>“ My conclusion is that the latter is the proper method to be adopted and followed in the statement of these accounts, as being equitable under all the cirumstances.”</p> <p>Exceptions to this report were filed on behalf of the association and of the receiver, and the exceptions were sustained by the court, and the cause was referred back to the auditor with directions to state the account anew. Specific directions were given to him as to the method of statement, which were as follows :</p> <p>“ In stating said amounts the auditor shall charge said members with the full amount received by them on account of said loans or advances, together with legal interest thereon from the time such loans or advances were received, and he shall give said members credit for all payments made by them on account of interest and premium upon the principle of partial payments; and in any future dividends that may be made to the stockholders of the defendant association on account of their stock those members who may have obtained loans or advances from' said association shall, if they have repaid said loans or advances, receive, equally with the investing or non-borrowing members, a pro rata share of such dividends.”</p> <p>A second report was thereupon filed by the auditor, prepared in accordance with these instructions.</p> <p>At this point in the proceedings, William P. Armstrong, one of the appellants, who seems not to have been previously a party to the suit, but who appears from his petition to have been a member of the association, and a borrower frqm it, was permitted to intervene, and, together with the other appellants here, — whether these were intervenors also or original parties to the suit, does not appear from the record before us — was allowed, as it would seem, after the expiration of the usual time limited for that purpose, to file exceptions to the auditor’s second report. But these exceptions were overruled, and the report was ratified and confirmed; and from the order of affirmance the present appeal has been taken.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently-' stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe complainants from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, in a suit to foreclose a deed of trust. Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.

<p>Hearing on a motion by the appellant to vacate ‘a de-, cree previously passed affirming a decree appealed from.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the complainants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a creditor’s bill.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit in equity to recover a balance claimed to be due upon an indebtedness secured by deed of trust. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an apppeal by the District of Columbia from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, rendered in a proceeding by certiorari to vacate a special improvement tax. The facts are sufficiently stated in the'opinion.

Hearing on. an appeal by the District of Columbia from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, vacating a reassessment rendered on the return to a writ of certiorari.

Hearing on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia quashing a writ of certiorari issued to a justice of the peace. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granting an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granting an absolute divorce upon the ground of adultery. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by two of several defendants from a decree granting the relief prayed for in a bill in equity to compel the conveyance of certain real estate.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on appeals from two decisions of the Commissioner of Patents in interference proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a patent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit for the specific performance of an alleged oral agreement.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the District of Columbia from a judgment on verdict in an action of covenant.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on a demurrer to the declaration, in an action at law to recover damages for an alleged infringement of a patent.

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree in a suit in equity by an executor for the construction of a will. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia. Judgment affirmed.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on appeal by the defendant from a decree in equity correcting a misdescription of certain premises contained in a mortgage and enjoining a judgment creditor of the mortgagors from selling the property under execution.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>■ This is an appeal from a decree correcting the description of certain premises contained in a mortgage, and enjoining the sale of the part of the lot embraced in said correction, under an execution against the mortgagors.</p> <p>The following is a brief history of the facts upon which the decree rests, concerning which there is no controversy? and of the proceedings culminating in that decree.</p> <p>December 1, 1896, John R. Lang and William H. A. Lang obtained' a loan of $12,000 from the appellee, Herbert Bryant, a resident of Alexandria, Virginia, for which they executed a note bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent-per annum payable semi-annually.</p> <p>To secure said note they, joined by their wives, conveyed to William H. Saunders and Julian T. Burke, trustees,-“the following described land and premises, situate in that part of the city of Washington, formerly Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, known and distinguished as and being part of Lot numbered 47 in old Georgetown, situate in the square formerly designated as Square numbered 30 in said Georgetown and now known as Square numbered 1200 in the city of Washington, and described as follows, viz.: Beginning for the same at a point on the west line of High street, distant 30 feet southerly from the south line of Bridge street, and running thence southerly along High street 120 feet; thence westerly 175 feet parallel with Bridge street; thence northerly 60 feet parallel with High street; thence easterly 95 feet, parallel with Bridge street; thence northerly parallel with High street 90 feet to Bridge street; thence easterly 34 feet along Bridge street; thence southerly parallel with High street 30 feet; thence easterly parallel with Bridge street 46 feet to the place of beginning, together with all and singular, the improvements, ways, easements, rights, privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging or in any wise appertaining,” etc.</p> <p>This instrument, properly acknowledged by the grantors, was filed for record in the District on December 3, 1896.</p> <p>The premises had been occupied by a building, for many years known as Lang’s Hotel. The grantors in the deed had come into possession under the will of their grandmother, Eleanor Lang, and were at the time of the said loan carrying on the business of said Lang’s Hotel.</p> <p>On October 9,1894, the said Lang brothers had conveyed the premises, by the same description, to Charles C. Glover and James M. Johnston in trust to secure Arthur Brice in the sum of $9,000. This instrument had been promptly recorded. Its lien was discharged with the proceeds of the loan by Bryant. The Langs were permitted to retain possession subject to the observance of the conditions respecting the payment of the principal and accruing interest of the loan.</p> <p>February 15, 1897, the appellant, George W. Manogue, recovered a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the said Langs for the sum of $412, with interest and costs. Execution issued thereon was returned “nulla bona,” February 16, 1897. February 17, 1897, the said Manogue filed a'bill to enforce said judgment against the lands of said Langs, describing the same precisely as described in the trust deed to secure Brice and Bryant as aforesaid. The parties in both trust deeds, as trustees and beneficiaries, were made defendants, and asked to be required to render a statement of the amounts due them. A decree for sale, subject to said liens, was prayed' to satisfy* said judgment.</p> <p>The Brice lien was shown to have been paid, and there was no contestation of the validity of the Bryant trust deed. Whilst that bill was depending, the Langs failed to pay interest as stipulated, and under the provisions of the trust deed the trustees became empowered to.sell the premises.</p> <p>On December 10, 1897, they joined Bryant in a petition filed in said cause alleging the default aforesaid and praying for leave to advertise and sell the said premises. A decree was passed December 15, 1897, permitting the sale as prayed and directing the surplus proceeds thereof, if any, to be brought into court.</p> <p>The premises were sold under this permission, as a whole, on February 1, 1898, and were bid in by Bryant for the sum of $13,400. This was something less than the amount of the indebtedness with interest and charges.</p> <p>February 3, 1898, Manogue filed a petition to set aside the sale because of inadequacy of the price, and prayed a resale in parcels, whereby a better price might be secured. He alleged that the property “has a front of 34 feet on M street, formerly Bridge street, and 120 feet on Thirty-second street, formerly High street; that the front on said M street is improved by a large building which has heretofore been used for hotel purposes, and that the front on Thirty-second street is improved by two dwellings, a stable, leaving on said front unimproved ground which is susceptible of convenient subdivision into six separate parcels.”</p> <p>February 10, 1898, the petition was granted and the trustees were ordered to resell in parcels, and afterwards in one piece, provided a higher price could be obtained by the latter mode than the aggregate of offers for the parcels. The property was, under this order, offered in parcels and finally sold in one piece to Bryant, who was the highest bidder, for the sum of $13,710, on May 17, 1898. There is nothing in the record to show, but the bill herein alleges, confirmation of said sale in June, 1898.</p> <p>In obtaining the loan the Langs represented the lot as occupying all the space occupied by the hotel between the lot of Dunlop on one side and the fire-engine house on the other, and the value of the whole building was estimated and considered in granting the loan. It appeared, for the first time, on the division of the lot into parcels for sale as aforesaid, that the hotel fronted 42.35 feet on M or Bridge street instead of 34 feet as set out in the description in the trust deed.</p> <p>It appears that the strip of 8.35 feet had belonged to the city of Georgetown, and by virtue of some arrangements, not accounted for in the record, the Lang Hotel had been built over the same upon an arch and joined to the wall of the town hall.</p> <p>This town hall has since been converted into a fire-engine house. A tunnel about 90 feet long was thus made under-the second story of the hotel by means of this arch. Above the arch there was no wall marking a division of the hotel along the division line of said strip and the Lang lot proper. In 1863, Mrs. Eleanor Lang purchased the strip from the city authorities, but under a trust deed to secure the purchase money it was reconveyed to the city. It does not appear what title her grandsons had in said strip, and it is alleged in the answer of Manogue to the appellee’s bill that they and those through whom they claimed acquired title by adverse possession. The tunnel was closed by them or their said grandmother, without apparent objection of the city authorities, and made a part of the hotel building also. When Bryant made his loan, this room, so made on the ground floor, was occupied as a barber shop, and its rental was considered in estimating the value of the security therefor.</p> <p>Manogue was a grocer in Georgetown and sold goods to ■the Langs. He was familiar with the location and character of the construction of the building.</p> <p>It is conceded that he believed the whole lot covered by the building belonged to the Langs and was included in the ■deed of trust. He did not know that the frontage exceeded thirty-four feet on M or Bridge street, and had no idea of the existence of the strip of 8.35 feet in excess. It was in this belief that he filed Ms bill aforesaid to subject the whole of the premises to his judgment, and in so doing followed the description contained in said trust deed.</p> <p>„ After the discovery of the fact that the call in the description of frontage of thirty-four feet on M street left this strip unaccounted for, he caused an execution to be issued on his judgment and levied thereon. Bryant then filed this bill against the Langs and Manogue and Aulick Palmer, Mar-, shal of the District, to correct the description in the trust deed, and to forever enjoin the sale under execution in favor of Manogue.</p> <p>The preliminary injunction was granted. The Langs made no answer, and on final hearing a decree was passed correcting the description as prayed, and perpetuating the injunction.</p> <p>From this decree Manogue alone has appealed.</p>

Hearing on an. appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on a verdict directed by the trial court, in an action to recover an assessment on certain shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff corporation. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on a motion by the appellee to dismiss an appeal for want of necessary parties.</p>

<p>Hearing on ah appeal by the District of Columbia from a decree in equity canceling an assessment against the property of the complainant, an educational institution, for a proportion of the cost of a local improvement.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by a defendant indicted for murder from a judgment of conviction entered upon the verdict of a jury. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: The appellant, George W. Horton, was indicted in the Supreme Court of the District for the murder of Jane Nicholson, on June 24, 1898. He was brought to trial and found guilty as charged.

<p>Criminal Law; Intoxicating Liquors; Sale to Minor; Criminal Intent; Information.</p> <p>1. To constitute the offense of selling liquor to a minor under the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3,1893, the person charged must have had knowledge himself, or by his agent acting for him in selling to the minor, that the latter was at the time under twenty-one years of age.</p> <p>2. Where an information in the Police Court in such a case fails to charge the defendant with knowingly selling liquor to a minor, the court should direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the petitioner from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, discharging a rule to show cause why the respondent should not be required to pay certain arrears of alimony accruing pendente lite after the passage of a final decree of divorce granted the respondent.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>The appellant, Johanna Walter, and appellee, John Walter, appear to have borne to each other the relation of wife and husband. On March 1, 1895, the appellant instituted the proceedings out of which the present appeal has grown by filing in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia a petition for divorce from the appellee. On March 14, 1895, there was an allowance to her of alimony pendente lite to the amount of $100 a month, which, by an order of May 7,1895, was increased to the sum of $200 a month. Subsequently the appellee answered the bill or petition of the appellant, and on September 20, 1895, filed his cross-bill or cross-petition in the cause, praying for a divorce from the bond of matrimony between him and the appellant. Much testimony seems to have been taken; and the cause came on for hearing in January of 1898. On February 7, 1898, the court rendered its decree, dismissing the appellant’s petition, and allowing to the appellee on his cross-petition a divorce from the bond of matrimony between him and the appellant. There was no appeal from this decree; and it remains in full force and effect, and is now an absolute finality.</p> <p>The appellee had paid the alimony allowed pendente lite that had accrued up to January 1, 1898 ; but he paid none for the month of January, 1898, and the appellant claims that she is entitled to have the sum- of $200 from him for that month. A smaller sum of $27 was also claimed by her as a balance due for some previous month; but upon the appellee’s showing this minor claim has been abandoned. On December 28, 1898, upwards of ten months after the rendition of the decree of divorce in favor of the husband, no steps, it seems, having been taken in the cause in the meantime, the appellant filed her petition therein for a rule on the appellee to show cause why he should not be required to pay the alleged arrears of alimony for the month of January, and the balance referred to of a previous month. The appellee answered the petition and rule; and in his answer, while he satisfactorily disposed of the claim for this small balance, admitted that he had not paid the §200 claimed to be due for the month of January, and stated his reasons for such non-payment, the substance of which was that the decree of divorce granted to the appellee operated as a revocation and annulment of the orders for the allowance of alimony to the appellant, and that the conduct of the appellant, as disclosed by the testimony upon which the decree was based, was of so scandalous and fraudulent a character as not to entitle her to the consideration of the court.</p> <p>The court regarded the reasons assigned by the appellee as sufficient, discharged the rule upon him, and dismissed the appellant’s petition. And from the order of dismissal the present appeal has been taken.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a bill of review.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This appeal is from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill of review.</p> <p>The facts, as they appear from the bill itself, which was heard on demurrers to it by the several appellees, are these: On December 19, 1896, one Charles C. Smith died seized of certain'pieces of real estate in the District of Columbia, which comprised two lots in Square 276, in the city of Washington, being the property involved in the present controversy, and several lots in the village of Garfield not involved in the proceedings. There were some small improvements on two of the lots in Garfield; and apparently some small improvements also on the lots in Square 276. The deceased left four children surviving him, who were his heirs at law, two of them married women, the appellees Mary Butler and Georgiana Austin; and two of them minors, the appellees Charles Edward Smith and James Douglass Smith ; and he also left a widow, the appellant Mary Louise Smith.</p> <p>Believing or assuming that their father had died intestate, the appellees, Mary Butler and Georgiana Austin, joining with them their respective husbands, instituted a suit in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on February 12, 1897, for the purpose of having a partition of the estate. In this suit, to which the widow and the minor children were made defendants, it was alleged by the complainants that their father had died intestate, that the property was incapable of specific partition, and that it would be to the interest of all the parties to have it sold for the purpose of partition ; and accordingly a sale was prayed as well as general relief.</p> <p>The widow, Mary Louise Smith, the appellant in the present suit, appeared and answered the bill. In this answer she denied that her husband had died intestate, and set up a will claimed by her to have been made by him, whereby he purported to devise to her for her life the property in Square 276, which it seems had been their home and whereon there was some kind of a structure, with remainder over equally to his four children. And she averred that she had elected to take this property under the will in place of dower; that she did not wish it to be sold; that the complainants were not entitled to have partition of it, and that, in view of her election, she had no interest in the other property. The will set up purported to have been executed by Charles C. Smith on November 20, 1895, with his mark. There was a witness to the mark, but this witness does not sign the attestation clause, or purport to have been a witness to the will. There were two witnesses, and only two witnesses, to the attestation clause, who purport to have received the testator’s acknowledgment of the will. Only by counting the witness to the mark as a witness also to the will could the necessary number of three witnesses required for a valid will of real estate be made out.</p> <p>It does not appear from the record before us whether the minor defendants appeared and answered in the usual way by guardian ad litem,; but we may assume that all the proceedings in that regard were regularly had, as no objection has been taken to them.</p> <p>There was replication filed by the complainants, and testimony taken by them in support of their bill; but the defendant, Mary Louise Smith, the appellant here, took no testimony and took no further part in the proceedings. At the hearing on December 1, 1897, a decree was rendered for the sale of the property in accordance with the prayer of the hill of complaint, and trustees were appointed to sell. The trustees in due time sold the property in Square 276 to the appellee, James H. Winslow; and, although the appellant here appeared in court and opposed the ratification of the sale and prayed that it should be vacated, on the same grounds substantially as those set up in her answer, the sale was ratified and confirmed. Subsequently, the appellant Winslow, the purchaser at the sale, was put in possession of the property by means of a writ of assistance, and the appellant was ejected therefrom. The other property seems to have remained unsold. And it is understood, also, that, except some amounts expended for taxes, incumbrances and costs, the purchase money yet remains intact in the hands of the trustees and undisturbed.</p> <p>Subsequently, the decree of sale and the decree of ratification of sale having both become absolutely final by the lapse of the several terms at which they were rendered, and by failure to prosecute any appeal from them, the appellant, on October 4, 1898, filed her bill of review as complainant against all the other parties and Winslow, the purchaser, on the ground, as alleged, that the decree of sale was void on its face. To this bill of review there were demurrers interposed by Winslow and the other adult defendants, and the usual answer was filed for the infant defendants. The court below sustained the demurrers, and dismissed the bill; and from the decree of dismissal the present appeal has been prosecuted.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by one of two defendants from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia under the Seventy-third Rule of that court in a suit on a promissory note. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the District of Columbia from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon the verdict of a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment upon demurrer to the declaration in an action on the'case.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows :</p> <p>This is an action for damages begun in the SupremeCourt of the District of Columbia, on May 8, 1899, bj^ Eleanor A. H. Magruder, against George A. Armes, Jackson H. Ralston, Frederick L. Siddons, Harvey T. Winfield and Albert' A. Wilson. Defendants’ demurrer to the declaration was sustained and judgment thereon entered, from which the plaintiff has appealed.</p> <p>The substantial allegations of the declaration are: (1) That George A. Armes, as plaintiff in a suit at law in the Supreme Court of the District, with the assistance of Harvey T. Winfield, who appeared as attorney of record for plaintiff in said case, and of Jackson H. Ralston and Frederick L. Siddons as counsel, had issued a writ of fieri facias in said case against plaintiff and George C. W. Magruder, her husband, under date of February 19, 1896; (2) That said writ was directed to Albert A. Wilson, Marshal of the District of Columbia, and by him levied upon the interests of both plaintiff and her husband in and to a valuable lot designated by square and lot number; (3) “Said lot was the sole and separate estate at law in fee of said plaintiff, she being a married woman residing in said District; ” (4) Said lot was of the value of $1,800, and after being so seized was held by the marshal until plaintiff, to prevent the sale of said lot, was compelled to pay the demands made in said writ; (5) Said writ commanded the marshal of the goods, chattels, lands and tenements of this plaintiff, and George C. W. Magruder, surety, to cause to be made $6.25, with interest from February 13, 1896, and $22.70, costs and charges; (6) That said writ was illegal and void on its face “because it was not made leviable only out of the sole and separate estate of said plaintiff, and made no allowance of any of the exemptions from execution allowed by law; furthermore, said writ called for interest when the judgment and verdict in the case gave none, and charged in the costs twenty dollars for said Armes and his attorney which are not allowed by law;” (7) “Said writ was issued and acted under for the wilful purpose of oppressing this plaintiff and of compelling this plaintiff to pay illegal charges and to enforce a judgment against plaintiff in favor of said Armes in said law suit No. 39,058, which this plaintiff alleges was unauthorized by law and beyond the jurisdiction of said court to render, and void; ” (8) “ Said judgment was rendered upon an alleged charge by law of $1.25 a day to said Armes for attending said court as a witness in a certain suit at law No. 30,689 for this plaintiff, but was without law or merit;” (9) The judgment in No. 39,058, on which the writ issued, is set out in full and shows the recovery by Armes against Eleanor A. H. Magruder of the sum of $6.25, together with the costs of suit; (10) That “said judgment is a common law judgment on an alleged implied contract against her, she being a married woman then as now, and said judgment has no restriction in recovery or for execution to her sole and separate estate, and was beyond the jurisdiction of said court to render, and was and is legally void,.and said judgment could not be entered for a larger fee to the plaintiff therein as a witness than the law authorized in such a case;” (11) The said judgment is also declared void as to George C. W. Magruder named as surety and joined with her therein, he not being a party to the cause, and having judgment entered against him because he had signed an undertaking with plaintiff before the justice of the peace before whom said cause was originally tried, to secure an appeal to the Supreme Court of the District, although he had not been served with process; (12) That plaintiff and husband had a right to appeal from said judgment within twenty days, during which time no execution could issue; but that defendants, intending to oppress the plaintiff, sued out the said execution within six days, and eleven days thereafter levied the same as aforesaid; (13) That unable to terrify the plaintiff and compel payment by the levy, the defendants advertised the property for sale and endeavored also to sell the right of plaintiff’s husband therein as tenant by the curtesy; (14) That on April 23, 1896, plaintiff moved to quash said writ, levy, etc.; but said motion was overruled on May 6, 1896, in the absence of plaintiff’s counsel; (15) That on May 8, 1896, plaintiff and her husband entered an appeal from the order overruling said motion to quash to the Court of Appeals; but the defendants persevered in their attempt to sell said property as advertised on May 9, 1896, and would not postpone the same to give plaintiff time to perfect said appeal; (16) Said marshal, acting for all the defendants, demanded the illegal and excessive sum of $89.94 as costs and charges, including therein a charge of $50 for advertising, when the same was not worth more than $17.05; and to prevent the sacrifice of her property plaintiff was compelled to pay said sum and stop the sale; (17) That afterwards the defendants prevented her from perfecting said appeal by causing the said Supreme Court to refuse to approve her appeal bond; (18) The damages sustained are made to sound in the sum of $6,000.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the District of Columbia from a judgment on verdict in an action by a husband and wife to recover damages for personal injuries to the wife.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing ou an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing a bill to establish a resulting trust and to enforce an alleged liability for the balance of a mortgage debt.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia under the Seventy-third Rule of that court, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in an action on a bond. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by one of several defendants from .a decree in equity in a suit to procure the sale of real estate for purposes of partition.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearings on motion to expunge part of the transcript of the record or to return the record to the clerk of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for correction; and also, on suggestion of diminution of record.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, upon a verdict of a jury in an action by an administrator to recover damages for negligently causing the death of plaintiff’s intestate. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the receiver of a foreign corporation appointed in the State where the corporation was incorporated, from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing his petition filed in a suit in equity in this District, in which receivers of the corporation had been appointed here.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon a verdict of guilty in a prosecution for adultery. Affirmed.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the relator from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>The relator, the Mutual District Messenger Company, is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of West Virginia for the purpose of engaging in business in the District of Columbia.</p> <p>It owns certain wires, and leasehold interests in wires, connecting its office, on the corner of F and Fourteenth streets in the city of Washington, with a great number of houses in said city, and in the county of Washington. By means of these wires it maintains a general call and messenger service throughout the District, provides a supervision of private watchmen for banks and so forth, maintains a regular alarm system, and cares for private residences during the absence of their owners. The provision for watching and guarding houses is alleged to be one of great usefulness and benefit to the citizens on account, specially, of the inadequacy of police protection.</p> <p>In the petition filed on June 22, 1899, to obtain a writ of mandamus to the District Commissioners, it is alleged, that relator owns a wire attached to poles of the Chesapeake aud Ohio Telephone Company that runs along Columbia road in the county of Washington, and passes the residence of Rear Admiral Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., which is situated at the corner of said road and Kalorama avenue. One of the said poles stands on the sidewalk of the road directly in front of said house, and to connect the same with the wire thereon, the connecting wire would run across about four feet of the sidewalk.</p> <p>The said Selfridge, expecting to be absent from his home during the summer of 1899, applied to the relator to connect its wire with his said home and install its burglar alarm system therein.</p> <p>On May 8,1899, relator made application to the Commissioners for leave to string the said wire across the sidewalk; and the same was accompanied by a letter from said Selfridge pointing out his need of the protection of relator's service, and asking that the application be granted. This application was refused by the Commissioners for want of authority to grant the same, and their reply also stated that the wire along Columbia road had been “ strung without authority and exists in violation of law.”</p> <p>Relator further alleged that the Commissioners have exclusive jurisdiction over all the public roads in the District, outside the limits of the city of Washington, and have full authority to grant the permission applied for. It denied the want of authority for the maintenance of its wire along Columbia road, and charged that the refusal of the application had been arbitrarily made, without any just cause or reason. It is further alleged that the electric current carried on its wires is not dangerous to person or property.</p> <p>Certain affidavits were attached to the petition, tending to support the facts alleged therein, and to show that the wire along Columbia road had been maintained for about seven years, and that it had been the custom of relator and other corporations, previous to the year 1896, to string wires in the county of Washington without permission, all of which was well known to, and had been acquiesced in by, the Commissioners during that period.</p> <p>The District Commissioners made return under oath, to the rule to show cause, alleging, that “the large majority of the wires strung and used by the said petitioner, and the house connections made .by it, are' illegally existing overhead wires, and the same were put up and maintained without authority of law and without the knowledge or permit of the Commissioners of the District; that they never issued any permit to the petitioner for any house connections whatever, and that the said petitioner has uniformly refused to inform these respondents as to the location of its aforesaid wires or of its aforesaid house connections, although requested by these respondents so to do.”</p> <p>They admit the facts alleged in regard to the application for the connection with the Selfridge house, and their refusal to grant the same because “ they are without legal authority to permit the erection or maintenance of overhead wires in the District of Columbia by the said petitioner.” They further allege that they are advised that they have no legal authority to grant the application; and that the authority to grant permissions for house connections for the electric service has no application to the relator and the business carried on by it. They specially deny that the wire on Columbia road was erected, or now exists, by authority of any law; that it had been the custom to erect said wires without permission and with the acquiescence of the Commissioners; and that their action in refusing the application in this case had been arbitrary and without just reason or cause. They further say that the only permission to repair wires ever given by them had been limited to apply only to “ those existing on July 18, 1888, that being the date after which the Commissioners were prohibited by Act of Congress from permitting the stringing of additional overhead wires.”</p> <p>The case was heard on the1 petition and affidavits of the relator and the return of the respondents, and the petition was denied and dismissed. From this judgment the appeal has been prosecuted.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on a verdict in an action on a policy of accident insurance. The facts are sufficiently stated in tlie opinion.

Hearing and rehearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Mr. Justice Morris delivered the opinion of the Court: This is an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding, wherein the matter in controversy is an improvement in printing machines.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the caveators from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a special term for Orphans’ Court business, admitting a will to probate after the trial by jury of issues framed upon a caveat to the will.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a patent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Com missioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>In error, to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal (specially allowed) by the plaintiff in an action at law, from an order overruling his motion for a judgment by default against the defendant.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon a verdict in an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by one of several defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit in equity to vacate a conveyance of real estate and for other purposes. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: Anthony Buchly died July 22, 1881, leaving a will and codicil making disposition of property, both real and personal, situated in the District of Columbia.

<p>Hearing upon two appeals by the defendant from interlocutory orders of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit for an injunction.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, entered after a demurrer to a plea in abatement had been sustained, and the defendant had elected not to plead over.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>