Volume 16 — Appeals, District of Columbia

Hearing on an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered upon an agreed statement of facts in an action of assumpsit. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: The parties to this appeal had been partners as claim agents and attorneys, in the city of Washington, for some years before September 1, 1889, at which time their partnership was dissolved.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a suit in equity to enjoin the infringement of a patent, and for ail accounting.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon the verdict of a jury in an action of covenant.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is a suit at common law on a covenant contained in • a contract under seal entered into by the parties for an exchange between themselves of certain pieces of real estate owned by them.</p> <p>The appellee, Milton Ruby, was the owner of two adjoining farms in Frederick County, in the State of Maryland, one of 208 acres, said to have been unincumbered, and which figures in this suit, and the other of 68 acres, which, although frequently referred to in the testimony, is not involved in the present litigation. The appellant, Lancelot A. Hartman, was the owner of three several pieces of real estate in the city of Washington, all of which were covered by mortgages, to the aggregate amount of about $14,000. The parties agreed upon an exchange. The appellee contracted to give his farm of 208 acres, exclusive of a tract of about two acres, known as the orchard, adjacent to his residence, to the appellant in exchange for the Washington City property of the latter; and the appellant contracted to convey to the appellee the three pieces of Washington City property, subject to three several deeds of trust or mortgages specifically enumerated in the deed or articles of agreement. In the contract the appellant, Hartman, entered into a covenant with the appellee in these terms: “And the said Lancelot A. Hartman guarantees to sell said properties hereby conveyed by him to party of the first part (Ruby) for a sum of money that shall not be jess than $17,000.”</p> <p>Deeds were duly executed in pursuance of the contract. The appellee conveyed the farm for the nominal consideration of $10,000; the testimony, however, on behalf of the appellee being that it was worth at the time_ from $80 to $85 an acre, while the testimony on behalf of the appellant indicated a valuation of from $40 to $55 an acre. By a mistake, conceded by the parties to have been such, the orchard property of two acres, heretofore referred to as having been excluded from the contract, was in fact included in the deed from the appellee to the appellant. A supplemental contract was thereupon made for its recofiveyance; but the appellant, instead of giving effect to this supplemental agreement, and in a palpable violation of it for which no excuse is offered in the record, conveyed this orchard property to a third person.</p> <p>The appellant conveyed the Washington City lots to the appellee subject to the three mortgages or deeds of trust recited, which the appellee assumed to pay. But the appellant seems thereafter to have made no effort to perform his covenant or guarantee to sell the property conveyed by him for the sum of $17,000, or for any other sum. The contract had been entered into on March 13,1895; and the appellee, deeming that he had waited a sufficient time for the per-' formance of the covenant by the appellant, instituted the present suit against the latter on December 21, 1896, for the non-performance of the covenant, and also for the failure of the appellant to reconvey the orchard tract.</p> <p>The declaration contained two counts. The first alleged damages to the plaintiff to the amount of $17,000 for the failure and refusal of the defendant to sell for that amount the property conveyed by him to the plaintiff. And the second count alleged damages to the amount of $3,000 for the defendant’s failure to reconvey the orchard lot, according to his agreement.</p> <p>Thirteen pleas were filed for the defendant; four others were afterwards added. Three of these seventeen pleas were eliminated on demurrer. Others of them might perhaps have been disposed of in the same way. All of them which were appropriate amounted to the general issue, and the parties went to trial upon them.</p> <p>At the trial, the plaintiff having proved the two contracts which have been mentioned, the one for the exchange of the respective properties of the parties of the date of March 13, 1895, which contained the covenant sued on in the first count of the declaration, and the supplemental contract of March 22, 1895, which was for the reconveyance of the orchard lot, and the violation of which was the subject matter of the second count of the declaration, thereupon offered to adduce evidence to show that, by the covenant sued on in the first count, it was meant that the appellant, Hartman, should sell for the appellee the properties conveyed by the former to the latter at a sum not less than $17,000 over and above all incumbrances thereon; and being requested by the court to reduce the offer to writing, he proceeded so to do. As this offer is the foundation of the greater part of the controversy before us, it will be proper to state it in full, as set forth in the record. It is as follows:</p> <p>“For the purpose of explaining the words — ‘and the said Lancelot A. Hartman guarantees to sell said properties hereby conveyed by him to party of the first part for a sum of money which shall not be less than $17,000’ — contained in the agreement for exchange in evidence, we offer to prove: 1st. That at the time of the execution of said agreement the plaintiff owned the farm mentioned in the said agreement, unincumbered, worth about $17,000, and that the defendant owned the three parcels of property therein mentioned, incumbered to the extent of $14,000, which were not worth $17,000 over and above said incumbrances: 2d. That before, at and after the execution of said agreement of exchange the defendant stated to plaintiff and others that he, the said defendant, was to sell the said three pieces of property for the plaintiff, so as to realize $17,000 for the plaintiff over and above said incumbrances.”</p> <p>To this offer objection was made on behalf of the defendant; but after argument the objection was overruled, and the plaintiff was allowed to adduce testimony in accordance with his offer. To this ruling of the court, and to each and every part of the testimony offered in pursuance of it, an exception was reserved on the part of the defendant. In the course of this testimony it • was developed that the appellant had speedily disposed of the property conveyed to him by the appellee; and that therefore rescission of the contract for fraud was impossible.</p> <p>On the part of the defendant^ large amount of testimony was introduced, including a very considerable amount of correspondence between the parties and between the appellee and the real estate agents who were concerned in the transaction. Some of this testimony was intended to show the circumstances under which the agreements between the parties were effected; but most of it was to show the respective values of the property conveyed. For the purposes of our decision it is not necessary to refer to it more in detail. But it may be stated that, in the course of it, the defendant’s witnesses who were present at the making of the contract of March 13, 1895, admitted upon cross-examination that it was the understanding that the Washington City property should sell for $17,000 over and above the incumbrances upon it; and that the defendant himself, when he became a witness on his own behalf, testified that “he did not know whether it was meant that he was to sell the property for $17,000 over and above the incumbrances or not.”</p> <p>At the conclusion of the testimony, four instructions asked by the plaintiff were given to the .jury; and fifteen requested by the defendant were all refused. To the rulings of the court thereon exceptions were duly taken.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $16,500, with interest thereon from December 21, 1895, the date of the filing of the declaration. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were immediately interposed; but they were overruled, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict. From this judgment the defendant has appealed.</p> <p>The agreement set out in the first count of the declaration is plain, clear, distinct and unambiguous, and hence evidence was inadmissible to explain, alter, add to or modify said contract. Dixon v. Clayville, 44 Md. 573; Clark v. Lancaster, 36 Md. 196 ; Marshall v. Haney, 4 Md. 48 ; Dance v. Dance, 56 Md. 437; Stockham v. Stockham, 32 Md. 196; Allen v. Bryson, 67 Iowa, 591; Stewart v. Murray, 13 Minn. 246; Clark v. Russell, 3 Dali. 434; Shankland v. Mayor, 5 Pet. 390 ; Sprigg v. Bank, 14 Peters, 201; Canal Co. v. Penna. Co., 8 Wall. 290. If the evidence was offered for any other purpose it was irrelevant and inadmissible.</p> <p>That the ambiguity involved is latent and properly the subject of explanation by parol evidence is abundantly clear. Extrinsic evidence-is not admissible to remove a patent ambiguity, for if a meaning be assigned by aid of extrinsic evidence to that which is apparently destitute of meaning the effect of the instrument would depend not upon the instrument, but upon the force of the oral testimony. But this rule must be qualified in regard to an ambiguity which is latent and not patent, for then proof of collateral facts and surrounding circumstances existing at time the instrument was made may be properly admitted so that the court may be placed as nearly as possible in the same situation as the parties themselves with a view the better to adjudge in what sense the language of the instrument was intended to be used and to apply it to the subject matter. Bradley v. Steamboat Co., 13 Pet. 89; Cole v. Wendel, 8 John. 116; Reid v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 23; Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464; Keller v. Webb, 125 Mass. 88; Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545; Fryer v. Patrick, 42 Md. 51; Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63; McCreary v. McCreary, 5 G. & J. 147.</p> <p>When in applying the terms of a contract to the subject matter thereof a latent ambiguity is disclosed, then, for the purpose of applying the terms to the subject matter and removing the ambiguity, it is proper to show by the declaration of the parties themselves, made before, at the time of executing the contract or afterwards, what was their understanding of the meaning of the words used. Keller v. Webb, 125 Mass. 88; Stoop v. Smith, 100 Mass. 63; MacDonald v. Dana, 154 Mass. 152.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia upon a verdict in an action of ejectment.</p> <p>Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.</p> <p>The defendant was clearly estopped by tbe findings in Anderson v. Reid, 14 App. D. 0. 54, to show that he was a bona fide purchaser and improver of the property in question. In its review of the testimony the court considered all the facts and judicially determined that Reid was a mala fide purchaser and had not been misled by any conduct of Anderson’s. Railroad Co. v. Uniled States, 168 U. S. 1 ; Almy v. Daniels, 15 R. I. 312; Laing v. Regrey, 160 U. S. 531; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 709 ; Voorhees v. Bank, 10 Pet. 449 ; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 340 ; Patton v. Kensinger, 2 Abb. C. C. 94; Le Roy v. Clayton, 2 Sawyer, 493; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 203, and 7 Pet. 572.</p> <p>Tbe decree of this court in Anderson v. Reid, 14 App. D. C. 54, directing tbe dismissal of tbe bill in that case because tbe court below was without jurisdiction to entertain tbe suit, did not estop the defendant from showing in tbe present action that he made tbe improvements in good faith. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 429; Durant y. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107 ; Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. 370; Story Eq. PL, Par. 791, 793, notes.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit in equity by a widow against the trustees of her husband’s estate, for exoneration of her estate and reimbursement for money raised by mortgage upon her property during her husband’s lifetime, and claimed to have been used,to pay his debt. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

<p>In error, to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the complainants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity against the estate of a deceased trustee to enforce a liability on account of the defalcation of his co-trustee.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity to vacate certain deeds for alleged fraud. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This suit was begun with the original bill filed September 1, 1896, by Lily Alys Godfrey, and the defendants therein named were Stephen A. Dutton and wife, Louis W. Richardson and Mary Alice Godfrey.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by defendants from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, entered upon a verdict directed for the plaintiff in an action on a certified copy of a contract and bond under act of Congress of August 13, 1894.</p>

<p>Hearing on a motion for reargument and reconsideration of former opinion and decree. For former report of these cases see 14 App. D. C. 200.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit to enforce mechanics’ liens. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This is a suit in equity instituted in the Supreme Court of the District to enforce mechanics’ liens against a part of lot 14, in square number 223, in this city, the property of the appellant, The Riggs Fire Insurance Company.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe complainant from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity for tbe reformation of a deed and for other relief. Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia appointing receivers pendente lite in a suit in equity for the appointment of a receiver of rents of certain real estate, to enjoin a sale of the property and for other relief.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows •</p> <p>This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Supreme Court of the District appointing receivers for certain property called the Victoria Flats.</p> <p>The order was made on a bill filed by David C. Grayson, trustee, and a number of others as beneficiaries, in a trust deed covering said property, against Frank I. Wood, H. Maurice Talbott, Bernard A. Duke and Nicholas T. Haller, as claimants of the equitable title, and B. H. Warner and Louis D. Wine, trustees, and others as trustees and beneficiaries in certain prior incumbrances.</p> <p>The following facts are stated substantially in the bill:</p> <p>January 13, 1897, Alice S. Hill conveyed to Nicholas T. Haller lots 1 and 2, block 45, of W. 0. Hill’s subdivision of the middle grounds of Columbian University. Each lot has a frontage of 75 feet on Fourteenth street, and extends back 190 feet parallel with Welling street, on which lot 1 abuts.</p> <p>Haller, in execution of a scheme to build the Victoria Flats upon said lots, obtained a loan of $75,000 for five years, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent., payable semi-annually.</p> <p>On January 22, 1897, to secure this loan, he conveyed to Warner and Wine, trustees, a part of the ground comprised in said lots having a frontage of 120 feet on Fourteenth and of 124 feet on Welling street.</p> <p>On the same day he conveyed to trustees the remaining portions of lots 1 and 2 to secure'the payment of $12,330, evidenced by notes payable in one, two and three years.</p> <p>Haller proceeded to erect his building upon the parts of the lots conveyed in the first deed of trust with a frontage of 100 feet on Fourteenth street and a depth of 87 feet on Welling. By reason of certain parking reservations along the said streets, unknown to Haller when he purchased, and when his plans were made, he was unable to leave a contemplated strip on the north and west of the same, within the boundaries specified in the deed of trust to secure his building loan. The walls, in fact, extend one or more inches beyond said boundaries, and the eaves overhang the same. Porches were ‘also built on both sides extending 6 feet beyond said lines, and very many windows in said walls necessary for light and air open on the adjacent portions of the lots not embraced in the said trust. The possession of a strip of ten feet of said remaining ground adjoining the south side and west end of the building is necessary to its use and, if the same shall be built upon, will greatly impair its value. To provide against this contingency, Haller entered into an. agreement with the trustees and the beneficiaries of the deed of trust aforesaid covering the remainder of the lots, that upon payment by him .of $4,000 of said indebtedness they would release to him a strip of land ten feet wide adjoining said building on the south and west sides thereof.</p> <p>This release was not obtained. Haller became seriously involved and was unable to pay all of the debts contracted for building material. Mechanics’ liens to the extent of $30,087.69 were about to be filed.</p> <p>To prevent this, and to secure the said sum and a further indebtedness of $10,350, he, on December 20, 1898, conveyed the same portions of the lots as described in the building loan trust deed aforesaid, to David C. Grayson and John C. Heald, trustees.</p> <p>This instrument was not made an exhibit in the pleadings, but the effect of an important provision thereof, together with certain proceedings thereunder, appear as follows in a paragraph of the bill:</p> <p>“6. By the said deed of trust to the complainant Gray-son and the defendant Heald, and for the better security of the beneficiaries thereunder, it was further provided that the said trustees under the said deed to Grayson and Heald should collect the rents and profits of the said Victoria Flats building over and above the amounts necessary to pay the interest on the debt secured by the first trust on the said property, and taxes and insurance, and the repairs and running expenses of the said building, so long as any part of the indebtedness secured by the said second trust should remain due and unpaid, and to apply the rents and profits as frequently as practicable on the notes secured by the said second deed of trust pro■ rata until all the indebtedness thereby secured should have been fully paid, and, pursuant to the said provision of the said deed of trust, the said property was placed in the hands of the firm of B. EL Warner & Co. to collect the said rents, issues, and profits, and pay the interest on the said first trust, together with the taxes, insurance, repairs, etc., and to account to the said trustees, Grayson and ELeald, for the surplus rents, under which arrangement the surplus rents and profits of the said building were paid over to the said Grayson and Heald and applied toward payment of the interest on the promissory notes secured by the second deed of trust until about the month of May, 1899, when, upon the representation that the expense of real estate agents’ commissions would thereby be saved, and that the income of the said premises would otherwise be increased, the said trustees, Grayson and Heald, acquiesced in permitting the defendant Frank I. Wood, who had become interested in the property, as hereinafter shown, to collect the said rents and profits, it being understood that they would be applied as theretofore to protecting the property against sale under the first trust by payment of the interest, taxes, insurance, and other necessary charges, and that any and all surplus of said rents above the said charges would be applied to the promissory note, secured by the second trust.”</p> <p>Haller, “becoming further embarrassed, and being threatened with judgments then about to be recovered against him on account of other transactions,” on December 20, 1897, conveyed to Holt and Sebring, trustees, all of the said lots 1 and 2, not included in the trust deeds to Warner and Wine and Grayson and Heald, to secure notes payable on their face to William 0. Roome and William J. McClure, who are made defendants, in the sum of $34,000; which said notes were never in fact delivered, and the transaction was wholly fictitious. This was done upon the advice and by the direction of Wood.</p> <p>On March 31, 1898, and again by direction of Wood, Haller conveyed to defendant Duke, upon an expressed consideration of $10, the lots constituting the Victoria Flats property as aforesaid, and also the strip of ten feet adjoining the same and heretofore referred to. Duke, it is alleged, is an irresponsible person, and the conveyance was made to him for the benefit of Wood and Talbott, who had in some manner become interested in the property.</p> <p>A claim is set up that the said strip is absolutely necessary to the value of the building; that the trust deed to Grayson was accepted in the belief, from the acts of Haller, that the same had become a part of the flats property— Haller having extended his building upon it and led all persons to believe, that it was a part of the same property; and that Duke, Wood and Talbott acquired their rights subject to said equity.</p> <p>The bill then further charges that Wood and Talbott, after the execution of the trust deed by Haller to Grayson and Heald, attempted to buy up the claims secured therein upon offers of 20 per cent, of their face value, and upon failure declared that they would see that the holders “ got nothing.” Failing in this scheme, Wood procured from Haller, on July 31,1898, a conveyance in fee of the remainder of the lots outside of the building save and except the said strip that had been previously conveyed to Duke.</p> <p>On March 13, 1899, Wood procured a conveyance of the said strip from Duke. This was done to separate this strip from the building and to cause a sacrifice of the same upon a sale under the trust deeds incumbering it. Wood then next procured a release to himself, by Holt and Sebring, trustees, of the fictitious incumbrance before referred to. The said strip has never been released from the original trust deed covering the whole of the lots outside the flats, but the notes secured thereby, to the extent of $4,000, have been paid through some arrangement by Wood and Talbott with the National Bank of Gaithersburg; and Wood and Talbott claim to be the owners of all of said notes.</p> <p>Wood and Talbott failed to pay the interest on the trust deed to secure the building loan, and have thereby caused the trustees therein to advertise the property for sale on September 7, 1899.</p> <p>Grayson, learning this, requested Wood to pay the same out.of the rents received by him, and offered, if there was not sufficient thereof, to advance the remainder and stop the sale. Wood refused, and then and there told Grayson that he and Talbott, by reason of their ownership of the “strip,” held “the key to the situation,” and were willing that the flats should be sold.</p> <p>Further prosecuting his attempt to have the flats property sold under conditions that would prevent its bringing more than the amount of the first trust, and enable him and Talbott to obtain-the property discharged of complainants’ lien, the said Wood, on September 2, 1899, filed a bill against Bernard A. Duke, alleging the fact that the flats encroach upon the strip and impair its value, and praying to have the nuisances thereby created abated.</p> <p>The prayers of the bill are for appointment of a receiver of the rents of the flats; for restraint of the advertised sale; for the establishment of their equitable liens upon the said strip of sa-id lots; and for a decree declaring an easement for light and air in said strip, etc.</p> <p>Affidavits were filed tending to support the allegations of the bill, in respect of the demand of Grayson for the payment of the interest, and his offer to advance any sum in addition that might be necessary, the attempt of Wood to purchase at 20 per cent, of face value claims secured by the deed of trust to Grayson, and the threat that the owners of said claim should never receive a dollar thereon.</p> <p>The sworn response of Wood to the rule to show cause states the following facts substantially, and beyond these and inferences deducible therefrom, does not deny the allegations of the bill.</p> <p>The conveyance by Haller to Duke of the flats property and adjoining strip, whilst absolute in form, was in trust for Wood and Haller in equal shares as tenants in common. Thereafter Haller conveyed his said interest to said H. Maurice Talbott.</p> <p>That after Talbott became part owner he and Wood decided that it would be to their interest to collect the rents of the flats, and commenced to do so May 2, 1899; and they say that they had a right to do this without the consent of Grayson and Heald. •</p> <p>'The provision in the trust of the latter is admitted to be substantially as alleged in the bill, but the legal effect thereof, as claimed in the bill, is denied. That the rents of the flats were reduced on account of the dull summer season, and when the interest due on the first trust deed matured July 22, 1899, the respondents had in hand only $1,400, after deducting running expenses — a sum insufficient to meet the payment due, which amounted to $2,250.</p> <p>The demand of Grayson is admitted, but was refused because Grayson’s right, as claimed under the trust deed, is denied, and because Grayson refused to state what disposition he would make of said sum if the-trustees Warner and Wine should decline to receive a part payment.</p> <p>The charge that he withheld the money to cause a sale of the flats property is denied; and a willingness is declared to abide the decision of the court whether the net rents then in hand, amounting to $2,375 should be paid on said interest, without deduction for accrued taxes. The subjection of the adjoining strip to the easement claimed is denied, and the conveyance of the same to Duke, for the benefit of Wood and Talbott, was not made to include it in the flats property.</p> <p>The agreement between Haller and the beneficiaries of the first trust upon the ground outside and surrounding the flats, for the release of the lien upon the “strip” upon the payment of $4,000, as alleged in the bill, is denied; but it is admitted that the trustee therein wrote to Haller that he would release if $4,000 should be paid prior to March 10, 1898.</p> <p>Haller made no such payment, and after March 10,1898, Wood and Talbott took up two of the notes, for $2,000 each, as set forth in the bill; but said notes have not been paid, and the trust remains as originally created.</p> <p>Upon hearing, after this answer had been made, the court made the order appointing receivers for the property, and restraining the advertised sale. Warner and Wine, trustees, were appointed receivers.</p> <p>Wood, Talbott and Duke have joined in the appeal from this order.</p> <p>1. Where it appears that the complainants can not have a final decree, a receiver pendente lite ought not to be appointed. Owen v. Homan, 13 McN. & S. 412; Bainbrigge v. Baddeley, 3 McN. & S. 420; Greggory v. Greggory, 33 N. Y. Sup. 39; Gofer v. Echerson, 6 Iowa, 525 ; Wilkinson v. Bobbie, 12 Blatchf. 300.</p> <p>2. Only where the physical integrity of the security is in imminent danger of waste or depreciation, the mortgagor insolvent, or, when rents have been pledged as additional security, the latter are being dissipated or misapplied, should a receiver be appointed. Even if the rents and profits had been expressly included in the deed of trust to Warner and Wine, the latter could only have had a receiver of them appointed upon proof of the insolvency of the debtor, the mortgagor. Grant v. Insurance Co., 121 U. S. 105; Freedman Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 502; Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U. S. 652; Trust Co. V. Ice Co., 14 App. D. C. 312; Cortelyou v. Hathaway, 64 Am. Dec. 498; Mayo v. McPhaul, 71 Ga. 758; Venable v. Smith, 98 N. C. 523; Chase’s Case, 1 Bland, 213. To justify the appointment of a receiver it is not enough to show that the property is in danger. It must also be shown that the party in possession is not responsible. Clark v. Ridgeley, 1 Md. Ch. 70; Burt v. Burt, 41 N. Y. 46.</p> <p>3. The appointment of a receiver was oppressive and unnecessary. Less stringent methods of protection should have been adopted by the court. Speights v. Peters, 9 Gill (Md.), 472; Matter of Cohen, 3 Ch. (Md.), 201; Blondheim v. Moore, 11 Md. 365 ; Furlong v. Miller, 3 Md. 99 ; Haight v. Burr, 19 Md. 130; Brick Co. v. Robinson, 55 Md. 418; Insurance Co. v. &rant, 3 MacA. 220. A proper order in the_ case might have been one requiring Wood to give security to account for the rents and profits as the court might direct. Insurance Co. v. Stebbins, 8 Paige, 567.</p>

<p>Hearing on two appeals by the plaintiff, one a general appeal and the other an appeal specially allowed by this court, from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sustaining a demurrer to one of two counts of the declaration in an action on a promissory note.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>Two appeals have been taken in this case from the same judgment, and are presented on a single record. The appellee has moved to dismiss each in turn as not properly taken, and the grounds of those motions must be first considered.</p> <p>The record shows the following proceedings in the court below. The Commercial National Bank of Chicago filed its declaration July 27, 1899, against the Consumers’ Brewing Company of the District of Columbia to recover upon two promissory notes or obligations for the payment of money.</p> <p>The first count of the declaration sets out the instrument that is in controversy on this appeal as follows:</p> <p>“$21,850.00.</p> <p>“Washington, D. C., June 20th, 1898.</p> <p>“On or before one year the Consumers’ Brewing Co. of Rosslyn, Va., promise to pay to Chas. Kaestner& Co. order, at the Riggs National Bank of Washington, D. C., or order, at said bank, twenty-one thousand eight hundred fifty & no/100 dollars, for value received, with interest at 6 per centum per annum, having deposited with said bank, as collateral security for the payment of this note, the following property, viz., certificates Nos. 324, 392, 304, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, aggregating two hundred and thirty shares of the capital stock of the Consumers’ Brewing Co. of Rosslyn, Va., it being agreed by the makers that the interest on this note shall be paid monthly and that the principal shall also be curtailed monthly, with full power and authority to Chas. Kaestner & Co. or said bank to sell the whole or any part of said security, or any substitutes therefor or any additions thereto, at public or private sale, at any time and at the option of said bank or its assigns, on the non-performance of this promise or any part thereof, and without advertisement or notice to tbe undersigned ; and upon such sale the holder hereof may purchase all or any part of said securities, discharged from any right of redemption. After deducting all proper costs and expenses, the residue of the proceeds of sale shall be applied to the payment of this note, and the undersigned agrees to remain liable for any deficiency then remaining. In case of depreciation in the market value of said security at any time pledged for this loan, a payment shall be made on account or additional security added, as required by said bank. It is agreed that any excess of security upon this note shall be held as security for any other debt due to the said bank by the maker hereof.</p> <p>“The Consumers’ Brewing Co.,</p> <p>“By Wm. McGuire, Pres.;</p> <p>“By Jas. Richardson, Treas.”</p> <p>[Indorsement on back of note:] “41576. Consumers’ Brewing Co. $21,850 & int. 6 % 20 June, ’99. Riggs bk. Chas. Kaestner Co.”</p> <p>The second count is on a note for $2,000, bearing the same date and executed by the same parties, which is omitted from the record because the issues concerning it remain undetermined in the court below.</p> <p>Defendant demurred to the first count on the ground that the instrument therein set forth was not a negotiable note, and, consequently, that an action could not be maintained thereon in the name of the indorsee.</p> <p>This was sustained November 28, 1899, “and the plaintiff, electing to stand upon said count, judgment on the demurrer is ordered.”</p> <p>The judgment further recites: “ Therefore it is considered that the plaintiff take nothing by its suit contained in the first count of its declaration, and that the defendant go thereof without day as to said count.”</p> <p>Plaintiff noted an appeal and gave the required bond. Being in doubt whether the said judgment was final in the sense that an appeal would lie as matter of right, plaintiff petitioned this court for the allowance of a special appeal as from an interlocutory order, which was duly granted.</p> <p>Appellee has moved to dismiss both appeals.</p> <p>1. The note in question was meant, to be negotiable. This intention is a material element in determining the character of a written instrument. White v. Railroad Co., 21 How. 575.</p> <p>2. The note in question is negotiable according to the usage and practice of the business community. That such usage and practice may determine the negotiability of a written instrument is well settled. White v. Railroad Co., supra; Bank v. Bates, 120 U. S. 556; Thompson on Corp., Sec. 2589; Kortright v. Bank, 20 Wend. 92; McNeal v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 331; Railroad Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 41.</p> <p>3. The following cases illustrate the growth of the principle of negotiability. Texira v. Evans, cited in Master v. Miller, 1 Anstr. 228; Uibblewhite v. M’Morine, 6 M. & W. 200, 216 ; United States v. Nelson, 2 Brock. 64. The following results of this growth may be noted: Certain instruments are declared to be practically commercial paper and to be entitled to all immunities attaching to such paper. Municipal bonds and coupons attached, payable to order and indorsed, or payable to bearer. Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282 ; School District v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135 ; Provident Co. v. Mercer Co., 170 U. S. 593. Bonds and treasury notes of the United States, payable to holder or to bearer at a definite, future time. Vermilye v. Express Co., 21 Wall. 138. Letter of credit relating to bills of exchange. Agra v. Bank, 2 L. R. Ch. App. 297; In re Blakely Co., 3 L. R. Ch. App. 154; Arents v. Com., 18 Gratt. 769. Certificates of deposit by a bank or banker, payable to A, B, or order. Miller v. Austen, 13 How. 918 ; 2 Daniel Neg. Inst. (3d Ed.), Sec. 1703. .Certain other instruments are declared to be quasi negotiable. 2 Daniel Neg. Inst. (3d Ed.), Sec. 1708 ; Railroad, v. Howard, 7 Wall. 415. County warrants, payable to bearer. Wall v. Munroe Co., 103 U. S. 74. Certificates of stock. Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369; Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 613; Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U. S. 804. Bills of lading have bj^ statute been made negotiable, but they are subject to defenses, and the law of innocent holder is not applicable to them. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557, 562.</p> <p>4. The note in' question is a promissory note. A promissory note is an absolute promise in writing, signed, but not sealed, to pay a specified sum at a time therein limited, or on demand, or at sight, to a person therein named, or to his order, or to the bearer. Byles on Bills, 4. Promissory notes “are promises in writing to pay a fixed sum of money to a named person or order, at all events, and at a time which must certainly arrive.” School District v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135; Railway Co. v. Bank, 136 U. S. 268. Therefore, the test is, as to time, must a time arrive when the note must be paid? As to amount, must a certain sum be paid in any event? In this jurisdiction it is settled that a note payable on or before a certain day is a good promissory note. Railroad Co. v. Bank, 136.U. S. 268; School District v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135; 4 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d Ed.), 92. The same principle applies necessarily as to amount. If a certain amount must, at all events, be paid, it makes no difference how it is to be paid. Payment in instalments is a mere incident. Railway Co. v. Bank, 136 U. S. 286, citing with approval Ricker v. Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 402. Notes payable in such instalments and at such times as the directors of the payee, a corporation, shall direct, are payable in effect on demand or in instalments on demand and are good promissory notes. Gaytes v. Hibbard, 5 Biss. 99; White v. Smith, 77 111. 351; Turnpike Road v. Hurtin, 9 Johns. 217; Hoivland v. Edmonds, 24 N. Y. 307; Insurance Co, v. Miller, 26 Vt. 77; Insurance Co. v. Bill, 31 Conn. 534; Stilwell v. Craig, 58 Mo. 241. To show the extent to which courts have gone in this direction the following authorities are cited: A note payable at or after death is ultimately certain and is a valid promissory note. Colehan v. Cooke, Willes, 393; Conn v. Thornton, 46 Ala. 587; Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7; 4 Am. Eng. Encyc. L. (2d Ed.), 92, note 2; So of a note payable after peace restored. Chapman v. Wacasar, 64 N. Car. 532. So of notes payable at a day certain or sooner, if made out of certain sales. Bank v. Crenshaw, 103 Ala. 497; Cisne v. Chidester, 85 111. 523; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa, 166; Walker v. Woolen, 54 Ind. 164; Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Penua. St. 13. A note payable on or before a day certain, provided the amount is not collected in the meantime from another source, is a good promissory note. Pemberton v. Hoosier, 1 Kans. 108; Palmer v. Hummer, 10 Kans. 464; Gardner v. Barger, 4 Heisk. 668; Smith v. Ellis, 29 Me. 422.</p> <p>5. A statement that certain securities have been deposited to provide for the payment of the instrument does not destroy its negotiability. Wise v. Charlton, 4 Ad. & El. 786 ; Faneourt v. Thorne, 9 Q. B. 312; Haynes v. Beckman, 6 La.0 Ann. 224; Mumford v. Tolman, 54 111. App. 471; Knipper v. Chase, 7 Iowa, 145; Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67; Perry v. Bigelow, 128 Mass. 129 ; Arnold v. Railroad Co., 5 Duer, 207; Bank v. Crowell, 148 Penna. St. 284; Banker. Gary, 18 S. C. 282; Bowie v. Joyner, 25 S. C. 123. Nor does the addition of a power of sale in case the instrument be unpaid at maturity, and a provision that the maker shall pay the deficiency, if any, after sale, have that effect. Knipper v. Chase, 7 Iowa, 145; Haynes v. Beckman, 6 La. Ann. 224; Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67; Perry v. Bigelow, 128 Mass. 129; Arnold v. Railroad Co., 5 Duer, 207; Bank v. Crowell, 148 Penna. St. 284; Bank v. Gary, 18 S. 0. 282. But it has been held in two recent cases that if the security can be sold before the maturity of the note, that circumstance will destroy its negotiability. Bank v. Perry, 66 Fed. Pep. 887; Bank v. McGeoch, 73 Wis. 332; 1 Daniel Neg. Inst. (3d Ed.), Sec. 156; Burke v. Bulaney, 153 U. S. 228. In this District promissory notes secured upon real estate are almost universally employed for the purposes elsewhere accomplished by mortgages. These deeds of trust contain provisions that the collateral real estate security may be sold upon default in payment of interest, of taxes or of insurance. Upon such sale the net proceeds are to be applied to the payment of the principal note whether due or not. If the decision in the case of Bank v. Perry, supra, is good law, the negotiability of this great mass of paper is destroyed. The decision in Bank v. Perry, supra, that if the security can be-sold before maturity of the note, that circumstance destroys its negotiability, is based upon the erroneous idea that the principal sum of a note can not be so anticipated in payment as to prevent the sum for wThich it was originally given being payable at its maturity; a doctrine inconsistent with that of the Supreme Court of the United States. Opposed to this decision is that óf Mumford v. Tolman, 54 111. App. 471, which involved the exact-point in question. See, also, Goschen v. Turnpike Co., 9 John. 217; Bank v. Crenshaw, 103 Ala. 497.</p> <p>1. The judgment was not a final judgment, within the meaning of section 7 of the act establishing this court; was not appealable; and this court is without jurisdiction to review, affirm, reverse, or modify the same upon the general appeal. That appeal should therefore be dismissed. Holcombe v. McKusick, 20 How. 552; 11 How. 22; 106 U. S. 3; 148 U. S. 264; 21 Wend. 667.</p> <p>A judgment, to be final and appealable, must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case. 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of L. 967; 2 Encyc. PI. & Pr. 53, 54; 43 W. Va. 43.</p> <p>2. The objection to the maintenance of the special appeal also goes to the jurisdiction of the court. It is clearly not an interlocutory order, but was final as to the first count. The special appeal should therefore be dismissed. Kimball v. Evans, 93 U. S. 320; Parson v. Parker, 3 MacA. 9; 2 Poe PI. & Pr., Sec. 360; 1 Id., Sec. 710; Riley v. Jarvis, 43 W. Va. 43.</p> <p>3. If this court has jurisdiction of the case, the judgment should be affirmed. The instrument sued on in the first count contains a promise to pay on or before one year, and to curtail the principal monthly, and also a promise, in case the stock pledged as security shall depreciate in value, to make a payment on account, or add additional security, as Riggs bank may require. Each of these promises is a part of the contract. Bank v. Perry, 66 Fed. Rep. 887; Costelo v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293; Killam v. Schmps, 26 Kan. 310. The maker’s liability on this instrument is uncertain in several respects, viz: (1) As to the time when he must pay an instalment on it, and (2) as to the amount of each instalment, and (3) as to the amount, if any, which shall be due at the expiration of the year. Such an instrument is not negotiable. Bank v. Perry, 66 Fed. Rep. 887. Any contingency either as to the amount to he paid, or as to the time when payment is to occur, robs the paper of that certainty which is one of the chief essentials of negotiability. Chouteau V. Allen, 70 Mo. 290; Hubbard v. Mosely, 11 Gray, 170; Way v. Smith, 111 Mass. 523; Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137; Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass. 151; Bank v. McGooch, 73 Wis. 332; Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. 0. 24; Smith v. Mar land, 59 Iowa, 645; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cowen, 108; Russell v. Russell, 1 MacA. 263; Smilee v. Stevens, 39 Vt. 316; Nunez v. Dautel, 19 Wall. 560; 1 Rand. Com. Paper, Sec. 110, p. 148 and note 2; 1 Dan. Neg. Instr., Sec. 45a.</p> <p>4. Whether the instrument be negotiable or not is a question of law, and not of fact. The instrument was issued complete, is unambiguous, and no question of intention can arise. The character of the instrument, whether negotiable or not, depends upon its terms, and not upon the intent of the parties or either of them.</p> <p>5. A promissory note is “an unconditional promise to pay to another’s order or to bearer a specified sum of money at a specified time.” Tied. Com. Pap., Sec. 6. This definition indicates thé test. The time must be specified; the sum to be paid at that time must be specified, and the promise to pajr the specified sum at the specified time must be unconditional. In the case at bar we find uncertainty in all these respects. The decisions opposed to the well-established requirements of certainty in commercial paper, cited by counsel for the appellant as emanating from the “progressive school,” are not controlling here. Recent decisions are sustaining the rule requiring such certainty, as appears in.the following list of cases denying negotiability, viz: Because of provisions maturing a note secured by mortgage on failure of maker to pay taxes and assessments. Wistrand v. Barker, 7 Kans. 562; Brooke v. Struthers, 68 N. W. 272. With exchange. 18 Ind. App. 30; Id. 122; Bank v. Slette, 69 N. W. 1148; Culbertson v. Nelson, 93 Iowa, 187; 38 Fed. Rep. 283; 28 Fed. Rep. 865; 10 Mo. App. 527. Where bank book of depositor must accompany order. White v. Cushing, 88 Me. 339. With.costs and attorney’s fees. 67 Mo. App. 150; 86 Mich. 191; 48 S. 0. 308; 91 Me. 406 ; 60 Md. 584. Where paper showed on its face that the consideration was an executory contract. 171 Penna. 615. Holder may, before or after maturity, extend time of payment. 39 Fed. Rep. 262. That note will be renewed at maturity. 126 Penna. St. 194. Payee may declare note due before maturity if he deem it insecure. 28 S. C. 504; 84 N. C. 24.</p>

<p>In error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granting a perpetual injunction enjoining the erection of a wall and directing the removal of windows in an existing wall. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the claimant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a libel in admiralty.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the respondent, the Intendant of the Workhouse, from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a habeas corpus proceeding, discharging the petitioner, who was held in custody under a conviction in the police court of being a suspicious person. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from.a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon the verdict of a jury in an action on a policy of insurance. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This was an action upon a policy of fire insurance for the sum of $5,000, originally issued February 3, 1893, and renewed from year to year. The recited premium is $50.

<p>Statutes; Repeal by Implication; Police Regulations; Hacks and Hackstands.</p> <p>1. While repeal by implication is not favored, it is as effective as express repeal where the later enactment covers the whole subject matter of the previous law and is plainly intended to prescribe the only rale which shall govern.</p> <p>2. Sec. 4 of the act of the legislative assembly of this District of August 23, 1871, regulating hacks and hack stands and the assembling of vehicles on the streets, was repealed by the police regulations on the same subject subsequently prescribed by the Commissioners of the District under the authority of the act of Congress of January 26, 1887 (24 Stat. 368), and joint resolution of Congress of February 26, 1892 (27 Stat. 394), and no prosecution can be maintained Under an information in the police court for a violation of that section of the act of the legislative assembly.</p>

<p>In error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>In error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity after the cause had been set down for hearing by one of several defendants, upon bill, answer and replication, and a decree pro confesso against the other defendants.

<p>Statutory Construction; Intoxicating Liquors.</p> <p>1. While every word of a statute is to receive effect and to be construed according to its ordinary and natural signification, and the strict letter is not to be departed from without good and sufficient cause, a thing not within the meaning and purpose of a statute, although perhaps within the strict letter, will not be construed as included in the enactment.</p> <p>2. A criminal prosecution for selling a certain malt extract in violation of the act of Congress of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat. 563), regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors in this District, and defining such liquors to be certain well known and specified intoxicants and also “all other fermented and distilled liquors,” can not be maintained where the testimony shows that while such extract is a fermented liquor containing a percentage of alcohol, it has never been used as an intoxicant and it is doubtful whether it could be so used.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from' a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a suit by executors for the construction of a will. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1. The legacy and devise made in the sixth paragraph of the will were undoubtedly specific. 13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. 10; Roper, on Legacies, 192, 242; 2 Redf. on Wills, 132 ; Woerner Am. Law Admn., Sec. 444; Roper, *193.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon demurrer to one of several pleas to a declaration in an action on a policy of insurance. The facts are suffi ciently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon a verdict for the defendant directed by the court, in an action against the District of Columbia for damages for an alleged nuisance.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents refusing an application for a patent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a patent.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction and sentence by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered upon the verdict of a jury in a prosecution for carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 16 years. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on a return to a writ of certiorari issued by this court to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by certain land owners from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court of the United States, confirming a verdict, award and assessment for alleged benefits in a proceeding for the opening and extension of certain streets.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granting the relief sought in a suit for the cancelation of certain notes and the release of a deed of trust. The Court in its'opinion stated the case as follows: This is a suit in equity commenced by Edwin JB. Olmsted, on May 1, 1899, to obtain the cancelation of certain notes and the release of a trust deed securing the same upon certain land in the District of Columbia.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendants (specially allowed) from an interlocutory order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in an action on a bond.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon a verdict for the plaintiff directed by the court in an action to recover for the use of a party wall. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated, in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon the verdict of a jury finding him guilty of an assault with intent to kill. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill filed to enforce a mechanics’ lieu. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing od an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as an equity court, in a suit for an accounting. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by defendant from a judgment of conviction and sentence of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding a special term for criminal business, in a prosecution for murder. ' The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1. That any circumstances or any peculiar circumstances are necessary for the purpose of qualifying the verdict is absolutely contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Hearing on appeal by defendant from a judgment of conviction and sentence of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a special term for criminal business, in a prosecution for m'urder. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1. Under our statute the juror should stand indifferent between the two penalties. Mehin v. State, 11 La. Ann. 535; Stall v. State, 28 Ala. 25; Proffat on Jury Trials, 178; People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, in a suit for the construction of a will. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1. Upon the death of Daniel Hauptman the real estate was eo instanti converted into money. Allison v. Wilson, 13 S. & R. 332; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 562; McCullough v. Dashiell, 1 H. & G. 96; Smith v. Hooper, 23 Md. 273; Thomas v. Wood, 1 Md. Ch. 296. 2.

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity to vacate a sale under a deed of trust. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This is a proceeding in equity instituted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to vacate a sale of certain real estate in this city made under a deed of trust.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in sui't in equity to subject an equitable interest of the defendant to the satisfaction of a judgment.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing oh an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts' are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, vacating and annulling a bond, a deed of trust securing the same, and a deed executed in pursuance of a sale under the deed of trust. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. Tlip facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit in equity to establish a resulting trust and to enjoin the prosecution of an action of ejectment. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.