¶1The plaintiff brings this action to restrain the defendant from erecting six apartment houses on the north side of Eighty-Second street, between Ninth and Tenth avenues, and asks for a preliminary injunction until the trial. In the year 1860 the owners,of the property between Seventy-Ninth street, Eighty-Third street, Ninth avenue, and Bloomingdale road, entered into an agreement which provided “that no building whatever shall be erected within forty feet of the front of any of the lots situated within the boundaries aforesaid, except of brick, stone, or iron, with roofs of slate or metal. Also that there shall not be erected or allowed upon any of their said lots any brewery, distillery, slaughter-house, smith’s shop, forge, furnace, steam-engine; brass foundry, nail or other iron factory, sugar bakery, livery stable, or any soap, candle, starch, varnish, vitriol, glue, ink, or turpentine factory, or any factory for tanning, dressing, or preparing hides, skin, or leather, or any other dangerous, noxious, or offensive establishment, trade, or business whatsoever, nor any house of the character or description usually known as a ‘tenement-house.’” The defendant has begun the erection of six five-story flats or apartment houses, and this motion for a preliminary injunction is made upon the claim by the plaintiff that the erection of these buildings by the defendant is a violation of the above covenant. The question involved, therefore, is whether houses of the character about being erected by the defendant are tenement-houses, within the meaning of the covenant. In this connection it must be remembered that apartment or flat houses had no existence prior to 1860, in this city. We had two classes of houses which were, designated as “private dwellings” and “tenements.” Since then there has grown up a class of houses which are now designated as “flats” or “apartolent houses.” It is conceded by all that the term “flat” or “apartment house,” as generally known, was not used in building in the city of New York prior to the past 25 years. It is claimed, however, by the plaintiff, and as positively denied by the defendant, that buildings which are called “flats” or “apartment houses” were formerly known as “tenements,” and that the word “tenement” was the only word applicable to such buildings. Webster defines “tenement” to be “a dwelling-house or an apartment in a building used by one family; often, in modern usage, an inferior dwelling-house, rented to poor persons, or a dwelling erected for the purpose of being rented, called also a ‘ tenement-house.’”
¶2In Musgrave v. Sherwood, 23 Hun, 674, note, it is said: “The word ‘ tenement,’ in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to houses and other buildings, yet in its proper legal sense it signifies everything that may be holden. It not only includes land, but rents and other interests.” In that case it was held that a covenant in the deed against the use of premises as a “tenement-house” was not violated by the use for a family hotel or apartment house. It is true that the court in that case, at special term, in discussing the question as to what was a tenement-house, refers to the following definition, given in chapter 908 of the Laws of 1867, being an act for the regulation of *722tenement and lodging houses in the cities of New York and Brooklyn: “A tenement-house, within the meaning of this act, shall be taken to mean and include every house, building, or portion thereof, which is rented, leased, let, or hired out to be occupied, or is occupied, as the home or residence of more than three families, living independently of another, and doing their cooking upon the premises, or by more than two families upon a floor, so living and cooking, but having a common right in the halls, stairways, yards, ” etc. This definition would undoubtedly include houses of the character about being erected by the defendant. The question here, however, is not what is defined ' as a tenement within the provisions of the act quoted, not what may be understood by real-estate brokers as being included within the clause or description of tenement-houses, but what was a tenement-house, within the meaning of the covenant made in 1860, a breach of which is claimed in this action. As stated in Musgrave v. Sherwood, at special term, the rule is correctly stated to be that “ the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s houses, as conducted and proposed to be, come within the meaning of the covenant. As the covenants, as construed by the plaintiff, work a restraint of what would otherwise be the lawful use of the defendant’s houses and lands, to be restrained the breach made or threatened should be clearly and satisfactorily established.” From the connection of the word “tenement” and the other kinds of business forbidden and of houses prohibited by the covenant, it would seemingly require that the construction to be given to the word “tenement” should be similar to that given in the covenant in the Musgrave Case as something “noxious or offensive,” and therefore applicable to that class of tenements which, as distinguished from flat or apartment houses, are occupied by a number of poorer families.
¶3In Myers v. Sterne, at special term, (not reported,)
¶4NOTE.
¶5Myers et al. v. Sterne et al., referred to above, was decided in the supreme court, special term, New York county, February 28, 1890. Mr. Justice Andrews filed the following opinion: “The brief submitted by plaintiffs’ attorney con tains the following statement : * Upon the claim made by the defendant Sterne,—that is, that the total change of the character of this neighborhood since 1870 was not within the contemplation of the parties when they executed the restriction, and that the covenant should therefore (so far as the word “ tenement-house ” is concerned) be declared no longer in force,—we have been unable to find any testimony substantially contradicting the facts proven by the defendant. If the court is satisfied that that entire section of the city has so changed since 1870 that the purposes for which the land was restricted are impracticable, within the principles laid down in the case of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, and Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 312, we submit that this should only be granted at the cost of the defendant Sterne.’ The law applicable to the case was settled by the decision above cited. The evidence as to the change in the character of the neighborhood was very full and convincing, and, as plaintiffs’ attorneys admit that they can find no evidence substantially contradicting it, it appears to me that the above statement *724amounts to- a concession by the plaintiffs that the restrictions in question should be declared to bo no longer in force. The attorneys of the defendant Delano claim in their brief that the evidence as to the change in the character of the district does not warrant the setting aside of the restrictions; but in view of such concession of the plaintiff, and of the conclusive and practically uncontradicted evidence given on behalf of the defendants Sterne and Horne, I think that the relief prayed for the latter two defendants should be granted, and that the restrictions and covenants should be wholly vacated, set aside, and annulled. It is doubtful whether the buildings which the defendant Sterne proposes to erect can fairly be regarded as tenement-houses, within the meaning of that term, as used in the covenants, but, in view of the opinion above expressed, it is not necessary to discuss that point. Under all the circumstances of the case I do not think that any allowances or costs should be granted. The decree will be settled on notice. ”
¶6 See note at end of case.