Volume 151 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

The trial court did not err in denying a public official's application to seal her criminal case record where no complaint, information, or indictment was filed against her, which is required to seal a criminal record pursuant to R.C. 2953.52.

A technical deficiency in a sentencing entry regarding post-release control does not render the sentence void when the record taken as a whole reveals that the trial court satisfied all of the statutory requirements to impose post-release control.

R.C. 3734.03 R.C. 3734.99 definite sentence. The trial court's judgment was reversed and remanded for resentencing to impose a definite sentence of "at least two years, but not more than four years" pursuant to penalties set forth in R.C. 3734.99 for a violation of open dumping under R.C. 3734.03.

Summary judgment immunity negligence storm sewer system duty maintain R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d) R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) discretionary creek retention basin pipe right of way sediment drainage ditch easement purchase agreement hold harmless indemnify city third-party beneficiary R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) employee reckless bad faith punitive damages attorney fees R.C. 2744.05(A). Reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the city upon finding there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the storm sewer-drainage ditch easement area in the subdivision and/or the retention basin on plaintiffs' property are part of the city's storm sewer system and, if so, as to whether the city exercised ordinary care in maintaining and repairing the storm sewer system. Affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of city engineer on plaintiffs' claim of individual liability upon finding he is entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Affirmed the denial of the claim for punitive damages and attorney fees.

The trial court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over appellant-board's declaratory judgment, replevin and conversion claims because the relief sought may only be determined through a quo warranto action under R.C. 2733.05 and R.C. 2733.06. Standing in quo warranto actions is given exclusively to the attorney general, county prosecuting attorneys, and persons claiming entitlement to public office. Since the board had no standing to bring a quo warranto action, the trial court erred when it stayed its claim for injunctive relief and damages under R.C. 5312.13 on the basis of judicial economy. The trial court's stay did not promote judicial economy, but hindered it, as it likely halted the claim indefinitely. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the board's declaratory judgment, replevin, and conversion claims is affirmed. The trial court's order staying the board's claim for an injunction and damages under R.C. 5312.13 is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on that claim.

Where a defendant submitted evidence showing that he was entitled to somewhere between 539 days of jail-time credit and 331 days of credit, but was only given 210 days of credit, and where the State offered nothing to rebut the defendant's evidentiary submissions, and where this error was not raised at sentencing, the trial court plainly erred in finding defendant had presented "no evidence" and in denying the motion for jail-time credit.

The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendant-appellees.

Trial court did not commit plain error by not declaring a mistrial on all counts of the indictment. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion for severance. Appellant was not denied due process due to the involvement of the presiding judge in the investigation of the crimes for which he was charged. Appellant's conviction for the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32 was supported by sufficient evidence. Juror pole revealed juror was not certain or pressured with regard to her verdict on two counts, and trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant on those counts.