Volume 151 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

The trial court did not err in denying a public official's application to seal her criminal case record where no complaint, information, or indictment was filed against her, which is required to seal a criminal record pursuant to R.C. 2953.52.

A technical deficiency in a sentencing entry regarding post-release control does not render the sentence void when the record taken as a whole reveals that the trial court satisfied all of the statutory requirements to impose post-release control.

R.C. 3734.03 R.C. 3734.99 definite sentence. The trial court's judgment was reversed and remanded for resentencing to impose a definite sentence of "at least two years, but not more than four years" pursuant to penalties set forth in R.C. 3734.99 for a violation of open dumping under R.C. 3734.03.

Summary judgment immunity negligence storm sewer system duty maintain R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d) R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) discretionary creek retention basin pipe right of way sediment drainage ditch easement purchase agreement hold harmless indemnify city third-party beneficiary R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) employee reckless bad faith punitive damages attorney fees R.C. 2744.05(A). Reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the city upon finding there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the storm sewer-drainage ditch easement area in the subdivision and/or the retention basin on plaintiffs' property are part of the city's storm sewer system and, if so, as to whether the city exercised ordinary care in maintaining and repairing the storm sewer system. Affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of city engineer on plaintiffs' claim of individual liability upon finding he is entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Affirmed the denial of the claim for punitive damages and attorney fees.

AGGRAVATED MURDER – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY – SELF-DEFENSE – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – CUMULATIVE ERROR: Defendant's conviction for aggravated murder was not supported by sufficient evidence of "prior calculation and design" where defendant did not engage in a studied consideration of the method, means, or location of the killing: defendant did not choose the time or location of the shooting, there is no evidence that defendant knew the victim would be at the location of the shooting, and the act was an almost instantaneous eruption of events. [But see DISSENT: The state presented sufficient evidence of "prior calculation and design" where, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supported the conclusion that defendant engaged in a pattern of activity that involved ascertaining the whereabouts of the victim, strategically parking his vehicle, exiting from it with gun in hand, and firing multiple times at the victim.] The defense did not open the door for, and the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, other-weapons photographs where defense counsel made only a brief implication during cross-examination and no unfair prejudice to the state resulted from defense counsel's question. Where defendant pursued a theory of self-defense in a murder trial, the trial court's exclusion of evidence as to defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense violated defendant's right to present a complete defense: (1) the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay defendant's testimony that his father and aunt told him about an incident where the victim made threatening statements against defendant while possessing a gun and (2) the trial court erred in arbitrarily excluding social media posts by the victim pertaining to violence and guns where it allowed the state to capitalize on the improper ruling in its closing argument. [But see DISSENT: While the trial court erred in admitting the photo of the guns and ammunition, precluding defendant's testimony regarding threats from the victim, and inconsistently handling admission of the social media posts, the errors were ultimately harmless when viewed within the context of the entire trial and the conclusion that sufficient evidence of "prior calculation and design" existed.] The cumulative effect of the errors in the trial court's evidentiary rulings deprived defendant of a fair trial where the evidence unfairly hampered defendant's credibility and made defendant's claim of self-defense far less persuasive. [But see DISSENT: Where the evidence supported the conviction for aggravated murder other evidentiary errors committed at trial were harmless.]

The trial court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over appellant-board's declaratory judgment, replevin and conversion claims because the relief sought may only be determined through a quo warranto action under R.C. 2733.05 and R.C. 2733.06. Standing in quo warranto actions is given exclusively to the attorney general, county prosecuting attorneys, and persons claiming entitlement to public office. Since the board had no standing to bring a quo warranto action, the trial court erred when it stayed its claim for injunctive relief and damages under R.C. 5312.13 on the basis of judicial economy. The trial court's stay did not promote judicial economy, but hindered it, as it likely halted the claim indefinitely. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the board's declaratory judgment, replevin, and conversion claims is affirmed. The trial court's order staying the board's claim for an injunction and damages under R.C. 5312.13 is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on that claim.

Where a defendant submitted evidence showing that he was entitled to somewhere between 539 days of jail-time credit and 331 days of credit, but was only given 210 days of credit, and where the State offered nothing to rebut the defendant's evidentiary submissions, and where this error was not raised at sentencing, the trial court plainly erred in finding defendant had presented "no evidence" and in denying the motion for jail-time credit.

The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendant-appellees.

Trial court did not commit plain error by not declaring a mistrial on all counts of the indictment. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion for severance. Appellant was not denied due process due to the involvement of the presiding judge in the investigation of the crimes for which he was charged. Appellant's conviction for the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32 was supported by sufficient evidence. Juror pole revealed juror was not certain or pressured with regard to her verdict on two counts, and trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant on those counts.