Volume 152 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

CIVIL - summary judgment Civ.R. 56 political subdivision immunity R.C. Chapter 2744 personal injury governmental and proprietary functions exceptions to immunity negligent performance of proprietary functions R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) specific activity that caused injury maintenance of public grounds regulating the use of public grounds R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e) public peace, health, safety or welfare not customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c) obligation of sovereignty R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a) common good of all citizens of the state R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b) physical defect R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) defense to liability exercise of judgment or discretion R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) inadvertence, inattention, or unobservance employee of political subdivision individual capacity wanton or reckless manner R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) issue of fact.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a judgment of forfeiture against surety.

domestic violence – disorderly conduct – criminal damaging or endangering – right to counsel – colloquy – sufficiency – Crim.R. 29 –

CHILD ENDANGERING – EVIDENCE – MENS REA – RECKLESSNESS: Defendant mother's conviction for child endangering was not supported by sufficient evidence that she had acted with reckless intent where the evidence showed she lost track of her four-year-old daughter for no more than five minutes, she believed that her daughter was playing in the front yard with an older brother, and she took precautions to negate the risk of her daughter leaving the front yard and running into the road, and the evidence did not show that she knew of any tendency of her daughter's to leave the front yard and run across the street.

Murder reckless homicide R.C. 2903.041(A) recklessness R.C. 2901.22 negligent homicide R.C. 2903.05(A) lesser-included offense ineffective assistance of counsel sufficiency circumstantial evidence manifest weight accident jury instruction plain error. Appellant's reckless homicide conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although reckless homicide is a lesser-included offense of murder, negligent homicide is not. The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to provide a negligent homicide instruction to the jury. Appellant was not denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial or the effective assistance of counsel.

The trial court erred in convicting the appellant of three-year firearm specifications for displaying, brandishing, indicating that he possessed, or using a firearm to facilitate the offenses of vandalism and having a weapon while under disability. The record contains legally insufficient evidence to support a finding that the appellant displayed, brandished, indicated that he possessed, or used a firearm while committing the offenses. However, the record does support the trial court's finding that the appellant had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the offenses. Therefore, he is subject to a one-year firearm-specification sentence under R.C. 2941.141(A) rather than a three-year sentence under R.C. 2941.145(A). The State presented legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that the handgun at issue was operable and, therefore, that the appellant was guilty of having a weapon while under disability. Finally, the trial court's findings in support of partially consecutive sentences on the appellant's substantive offenses of having a weapon while under disability, vandalism, and domestic violence are not impacted by a determination that he is subject to a one-year firearm-specification sentence rather than a three-year firearm-specification sentence. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to impose a one-year firearm-specification sentence.

Constitutionality of Marijuana-Metabolite per se violation

In this administrative appeal, the trial court erred in applying R.C. 119.12 and R.C. 5104.04 and by adding requirements for revoking the license of a childcare center. The trial court also erred in vacating appellant's administrative order, which had revoked the childcare licenses of appellee's three childcare centers. Appellant's decision to revoke was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to reinstate the revocation orders.

Trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment and also found the phrase in the "hope of gain," as used in R.C. 2915.01 et seq. was not unconstitutionally vague.