Volume 154 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

This case arose out of a two-vehicle collision that resulted in the plaintiff, Eunique Williams, sustaining severe bodily injuries when one of the automobiles involved struck her while she was standing at her post as a crossing guard. The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Rick M. Ford, a co-defendant. The plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred when he concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was inappropriately granted because genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute.

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal by the defendant, Aly T. Diene, from a decision of the Superior Court granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in favor of OSJ of Providence, LLC. On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the plaintiff's suit was untimely because it was filed three months after the guaranty had expired (2) the hearing justice erred when he refused to allow the defendant's defense that the plaintiff breached the lease with Bayal Restaurant, Inc. (Bayal) first and (3) the hearing justice erred when he awarded the plaintiff's attorney's fees and "extra" rent as part of the assessment of damages. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's statute of limitations argument was misplaced because the expiration of the guaranty was a term of the agreement, one that was unrelated to the statute of limitations. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's contention that the hearing justice erred when he refused to allow him to argue that the plaintiff breached the lease first was a second bite at the apple because Bayal's liability had already been determined. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the clear and unambiguous terms of the guaranty provided for both attorney's fees and additional rent. The Supreme Court found no genuine issues of material fact and, accordingly, affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

At issue in this case is whether or not residents in an R-1 zone in the Town of Hopkinton could legally keep alpacas on their land. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Hopkinton allowing the respondents to keep alpacas on their land was fatally flawed because of a condition attached to said decision. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the Superior Court with directions that the decision of the Zoning Board of Review be quashed.

This matter came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the defendant, Anthony Moore's judgment of conviction on three counts: first-degree murder conspiracy to commit murder and using a firearm when committing a crime of violence. On appeal, Moore argued that the trial justice erred in: his denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial his refusal to provide an "empty chair" instruction to the jury and his rulings on certain evidentiary matters. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. With respect to the defendant's motion for a new trial, the Court rejected the defendant's argument alleging that discrepancies in the trial witnesses' testimony justified a new trial. The Court recognized inconsistencies but classified them as relating to minor details insufficient to undercut the trial justice's credibility determinations, which deserved the Court's deference. Further, in relation to the defendant's assertion that the trial justice erred in refusing to provide an "empty chair" jury instruction pertaining to Robert Winston's absence at trial, the Court held that the trial justice followed its existing jurisprudence and gleaned no error in his instruction. The Court further rejected the defendant's request to alter its current rule. Finally, the Court held that the trial justice acted within his discretion in all of the evidentiary rulings that the defendant challenged.

Ajax Construction Company and Beacon Mutual Insurance Company came before the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari following a decree by the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court in favor of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Ajax originally petitioned the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Court to determine which insurer was required to pay benefits to an injured Ajax employee. On appeal, the Appellate Division found Beacon solely responsible to pay the benefits. The court determined that Liberty was not liable because the Ajax employee, who worked primarily in Massachusetts, did not qualify as a "Massachusetts employee" under the Liberty policy. The Appellate Division further interpreted the phrase "entire liability of the employer" in G.L. 1956 § 28-36-5 to require Beacon to pay the entire amount of the benefits. The Supreme Court quashed the Appellate Division's decree. First, the Court determined that the Appellate Division erred in interpreting the term "Massachusetts employee" and in relying on extrinsic evidence to define the term. The Supreme Court deemed the term clear and unambiguous, and it held that the Ajax employee qualified as a "Massachusetts employee" under the term's plain meaning. The Supreme Court further found the Appellate Division's interpretation of § 28-36-5 erroneous and held that the phrase "entire liability of the employer" was ambiguous. The Court concluded that the statute's legislative intent and purpose was to ensure that an employer provided coverage for all employees, but not that it had to do so with one insurer and one policy. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Beacon was not liable under § 28-36-5 to pay the benefits. The Court held that Liberty was wholly responsible for the payment of benefits and ordered it to reimburse Beacon for any payments that Beacon had made.

The defendant, Oscar Muralles, appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree child molestation. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial because, in the defendant's view, (1) the trial justice overlooked and misconceived the evidence and (2) the verdict failed to truly respond to the evidence and failed to do substantial justice between the parties. Specifically, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial due to what he characterized as a lack of credibility on the part of the complaining witness and another witness and inconsistencies in their testimonies. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice conducted the proper analysis in passing upon the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Court concluded that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence in his determinations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, Carmen Rohena (plaintiff), as parent and natural guardian of Josue Espinal (Josue), appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the City of Providence (the city or defendant), on the basis that the city was not immune from liability under Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute. The plaintiff argued that the city was put on notice that the conditions of the public park owned by the city were dangerous and that the city failed to guard or warn against those known dangerous conditions. The Supreme Court held that it was precluded from hearing this argument under the well settled "raise-or-waive" rule, because the argument was not raised in the Superior Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Brandon Potter, appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, CACH, LLC (CACH), in a credit card debt collection action. He contended on appeal that the hearing justice erred in granting CACH's motion for summary judgment. He further posited that the hearing justice committed error in denying his motion to compel arbitration and his motion to amend his answer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Potter's motion to compel arbitration was properly denied because he failed to plead a demand for arbitration in his answer and therefore waived that issue. It further held that denial of his motion to amend was appropriate under the circumstances of the case. Lastly, it upheld the decision of the Superior Court with respect to CACH's motion for summary judgment due to the fact there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that CACH was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.