Volume 154 — Louisiana Reports

Proceedings on the succession of George W. Bancker, Jr., in which his heirs were sued by the heirs of -his deceased widow. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal iron! Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Action, by J. Loister Ferguson against Mrs. Lena Patton Ferguson. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Elvira Kent against the Baton Rouge Electric Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

F. Brunot, Judge. Action by the State, on relation of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, against J. J. Lancaster and another, receivers of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. From a judgment for the relator, defendants appeal.

Action under the Employers’ Liability Act by John W. Delaney against the Ferd. Brenner Lumber Company. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and compensation awarded in an insufficient amount, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p> (>'Syllabus hy Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Criminal law &wkey;>l35, 1166(4) — Rulings respecting change of venue sustained, when no proof tendered and challenges not exhausted.</p> <p>Rulings refusing to allow filing of answer to state’s objections to change of venue and refusing to allow supplemental motion for change of venue must stand, when no proof was tendered, and jury was obtained without exhausting peremptory challenges.</p> <p>2. Criminal law ¡&wkey;590(2) — Continuance held properly denied.</p> <p>Where experienced counsel was appointed ten days before trial, and had devoted the entire interval to preparing case, and assistant counsel had also participated in conferences, and, in trial judge’s opinion, motion for continuance was for delay, denial held not error.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <&wkey;622(3) — Motion for severance held not to state sufficient grounds.</p> <p>Motion by defendant jointly indicted with another for severance on ground that his codefendant would make a judicial confession, that his trial would be merely formal, and that state intended to use his confessions, which would not be admissible against the moving defendant, held not to show sufficient grounds for severance.</p> <p>4. Criminal law <§=>11661/2(8) — Rulings on challenges sustained, when peremptory challenges not exhausted.</p> <p>Rulings on challenges to jurors must be affirmed, when peremptory challenges were not exhausted, especially where the ■ bills of exception based thereon have not been argued.</p> <p>5. Criminal law <&wkey;!26(l) — Change of venue properly denied, when fair trial could be had.</p> <p>Where nearly all of the 75 prospective jurors examined stated under oath that they could give defendant a fair and impartial trial, and the only evidence in the record, being that attached to bills complaining of overruling of challenges, did not show fair trial could not be had, denial of change of venue was not error, especially where all challenges were not used.</p> <p>6. Criminal law <§=>1111(3) — Judge’s statement in per curiam to bill of exceptions accepted, when evidence not in the record.</p> <p>Judge’s statement in per curiam to bill of exceptions complaining of admission of testimony as to purported confession on ground that it was not such as to one defendant, that witness testified that both defendants stated facts in presence of each other must be accepted, when evidence concerning the matter is not in the record.</p> <p>7. Criminal law <&wkey;528 — Confession held properly admitted, in view of testimony that both defendants stated facts in each other’s presence.</p> <p>Objection to introduction of purported confession on ground that it was not a confession as to one defendant was properly overruled, where witness, to whom it was made, stated that both defendants, in the presence of each other, stated all the facts, especially where both defendants related the same facts on the stand. i</p> <p>8. Criminal law <&wkey;ll68(2) — Admission of evidence, in absence of jury with respect to confession held harmless.</p> <p>Where taking of testimony as to voluntary nature of alleged confession took place out of jury’s presence, defendant was not injured because state was permitted to call witnesses in rebuttal to give testimony not in rebuttal.</p> <p>9. Criminal law <&wkey;683(2) — Court not bound by formal rules in hearing evidence as to whether confession voluntary.</p> <p>In hearing evidence out of jury’s presence on question whether confession was voluntary, the court had right and discretion to hear all available evidence, and was not bound by formal rules applicable to trial before jury as to admission of evidence in rebuttal.</p> <p>10. Criminal law <&wkey;531 (3) — Evidence held insufficient to show confessions voluntary.</p> <p>Evidence held insufficient to show that confessions made while in jail by defendants, who had previously been punished and grilled to compel them to point out the location of murdered persons’ bodies, were voluntary, especially where stenographic report of confession was not introduced.</p> <p>11. Criminal law <&wkey;l 110(2) — Supreme Court cannot have all evidence brought up and considered.</p> <p>The Supreme Court cannot provide that all evidence shall be brought up for consideration, where this is made condition of consent by defendant’s counsel; to consideration of trial court’s per curiam to bills of exception, as amended after transcript was completed and filed.</p> <p>12. Criminal law <&wkey;>IO®3 —Amendment to per curiam to bills of exception made after filing of transcript not considered.</p> <p>The trial court should, when bills of exception are presented, or as soon thereafter as possible, and at least before transcript is completed and filed, write its per curiam to all bills, and amendments to per curiaras made after the transcript was lodged in Supreme Court and case had been once continued cannot be considered.</p> <p>13. Criminal law <§=>53l(l) — Confession presumed involuntary, when previous confession involuntary.</p> <p>When showing has been made that accused confessed through fear or promise of relief, the law presumes that stich condition of mind continues at any subsequent confession, unless it be proved that by lapse of time and circumstances under which it was made the prisoner’s act was entirely free and voluntary.</p> <p>14. Criminal law <&wkey;l 163(3) — Assumed that confessions illegally admitted were prejudicial.</p> <p>Though there may have been sufficient evidence to support conviction without alleged confessions illegally admitted, the court is bound to assume that such evidence prejudiced the rights of accused.</p> <p>15. Criminal law &wkey;>400(3)— State not restricted to stenographic report of confession when incorrect.</p> <p>When stenographic report of confessions was not read or signed by accused and was erroneous, the state was not bound to offer it in evidence, and could introduce other proof of the confes'sions.</p> <p>16. Criminal law <&wkey;627!/2 — Defendants held entitled to production of stenographic report of confessions for examination.</p> <p>Though district attorney claimed stenographer’s report of confession was not accurate, defendants were entitled to have it produced for examination and use by them, if it contained anything in their favor, its effect being for the jury, especially where no one else was present or produced as witnesses except those for the state.</p> <p>17. Criminal law <&wkey;752, 753(2) — Motion to exclude evidence and direct verdict not authorized.</p> <p>Motion to exclude the state’s evidence and for instructed verdict for defendant is not authorized under the Louisiana practice.</p> <p>18. Criminal law t&wkey;844(l), 1178 — Claim of error in general charge held not so presented as to he acted upon.</p> <p>Claim that general written charge was erroneous as to weight of evidence was not so presented as to be acted upon by trial or Supreme Court, when no special error was pointed out, and bill of exceptions on that ground was not mentioned in argument.</p> <p>19. Criminal law <&wkey;>804(9) — Request that charge be delivered instead of being read properiy refused.</p> <p>Defendant’s request that written charge be actually delivered to jury instead of being read to them by the court was properly refused.</p> <p>20. Criminal law <&wkey;798(l) — instruction properly refused as leading jurors not to listen to fellow jurors.</p> <p>Instruction that every juror should vote his own convictions and not those of some, other juror, and that, if there was one juror who had reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, he should not vote for a conviction while he had such doubt, held- properly refused, as calculated to impress jurors with erroneous idea that they should not listen to arguments and views of fellow jurors or be influenced thereby.</p> <p>21. Criminal law <&wkey;76l(7), 811 (4) — Homicide <&wkey;305 — Instructions properly refused as intrenching on the facts, prejudicial to codefendant, and involved.</p> <p>Instructions in murder case based on contention that one defendant had nothing to do with the killing, but merely helped to conceal the bodies, held properly refused as intrenching on the facts, prejudicing the other defendant by singling out the one in question, and as involved, intricate, and calculated to confuse.</p> <p>22. Criminal law <&wkey;755i/2 — Judge prohibited to comment on the facts.</p> <p>The judge is prohibited, both by Constitution and statute, from commenting on the facts.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Venue <&wkey;5(4) — Court not without jurisdiction to annul order of seizure and sale made in another parish.</p> <p>. In suit in G. parish to annul sale of property on foreclosure of mortgage under order of seizure and sale made by district court of C. parish, and to annul the mortgage, plea to the jurisdiction ratione materias was properly overruled.</p> <p>2. Courts t&wkey;l7 — Suit to annul sale held in rem, and jurisdiction of the person not necessary.</p> <p>Suit to annul sale of property in foreclosure proceedings and to annul the mortgage for fraud and conspiracy was proceeding in rem and for revendication of real property, and, under Code Prae. art. 163, it was not necessary that court have jurisdiction of defendant’s person.</p> <p>3. Mortgages <&wkey;529(8) — Suit to annul mortgage and sale not precluded by failure to appeal or enjoin sale. -</p> <p>While Code Prac. art. 739, permits debtor enjoin proceedings under executory process without bond, stockholder’s failure to appeal from order of seizure and sale on foreclosure corporate mortgage or to enjoin the sale did not bar suit to annul, where property had not passed out of hands of purchaser, who was charged with knowledge of and participation in fraud and conspiracy on which suit was based.</p> <p>4. Principal and agent &wkey;>177(1) — Mandate; knowledge of agent attributed to principal.</p> <p>Where one taking corporate mortgage, subsequently attacked as given pursuant to fraudulent conspiracy, was represented in the transaction by his father, an officer of the company, his agent’s knowledge must be attributed to him.</p> <p>5. Corporations <&wkey;>212 — Presumption of lack of bona fides in giving of mortgage held raised, and burden shifted to defendants to overcome it.</p> <p>Circumstances surrounding organization of corporation and issuance of stock therein, and giving of corporate mortgage to son of one of the large stockholders, (held to raise strong presumption of lack of bona fides, and, in minority stockholder’s suit to annul mortgage and sale thereunder, to shift to defendants the burden of overcoming such presumption by clear and satisfactory proof.</p> <p>6. Corporations <&wkey;2l2 — Wide latitude allowed in admission of evidence in suit by minority stockholder to cancel mortgage and sale, when serious doubt raised.</p> <p>In minority stockholder’s suit to cancel ,mortgage and sale thereunder on ground of fraud, where the showing made cast serious doubt and question on acts of large stockholders and officers, all of whom were connected by relation or otherwise, the widest latitude should have been allowed in the' admission of evidence.</p> <p>7. Trial <&wkey;66 — Though corporate books not called for until during rebuttal, case should have been reopened for purpose of inspection.</p> <p>Though, in minority stockholder’s suit to set aside corporate mortgage and sale thereunder for fraud, inspection of corporate books was not asked until during plaintiff’s case in rebuttal, where attempts of other stockholders to obtain inspection had been hindered by shifting of the books between Missouri and Louisiana, the court should have reopened the case and allowed reasonable time for production and inspection.</p>

Suit by the State, on relation of C. J. Ellis, Jr., District Attorney, against John M. Eerguson. Exceptions were overruled, and case ordered to trial, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; J. A. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by T. M. Bradford and others against Grant Parish School Board. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Percy Saint, Judge.</p> <p>Summary proceeding b,y the State against the Liberty Oil Company, Limited. From a judgment dismissing the proceeding, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Suit by the State, on the relation of Louis Dubos and others, against the City of New Orleans and others. Judgment for relators, and defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Percy Saint, Judge.</p> <p>Mandamus by the State, on the relation of the Liberty Oil Company, Limited, against the City of New Orleans. Judgment for plaintiff,- and defendant appeals.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. , , Mandamus by the State, on the relation of Dennis J. Hayes, against the City of New Orleans and others. Judgment for defendants, and relator appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Jury <&wkey;l30 — Defendant entitled within proper limits to- traverse state’s challenge for cause.</p> <p>Where state challenges juror on ground that he entertains scruples against death penalty, the court should permit defendant to traverse the challenge within reasonable and proper limits.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <&wkey;l 166*/2(7)— Erroneous sustaining of challenge, or erroneous refusal to permit traverse, not ordinarily ground for reversal.</p> <p>As defendant only has right to object to obnoxious jurors, and not to select jurors, error in sustaining challenge for cause or in refusing to permit it to be traversed is not ordinarily ground for reversal.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <&wkey;368(3) — Conversation between witnesses concerning homicide a few minutes later not part of res gestae.</p> <p>Conversation between witnesses about five or six minutes after homicide, and after one of them had gone to where deceased lay and returned, and relating to what had just happened a few minutes before, was no part of res gestee, and should have been excluded.</p> <p>4. Criminal law <&wkey;730( 12) — Argument concerning defendant’s religious standing ground for reversal, when court refused1 to give instruction to disregard.</p> <p>Where there was no evidence concerning defendant as a religious man, argument of .district attorney concerning his religious beliefs or lack of belief or his claimed sinfulness was improper, and, where court refused to charge that his religious belief had nothing to do with the case, required a reversal.</p> <p>Land and Brunot, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish* of Red River; Jas. W. Jones, Jr., Judge.</p> <p>Suit by J. J. O’Beirne against the Police Jury of Red River Parish and another. Prom a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by John Liuzza against Alpha P. Simms. Judgment granting temporary injunction, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.

Ellis, Judge. W. B. Kemp and another were charged with an offense, and from a judgment quashing the information, the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>I.Interpleader <&wkey;11/2 — Contractor cannot sue without provoking concursus when claims filed.</p> <p>Under Act No. 224 of 1918, §§ 4, 5, providing, relative to construction, etc., of public roads and other public works by the state, etc., for institution of concursus when claims have been filed against indebtedness due contractor, the contractor, or its receiver, cannot, without provoking concursus, sue for the money due.</p> <p>2. Interpleader <&wkey;l7 — Contractor’s receiver cannot compel claimants to litigate claims in .receivership proceeding.</p> <p>Under Act No. 224 of 1918, §§ 4, 5, receiver of contractor cannot compel persons having claims for labor or materials to litigate such claims in receivership proceeding pending in parish other than that in which road.wos constructed, but can only compel litigation of such claims by concursus in parish in which road is located.</p> <p>3. Interpleader I'/2 — Statute as to determination of claims by concursus not repealed.</p> <p>Act No. 224 of 1918, §j 4, 5, providing for determination of claims for labor or materials against indebtedness due contractor for construction of road by concursus, was not repealed or superseded, so far as state highway commission was concerned, by Act No. 95 of 1921, relative to state highways and bridges, and to the state highway commission.</p> <p>4. Interpleader &wkey;>l7 — Court held authorized to determine merits of suit by contractor’s receiver.</p> <p>In suit by contractor’s receiver against state highway commission and persons having claims for labor and materials to compel payment of amount due contractor, and litigation of the claims in the receivership proceeding, where no concursus was provoked, the court had jurisdiction to determine merits of plaintiff’s demand, though the road on account of which money was due was in another parish.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Henry Pried was convicted of wife desertion, and he appeals. On motion to dismiss the appeal.</p>

Wallis, Jr., Judge. , Victor Billot was convicted of killing deer during the closed seasop, but motion in arrest of judgment was sustained, and the State appeals.

Suit by John C. Capell and wife against Guy R. Molony, Superintendent of Police. Writ of injunction was denied, and plaintiffs apply for writs of certiorari and mandamus.

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by D. D. Davies against the Texarkana Crude Oil Company. From a judgment granting insufficient relief, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from' First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; R. D. Webb, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by J. H. Landis against Mrs. Mary G. Agnew and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; M. M. Boatner, Judge.</p> <p>Mandamus by the State; on the relation of Nicholas G. Carbajal,. against Frank J. Looney, Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee. Judgment for' defendant, and relator appeals.</p>

Edrington, Sr., Judge. Suit by the Barataría Land Company against the Louisiana Meadows Company, in which Mrs. Anna B. Davidson, individually and as executrix of Charles P. Davidson, Sr., deceased, was substituted as plaintiff, and in which Dr. T. L. Wolfe and others appeared and attempted to appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional law <&wkey;>225(l) — Municipal corporations t&wkey;626 — Zoning ordinance held not to discriminate arbitrarily.</p> <p>Ordinance of city of New Orleans, excluding any business on particular street between designated cross streets, except drug store, boarding house, apartment house, hotel, or bank, held valid, and not to make arbitrary discrimination, or deny the equal protection of the laws.</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <&wkey;1175(7) — Judgment not rendered on reversal of judgment refusing injunction.</p> <p>Where, in answer to rule to show cause why temporary injunction should not issue against business, claimed to violate zoning ordinance, defendant denied that ordinance applied because of previous use of his building, but the court denied injunction on sole ground that ordinance was ultra vires and invalid, the Supreme Court, in setting aside the judgment, cannot render final judgment under Code Prac. art. 905, but must remand case for further proceedings in view of article 895, providing that Supreme Court can only exercise jurisdiction so far as it shall have knowledge of matters argued or contested below.</p>

Action by the Henderson Cotton Oil Company against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company. Judgment for plaintiff, defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed, and a transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court refused, whereon defendant applies for writs of certiorari and mandamus to compel the Court of Appeal to reinstate the appeal or to transfer it to the Supreme Court.

<p> {Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Public service commissions t&wkey;>2l — Interference by courts in matters of procedure not authorized.</p> <p>Under Const. 1921, art. 6, §§ 4, 5, resort to courts is authorized only for purpose of assailing orders and decrees of Public Service Commission commanding common carrier or public utility to perform or desist from performing some act or thing and not in mere matters of procedure where Commission has jurisdiction, unless Commission ignores or violates fundamental rights, or invades some constitutional guarantee.</p> <p>2. Carriers <&wkey;4 — Commission authorized .to find pipe line company a common carrier, and render proper orders.</p> <p>Under Act No. 76 of 1920, amending and re-enacting Act No. 36 of 1906, if oil company was engaged in transporting oil for hire as common. carrier pipe line, the Public Service Commission had right to so find, and to render such orders thereon as it thought proper, and to that end to use processes afforded it by Constitution and laws of the state.</p> <p>3. Carriers &wkey;>IO — Commission held entitled to procure information concerning operations of pipe line.</p> <p>The Public Service Commission, having instituted investigation as to operation of common carrier pipe line by an oil company and a pipe line company to which it had transferred the pipe line, had right to procure information as to value of the pipe line company’s property, and amount of oil transported by it, and its earnings and expenses, and as to cost and value of the pipe line system transferred, and amount of oil transported through it by the oil company; and charges and expenses thereof.</p> <p>4., Public service commissions &wkey;>ll — Limited by rules governing district courts' with respect to certain matters of procedure.</p> <p>While procedure of Public Service Commission is more or less informal, in summoning and compelling attendance of witnesses, swearing them, compelling production of books and papers, taking testimony by Commission and punishing for contempt, it is regulated by rules governing district courts.</p> <p>5. Public service commissions <&wkey;I6--May appoint expert to examine books, or fix time and place for their production and examination.</p> <p>The Public Service Commission may appoint experts to examine intricate books of account, and, on proper compliance with Code Prac. art. 473, as to description and nature of books and papers to be produced, may fix time and place for their production and examination, within the bounds of reason, and with just consideration for rights and convenience of the parties.</p> <p>6. Public service commissions <&wkey;>l6 — Order for production of books for examination by experts held not unreasonable.</p> <p>Order of Public Service Commission for production of books of company having office and domicile in city of Baton .Rouge for examination by experts at Commission’s office and domicile in that city within five days was not unreasonable.</p> <p>7. Public service commissions <&wkey;l6 — Must describe books and papers ordered produced.</p> <p>In ordering production of books and papers for examination, the Public Service Commission must comply with Code Prac. arts. 140, 141, 473, as to description of the books and papers needed, and cannot by blanket order direct production of all books without description, nor can it act out of mere curiosity.</p> <p>8. Public service commissions &wkey;>2l — One ordered to produce books and papers must seek modification of order before resorting to court.</p> <p>One ordered by Public Service Commission to produce for examination books and papers not sufficiently described, should first seasonably object before the Commission, and give it opportunity to modify or ' revise its order before applying for injunction.</p> <p>9. Public service commissions &wkey;>l6, 21 — Order for production of books and papers held objectionable, and ground for injunction.</p> <p>Order of Public Service Commission directing president of company to produce all books, papers, and accounts of any and every nature, relating to and bearing upon a case before the Commission, was objectionable, because not describing the books and papers, and, if not corrected on proper objection, tbe courts would have been justified in intervening by injunction to prevent unreasonable search and seizure contrary to the Constitution.</p> <p>10. Public service commissions <&wkey;>6 — Powers of determination as extensive as those of trial courts.</p> <p>Within its sphere and as to those matters of which it has jurisdiction, the Public Service Commission’s powers of determination are no less extensive than those of the trial courts.</p> <p>11. Public service' commissions <&wkey;>2l — When Public Service Commission may be enjoined stated.</p> <p>As to matters over which it has no jurisdiction, or in extreme cases where it has jurisdiction, if some fundamental right is invaded or denied, the Public Service Commission may be restrained from acting.</p> <p>12. Public service commissions &wkey;?2l — Proper court to grant injunction against Public Service Commission stated.</p> <p>As a matter of original jurisdiction, the proper court to restrain the Public Service Commission from acting without jurisdiction or in violation of fundamental rights is the district court of East Baton Rouge parish.</p> <p>13. Public service commissions <5&wkey;9 — Not restricted to particular parish in holding sessions or summoning witnesses and requiring production of books. \</p> <p>Under Const. 1921, art. 6, § 3, the Public Service Commission is not restricted to any particular parish in holding its sessions and conducting its proceedings, or in summoning witnesses, or requiring production of books, papers, etc.</p> <p>14. Public service commissions &wkey;>9 — Hearing should be held at Commission’s domicile, when company domiciled in the same city.</p> <p>In investigation of status of oil company as common carrier' by pipe line in which production of books, papers, and documents was ordered, the hearing should have been held at Commission’s domicile in Baton Rouge, in which city such company was domiciled, instead of requiring it to carry its books and records to New Orleans.</p> <p>15. Carriers <&wkey; 10 — Claim that property had been sold, held not to affect jurisdiction of Public Service Commission.</p> <p>Where proceeding for investigation of status of oil company as common carrier by pipe line had been initiated, the company’s claim that it had subsequently sold its pipe line property did not deprive Commission of its jurisdiction to determine the question of fact whether such company had been operating a common carrier pipe line, or whether its alleged action was bona fide, especially where it had in effect made the transferee a party, and directed production of books, evidence, etc., affecting it and its relation to the oil company.</p> <p>16. Carriers &wkey;>IO — Public Service Commission not acting beyond jurisdiction in investigating sale of pipe line.</p> <p>In proceeding by Public Service Commission to investigate oil company’s status as common carrier by pipe line, where it was claimed that it had sold its pipe line, the Commission was not exceeding its jurisdiction in requiring production of books and papers, bearing on quantity of oil transported by the transferee for the oil company, the charges and tolls exacted therefor, the cost of construction of the lines, and the nature and character of the property.</p> <p>17. Public service commissions <g^6 — Exceeded jurisdiction in declaring oil refinery a public utility.</p> <p>In attempting to declare an oil company’s refinery a public utility, the Public Service Commission exceeded its power and jurisdiction, and was properly enjoined.</p> <p>O’Niell, C. X, dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>W. W. Varnado was indicted for perjury. From a judgment quashing the indictment, the State appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>1. Criminal law &wkey;3ÍI59(2) — Jurisdiction of Supreme Court confined to questions of law, and does not extend to sufficiency of evidence.</p> <p>The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in criminal cases is confined to questions of law, and does not extend to questions of the sufficiency of the evidence on which a defendant is convicted, which is one of fact, whether the conviction is of the offense charged or of a lesser offense included in the indictment.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <&wkey;l 171 (I) — Argument of prosecuting attorney as to purpose of inflicting punishment held not prejudicial error.</p> <p>That the prosecuting officer in speaking of the philosophy of the law said that punishment was not meted out merely for the sake of punishing, but for the purpose of deterring others, and gave an illustration, held not prejudicial error, no reference being made to accused personally or to the case on trial.</p>

L. Hooe, Judge. Erank Johnson and Charley Hoob were convicted of the manufacture of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes and they appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Taxation <&wkey;>204(3) — Exemptions from taxation under Constitution inapplicable to taxes for year in which Constitution took effect.</p> <p>The exemption from taxation conferred under Const. 1921, art. 10, § 4, does not apply to faxes -for the year 1921, though the local authorities neglected to levy them until after the Constitution took effect, in view of the saving clause of article 22, § 1, par. 4.</p>

X. Ransdell, Judge. Aleck Jackson was charged with murder. A motion to quash the indictment was sustained, and the State, appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Thomas G. Cuneo aganst Joseph Ariatti, Incorporated. From a judgment allowing plaintiff a recovery less than that prayed for in his petition, he appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Criminal law <&wkey;>II82 — When conviction affirmed, in absence of bill of exception, assignment of error, and argument, stated.</p> <p>Where the record contains no bill of exception, no assignment of errors has been filed, and the case has been submitted without brief or argument, the conviction will be affirmed, if the proceedings appear to be regular and there is no error on the face of the record.</p>

F. Brunot, Judge. Proceeding by- Chaney Cooper and another to be sent into possession of the estate of Nancy Smith Blackburn, deceased, wherein H. H. Blackburn filed a petition ip opposition. From a judgment rejecting his demands, petitioner in opposition appeals.

<p>Appeal froni Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Hugh C. Cage, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Leslie Ludlow against Florence Moore, his wife, for divorce and custody of a child. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Carter, Judge ad hoe. Emile Martin was charged with unlawfully failing to keep his office of registrar of voters open. A motion to recuse was denied, and defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>I. Railroads <&wkey;274(2) — .Drayman falling between car and platform held neither an invitee nor licensee.</p> <p>Where a drayman, about to remove certain goods from a freight car, instead of stopping on his way at the freight office to pay freight charges, drove up to the car standing at a loading platform, and started to pass through the car to get to the freight office over the platform, and fell between the car and the platform, because of the slipping of the iron plate bridging the space between the two, held, that, while he had a right to drive up to the freight car and enter it to get the merchandise, he had no right to cross through onto the platform, and in doing so he was neither an invitee nor licensee, and the carrier owed him no duty other than to refrain from wantonly and designedly causing him to be injured.</p> <p>2. Railroads <&wkey;278(I) — Drayman injured by falling on insecure iron plate held negligent.</p> <p>Where a drayman without authority crossed through a freight car onto the carrier’s platform to get to the freight office, and was injured when an iron plate bridging the space between the car and the platform slipped, precipitating him to the ground, held, that plaintiff was negligent in failing to observe the condition of the plate when he stepped thereon, and was therefore not entitled to recover.</p>

<p>Appeal from Third Judicial. District Court, Parish of Claiborne; J. E. Reynolds, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Frank Manning against G. Wash Shaw. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. H. Stephens, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Gulf ■& Ship Island Railroad Company against W. J. Hunter. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermilion; W. W. Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>Proceeding by the State, on the relation of Delicien Dartez and another, against Anna Dartez. Judgment for relators, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Descent and distribution &wkey;>90(4)-*-Succession; evidence held to sustain finding that property purchased by deceased for defendant was purchased with defendant’s own money.</p> <p>In an action by heirs of deceased to have certain property standing in the name of a daughter declared to belong to deceased, or in the alternative to compel an accounting, evidence held to sustain a finding that the daughter owned the property; it having been paid for by deceased from money arising from the sale of cattle given to her by deceased.</p>

Mary; Percy Saint, Judge. Petition by Mrs. Agnes Le Blanc Kahn, widow and natural tutrix of a minor legatee, for a rule on Henry Kahn, executor of the - succession of Louis PI. Kahn, deceased, to file his final account. Judgment for exécutor, and the widow and tutrix appeals.

P. Mills, Judge. Action by G. W. Wetherbee and others against Weaver Bros. & Thompson, wherein Zach Evans intervenes. Judgment for plaintiffs against defendants, and for intervener against defendants and plaintiffs appeal.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Highways <&wkey;l03 — State highway commission held authorized to construct road in part on route other than that first selected.</p> <p>In view of Const, art. 6, §§ 19, 21, and 23, and under Act'No. 95 of 1921 (Sp. Sess.) § 7, creating a system of hard-surface state roads, the state highway commission is vested with the discretion and duty of selecting the specific and detailed locations of the routes specifically named, and hence will not be enjoined from constructing part of a highway over a route other than that which had been selected before the commission was created.</p> <p>2. Bridges &wkey;>7 — State highway commission heid to have discretion to construct bridges over navigable streams from general highway fund.</p> <p>Under Const, art. 6, § 19, requiring that bridges over navigable streams shall be built wholly from the general highway fund, and Act No. 95 of 1921 (Sp. Sess.), § 19, providing that such bridges shall be constructed over navigable streams as the state highway commission may from time to time decide, the commission is authorized to use its discretion as to whether such a bridge shall be built, and will not be restrained from building a bridge, where no abuse of discretion is shown.</p> <p>3. Highways <&wkey;l05(l) — Power and duty to state highway commission as to roads previously built by parishes stated.</p> <p>Under Act No. 95 of 1921 (Sp. Sess.) § 7, providing for a system of hard-surface state highways under the .control of the state highway commission, and requiring the commission to assume control and maintenance of such hard-surface public highways as had previously been constructed by parishes, etc., the commission is not bound to accept all portions of such roads constructed by parishes or other subdivisions, or by the former highway department, but may change the same or select others; the "intention being that the commission should be empowered to take charge of the roads falling within the class provided by the statute, and should give them preference in building the general system.</p>

Suit hy Bernhardt J. Zahn against unknown owners for a writ of possession. . Writ issued, and Bertrand Kiern applied for suspensive and devolutive appeal, which was granted, and bonds therefor fixed. On application by Bertrand Kiern for writs of certiorari and prohibition to be directed to the clerk and sheriff of the civil district court ordering them to send up the record, and restraining 'further proceedings by the sheriff.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Siaf.) </p> <p>1. Libel and slander <&wkey;7l — Plaintiff held to have forfeited right of action for slander.</p> <p>In an action for slander based on a statement by defendant that plaintiff, who had refused to buy from defendant a Liberty bond, was a traitor to the government of the .United States, and a fugitive from France to evade military duty, held, that plaintiff, by his own conduct and ill-tempered speech, bad forfeited any right of action he might otherwise have had.</p> <p>2. False imprisonment <&wkey;7(4) — Facts held not to show cause of action against party making disclosure to judge causing arrest.</p> <p>In an action for false arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by defendant upon plaintiff’s refusal to subscribe for a Liberty bond, where it appeared that plaintiff and defendant engaged in a mutual combat, after which defendant related the facts to the district judge, who caused the sheriff to arrest plaintiff -on the ground of dis-. loyalty, held that, since defendant was not the prosecutor no-r tbe procuring cause of the prosecution, and there was no evidence of malice, and the evidence did; not show that the arrest was entirely groundless, there was no cause of action.</p> <p>3. False Imprisonment &wkey;>!3 — Want of probable cause necessary.</p> <p>In an action for false arrest and imprisonment, , even where express malice has been proved, there must be some positive evidence to show that the prosecution was groundless, and an acquittal, or even subsequent proof of complete innocep.ce, is not sufficient evidence of want of probable cause.</p>

<p>Appeal from, Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension; , Philip H. Gilbert, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the West Louisiana Bank against ¡M. A. Dawson. Prom an order granting ex-ecutory process on a mortgage, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Principal and surety <&wkey;l60 — Suretyship? evidence of obligee’s knowledge of principal’s fraud admissible in action on indemnity bond.</p> <p>In an action on an indemnity bond, guaranteeing plaintiff against pecuniary loss through the fraud of its cashier, the bond requiring plaintiff to notify the bonding company at the earliest practical moment of discovery of any act capable of giving rise to a claim thereunder, evidence disclosed in another subsequent suit that plaintiff knew of frauds committed by the cashier three months before notifying the company was material and admissible.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error &wkey;*H08 — Case remanded to make available evidence not discovered until after appeal taken.</p> <p>Where, after appeal by a surety company in an action on a bond indemnifying a bank-against fraud of its cashier, it was disclosed in another case brought by the bank against a third party that the bank had knowledge of frauds committed by its cashier three months before it notified the surety company thereof, the case will be remanded to permit the surety company to avail itself of such evidence.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>I.Appeal and error <&wkey;*390 — Omission of appellant to make oath as to sufficiency of bond may be corrected before judgment.</p> <p>Omission of an appellant to make oath that the surety on the bond of appeal, is woi'th the amount for which he is bound as required by Act No. 112 of 1916, § 4, may be corrected in the district court under section 3 at any time prior to judgment if notice shall be served on appellant that the bond is insufficient.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error &wkey;>395 — Failure to make affidavit as to solvency of surety on appeal bond held not ground for dismissal of appeal.</p> <p>'That appellant has failed to make oath that the surety on the .bond of appeal is worth the amount for which' he is bound does not constitute a ground for dismissal of the appeal, in view of Act No. 112 of 1916, § 9, providing that no appeal shall be dismissed for error as to the bond until appellant shall have failed to correct it.</p> <p>3. Appeal and error <g=3'656(l) — Supreme Court cannot order missing affidavit on appeal bond to be made and filed.</p> <p>It is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to order a missing affidavit as to the solvency of a surety on appeal bond to be made and filed.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>4. Logs and logging <@=»3(I0) — Deed to standing “timber” held not to include material for pulp and charcoal.</p> <p>A deed to standing timber estimated at a certain number of feet for trees measuring 12 inches in diameter and 24 inches above the ground held not to include smaller trees, treetops, lightwood, pine knots, and other timber by-products suitable for paper pulp and charcoal, . the word “timber” meaning such as are suitable to be made into marketable and commercial lumber.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Timber.)</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Street railroads 4&wkey;l00(l) — 12 year old boy struck by street car held guilty of contributory negligence.</p> <p>Where a 12 year old boy of average intelligence, sufficiently advanced in school work to use five or six books in his studies, and of sufficient discretion to be guilty of negligence, while crossing a street immediately after the passage of a street car ran headlong in front of a car going in the opposite direction on an adjoining track without looking or listening, and was injured, held., that he was guilty of negligence barring recovery.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Bills and notes &wkey;>403 — Presentment at place other than that specified in note held to discharge indorsers.</p> <p>In view -of Negotiable Instrument Law, § 73, permitting presentment of a note at the place of payment specified therein, and sections 70 and 89, making- a presentment and notice of dishonor necessary to charge indorsers, and where a note was made payable at the place where the payee resided, but was. presented for payment and protested at the domicile and place of business of the maker, the indorsers were discharged.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Pleading <&wkey;>93(l) — Prayer in reoonvention for value no bar to claim for articles themselves in alternative.</p> <p>Where defendant, who was enjoined from removing a pump and derrick from plaintiffs’ land, claimed- in reconvention first the value of the property and in the alternative asked to be decreed the owner thereof, held, that by reversing the usual order of the requests for relief and asking for the value first defendant was not estopped to afterwards claim in the alternative the property itself.</p> <p>2. Fixtures <&wkey;>l4 — Water pump held an “immovable by destination” and to pass with sale of land.</p> <p>Where plaintiffs’ vendors leased to defendant a plantation and bound themselves to sink a water well thereon, but refused to expend more than a certain-amount, and sunk the well only when defendant agreed to bear the difference in cost, held', that when defendant was about to leave the premises he was not entitled to remove the pump therefrom; the pump being a necessary adjunct to the well and being bought and paid for by lessors with intent of becoming the owners thereof, and hence was an “immovable by destination,” passing to the purchasers of the plantation under Giv. Code, art. 468.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Bhrases, First and Second Series, Immovable by Destination.]</p> <p>3. Fixtures '<§=^14 — Derrick used in sinking well held removable by lessee.</p> <p>Where plaintiffs’ vendors leased to defendant a plantation and bound themselves to sink a well, but were willing to expend only a certain amount of money, and sunk the well only when defendant agreed to bear the difference in cost, held, that defendant was entitled to remove the derrick used in sinking the well; he having put up and paid for it, and it being his exclusive property.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Injunction &wkey;>5 — When mandatory injunction may issue stated.</p> <p>While the general rule is that an injunction will issue only in its prohibitory form, when a defendant obstructs a plaintiff in the enjoyment of a real right, as by fencing a common passageway or building a levee across a drainage course, the latter is entitled to a prohibitory injunction restraining the disturbance and to a mandatory injunction for the removal of the obstruction, or to' undo what has been illegally done.</p> <p>2. Waters and water courses &wkey;sl 19(5) — Lower proprietor not authorized to obstruct natural drain from upper estate.</p> <p>Under Code, art. 660, granting a servitude of drain in favor of the upper estate against the lower by which the lower estate is burdened with receiving the waters which run naturally from the upper estate where the industry of man has not been used to create such servitude, a lower proprietor is not at liberty to raise any dam or to make any other work to prevent such running of water.</p> <p>3. Waters and water courses <&wkey;ll9(2) — Rights of proprietor of upper estate as to drainage stated.</p> <p>A proprietor of an upper estate can do nothing whereby the natural servitude of drain “due by the lower estate may be rendered more iburdensome, except that he may make all drainage works necessary to the proper cultivation of his estate by cutting ditches, -concentrating the flow of water, and increasing it beyond the slow process by which it would ultimately reach the same destination, although he cannot divert such water from the natural flow.</p> <p>4. Waters and water courses <&wkey;>l 19(5) — Mandatory injunction lies to compel lower proprietor to remove obstruction.</p> <p>Where two adjoining estates have practically the same elevation, but there is a difference of a few inches whereby the natural drainage of water is over the lower estate, the proprietor of such lower estate has no right to erect levees diverting the flow of water, and mandatory injunction lies to compel him to remove such obstructions.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>I. Appeal and error &wkey;>l09l (I) — In absence of proof that decision by Court of Appeal was by one judge only, Supreme Court will assume that such court acted in compliance with Constitution.</p> <p>Where on review of a decision of a Court of Appeal it is claimed that the case was decided by only one judge, and there is no proof on the subject, the Supreme Court is bound to assume that the court acted in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution under the maxim omnia rite acta prsesumuntur.</p> <p>2. Sales <&wkey;52(5) — Evidence held insufficient to show sale conferring right to vendor’s lien.</p> <p>Where a sale under a vendor’s lien had been- decreed in favor of an intervener, and a third opponent claimed a lien on the proceeds of such sale, and the only evidence offered by intervener to support the vendor’s lien was the contract of sale by the dealer to it of the property sold, and the account against the purchaser, held that the proof was insufficient to show the sale.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Bditorial Staff.) </p> <p>Indictment and information &wkey;>159(4) — -Indictment may not be amended by substitution of different person assaulted.</p> <p>Act No. 123 of 1855 (now Rev. St. 1870, § 1047), permitting the court in a criminal case to allow amendments to cure variance, -if the variance is not material to the merits and if defendant cannot be prejudiced thereby, does not authorize the amendment of an indictment for assault by wiilfully shooting at one J. by substituting the name of C., an entirely different person, since under the statute a fatally defective indictment cannot be so amended as to render it valid.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Judgment 4&wkey;95l (’1) — Burden of destroying presumption of validity of judgment stated.</p> <p>Where a judgment creditor seeks to subject to his judgment as community property certain property standing in the name of the judgment debtor’s wife, the burden is on the wife to show that the judgment was invalid, and thereby to shift the burden of proof to plaintiff; the judgment being valid on its face.</p> <p>2. Judgment &wkey;>951(4) — Fraud and collusion in obtaining judgment not shown.</p> <p>Where a judgment creditor holding under a judgment valid on its face sought to subject as community property certain property standing in the name of the judgment debtor’s wife, she claiming fraud and collusion between her husband and .the judgment - creditor, evidence held insufficient to sustain the defense.</p> <p>3. Husband and wife <&wkey;262(l) — All property bought during marriage presumed to belong to community,</p> <p>All property bought by either of the spouses during marriage is presumed to belong to the community, in view of Civ. Code, art. 2402.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Limitation of actions <§=>195(3) — Prescription; burden on plaintiffs to show suspension of prescriptions interposed in defense.</p> <p>In an action for possession of realty wherein defendants filed pleas of prescription of 10 and 30 years if there was any suspension of the prescriptions, the burden was on plaintiffs to show it.</p> <p>2. Limitation of actions &wkey;> 197(1) — Prescription; suspension of prescriptions by minority held not shown.</p> <p>In an action by surviving heirs and legatees to be placed in possession of land, wherein defendants filed pleas of prescription, of' 10 and 30 years, evidence held not to show that there was any suspension of such prescriptions because of the minority of the plaintiffs.</p> <p>3. Limitation of actions <&wkey;72(3) — Prescription; to suspend prescriptions minors must acquire title before prescriptive period complete.</p> <p>Minority of former owner’s heirs did not suspend prescriptions, where the period of prescription had been completed before they became heirs by the death of their ancestor.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Courts <@=224(1 () — Supreme Court held not to have jurisdiction of suit to recover $1,000 license fee paid to city.</p> <p>The Supreme Court, having a minimum jurisdiction of $2,000 under Const. 1921, art. 7, § 10, has no power to entertain an appeal from a judgment in a suit to recover $1,000 representing one-half of an annual fee for a retail liquor license rendered useless by the advent of national prohibition, no attack on the validity of the law under which the fee was paid being made.</p>

Proceedings in mandamus by Mrs. Nora B. Hunt against P. K. Abel, Clerk of Court andv ex officio Recorder, to compel him to erase the cancellation of th'e record of a tax deed, and by J. H. Lewis against Mrs. Nora B. Hunt. Prom a judgment for defendant in the first-mentioned case plaintiff appeals, and from a judgment for plaintiff in the last-mentioned ease defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge in Case No. 24120, and Hugh C. Cage, Judge in Case No. 24122.</p> <p>Separate suits by the Colonial Sugars Company against the Board of State Affairs and others. Judgments for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Hugh C. Cage, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph L. Trenchard against the Central Laundry Company, Limited, and an-‘ other. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Mortgages <S&wkey;32(6) — ;Tes,t as to whether • contract»is one of sale with right of redemption, or mere security, stated.</p> <p>The one test by which t.o determine whether a contract evidences a real sale with right of redemption, or a mere contract of security, is whether the purchaser has gone into actual possession.</p> <p>2. Mortgages <®=>296 — When sale of realty with right of redemption becomes absolute, stated. '</p> <p>Where property is sold with the right of redemption, the purchaser’s title is perfected by delivery of actual possession,, and, if such delivery takes place before the delay for redemption has expired, the vendor preserves- his right, of redemption; but, if vendor delivers after the delay for redemption has expired, the sale becomes absolute.</p> <p>3. Mortgages <&wkey;296 — “Sale with right of redemption” held to pass absolute title, and not to constitute mere “pignorative contract.”</p> <p>Where a debtor, being unable to pay, sold his land to his creditor, who executed -a counter letter by which the right to redeem within two years for a certain sum was given, the debtor remaining in possession and receiving the revenues during such time, at the expiration of which the debtor leased the property from the creditor, the consideration being a share in the crops raised, held, that such action was an establishment and acknowledgment of the creditor’s ownership and right of possession and conclusive of the debtor’s forfeiture of his right to redeem, and hence the sale was not a mere “pignorative contract” whereby the original vendor retained title, but a “sale with right of redemption,” passing title under Civ. Code arts. 2567, 2575-2578.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James; William C. Carruth, Judge.</p> <p>Benjamin Harrison was charged with an offense. The indictment was quashed on demurrer, and the State appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Evidence <&wkey;564(I) — Comparison of signature with genuine signatures in publie records held inadmissible.</p> <p>In a suit for partition by licitation, wherein plaintiff’s claim of title depended on a counter letter alleged to have been signed by one of the defendants, such signature being denied, testimony as to the comparison of the signature with the signature of defendant affixed to certain public acts on file in the clex-k’s office was inadmissible as ex parte and not done in open court.</p> <p>2. Evidence <&wkey;343(8, 9) — Exclusion of copy of recorded counter letter forming chain of fftle held not error.</p> <p>In a suit for partition by licitation, where plaintiff’s title depended on a counter letter alleged to have been signed by one of the defendants, exclusion of a copy of such recorded counter letter was correct, where the signature on the original letter was denied.</p> <p>3. Evidence <&wkey;l83(l4) — Proof of loss of letter held insufficient to justify admission of secondary evidence.</p> <p>In a suit for partition by licitation, where plaintiff’s title depended on the genuineness of defendant’s signature to a certain counter letter which had been lost held, that the loss of such letter had not been proven with reasonable certainty, and secondary evidence thereof was therefore not admissible.</p>

F. Porter, Jr., Judge. John Fanguy _and others were charged with manufacturing, selling, disposing of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. Defendant named was alone convicted and he appeals.

Rogers, Judge. Suit by Mrs. Josephine Braud, wife, against Nicholas G. I-Iuth, for divorce after a judgment of separation. Suit dismissed and an absolute divorce granted the husband by a judgment which also sustained an exception of no cause of action and dismissed plaintiff’s reconventional demand set up in her amended answer. From the judgment dismissing her reconventional demand, plaintiff appeals.

Suit by Florence Cafiero against Frances V. Cafiero and others to be recognized as the forced heir of Jos. T. Cafiero. A trial by jury was denied, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.