¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶2The majority opinion accurately describes the judiciary’s responsibility to guarantee a fair trial despite the exercise by the press of its constitutional right to circulate inherently prejudicial publicity before and during a trial.
In an ideal world a free press would seek to foster fair trial rights by not circulating inherently prejudicial publicity at least during a time of trial. If this cannot be so, courts must guarantee the preservation of fair trial rights without any restraint of the editorial ¡freedom of the press.
[Ante at 147, 716 A.2d at 470-71 (citation omitted).]
¶3*211I fully agree with Justice Handler’s conclusion that the trial court’s refusal to take adequate preventative measures to address the prejudicial effects of the midtrial publicity compromised defendant’s right to a fair trial. In my view, however, the prejudicial effect of the trial court’s inaction undermined only the penalty phase of the trial. I therefore join part 1(c) of Justice Handler’s opinion, but only to the extent that it concludes that defendant’s death sentence be vacated. Accordingly, I would vacate defendant’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty trial. I join the majority opinion in all other respects, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with my conclusion concerning defendant’s death sentence.