Volume 158 — Georgia Reports

<p>1. It is not necessary that title be replaced in the grantor in order to bring property which has been conveyed as security for debt to sale where the grantee has been given the power to sell the land at public outcry upon default in payment of the debt, where the warranty deed securing the debt contains no defeasance clause and no bond to reconvey has been executed. Nor need the grantee in such a deed with power of sale take possession in order to effect a valid sale, nor is he required to notify the grantor of his intention to sell.</p> <p>2. Subrogation may be either conventional, resting upon agreement, or legal. In the present case there is no right of subrogation either conventional or at law. There is no right of subrogation at law, because the legal right of subrogation arising out of the payment of the debt of another extends only in favor of a surety for the payment of the debt or in favor of one who is compelled to pay the debt to protect his own right or interest, and at the time of the payment of the debt by Mrs. Hiers she had no claim against or lien upon the property in question, nor any interest based upon an indebtedness against the subsequent grantor in the deed executed to her. Under the evidence in this ease there is no right of equitable conventional subrogation, because there is no interdependence or connection between the note which Mrs. Hiers paid to the bank and the deed with power of sale taken by Long merely as a contract of indemnity against loss as surety upon the note of Hiers. Upon the payment of the note this contract by its express terms had performed its only office and was functus.</p> <p>3. The court properly allowed the intervention. A court of equity, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and all of the parties interested therein, should properly adjudicate in the one action the rights of all parties at interest.</p> <p>4. Eor the same reason the administratrix of the grantee in the deed upon which Mrs. Hiers based her claim of subrogation (whether the claim of that right was valid or invalid) should properly have been made a party, inasmuch as the deed had been entered cancelled by this administratrix. The fact that the order making her a party in the present ease was not attended with tlie usual preliminary formalities provided by law was harmless, since it appears that the administratrix had actual notice of the pendency of the litigation.</p> <p>5. The court did not err in appointing a receiver. As a general rule an allegation of insolvency is a necessary prerequisite to an order ousting a debtor from premises of which he is in possession; but such allegation is not essential in a ease in which the court is fully authorized to find that the debtor in possession is in fact insolvent and is arbitrarily remaining upon land which has been purchased by another at a legal sale • under power conferred by the deed of the party in possession himself, when it appears that he is neither attempting to cultivate the land nor caring for the buildings and other improvements, which are greatly diminishing in value by reason of neglect and decay.</p> <p>6. It was not essential to the validity of a conveyance executed by the grantee of a security deed with power of sale that the advertisement of the sale contain an explicit statement that the debt which the deed with power of sale was given to secure had matured and was past due, where there was a reference to the public records from an inspection of which any probable purchaser would have ascertained the fact that the indebtedness was in fact past due. The precise reference to the particular place in a public record where full information as to a fact of importance can be found is the equivalent of the statement of such facts as can be accurately ascertained and authoritatively established by such record.</p>

<p>1. Where the judge of the superior courts of one circuit grants an order upon a petition, duly filed, for mandamus and injunction, and afterwards it is made to appear that the judge is disqualified by reason of his relationship to one of the parties named as respondents in the petition for mandamus and injunction, and by consent of all the parties, because of the disqualification growing out of the relationship of the judge of the circuit in which such proceedings are .instituted, the judge of another circuit takes jurisdiction of the mandamus proceedings, and subsequently a petition is presented to this latter judge, alleging the violation of the terms of the injunction granted in the former proceeding, and praying that the respondents be punished for contempt, though the petition does not recite the fact of the disqualification of the judge of the circuit in which the mandamus proceedings are pending, it is not demurrable on the ground that the judge of the other circuit taking jurisdiction does not appear, from the allegations of the petition, to have jurisdiction of the case.</p> <p>2. Where a petition for injunction is presented, seeking to restrain several named parties from the commission of certain specified acts, and the judge to whom the petition is presented grants a restraining order thereon, though the judge granting the order is disqualified because of his relationship to one of the parties to the case, the order itself is not void; and one of the defendants named in the petition, who, with knowledge of the granting of the order and the terms thereof, commits the acts inhibited, is guilty of contempt of court. Whether such an order granted by a judge who is disqualified is voidable is not decided, it being merely decided that while it stands a party who violates the terms thereof does so at his peril.</p> <p>3. The judge was authorized, under the evidence, to find that the defendants were guilty of contempt and to pass the order complained of.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hodges. Madison superior court. August 20, 1923.</p>

Murder. Before Judge Munro. Muscogee superior court. December 22, 1923. Lee Benton was indicted for the murder of Flournoy Butler on July 24, 1923, in Muscogee County. He was convicted with a recommendation, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for life. The evidence for the State tended to show that the deceased, a youth of twenty years of age and a brother-in-law of the defendant, took and wore the shoes of the latter without his consent.

<p>1. An answer which, does not state a conclusion should not be ruled out on the ground that the question, to which such answer was a reply, sought to elicit a mere conclusion.</p> <p>2. Where a question sought to elicit and the answer stated a conclusion of the witness, for which reason both were objectionable, the admission of such evidence does not require the grant of a new trial, where the witness stated the facts upon which the conclusion was based.</p> <p>3. The court did not err in admitting the alleged statements of one of the defendants, set out in the third division of the opinion, on the ground that it was not shown that they referred to the deceased; it being a question for the jury whether they referred to the deceased.</p> <p>4. The court did’ not err in giving to the jury the instructions set out in the fourth division of the opinion.</p> <p>5. The court did not err in using the word, “will,” instead of the word, “may,” in giving in charge the principle laid down in the Civil Code (1910), § 5732.</p> <p>6. The court did not err in failing to charge the jury, in connection with his charge upon the law of alibi, that if they believed that the defendants, or either of them, had established his or their alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, they should acquit the defendant'or defendants so establishing his or their alibi; the court having charged the law of alibi as a defense, and it being incumbent on the defendants, if they wished the above instruction, to have specifically requested it.</p> <p>7. The court did not err in refusing to grant to counsel for defendant additional time for argument before the jury.</p> <p>8. The court did not err in failing to give in charge to the jury the instruction set out in the eighth division of the opinion, this instruction being substantially covered by the charge as given.</p> <p>9. The court did not err in failing to give in charge to the jury the instruction referred to in the ninth division of the opinion, because such instruction, if correct, was not applicable under the facts.</p> <p>10. The alleged newly discovered evidence does not require the grant of a new’ trial.</p> <p>11. The verdict is supported by the evidence.</p>

<p>1. Tlie general rule is that where one files a caveat to a paper offered fo’r probate as a will, tlie burden of proof is on the caveator to sustain the grounds of his caveat.</p> <p>2. “Where a paper found among a decedent’s papers is offered for probate as a will, and appears to have been canceled or obliterated in a material part, a presumption arises that the cancellations or obliterations were made by the deceased, and that he intended them to operate as a revocation.” Accordingly, where it is shown that the paper offered as a will for probate, which had been mutilated in material parts, had been in the custody of the deceased up to the time of her death, the propounder was met with the presumption just stated.</p> <p>3. “Joint operation of act and intention is necessary to revoke a will.”</p> <p>4. Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of this ease, the propounder did not overcome by evidence the presumption against him; and consequently the verdict of the jury in favor of the propounder was without evidence to support it.</p> <p>5. In view of the foregoing ruling, holding that the presumption that the alleged testator had mutilated the will herself had not been overcome by the evidence, it was error to submit that issue to the jury. .</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge J. B. Jones. Stephens superior court. July 2, 1923. The mayor and council of the City of Toccoa passed an ordinance on May 3, 1922, imposing a license tax of $100 a year for each moving-picture show doing business within that city. The plaintiffs in error conducted such a business in the city during the year 1922, and failed to pay the license tax.

<p>1. An equitable petition Raving been brought for an injunction to prevent the enforcement of a fi. fa. issued upon a judgment in a justice’s court, on the ground that the judgment had been obtained at a term when the plaintiff in the case in the justice’s court had agreed with the defendant therein to continue the case, and that the breach of such agreement was fraud, it was error for the court, at the interlocutory hearing, though the evidence might have been of such a character as to sustain the allegations of the petition showing fraud, to render a judgment enjoining the enforcement of the fi. fa. until the further order of the court, “provided the petitioner should give bond to try the case de novo at the next term of the justice’s court and should actually so try it.” The judgment was erroneous because final in its nature, and the court was without authority to render such a judgment at the interlocutory hearing.</p> <p>2. In view of the foregoing ruling, it is not necessary to pass upon certain questions of practice raised as to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the equitable petition and pass upon the issues made by the pleadings and the evidence.</p>

<p>Where A bought timber on a described tract of land and B advanced the money, or a part of it, for the same, and it was recognized by A that B had an “interest” in the property, and A having died his administrator sold the property at administrator’s sale after order duly obtained and advertisement duly made, and stated at the sale that the property was sold subject to B’s claim for $730, and that the purchaser would have to assume this debt and pay B the amount of his claim, and a purchase was made by one bidding at the sale who understood that he acquired the property subject to the demand of B, B could enforce his claim against him by suit for the amount of liis demand.</p>

<p>1. Where the principal in a misdemeanor criminal case and his sureties sign a recognizance and mail the same to the sheriff of the county where the indictment against the principal has been returned, or to his agent in another county, and where under the direction of the sheriff the bond, without having entered thereupon the approval and acceptance of the same, is returned to the sureties who reside in another county of this State, for the purpose of obtaining the affidavit of the sureties as to their financial responsibility, and such affidavit is made, and these papers are placed in the United States mail, addressed to the accused in the county where he is detained in jail, but before the arrival of the papers the principal escapes from jail, it cannot be said that the principal obtained his liberty by reason of the bond, there being no evidence of the acceptance and approval of the bond prior to the escape of the principal. It was error to hold that the trial judge was authorized to render a judgment of forfeiture absolute against the sureties on such bond.</p> <p>2. The only assignment of error properly made in the petition for certiorari is dealt with in the preceding headnote and corresponding division of the opinion. The remainder of the petition for certiorari presents no question for decision of this court, because of failure to comply with rules with regard to petitions for certiorari to review judgments of the Court of Appeals.</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. October. 5, 1923. By virtue of the act approved August 17, 1920 (Ga.

<p>Where a testator, who left a wife and six children, provided in his will that the wife should be the owner of all his property until the youngest child arrived at the age of twenty-one years, or until his wife should die or marry again, provided she should die or marry before the youngest child reached the age of twenty-one years, and that all the property should be kept together until the youngest child reached the age of twenty-one years or until the remarriage of the wife, in which latter case there was to be a division equally among the wife and children immediately after such marriage, the devise was one to the children as a class, and vested, upon the death of the testator, in the members of the class living at that time; and consequently, where one of the children, a daughter, who survived the testator, died without children before the time of division arrived, her husband took by inheritance her interest in the estate-.</p>

<p>The wife of an intestate, under our statute of distributions, occupies the same degree with children or those representing deceased children; and is entitled, without election, to a child’s part, unless the shares exceed five in number, in which ease she is entitled to one fifth part of the personalty of her deceased husband, and such part of the whole estate, if she elects to take a child’s part of the realty.</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Humphries. Fulton superior court. November 19, 1923. Arthur Tufts Company, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, filed its petition for injunction, discovery, accounting, and relief against DeJarnette Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as the defendant; and made this case: The defendant has brought suit against the plaintiff in the city court of Atlanta, to recover damages for breach of a contract therein set out.

<p>Claim. Before Judge Irwin. Haralson superior court. June 6, 1923.</p>

<p>2. Where it was provided in a will, which created a life-estate in certain lands in favor of the wife and two daughters of the testator,- that the survivor of the life-tenants “may let the land be sold” and use the proceeds for her support, and the survivor,-after the death of the other two life-tenants, sold the land and conveyed it to a purchaser in consideration of the agreement on the part of the latter that he would support her during the balance of her life, and this consideration appears to have been fully equal in value to the value of the land, a court of equity, as against tlie administrator cum testamento annexo of the deceased testator, will decree tlie title to tlie land to be in tlie purchaser.</p> <p>2. The demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of parties should not have been sustained.</p>

Murder. Before Judge Roop. Coweta superior court. November 9, 1923. Grady Minter and his father, J. W. Minter, and others were jointly indicted in Coweta County for the murder of Millard Trouton, alleged to have been committed in that county. Grady Minter, hereinafter called the defendant, was placed on separate trial and found guilty, the jury recommending him to the mercy of the court.

<p>Murder. Before Judge Roop. Coweta superior court. November 10, 1923.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. November 14, 1923.</p>

<p>Where a purchaser of land went into possession of a part of it under a bond for title from the vendor, and was sued in a city court upon a promissory note representing unpaid purchase-money, he could set up in that court the defense that he was not in possession of a part of the land, and that the vendor could not make good title thereto, and that in consequence of the defect in the title of the vendor to a part of the land the defendant was entitled to a reduction of the purchase-price.</p> <p>(а) The city court had jurisdiction to entertain such a defense.</p> <p>(б) The suit was not such a suit “respecting titles to land” as would deprive the city court of jurisdiction to try the case.</p>

<p>Application for dower. Before Judge Yeomans. Miller superior court. October 30, 1923.</p>

<p>Garnishment. Before Judge Spooner. City court of Bainbridge. July 24, 1923.</p> <p>Mrs. Alma NeSmitb, as administratrix of the estate of Hubert NeSmitli, brought suit in the city court of Bainbridge against Oscar NeSmith, on a contract, and recovered a judgment for $1000 principal, besides interest and cost. Hubert NeSmith during his lifetime obtained a policy of insurance with the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, and had Oscar NeSmith made the beneficiary in the policy. A summons of garnishment was secured by Mrs. NeSmith as administratrix, and it was served on the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of tho World. The latter filed an answer in which it admitted that it had in its possession the sum of $993.72, which sum it was admitted it -owed to Oscar Ne-Smith as beneficiary under its insurance certificate dated January 23, 1920, upon the life of Hubert NeSmith, a member of the said Woodmen of the World. In other paragraphs of the answer the garnishee alleges that it is a fraternal, beneficial association, and that it is incorporated, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nebraska, and is licensed to transact business as such in the State of Georgia; it denies liability under the garnishment proceedings, on account of the provisions of section 21 of the act of 1914 (Acts 1914, p. 99), which reads: “No money or other benefit, charity, or relief, or aid to be paid, provided or rendered by any such society shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of a member or beneficiary, or any other person who may have a right thereunder, either before or after payment.” The answer further alleged that-under the provisions of the act of 1914, supra, the benefit due by the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World to Oscar NeSmith is not subject to garnishment for any debt of Oscar NeSmith, and that the garnishee should not be subject to such garnishment proceedings, but the same should be dismissed. A traverse of the answer of the garnishee was filed by the plaintiff, alleging that section 21 of the act of 1914 is void and unenforceable, as being in violation of the constitution of the State of Georgia upon various grounds.</p> <p>Upon the trial the plaintiff introduced the first paragraph of . the answer of the garnishee, admitting that it had in its hands the amount of money set out above; also the pleadings, verdict, and judgment in the case of Alma NeSmith, administratrix,- v. Oscar NeSmith. The garnishee' introduced in evidence the certificate of insurance of the Woodmen of the World issued to Hubert Ne-Smith, naming Oscar NeSmith as the beneficiary. M. E. O’Neal testified that this certificate of insurance was turned over to him by Oscar NeSmith, and was the original certificate of insurance under which Oscar NeSmith claimed the $1000 due by the Woodmen of the World. At the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict finding the property not subject, and the plaintiff excepted.</p>

Complaint. Before Judge Crum. Ben Hill superior court. July 26, 1923. As originally brought the suit by Martin et- al. sought a judgment against .Pearlie Troup and J. C. Troup for the principal amount, and ten per cent, of principal and interest as attorney’s fees, upon a promissory note executed by Pearlie Troup to J. C. Troup, and alleged to have been, transferred to petitioners before maturity for a valuable consideration.

<p>Murder. Before Judge Hardeman. Eulton superior court. June 16, 1923.</p>

<p>In a contract for the sale of certain personal property used in the conduct of a wholesale gasoline and motor-oil business, etc., and the good will and trade-name of said-business, wherein there is embodied a stipulation and covenant that the vendors “shall not enter into the same kind or similar business anywhere within a radius of 20 miles of Atlanta, Georgia,” the covenant must be construed as precluding the right of the vendor making such covenant to engage in or in any manner participate in aid of sales of gasoline and motor oils by wholesale within the proscribed territory, and to prohibit him from such sales as the employee or sales agent of another as if he were the sole proprietor of the business in' which he is in fact only an employee.</p>

<p>Mandamus. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. September 3, 1923.</p> <p>W. E. Guerard brought mandamus proceedings against the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, alleging, that by an act of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, approved August 18, 1919, amending the charter of the City of Savannah, it was made the duty of the defendant to pay the registration clerk in the tax-collector’s office of Chatham County $600 per year, in monthly installments, as his compensation for work in connection with the registration of voters and the preparation of voters’ lists for municipal primaries and elections; that he is the registration clerk in the office of the tax-collector, and has performed the work in said act specified; and that the compensation was paid him up to the month of December, 1922, but that since then, although demand has been made upon the defendant, it has refused to pay him the compensation provided for by said act. The defendant demurred to the petition, setting up that by the act of the General Assembly, approved August 12, 1914, found in Georgia Laws 1914, p. 1163, it was provided that the work alleged to have been performed by this registration clerk should be done by the board of registrars of Chatham County for the compensation fixed by the terms of said act; and that the petition failed to show any contract or agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff. By amendment, in response to a special demurrer, the plaintiff alleged that the services performed by him had been the registration of voters for municipal primaries and elections, and the preparation of voters’ lists therefor.</p> <p>In section 27 of an act to amend the several acts relating to and incorporating the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, etc., approved August 18, 1919 (Georgia Laws 1919, p. 1310), it is provided: “The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah shall pay the registration clerk in the tax-collector’s office of Chatham County $600.00 per annum in twelve equal installments, as his compensation for work in connection with the registration of voters and preparation of voters’ lists for municipal primaries and elections.” Under the third ground of demurrer the contention is raised that this section of the act of August 18, 1919, upon which the petitioner depended for his .right to receive the compensation, was in violation of article 7, section 16, paragraph 1, of the constitution (Civil Code, § 6573), that the General Assembly shall not, by vote, resolution, or order, grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association. The trial court overruled the demurrers, and the defendant excepted.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeh Davis superior court. October 2, 1923.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Sheppard. McIntosh superior court. October 13, 1923. J. E. Paschall and E. M. Thorpe brought suit against TJ. A. Eogers and Frank D. Bozarth, for the purpose of enjoining them from trespassing upon designated lands and cutting timbers; and for damages for the value of timbers already cut.

<p>It is within the power of the county commissioners or other proper county authority, upon recommendation of the county board of education, to levy a tax not exceeding five mills upon the taxpayers of the county residing without tlie limits of independent local school systems, although there is also levied a similar tax of five mills upon the dollar for the support of the school under the provision of a local enactment within the local school district for the same purpose.</p>

<p>1. The charge to the jury in reference to their finding the truth of the issue, involved was not error for the reasons assigned in the exceptions; especially in view of other full and clear instructions on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt of guilt.</p> <p>2. Though the testimony was in conflict, the verdict was supported by evidence, and this court will not set it aside after its approval by the trial judge.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Malcolm D. Jones. Bibb superior court. December 1, 1933.</p>

• Receivership, etc. Before Judge J. B. Jones. Habersham superior court.

<p>1. Where the original sentence of death imposed upon a defendant convicted of the offense of murder is in full force and effect, the fact that an order fixing a new date for his execution under said sentence after the expiration of the date fixed therein is void will not entitle him, upon an application for habeas corpus, to bo discharged from imprisonment. His imprisonment under the original sentence is legal.</p> <p>2. A prisoner who has been convicted of murder and sentenced to be executed will not be discharged on habeas corpus because the sheriff has permitted the date assigned for the execution to elapse. A new date will be assigned.</p>

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. February 11, 1924.</p> <p>John B., Catherine M., B. S., and Mary E. Broderick, the two last named suing by Edward F. Broderick, next friend, filed a petition in Chatham superior court, alleging, that John H. Beid died intestate on January 31, 1917, leaving an estate worth about $10,-000, consisting in part of the furniture and fixtures, stock of drugs, medicines, and surgical instruments in a certain drug-store; that on April 24,1919, temporary letters of administration were granted to Bobert S. Beid, who immediately thereafter was authorized by the court of ordinary of Chatham County “to carry on, conduct, and manage the said business as a going concern, and to hire and employ from time to time such clerks, bookkeepers, or other help necessary to carry on and conduct said business;” that the law of Georgia does not authorize or permit a temporary administrator to conduct or to continue to carry on the business of the intestate; that R. S. Reid is improperly and unlawfully holding and managing said estate, and is selling and disposing of the assets without any legal right or authority; that he has failed and refused to recognize the right of petitioners to share in said estate; that he has never made any accounting or settlement, and has not filed any inventory or any legal or proper returns or accounts .of said estate'; and that unless the illegal sales and disposition of the assets be restrained by injunction, the interest of petitioners in the same may be wholly dissipated and lost. The prayers are, for the appointment of a receiver to administer and distribute said estate; that R. S. Reid be required to make full and complete accounting of his actings and doings as temporary administrator, and that he be enjoined from holding, selling, transferring, encumbering, or otherwise interfering with or disposing of any of the assets or property of the estate; for process, and general relief. The answer filed by R. S. Reid set up-that from the date of the death of J. H. Reid to April, 1919, E. E. Broderick, without administration of any kind, managed the affairs of said estate as he saw fit; that he withdrew from the bank some $3300 belonging to said estate, and had refused to make any accounting for the same; that defendant had procured administration when Broderick requested that an administrator be selected; that the estate was considerably involved; that the principal asset thereof was the good will and business of an old established drug business; and that he had continued the operation of said business in order that the same might be sold to the best advantage and realize as much as possible for all interested in the estate; and that he had at all times recognized the interests of petitioners, and stood ready to make full and complete accounting. A receiver was appointed. Subsequently R. S. Reid filed a petition in the same cause, setting up that Columbia Drug Company had instituted in the city court of Savannah a suit against him individually for $826.59, on account of drugs and druggists’ supplies furnished for the operation of the drug business; that he does not owe the account, but the Columbia Drug Company is a creditor of the estate, and that its vice-president was cognizant of all the details in connection with the handling and administration thereof by defendant. He prayed that the suit in the city court'be enjoined, and that the Columbia Drug Company be required to intervene and propound its claim in the proceeding in which the receiver was appointed. The answer filed by the Drug Company, stated, among other things, that “for lack of sufficient information and knowledge it is unable to admit or deny that it is a creditor of the estate of John Henry Reid, but that it sold merchandise from time to time to Robert S. Reid, temporary administrator of the estate of John Henry Reid, which merchandise was for the conduction and operation of the said business prior to the appointment of a receiver and subsequent to the death of said John Henry Reid.” Hpon the hearing the petition for injunction and the answer, as amended, of Columbia Drug Company were offered in evidence. The only other evidence introduced was a copy of the suit in the city court of Savannah, including as exhibits nineteen invoices, one of which was headed, “Dr. Robert S. Reid — Sent to Estate of J. H. Reid — Columbia Drug Company;” another headed, “Dr. Robert S. Reid — Sent to Estate of J. H. Reid — Bought of Columbia Drug Company;” the other seventeen being headed, “Dr. Robert S. Reid — For the Estate of J. H. Reid — Bought of Columbia Drug Company.”</p> <p>The court passed an order temporarily enjoining the prosecution of the suit in the city court of Savannah, and error was assigned upon that judgment.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge E. D. Thomas. Fulton superior court. July 9, 1923. Charles I. Branan and J. B. Coppedge filed their equitable petition against Morris Feldman, Hamilton Douglas Jr., Helen Douglas, and Davis & Freeman Inc.; and made this case: On January 21, 1919, Davis & Freeman Inc. instituted in Fulton superior court a bail-trover suit against Z. T. Coppedge.

<p>Under tlie ruling of this court in Bates v. Bates, 74 Ga. 105, the exemption from garnishment provided by the act of 1914 (Act's 1914, p. 62) is ineffective as against a decree for alimony.</p>

Alimony, etc. Before Judge Dickerson. Clinch superior court. October 17, 1923. On October 1, 1923, Annie S. Cason - instituted an action for divorce in the superior court of Clinch County, and prayed also for permanent alimony, temporary alimony, attorney’s fees, and custody of two infants the issue of the marriage, both being girls, one of them two and a half years old and the other nine months old.

<p>Claim. Before Judge Fortson. Walton superior court. October 26, 1923.</p>

Specific performance. Before Judge Malcolm D. Jones. Bibb superior court. July 14, 1923. In a suit upon certain promissory notes, brought to the January term, 1918, of the city court of Macon, Ed. Miraglia recovered a judgment against Gertrude Bryson individually, and against her as trustee of her daughter Johnnie Eva, and against her husband John J. Bryson, for $400, besides interest and attorney’s fees.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Humphries. Eulton superior court. June 28, 1923.</p>

<p>Where a municipal corporation of this State filed a petition with the Georgia Public Service Commission to revise and lower the rates charged for electric lighting and power in the municipality by a public-service corporation engaged in furnishing electricity to the public, subject to the jurisdiction of the commission as to the rates, and where the commission issued a rule nisi requiring the public-service corporation to show cause why the rates should not be revised, and where that corporation filed its answer in opposition to any lowering of the rates, with a cross-prayer for the raising of the rates, and where the issue thus formed came on to be heard regularly before the commission, when the municipality and the public-service corporation both appeared, announced ready for trial, introduced evidence, and presented arguments in behalf of each respectively; and where in such cause an order adverse to the company was rendered by the commission, lowering the rates until the further order of the commission, the writ of certiorari will not lie from the superior court to such order and judgment for the purpose of correcting alleged -errors therein, at the instance of the public-service corporation, the act of rate making being legislative or quasi legislative in character.</p>

Complaint for land. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. July 24, 1923. An action was instituted to recover a described parcel of land containing one and one tenth acres, more or less. The original petition contained a plat which was referred to as an exhibit.

The Court of Appeals (in Case No. 14872) certified the following questions for decision, as necessary to a proper determination of the ease: “Where P. was the owner of improved real estate, and, on October 10,1918, procured a loan thereon from S., evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a deed of conveyance to the property, and where on the date of the loan P. procured and paid for a policy of fire insurance upon a building situated upon the land included in the…

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Park. Jones superior court. December 1, 1923. Held: being about three fourths of a mile from defendant’s residence. The party lasted until 12 or 1 o’clock, after which Karsted and defendant left for their respective homes together. Karsted left defendant at defendant’s father’s home, and the defendant went to his own home.