Volume 158 — United States Reports

<p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: no error of which either party could complain. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr, G. 0. Moody and Mr. 8.8. Burdett for Koenigsberger. Mr. Eben W. Martin was on their brief. Mr. Wager Swayne for the Richmond Silver Mining, Company. Mr. Edwin Van Oise was on his brief. *42

This was a bill in equity filed by the decedent, "William H. Mattingly, against the Northwestern Virginia Railroad Company, the Parkersburg Branch Railroad Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, in the Circuit Court for the county of "Wood, State of West Virginia.

This was a bill in equity for the infringement of letters patent No. 268,411, issued December 5, 1882, to Arthur Kirk for a new and useful improvement in movable dams.

This was a suit in equity instituted by Philip and William Medart against the appellant, for the infringement of three letters patent granted t’o Philip Medart,' viz.: Patent No. 248,599, dated October 25, 1881, for the manufacture of belt pulleys; patent No. 248,598, also dated October 25, 1881, for a belt pulley; and patent No. 238,702, granted March 8,1881, also for a belt pulley. • t In the first patent, No. 248,599, the patentee stated in his specification that his…

Held: That the tract being subject to the preemption claim' of J. at the time when the grant to the railroad .company took effect, was excepted from the operation of that grant; (2) That after the cancellation of that entry it remained part of the public domain, and, at the time Of the homestead entry of T. was "subject to such entry.

’ On May 6,1882, the legislature of the State of Texas passed the following act: “Seo. 1.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>■ This was an appeal from an order upon a writ of habeas corpus, discharging David B. Sayre, a paymaster’s clerk in the navy, assigned to duty on the United States receiving ship Franklin, from the custody of Captain Mortimer L. Johnson, the commander of that ship, under a sentence of a naval court martial. The case appeared by the record to be a.s follows :</p> <p>• On July 6, 1893, the Secretary of the Navy signed and sent to Sayre an appointment in these terms : “ Upon the nomination of Paymaster James E. Cann, U. S. N., you are hereby appointed a paymaster’s clerk in the United States Navy, for duty on board of the U. S. ■ E. S. Franklin. Enclosed is a blank form of acceptance for your signature, also a blank oath of office, which you will duly execute and return with your letter of acceptance to the department; having done which, you will proceed to thó navy yard, Norfolk, Yirginia, and report to the commandant, on the 15th instant, for duty.”</p> <p>On July 10,1893, Sayre toofcthe oath of office, and returned it to the Secretary of the Navy, with an acceptance in these terms : “ I hereby accept the appointment of paymaster’s clerk, dated July 6, 1893, conferred on me; and do hereby oblige and subject myself, during my service as paymaster’s clerk, to comply with and be obedient to such laws, .regulations and discipline of the navy as are now in force, or that may be enacted by .Congress, or established by other competent authority; and herewith enclose oath of office duly executed.”</p> <p>Sayre accordingly entered uppn the performance of his duties as paymaster’s clerk, under Paymaster Cann, on board the Franklin, which was the receiving ship at the navy yard in Norfolk, Yirginia. Cann, besides being paymaster of the Franklin, was paymaster at Port Eoyal, South Carolina, and of the monitors at Eichmond, Yirginia; and was therefore obliged to be away from the Franklin several days in each month.</p> <p>On October 10, 1894, Sayre was put under arrest, by Captain Mortimer L. Johnson, commanding the Franklin, to await the investigation of a charge of embezzlement, and was thereafter held in custody. On October 13, the Secretary of the Navy ordered a court of inquiry to convene on October 16, at the navy yard in Norfolk, for the purpose of inquiring into the method in which the pay department of the Franklin had been conducted during the time covered by the- service of Paymaster Cann on board of her; and directed that Sayre be held in custody, but be permitted to attend the court of inquiry, and to consult with counsel and inspect the ship’s papers. He was accordingly brought before the court of inquiry from day to day until October 19. The court of inquiry recommended that he be tried by court martial on the charge of embezzlement; and he was informed-of this by a letter to him from the Secretary of the Navy of October 25.</p> <p>On October 25, the Secretary of the Navy also ordered a general court martial to convene at the navy yard in Norfolk on October 30, for the trial of Sayre, and of such other persons as might be legally brought before it.</p> <p>The charge against Sayre was of “ embezzlement, in violation of article fourteen of the Articles for the Government of the Navy,” with a specification that “ David B. Sayre, a pay clerk in the United States Navy, attached to and serving as such on board the United States receiving ship Franklin, at the navy yard, Norfolk, Virginia, having, on various dates between” July 15,1893, and October 10,1894, “ been entrusted by Paymaster James E. Oann, United States Navy, the paymaster of said vessel, with sums of money belonging to the United States, in various amounts, furnished and intended for the naval service thereof, for disbursement for the purposes of said service during the temporary absence of said Paymaster Oann from the vessel, and having,” on October 1, 1894, “ receipted to the said Paymaster Oann for money so entrusted to his care as aforesaid,” in the sum of $2701.44, did, between July 15, 1893, and October 10, 1894, “ knowingly and wilfully misappropriate, and apply to his own use and benefit, from the money so entrusted to him at various times as aforesaid,” the sum of $1971.11, “ in violation of article 14 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy.”-</p> <p>On October 26, a copy of the charge and specification wTas delivered to Sayre. The court martial met October 30, and sat from day to day until November 2. At its first meeting, Sayre was brought before it, and acknowledged that he had received a copy of the charge and specification. After they had been read, his counsel objected to the jurisdiction of the court, upon the ground that Sayre, being a paymaster’s clerk, was a civilian, and not subject to trial by court martial ; and also demurred, upon the ground that a paymaster’s clerk could not be guilty of embezzlement of funds of the United States, because the paymaster only was vested with the management and control of those funds, and had no power to delegate his authority to a clerk. The court martial decided that it had jurisdiction, and overruled the demurrer. Sayre then pleaded not guilty.</p> <p>The facts that the accused was originally put under arrest on October 10, and that the copy of the charge and specification was first delivered to him on October 26, were not brought to the notice of the court martial, until they appeared upon the examination of Captain Johnson, the last witness called for the United States. Sayre’s counsel thereupon moved that all the evidence introduced on the part of the United States be excluded, because the copy had not been served upon him until sixteen days after his arrest; and in support of this motion relied upon article 43 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy,1 and article 1785 of the United States Navy Regulations.2</p> <p>On November 2, the court martial, after arguments of the defendant’s counsel and of the judge advocate upon this motion, and upo.n the whole case, overruled the motion-, and found the specification proved, and the accused guilty of the charge; and sentenced him “ to be confined, in such a place as the Honorable Secretary of the Navy may designate, for the period of two years ; ” to lose his pay during his confinement, to the amount of $2210; and then to be dishonorably dismissed from the naval service of the United States.</p> <p>On November 17, the Secretary of the Navy approved the proceedings, finding and sentence of. the court martial, and ordered the sentence to be duly executed; and designated the prison at the navy yard in Boston, Massachusetts, as the place for the execution of so much of the sentence as related to confinement ; and directed him to be transferred, under a suitable guard, to that prison, to be there confined in accordance with the terms of his sentence.</p> <p>On November 21, upon the petition of Sayre, the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered a writ of habeas corpus to issue to Captain Johnson. The return to the writ stated that Captain Johnson held Sayre under the order of the Secretary of the Navy of November 17. Upon a hearing, the court, held by the District Judge, considered, as stated in his opinion on file and sent up with the record, entitled “finding of the court,” that Sayre was unlawfully restrained of his liberty, because detained under a sentence to an infamous punishment, not in time of war or public danger, without indictment or trial by jury,-in violation of the Fifth Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, “ but without prejudice in any other respect to the sentence of the court martial; ” and therefore ordered him to be discharged from custody. Captain Johnson appealed to this court.</p>

On May 2, 1888, the “Pacific Railroad,” a corporation of the State of Missouri, filed in the Court of Claims a petition seeking to recover interest on certain judgments it had previously obtained against the United States. There was a traverse denying the allegations of the petition. Evidence was adduced and the cause submitted to the court.

Paul F. Beardsley filed his bill in the Circuit Court of the. United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas against John D. Beardsley and the Arkansas and Louisiana Railway Company to enforce certain rights in the railway under certain alleged trusts, which resulted in a final decree, February 24,1887.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>On November 29, 1871, Andrew J. Joyce filed his bill of complaint in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against Mary White, administratrix of Patrick White, deceased, and Francis P. White, Mary S. White, James R. White, Lewis 0. White, and Charles A. White, irifants, and Mary White, widow of the said Patrick White, stating that the complainant and the defendants were residents of the District of Columbia; that Patrick White died intestate in March, 1871, leaving his widow, Mary White, and the said infants his heirs at law, and leaving also another son, Robert E. White, who had since died unmarried and without issue ; and that Mary White was appointed administratrix of Patrick White. The complainant averred that on or about June 1, 1858, he and Patrick White formed a partnership in the grocery business in the city of Washington, in pursuance of a written agreement entered into between them on that day, (a copy of the same being filed with the bill,) which was to continue for seven years. It was agreed between the partners, the bill alleged, that Patrick White was to keep the books of the firm; that the firm name should be P. White & Co.; that the capital should be $3000, to be paid in by the partners in equal portions; that, as the complainant was engaged in other business, he should employ a competent person to represent him in the business of the said firm; that Patrick White should have entire charge of the business, keep proper accounts, and sign all checks, drafts, and notes having relation to the partnership business, and to none others; that Patrick White should give a full statement and account of the business and make a settlement with the complainant whenever required so to do. It was alleged that the partners further agreed, as appeared by an instrument of writing filed with the bill, that neither member of the. firm should endorse any note or sign any bond, mortgage, or other instrument by which either might' become liable for the payment of any money.</p> <p>The bill alleged that the partnership commenced on June 1, 1858, and that the complainant, with the consent of Patrick White, employed John J. Joyce to represent him in the business, and fully complied with all the said agreements; that after the. expiration of the said seven years the partnership was continued for a further term of five years, by an agreement in writing which was filed with the bill; that the partnership terminated on June 1, 1S70, except as to a settlement of the partnership affairs; that during the time the business was carried on no settlement thereof was ever made, or account thereof stated; that Patrick White undertook within that time to state such an account, but died before it was completed; that during the lifetime of Patrick White, and with his consent, the complainant employed two competent bookkeepers to. make a statement of the effects and transactions of .the firm for the use of the partners, but that, owing to the death of Patrick White, they were compelled to cease their work. The complainant stated that he had in his possession, at the time of the filing of his bill of complaint, a number of the books and papers of the partnership, which had been delivered to him by Mary White since the death of her husband, and he prayed that she might be required to produce, with her answer in the cause, all other books and papers of the firm which might be in her possession. • He further stated that he was informed and believed that the partnership was indebted to various persons, but did not know who any' of them were, except one firm in Philadelphia.</p> <p>The. complainant then showed that Patrick White had purchased a certain parcel, of land in the city of Washington to secure a debt due the firm, and that afterwards he and his-wife, Mary White, executed a deed of one undivided moiety of the said land to the complainant, his heirs and assigns ;• and that in January, 18G9, a debtor of the firm, on account of his indebtedness, conveyed to the complainant and Patrick White, (trading as P. White'& Co.,) as tenants in common a certain other parcel of land in the said city. He stated that the said real estate was part of the assets of the partnership, and should be sold to pay the firm’s debts. He averred that since the death of Patrick White he had collected the sum of $1000 due to the partnership, for which he was ready to account, and- stated that he would endeavor to collect all other debts due to the same. He prayed that the defendant Mary White might discover if she had collected any debts due to the firm, and, if so, from whom collected, and the amounts thereof. Finally, the complainant alleged that the said real estate, of one undivided.moiety of which Patricly White died seized, was not susceptible of partition among the heirs at láw of Patrick White, and that it would be to the interest and advantage of the complainant'iand the defendants that the same be sold and the proceeds thereof first applied to the payment of the partnership debts, and the balance, if any, distributed among the parties to the cause. '</p> <p>The complainant prayed that the' cause might be referred to the auditor of the- court to state an account of all the effects and transactions of the firm; that the complainant might have the right to surcharge and falsify, if need be, the books, accounts, and vouchers of the business; that the complainant might have paid to him any money found to be due to him; that an account might be taken from the commencement to the end of the partnership; that the auditor might have power to advertise for all creditors of the firm to appear before him and prove their claims, and that the complainant might have the right to deny and plead to the same; that the said real estate might be sold and the proceeds thereof applied to the payment of the partnership débts, and that after the payment thereof any of the proceeds remaining might be distributed among the parties to the cause according to their respective rights; and that, on a final settlement of the partnership account, the complainant might have whatever should be found to be due to him charged against the estate of Patrick White.</p> <p>On December 23, 1871, the court appointed James White guardian ad litem of the infant defendants, and he filed an answer on January 5, 1872, signed by himself in person, submitting the rights of the infants to the protection of the court, and stating that he could not admit or deny the allegations of the bill.</p> <p>On January 3, 1872, It. T. Merrick, Esq., entered his appearance for the defendants in the cause.</p> <p>Mary White filed her answer as administratrix on January 30,1872, admitting that Patrick White died intestate, and that she was duly appointed administratrix of his personal estate, and had entered upon the duties of her office. She averred that she knew nothing of the matters set out in the bill relating to the said partnership, and that she had no books or papers of the firm in her possession, except two papers which she filed with her answer, and which she believed to be of no value. She admitted the allegations of the bill with regard to the said real estate, and that it constituted assets of the partnership, and stated that she was willing that the property should be sold, but that she did not admit that a sale of the same was necessary for the payment of the said debts. She averred that she had not collected any debt or claim due to the firm of P.. White & Co. on account of the partnership business. She stated that she did not know whether the said real estate was or was not susceptible of partition, or whether it would or would not be to the advantage of all the parties that the same be sold. As to all the matters set out in the bill,, of which the defendant stated herself to be in ignorance, she called upon the complainant to make proof. Finally, she prayed to have the benefit of the statute of limitations with regard to the partnership affairs which were carried on under the first agreement alleged to have been entered into by the complainant and Patrick White, by the terms of which the partnership existing thereunder terminated on June 1,1865.</p> <p>Issue was joined on February 20, 1872, and the court entered an' order on May- 7, 1872, with the consent of the solicitors for Mary White and for the guardian ad litem, referring the cause to the auditor to state an account of the property and transactions of the partnership, and an account of what might be found to have been due from one partner to the other at the dissolution of the partnership which existed from Juné 1, 1865, to June, 1870, reserving to the defendants the benefit of the statute of limitations, if the plea thereof should be valid in the premises as a defence. It was ordered that the auditor advertise for the creditors of the firm to appear before him and prove their claims; that the right be reserved to the defendants and the complainant to deny the same or plead to them; that the auditor state an account of all debts and claims against the partnership; that he have leave to employ such competent persons, as might be agreed upon by the parties to the cause to assist him; that the complainant have the right to surcharge and falsify, if need be, the books, accounts, etc., kept by Patrick White; and that the auditor take the depositions’’ of all witnesses produced before him in reference to the partnership affairs, and file such depositions with his report.</p> <p>By consent of the solicitors for the defendants, John F. Hanna and Thomas J. Myers were, oin July 9,1872, appointed. special auditors to assist the auditor-in the rcause, and to take testimony, and afterwards, on December 5, 1873, by consent as aforesaid, John F.. Riley was substituted in the place of John F. Hanna, who was absent from the city. The special auditors proceeded to examine the books, vouchers etc., of the partnership, and to take testimony, and on June 18,1875, their report was filed, signed (the solicitors for defendants consenting) by John F. Hanna as special auditor, and by Walter S. Cox, auditor of the court. The report showed that the estate of Patrick White was indebted to the complainant in the sum of $1937.90, with interest from June 1, 1870, and to Robert White,' a brother of Patrick White, in the sum of $294.23. It further appeared thereby that there was due to the said firm from the firm of Joyce & Fisher, one. of the members of which was the aforesaid John J. Joyce, the sum of $1789.18 on notes, and the sum of $199.88 upon open account.</p> <p>The cause was heard upon bill, answers, exhibits, proofs and auditors’ report, and a decree, consented to by the solicitors for defendants,’ was entered on September 9, 1875, confirming the said report, and adjudging that Mary White, administratrix, was indebted to the complainant and to Robert White in the amounts aforesaid. It was decreed that, it appearing to the court that jfhere were not sufficient assets to pay the complainant and Robert White, the partnership real estate be sold.</p> <p>On July 12, Í876, the complainant filed a petition setting out that after the ratification of the auditors’ report it had been found that a payment of $1523.25, made to the firm ofk P. White & Co. by John J. Joyce, had not been credited to him; that this error could not have been discovered from the books alone, but- was made to appear by explanations of certain items; and that the auditors had since become satisfied that, .in • justice to the estate of John J. Joyce, deceased, this error and others should be corrected. The complainant prayed that the order confirming the report might be set aside and the cause again be referred to the auditors, with proper directions.</p> <p>The report was vacated on July 12,1876, and the cause sent back to the auditors with directions to restate the. account, and to make such corrections therein as might be necessary. The alleged error pointed out in the petition was corrected in a second report filed by the auditors on February 13, 1877, which showed, that the amount due from the estate of Patrick White to the complainant was- $2706.98, with interest from June 1,1870. A decree ratifying the second report, and again directing a sale of the partnership real estate, was entered on May 29, 1877, by consent of the defendant’s solicitors.</p> <p>On motion of the complainant, and with the consent of the solicitors for the defendants, leave wás granted him on May 24,-1882, to file a supplemental and amended bill. A bill styled by him a supplemental bill was filed on the same day, in which he set out the proceedings above mentioned, and stated that since the time of. filing of the original bill one .of the defendants, who was at that time an infant, had reached the age of twenty-one years. The complainant averred that the trustees appointed to sell the said real estate had, after advertising a sale and taking due steps to effect the same, been unable to get a bid for either of the pieces of property. He stated that one of the said parcels was purchased by Patrick White for the sum óf $572.72, at a sale made in pursuance of a decree entered in a suit brought by the firm against one of its creditors, and that the other parcel had been conveyed to the partners by another creditor, in payment of a debt of about $800. The complainant then set out the descriptions of five certain .parcels or lots of land in'the city of Washington of which Patrick White died seized. He alleged that Patrick White died intestate, leaving' the said Mary White as his widow and the other defendants as his only heirs at law; that Patrick White did not leave sufficient personal estate to pay all debts and claims against him ; that on September 24, 1872, Mary White filed her account as administratrix, showing that after paying all the debts - filed against the said estate there was left the sum of $1321.96; that this amount was distributed by the court to Mary White as the widow of Patrick White and as the guardian of her infant children, and had all been expended in the education of her children and in supporting- herself and them; and that at the time of the said distribution the complainant’s claim against Patrick White’s estate had not been ascertained by a decree of the court. The complainant prayed that Mary White, as administratrix, and in her own right, might answer the supplemental bill; that a guardian ad litem might be appointed for the infant defendants; that the said real estate of which Patrick White died seized, or as much thereof as might be necessary to pay the complainant the amount due him, might be sold.</p> <p>Andrew J. Joyce died on June 8, 1882. His death was suggested to the court on the 22d of that month, and upon motion of his executrix and executor, Prances M. Joyce and William J. Miller, they were on that day made parties complainant, and the cause was revived in their name.</p> <p>Mary White was appointed guardian ad litem of the infant defendants on July 5, 1882, and, as such, filed her answer in person on the twelfth of the same month, giving a statement of the ages of the said infants, by which it appeared that one of them was under fourteen years of age and the others above that age; that the defendants were the only heirs at law of Patrick White; that the trustees appointed to.sell the said partnership property had attempted and failed to dó so; that the prices paid for the property by the firm were as stated in the supplemental bill; that Patrick White died seized of the real estate described in the supplemental bill; that he did not leave sufficient personal estate to pay all the debts and claims against the same, and submitting the rights of the infant defendants to the protection of the court. On the same day she filed her answer as a defendant in the supplemental bill, admitting the matters and things therein set forth to be substantially true.</p> <p>The court entered a.decree on the same day, September 12, 1882, directing that the said five parcels of land of which Patrick White died seized be sold, appointing trustees to make the sale, and providing for the manner of advertising, the same, etc.</p> <p>On August 9, 1883, Mary White filed a petition alleging, that the auditors, in their amended report, had failed to charge John J. Joyce, of the firm of Joyce & Fisher, formerly the representative of Andrew J. Joyce in the firm of-P. "White & Co.', with the sum of $1789.18 due on notes of Joyce & Fisher, which had been given by the latter firm for the stock and good will of the firm of P. White & Co., and the sum of $199.88 due on open account, and that the auditors had made certain other errors, specifically referred to in the petition, whereby the defendants were greatly injured. She therefore prayed to have the decree confirming the second auditors’ report set aside, and the cause referred to the auditor of the court to state an account of the partnership affairs, and that the special auditors might be required to file all the partnership books and papers in their possession with the clerk of the court.</p> <p>The complainants filed their answer to this petition on December 14, 1883, admitting that the Joyce & Fisher notes and the open account of that firm were in favor of the firm of P. White & Co., but averring on information and belief, and from reference .to certain exhibits filed with the answer, that the sum of $731.3S had been collected .from- the estate of John J. Joyce. They also answered the allegations of the petition with regard to other alleged errors in the second auditors’ report, and stated that they should not be surprised to find that errors in favor of and against Andrew J. Joyce had been committed in making the 'auditors’ account, since they believed that to make up a true account from the books, papers, and vouchers of the partnership would be impossible, and that if the second report should be set aside it should be upon certain terms stated in the answer, among which was that the pleas of the statute of limitations should be overruled, as such pleas were abandoned at the hearing of the cause, although such fact was not embodied in the decrees confirming the auditors’ reports.</p> <p>The petition was, on August 2, 18S4, dismissed.</p> <p>On April 8,'1884, Ann Joyce, the widow of John J. Joyce, and "Mary A. Joyce, Catherine Joyce, Philomena Joyce, Fannie Joyce, Monica Joyce, and Joseph I. Jojme, the adult children of John-J. Joyce and Ann Joyce, filed an intervening petition stating that John J. Joyce died on May 12,1871, leaving surviving him as next of kin and heirs at law the petitioners, and alleging that during the lifetime of John J. Joyce he was engaged in the grocery business in the city of Washington with Andrew J. Joyce and Patrick White; that about the year 1858 he was engaged in the said business with Pát-\ rick White, under the firm name Of P. White & Co.; that, being indebted to Andrew J. Joyce, it was agreed that the latter should take his place in the firm until,his indebtedness should be paid; that for this purpose Andrew J. Joyce became a membér of the said firm in his place; that while the business continued it was managed and controlled by Patrick White and John J. Joyce, and the profits thereof were appropriated by thein to their use, and not. by Andrew J. Joyce, he being only nominally connected with the firm for the purposes aforesaid. The petitioners showed that Andrew J. Joyce left a will providing, among other things, that all his interest in the said firm, after deducting therefrom the sum of $800, being the amount of the said debt due by John J. Joyce bo Andrew J. Joyce at the time the latter became nominally a partner in the said firm, should become,the property of John J. Joyce. It was alleged that the reason for the bequest was that the interest of Andrew J. Joyce in the said firm really belonged to John J. Joyce. The will was filed with the petitioner as an exhibit; as was also an instrument of writing, executed on April 8, 1884, referred to in the petition, whereby Andrew J. Joyce made the same disposition of his interest in the firm as was afterwards made in his will, subject to the said deduction of $800. The petitioners further showed that the cause was referred to special auditors, and that the auditors found that a large amount of money was due to Andrew J. Joyce; that, for the reason that certain errors had been discovered in the auditors’ report, the report was set aside and further proceedings were directed to be had for the .purpose of correcting the same, and also, that another auditor was substituted in the place of one of the auditors who made the report; that the auditors, subsequently appointed, had found and were about to award that Patrick 'White was not indebted to Andrew J. Joyce at tlje time of the dissolution of the partnership of P. White & Co. in an amount exceeding the indebtedness of John J. Joyce to Andrew J. Joyce, as aforesaid,' and that, therefore, if such award should be confirmed, and the court should decree that Patrick White was not indebted to Andrew J. Joyce, such decree would, as the petitioners believed, be a bar to any recovery by the representatives of John J. Joyce against the estate of Andrew J. Joyce for any interest which John. J.. Joyce owned in' his lifetime in the firm of P. White & Co.; that the petitioners were interested in the question of the amount which might be found due in the accounting in the cause, and that a complete: determination of the controversy-could not be had without their having the right to be heard.</p> <p>The court entered an order on April 15, 1884, permitting the pétitioners to intervene as complainants,, and referring the cause to the auditor of the court to further state the account between the parties, and to take further testimony.</p> <p>On April fl8, 1884, Joseph I. Joyce, administrator of John J. Joyce, deceased, and Ann Joyce, and Mary A. Bodriguez, Catherine Fisher, Philomena ■ Joyce, Fannie Joyce, Monica Joyce, arid Joseph I. Joyce filed an intervening petition, in which were repeated the allegations of the said petition of Ann Joyce and others filed on April 8, 1884. Leave to withdraw, amend, and refile this petition was granted on May 2, 1884.' The petitioners were made parties complainant in the cause on May 13, 1884.</p> <p>On June 13, 1884, an order was entered restraining further proceedings under the decree of September 12, 1882, and on the same day the defendants in the original and supplemental bills, upon, leave granted by the court, filed a bill of review. Therein they stated that Mary S. White had become of age since September, 1882, and that James B. White, Louis C. White, Charles A. White, and Francis P. White were yet ihfants, and set out the proceedings theretofore had substantially as they appear above, They alleged that there was error in the decree of September 12,1882, entered in pursuance of the prayers of the supplemental bill, for the reasons that the original bill was brought to settle the affairs of the partnership, and did not allege that Andrew J. Joyce was the creditor of Patrick J. White; that the. infant children of Patrick White were not necessary or proper parties to the original bill, and could not be bound by proceedings had thereon ; that, inasmuch as the orders and decrees in the original proceeding were almost" all entered by consent, the infants’ could not be bound thereby, even if they were proper parties; that the auditors’.reports showed that there-was a large amount of assets belonging to the' firm of P, White <fe Co., and that the trustees appointed to dispose of the assets had never reported to the court what .disposition, if any, had been made Of the same, or what application had been made of the proceeds; that the indebtedness found by the . decree of May 29, 1877, was against Mary White as administratrix of Patrick White, and against his personal estate only, and could not establish the claim against Mary White and the said infants as the widow and heirs at law of Patrick White; that the so-called supplemental bill was an entirely new cause, and of a different nature from the original causé, being brought by a creditor of a deceased debtor against his heirs, infants and adults, to Subject his real estate to the debt claimed to be due; that, the proceeding by supplemental bill thus being an original action, the complainant therein was bound to prove his claim as against the defendants, and that the proceedings in the suit against the administratrix, including the auditors’ reports, were without effect and could not properly be used as against the defendants in the supplemental bill, though in fact they were so used, and no proof was made'by the complainant in that bill; that the court appointed a guardian ad litem for the infants without it anywhere appearing that they had nominated or declined to nominate a guardian, although the record showed them to be over fourteen years of age; that the order appointing the guardian ad litem did not recite on whose motion it was made, and was in the handwriting of the solicitor of the complainant in the supplemental bill, and that the answer of the guardian at litem, which was also in the handwriting of the complainant’s solicitor, admitted all the allegations of the supplemental bill; that the decree founded • upon the supplemental bill purported to be entered by consent of the solicitor of the defendants therein, whereas the record did not show that they appeared by solicitor; that the infants could not be bound by the consent of a guardian ad litem or solicitor; that the. decree was absolute, and did - not give the infants a day after they should become of age to show cause against the same; that one of • the- defendants in the supplemental bill had since become of age, and, by the bill of review, showed cause why the said decree should be reversed and set aside; that it appeared from proceedings had since the entering of the said decree that the administrator of John J. Joyce was the real party complainant, and that John J. Joyce, as a partner in the firm of Joyce & Fisher, was indebted to the firm of P. White & Co. in the sum pf $1537.99., with interest from June 1,1870, and also in. the sum of $163, faith interest from June 1, 1870, which sums wpre among the' .uncollected assets of the firm of P. White & Co., one-half of which should be-applied to the payment of any indebtedness of Patrick White before his real estate, should be sold to pay debts alleged to be due to John J. Joyce or his administrator; that the record in the case since the entry of the decree founded upon the supplemental bill presented new facts in the case, and brought in new complainants against whom the defendants (complainants in the bill of review).had a good defence; that, since the entry of the said decree, errors had been discovered in the auditor’s account injurious-to the estate pf Patrick White. The complainants prayed, that the decree of September 12,1882, might be set aside. •</p> <p>Frances M. Joyce and William J. Miller, executrix and executor, filed their answer to the bill of review on June 13, 1884. They referred at some length-to matters set out in the bill of review, bearing upon the correctness of. certain items of the auditor’s report and relating to the state of. the accounts between the parties, and, in reference to the grounds upon which the complainants.asked, the court to treat the décree of September 12,1882, as erroneous, the respondents denied that the complainants in the bill of review were improperly joined as defendants in the original bill'; admitted that the supplemental bill was filed as a creditor’s bill ■ by a creditor of a deceased debtor against his heirs, both adults and infants, to subject the deceased debtor’s real estate to the payment of his indebtedness, and that the supplemental bill was filed on the alleged ground that the deceased debtor did not leave a sufficiency of personal assets to pay his debts; averred that the indebtedness of the deceased was found by a decree of the court in the cause, and was proved by the supplemental bill and by the sworn answers of the adult defendants, Mary White and Francis P. White, and the sworn answer of the infant defendants through Mary White, their guardian ad litem, and by the administratrix of Patrick White’s estate;admitted that-the decree appointing Mary White guardian ad litem did not show on whose motion the appointment was made, and that it did not show that the infant defendants nominated or declined to nominate a guardian, and that it was in the handwriting of the solicitor for the complainants in the supplemental bill; and admitted that the decree of September 12,1882, was absolute and did not give a future day in court to such of the defendants as were infants, and stated that they were advised that in such a case a decree is never given.to infant defendants when they shall have become of age to show cause against the decree.</p> <p>Joseph I. Joyce, administrator, and Ann Joyce and others demurred to the bill of review, and the demurrer having been overruled, they appealed to the said court in general term. Afterwards, on April 28, 1886, Joseph T. Joyce, administrator, filed an answer adopting the answer of Frances M. Joyce and William J. Miller as his own.</p> <p>Testimony was taken with relation to allegations of the bill of review concerning various items of account, etc., and* the cause coming on to be heard upon the bill of review, answers, and proceedings thereon, a decree was entered on November 22, 1888, whereby the said decree of September 12, 1882, was reversed. The defendants in the bill of review took an appeal to the said court in general term, where, on December 2,1890, the said decree of reversal entered in special term was set aside and the hill of review dismissed. Thereupon the complainants (defendants in the original proceedings) appealed to this court.</p>

In section 1 of the act of Congress of August 14, 1848, c. 177, establishing the territorial government of Oregon, is the following proviso: “ Provided, also, That the title to the land, not exceeding six hundred and forty acres, now occupied as missionary stations, among the Indian tribes in said Territory, together with the improvements thereon, be 'confirmed and established in the several religious societies to which said missionary stations respectively belong.” 9 Stat.…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the. opinion.</p>

Motion to dismiss. This was an action at law brought by Arthur A. Denny and F. X; Prefontaine, as executors of the last will and testament of James Crawford,-deceased,-against William P. Sayward, in the Superior Court of Kitsap County, State-of Washington, to recover moneys paid by James Crawford on a contract which he had executed as surety for William P. Sayward as principal.

Held: that the insurance- company, should ^-t be at -owed to be let in to share in the decree to the extent of what might remain of the penalty of the bond after satisfying the decree in-regard to the damage to the other vessel, since the bond was given' *210 only to satisfy the cause of action sued for in the original libel.

<p>A charge by the collector of customs at New York for storage in the public store, for labor, and for cartage from the general-order warehouse to ■ the public store made upon uninvoiced and unclaimed goods under the value of $100 sent to a general-order warehouse, and taken thence to a public store for examination on the application of the owner, is a valid charge authorized by law.</p>

On June 6, 1889, the appellant, as plaintiff, filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. The defendant appeared arid answered, ahd also filed a cross-bill, the purpose of which was to secure a decree cancelling an agreement for the sale of the real estate in controversy, made by an agent of the defendant,, and placed on record by the plaintiff.

Held: That the mortgagee had only the rights of M. aud was subject to all rights of set-off between M. and B.; (?) That the proof left no doubt that the deed to the wife of B, was made without her knowledge and that she was not a party to it; (3) That in whatever aspect it was viewed the assignee of M. could not recover.

On April 7, 1894, the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit, Eastern District of Texas, presented an indictment against Sephus Wright and Thomas Wade, late of the Choctaw Nation, and of Atoka County, Indian Territory.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>In 1854 Congress passed “An act to establish the offices of Surveyor General of New Mexico, Kansas, and Nebraska, to grant donations to actual settlers therein, and for other purposes.” Act of July 22,1854, c. 103,10 Stat. 308. Sections 8 and 9 of this law read as follows:</p> <p>“ Seo. 8.' And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the Surveyor General, under such instructions as may be given by the Secretary of the Interior, to ascertain the origin, nature, character, and extent of all claims to lands under the laws, usages, and customs of Spain and Mexico; and, for this purpose, may issue notices, summon witnesses, administer oaths, and do and perform all other necessary acts in the premises. He shall make a full report on all such claims as originated before the cession of the territory to the United States by the treaty of Gaudalupe Hidalgo, of eighteen hundred and forty-eight, denoting the various grades of title, with his decision as to the validity or invalidity of each of the same under the law's, usages, and customs of the country before its cession to the United States; and shall also make a report in regard to all pueblos existing in the territory, showing the extent and locality of each, stating the number of inhabitants in the said pueblos, respectively, and the nature of their titles to the land. Such report to be made according to the form which may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior; which report shall be laid before Congress for such action thereon as may be deemed just and proper, with a view to confirm bona fide grants, and give full effect to the treaty of eighteen hundred and forty-eight between the United States and Mexico; and, until the final action of Congress on such claims, all lands covered thereby shall be reserved from sale or other disposal by the government, and shall not be subject to the donations granted by the previous provisions of this act.</p> <p>“ Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, THat full power and authority are hereby given the Secretary of the Interior to issue all needful rules and regulations for fully carrying into effect the several provisions of this act.”</p> <p>Under these provisions Preston Beck, Jr., a citizen of the United States and a resident of the territory of New Mexico, presented his petition to the Surveyor General,. on May 10, 1855, to be recognized as the legal owner, in fee, of a certain tract of land lying in the county of San Miguel, in that territory “known as the Hacienda de San Juan Bautista del Ojito del Bio de las Gallinas,” and bounded “on the north by the landmarks of the sitio of Don Antonio Oritz and the mesa of the aguage de la Yegua, on the south by the river Pecos,' on the east by the mesa of Pajarito, on the west by the point of the mesa of the Chupaines. . . . And the said Preston Beck, the ‘present claimant,’ claims a perfect title to said land by virtue of a grant made • on the twenty-third day of' December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, by Bartolmé Baca, governor and superior political chief of the province of New Mexico, by and with the advice and approbation of the provincial deputation of the said province of New Mexico, to Juan Estevan Piño, a citizen of New Mexico, which said grant was made as aforesaid by authority of the laws, usages, and customs of the republic of Mexico in force at the time, and of the laws and regulations of Spain which were declared and -recognized to be. in force and effect at that time in the republic of Mexico. . . .</p> <p>“ The said Preston Beck claims and further states that he. cannot show the quantity of land claimed by him except as set forth in "said grant, as within the above-described well-known metes and boundaries nor can he furnish a plat of survey, as no survey has ever been executed.</p> <p>“ Claimant further states that one Alexander Hatch and about one hundred other persons have settled upon said grant without a title from any person or from any government .and with a full knowledge of the existence of the claim now presented.</p> <p>“ Claimant further states that by virtue of said grant Juan Estevan Piño was lawfully put in possession of said tract of land by the-competent authorities, and settled upon said claim, with a large amount of' property, and there held possession of the same for the space of twenty-one years and until expelled, by the hostilities of the savage Indian tribes; that upon the death of Juan Estevan Piño the said tract of land was inherited 'by his two sons, Justo Piño and Manuel D. Piño, who were his only heirs, and the present claimant claims his. title by virtue of deeds from Justo Piño and Gertrudes Roscom, his wife, and.from Manuel D. Piño and Josefa Oritz, his wife, all-of. original grants and deeds of transfer and documentary titles, marked A, B, C, D, E, are herewith filed and made part of this claim.</p> <p>“ Claimant files this his said claim before you under the Stli^ section of the act of Congress approved 22 July, 1854, entitled ‘ An act to establish the offices of Surveyor General of New Mexico, Kansas, and Nebraska, to grant donations to actual settlers therein, and for other purposes,’ and respectfully asks confirmation by you of his said claim.”</p> <p>The controversy initiated before the Surveyor General by the filing of this petition was decided by him in 1856. His opinion recites the claim, the grant made, the fact that the grantee was put in possession by the alcalde, the acquisition by Preston Beck, Jr., from the grantee or heirs, of all their rights, states that a hearing was had between Beck as owner of the grant and a large number of settlers, and continues:</p> <p>“ This case was argued very elaborately by the counsel on both sides, and many points concerning boundaries of the grant were introduced in the testimony, and the arguments, which this office deems unnecessary at present to notice, as they have no direct reference to the validity of the grant.</p> <p>“ This case has been considered by this office with much attention, and as it is understood that the validity of nearly all the private land claims in this Territory depends upon the same principles, all the authorities that could be procured having any bearing on the case have been carefully examined and maturely deliberated. The documents presented in' this case are original, and the signatures of the granting officers and conveyors are proven by testimony to be genuine, and the chain of title from the original grantee to the present claimant is complete. . . .</p> <p>“ The boundaries set forth in the granting decree and natural points, well known to all the community, and in the absence of any survey, which was not required in the grant, are amply sufficient to designate such portion of land as was intended to be severed from the public domain. The evidence pre-' sented by the claimant shows that the grantee did have possession of the land granted to him; that he occupied it with his stock and cultivated certain portions of it, and he continued to do so until he was driven off by the hostile Indians. Not having voluntarily abandoned the land, he did therefore voluntarily forfeit his right to the grant [It is evident from the context that the word “ not ” has been omitted before the word “ therefore ” in the last sentence.]</p> <p>“ The intention of the provincial deputation and the recommendation of the governor and no conditions being attached to it makes the grant a positive and absolute one, and vests in the grantee a title in fee to all the land embraced within the boundaries set forth in the granting decree.</p> <p>“ The objections made by counsel against the validity of the grant are therefore overruled.</p> <p>“Believing this to be one of the cases coming under the provisions of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, and having strong claims to validity under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases, the grant made to Juan Estevan Piño to a certain tract of land in the county of San Miguel, and known as the Hacienda de San Juan Bautista del Ojito del Bio de las Gallinas, and of which Preston Beck, Juniof, is the present claimant, is hereby approved, and the Congress of the United States is respectfully recommended to cause a patent to be issued to the said Preston Beck, Jr., by the proper department and cause the same to be surveyed.”</p> <p>On June 21,1860, Congress passed an-act, c. 167, of which the first section reads as follows :</p> <p>“ That the. private land claims in the Territory of New Mexico, as recommended for confirmation by the Surveyor General of that Territory, and in his letter to the Commissioner of the General Land Office of the twelfth of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, designated as numbers one, three, four, six, eight, nine, ten, twelve, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen, and the claim of E. W. Eaton, not entered on the corrected list of numbers, but standing on the original docket and abstract returns of the Surveyor General as number sixteen, be, and they are hereby, confirmed: Provided, That the claim number nine, in the name of John Scolley and others, shall not be confirmed for more than five square leagues; and that the claim number seventeen, in the name of Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain, shall not be confirmed for more than eleven square leagues to each of said claimants.” 12 Stat. 71. '</p> <p>Preston Beck’s claim was designated as “Number one” in the report of the Surveyor General, arid was therefore embraced in this confirmatory act. After the passage of the above act, a survey of the grant in question was made by the officers of the government-and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. ' A statement of facts signed by both parties admits that this survey was made “ without notice. to the owners of said grant, or either of them.” It is also admitted that Preston Beck, Jr., in whose name the grant was confirmed, died in 1860, a short time before the passage of the confirmatory act, leaving his estate,- in which the above grant, was included, to his brother, cousin, nephews and nieces, all of whom were non-residents of the Territory of New Mexico. It is conceded by the same statement that at the time of the making and approval of the survey, three of the beneficiaries under the will of Preston Beck, Jr., were minor children and three others were married-women; and that the plaim tiff, George "W. Stoneroad, was not one of the legatees under said will, but subsequently acquired a third undivided interest in the grant. And it is further admitted that none of the owners of the land have acquiesced in the. survey since the same was made and approved.</p> <p>In 1885, George W. Stoneroad, the person thus conceded to be the owner of one-third of the original grant, brought an action of ejectment against James P. Stoneroad, alleging that he was entitled to the possession of the Preston Beck grant, and that the defendant had illegally possessed himself of a .portion thereof. The defendant pleaded not guilty. At the trial of the case the parties entered into the stipulation, in which the facts, as above stated, were admitted, and one clause of this stipulation, in addition, says, in reference to. the act of Congress; “ said confirmation being absolute and without any condition whatever, and to the extent of the boundaries given in the origirial muniments of the title, as the same are correctly copied in said Exhibit A ” — the “ Exhibit A ”■ referred to being the original grant, describing the property as above mentioned. Besides the admissions which were thus made, oral evidence was introduced tending to show that.the defendant James P. Stoneroad possessed two tracts of land outside of the lines of the survey made by the government, but, as asserted, within the limits of the designated boundaries of the grant. At the trial the defendant asked the court to give the following instruction:</p> <p>“ The jury are instructed that if they find from the evidence in this case that the grant, in evidence in this case, has been surveyed by the proper authorities of the United States, and that such survey has been approved by the proper authorities of the United States as the correct location of said grant, and that the land in dispute in this case and in the occupation and possession of said defendant is outside t]he limits of survey, they must find for the defendant, though they may also believe that the said land so in dispute is within the boundaries of said grant, as such boundaries are set forth in the Original title papers of said grant, and the recommendation of the Surveyor General relative there to is evidence in this cause.”</p> <p>This instruction was refused, and a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant, after an ineffectual attempt to obtain a new trial, took the case by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Territory. There the judgment below was affirmed, and the defendant then brought the case here by error.</p>

On May 19, 1888, the defendant in error, as plaintiff, commenced this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado to recover the possession of a certain tract of land. After answer the case came on for final trial on October 10,1890. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants allege error.

John M. Boyd filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of 'Wisconsin against the Janesville Hay Tool Company and its officers, charging the defendants with infringement of letters patent granted the com-. plainant, numbered as No. 300,687, and dated June 17, 1884, for an improvement in hay elevators and carriers.

The following papers were presented to the court. in support of a motion for a decree in this case: To G. W. Pickle, Attorney General of Tennessee: Take notice that the State of Virginia, by R..

Todd and others, were indicted under section 5406 of the Revised Statutes, reading as follows: “ If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property, on account of ' his having so attended or testified, .…

Held: that it. was a new cause of action. Flatley v. M. & C. Railroad, 9 Heiskell, 230. A party filed a bill in equity against a corporation without alleging its dissolution, etc., and that he was without remedy at law; after he amended so as to insert all the necessary allegations to give equity jurisdiction ; Held that this also was a new cause of action.- Dudley v. Price, 10 B. Mon. 54 .

This was a' bill in equity for the ‘infringement of letters-patent No. 308,095, issued November 18, 1881, to the plaintiff Richards, for a grain transferring apparatus.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This case, which is an outgrowth of that of The Britannia, 153 U. S. 130, arose upon a certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals touching the liability of the Beaconsfield to respond for a moiety of the loss upon her cargo, by reason of her collision with the Britannia. The questions certified are based upon the finding of facts printed in the margin.1</p> <p>Upon this state of facts, the Court of Appeals certified to this court, for its decision, the following questions:</p> <p>1.. Whether, in entering said final decree, condemning each vessel in a moiety of said damages, the Circuit Court obeyed. the mandate of the Supreme Court.</p> <p>2. Whether, upon the above statement of facts, the libellant, Albert W. Sanbern, was entitled to a final decree condemning the steamship Beaconsfield,- her engines, tackle, apparel, and furniture, .in a moiety of the cargo damage, amounting to $31,526.64, as adjudged in the said final decree.</p> <p>3. Whether, upon the above statement of facts, the libellant, Albert W. Sanbern, was entitled to judgment against William Libbey, surety, in the sum of $23,000, as directed by the said order'óf Juñe 12, 1894, and as adjudged in the said judgment entered pursuant to the said order, and filed June 12, 1894</p>

On September 1, 1871, the town of Andes, in the county of Delaware, State of New York, issued ninety-eight thousand dollars of its bonds in payment of a subscription to the capital stock of the Delhi and Middletown Railroad Company, and received in exchange therefor stock of said company to an equal amount.

Held: in view of the evidence, to be no error to charge that the railway company is bound to keep its track clear from obstructions, and to see that the cars which it uses on side tracks are secured in place, so that they will not come upon the track-to overthrow any train that may come along.

<p>Where a case has gone to a hearing, testimony been admitted to a jury under-objection but without stating any reasons for the objection, and a verdict rendered, with judgment on the verdict, the losing party cannot, in the appellate court, state for the first time a reason for that objection which ■ would make it good.</p> <p>Evidence offered by the plaintiff to show the profits of his'business and admitted under objections is held not to be such as to enable the jury to intelligently perform its duty of finding the earnings of the plaintiff after allowing for interest on capital invested, and for the energy and skill of his partners.</p> <p>Other evidence, admitted under objections, held to be too uncertain to be made the basis for damages, and to have probably worked substantial injury to the rights of the defendant.</p> <p>While an appellate court will not disturb a judgment for an immaterial error, yet it should appear beyond a doubt that the error complained of did not and could not have prejudiced the.rights of the party duly objecting.</p>

This case was tried by the court without a jury, and from the findings the following facts appear: The German-American Mutual Warehousing and Security .Company (hereafter called the warehouse company) was a corporation of the State of New York, incorporated by c. 701, Laws N. Y. 1872, vol. 2, p. 1673.

These were cross-appeals from certain allowances and dis-allowances in the accounts of the claimant, who was district attorney of the United States for the Territory of New Mexico from January 1, 1886, to December 31, 1888. His accounts for the services performed by him during that time were duly rendered, with vouchers and items, to the-proper District Court, and were duly approved by said court in the sum of $19,230.80, as just and according to law.

Held: {1) That the contract was a several one as between S. and the three other parties, and that an action would lie in favor of either of those parties without joining the others ; (2) That the agreement included all contracts and orders which S. then had,’ whether for the immediate or future delivery of coal, but did not bind the other parties to fill contracts made by him subsequent to June 24, at 70 cents per ton;…

. .This was a bill in equity to recover damages for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 7851, granted August 21, 1877, to the plaintiff Eby, for an improvement in cob-carriers for corn-shellers.

Held: That the claims of the heirs of C. were sustained, unless overthrown by the evidence adduced by the defendants; (2) That the examination and review of that evidence by the court showed that the tax sale of 1869 had no validity, and that there was nothing in the case to affect the validity of the claim of the heirs of 0/ By the law of Virginia in force prior to the creation of the State of West Virginia, it was the…

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That in this that court committed no error. An unreversed judgment of a circuit court is not a nullity, and cannot be collaterally attacked. Ri^don Huston, who died in May, 1877, left a will, by which bequests were made to several persons, among whom was the testator’s son, Theodore Huston, the husband of the defendant in error.

The New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of New York, doing business in the State of Pennsylvania, appealed from a settlement of account made by the Auditor General of the latter State, assessing certain taxes, to tbe court of common pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. The case was heard by agreement without a jury, the court finding both the law and the facts. The following were the findings of fact: “1.

William Bennett, for himself and as the administrator of M. Gibbons, deceased, having made application in the United States land office at Sitka, Alaska, for a patent to what is known as the Aurora lode mining claim, the defendant in error, George Harkrader, filed an adverse claim in that office, and subsequently, under the authority of Rev. Stat., § 2326, commenced in the District Court of the United States for the District of Alaska this action in support of such claim.

Held: that the doctrine of laches was applicable; that the claim was stale; and that no court of equity would be justified in permitting the assertion of an outstanding equity of redemption, after such a lapse of time, and in the entire absence of the elements of good faith and reasonable diligence.

This was a bill filed by John H. Colvin, a citizen of the State of Illinois,'-on May 8, 1894, against the city of Jacksonville, Florida, and its mayor, in the Circuit Court of the United Statés for the Northern District of Florida, to enjoin and restrain the issue, sale, delivery, pledge, or other disposition of a certain issue of bonds to the amount of one million dollars.

This was a suit in equity brought in the Circuit Court of The railroad company relied;on these defences: 1.

Held: by the said Barling, Mandel & Green, as trustees, and the said Peters, as the receiver of the Exchange National Bank of Norfolk, held the assignment of the interest of the said Hyman in said section' twenty-one by, way of pledge as security for the debt of the bank against the estate of said Robert W. Hyman.

of Ludington v. Renick, 7 W. Va. 273 , was quoted as follows: “ A party seeking the rescission of a contract, on the ground of misrepresentations, must establish the same by clear and irrefragable evidence; and if it appears that he has resorted to the proper means of verification, so as to show that he in fact relied upon his own inquiries, or if the means of investigation and verification were at hand, and his attention drawn to them, relief will be denied.” The contract…

These were two motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus to Samuel 0. Dunlop, marshal of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia.

Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895), was a United States Supreme Court decision about the finality of administrative decisions concerning admission of foreigners to the United States, which built upon Nishimura Ekiu v. United States (1892), and strengthened the doctrine of administrative finality in United States immigration and nationality law announced in Nishimura Ekiu.

Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895), is a United States Supreme Court case in which self-defense in a homicide case was found not to require a duty to retreat.

In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), was a labor law case of the United States Supreme Court, which upheld a contempt of court conviction against Eugene V. Debs. Debs had the American Railway Union continue its 1894 Pullman Strike in violation of a federal injunction ordering labor unions back to work. The Supreme Court held that the federal government's Postal and Commerce Clause authority includes the ability to regulate the labor conditions of railways.

Held: much of the value'whieh would otherwise have attached to land passed into the slaves.