Volume 159 — United States Reports

<p>ERROR. TO THE CIRCUIT COURT CE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS..</p> <p>On the 2d of October, 1889, widow Martha Ann Van Horn, Elizabeth Evans, and her husband, David B. Evans, all three citizens of the State of Missouri, and Mary Ann Boling,- and her husband, W. W. Boling; citizens of the State-of Kentucky, brought an-action against Joseph L. White, a citizen of Hill County, State of Texas. The action was one of ejectment to recover a certain tract of land, situated in Hill County. The plaintiffs claimed to be the owners of an undivided third each of the land for which they sued.</p> <p>The defendant excepted to the petition upon the ground that it set but no cause of action, and then filed a general denial. He next pleaded limitations, under the law of Texas, of 1, 3, and 5 years; he averred his purchase and possession of the property in good faith, and alleged that he had put improvements thereon worth- $1125, for the value of which improvements he prayed judgment in the event of his. eviction. In addition, he averred that he and Géorge G. White, on the 20th day .of May, 1882, purchased the property in controversy under a warranty deed from W. B. Baker -for $1230 cash, and their note, due on the first' day of December, 1882, for $2460, bearing ten per cent interest from date until paid; that they paid, this note before maturity, with interest amounting to the sum of $2570; that one-half of the total sum of the purchase money,'or $1900, was paid by him, and that Baker, as his warrantor, was liable, in the event of his eviction, to refund ■the. same, with eight per cent interes»- from the date of the respective payments. He further alleged that on the 6th day of October, 1883, he bought from George G. White, for $3789, the undivided half which had been acquired by the latter as above stated, and that George G. White also warranted the title, and-would therefore be obliged to repay him, if the plaintiffs recovered, the amount of the purchase price, with interest. The prayer was that Baker and White be called ih warranty to defend the suit, and that if it was decided that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners of the property, there might be a judgment over against Baker for the amount -of the price, paid him, with interest at the rate of eight per cent from the dates .of the payments, and a like judgment against White, with interest from the 6th of October, 1883.</p> <p>Baker, in response to the call in warranty, filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that he was not, at the time of the service of the petition, an inhabitant of the Northern District of Texas. Subsequently, the death of Baker being suggested, his executors were made parties defendant to the call in warranty, and the same judgment was prayed against them which had been asked against him. The executors reiterated the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Baker, and in addition, demurred on the ground (1) of no cause of action ; (2) because the defendant could not sue them on the warranty until actually evicted; and (3) because a call-in warranty could not be engrafted on an action of ejectment, the sole purpose of which was the settlement of the controversy between the parties plaintiff and defendant, in regard to their title to the property. The executors also insisted that, even if they should be held liable, under the call in warranty, they owed no interest from the date of the sale, because Whjte. had been in the enjoyment of the property from the time of his purchase. George G. White submitted his rights to the court with consent that if the case should be decided in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment should be entered against him for such amount as the court might deem proper. On the 25th of April, 1890, the plaintiffs filed their replication to the defendant’s plea of limitations, in which they set out that they, the plaintiffs, claimed the property in controversy a,s the heirs at law of J. H. Chism, and that at the time of the taking of possession of the land in controversy, by the defendant, and those under whom he claimed, two of the plaintiffs, Mrs. Boling and- Mrs. Evans, were married women, and consequently the statute of limitations did not run against them. The replication -.contained the further averment: “ Said plaintiffs further show that the defendants, on their claim of title to the land in controversy, deraign their title through a forged pretended deed of conveyance, to wit, a pretended deed which defendants claim is-a'transfer of the head-right- certificate, by virtue of ’ which the land in controversy was patented by the State of- Texas to J. H. Chism, and, therefore, in law said pleas of three and five years’ limitations cannot prevail.”</p> <p>The demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the call in warranty was overruled, and the case was tried by a jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiffs for the whole amount of the land claimed and $350 rent. There was also a verdict in favor of the defendant for $750, as an allowance for improvements, and against the estate of Baker, under the calls in warranty, for $3690, with interest at eight per cent from October 2, 1887, and against George W. White for the sum of $3789, with interest from October.6, 1883, at eight per cent. After an ineffectual effort to obtain a new trial, the defendant, Joseph L. White, brought the case by error here, making as parties, defendants in error, the original plaintiffs, the executors of Baker, and George G. White.</p> <p>The undisputed facts were as follows: The plaintiffs are the sole legal heirs of James Harvey Chism, who served in the army of Texas during her war with Mexico. In, reward for his services there were two land certificates issued to him in the name of “ J. H. Chism.” The first, known as “ a bounty certificate,” numbered 4298, was certified on the 15th day of September, 1838, and covered 1280 acres of land. The other was “ a head-right certificate,” issued by the Board of Land Commissioners of Harrisburg County, in the following form:</p> <p>“ The Republic of Texas, ’)</p> <p>. “ County of Harrisburg, j</p> <p>“ No. 990. Class 2.</p> <p>“ This is to certify that J. H. Chism has appeared before us, the Board of Land Commissioners for the county aforesaid, and proved according to law that he arrived in this Republic subsequent to the declaration of independence and previous to August, 1836, and that he is a single man, and produced an honorable discharge, is entitled to one-third of a league of land to be' surveyed after the 1st day of August, 1838.</p> <p>“Given under our hands, at Houston, this 1st day of November, 1838.</p> <p>“ J. G. Hutchinson, President.</p> <p>-“John Woodruff,'Associate Commissioner.</p> <p>“Attest: Thos. Wm. Ward, Clerk.”</p> <p>On the 31st day of October, 1838, J. H. Chism, by a deed drawn in the county of Harrisburg, sold to R. B. Dobbins, for the sum of $500, the bounty certificate for 1280 acres of land first above mentioned. The clerk of .the Board of Land. Commissioners for Harrisburg County, in the performance of his duty under the Texas law, made a return of the issue of the head-right certificate, describing it as “ a second class certificate, No. 990, issued in November, 1838, to J. H. Chism for one-third of a league of land.” In 1840, Texas created a “ Travelling Board,” whose duty it was to inspect the .records of all the Boai’ds of Land Commissioners, “ and ascertain by satisfactory testimony what certificates for lands had been issued by the respective boards to legal claimants, and report as soon thereafter as practicable to the Commissioner of the General Lan'd.Office such certificates as they find to be genuine, setting forth in their reports the number and date of the certificates, the quantify of the' land, and the name of the person to whom it.was issued.”- 1 Sayles’ Early Laws of Texas, 385. Iñ June, 1841, this Board made its report to the General Land Office, and described the head-right certificate here involved, as follows: “ Second class certificate, No. 701, issued November 1, 1838, for one-third of a league of land to J. II. Chisholm.” On the 27th of October, 1852, the following document was recorded in Harris County, Texas — W. R. Baker being at that time the clerk of said county:</p> <p>“ Know all men by these presents, that I, J. H. Chisholm, for the sum of $150 to me paid by E. M. Robinson, do hereby sell, transfer, and convey tó the said. Robinson, his heirs and assigns forever, my head-right for one-third of a league of land, No.-:, dated November, 1838, issued by the Board of Land Commissioners for Harrisburg County, together with the land upon which the same may be located, to have and to hold the same to him, the' said Robinson, his heirs and assigns forever, and I agree to warrant and defend the said claim against all claims whatsoever.</p> <p>“ Witness my hand and seal, af Houston, December 2,1838.</p> <p>“Witnesses: George W. Lively. ^hishoum.</p> <p>“J. II. SOUTHMAYD.</p> <p>“ Republic of Texas, )■</p> <p>“ County of Harrisburg, f</p> <p>“Before me, Andrew Briscoe, Chief Justice of Harrisburg County, came J. H. Chisholm, the grantor above, and acknowledged to me that he signed and executed the foregoing deed for the uses and purposes therein contained; to certify which I have hereunto set my hand and seal of the county, at Houston, December 2, 1838.”</p> <p>On January' 2, 1858, J. M. Steiner deposited in .the General Land Office of Texas the certificate No. 990, for one-third of a league of land, issued, as above stated, to J. H. Chism, and lands were taken up thereunder in Hill County, Texas, and patent was issued therefor. On the 25th of July, 1888, a copy of the paper which had been recorded in the county of Harrisburg was placed on record in Hill County.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, as heirs of J. H. Chism, claimed the land covered by the patent issued under this head-right certificate. Their case substantially depended upon testimony tending to show that; after serving in the army of Texas, Chism returned to Kentucky, and stated that he was entitled to certain lands in Texas, and had with him papers so showing; that he subsequently went again to Texas for the purpose of looking after his land claims, and returned to Kentucky about November, 1838; that on his second return he also stated that he had land in Texas, and had sold some; and that he then had papers indicating his ownership of land in that State. The testimony of his sisters and others tended to identify one of the papers which he had with him on this last occasion with the land certificate No. 990. There was testimony to the effect that he was a good penman, that he signed his name J. H-. or J. Harvey Chism, and his name appeared as such on the army rolls and other official documents of the Republic of Texas. He died in 1839. After his death, in 1850 or 1851, his father placed the papers relating to the claim of the son for Texas lands in the hands of Augustin Moreman, and gave - him a power of attorney, in order that he might visit Texas and perfect the claim. Moreman, with the papers in his possession, proceeded to Texas. for the purpose of executing his agency. On arriving there, he went to the land office and exhibited the papers. The officers of the land office pronounced the claim valid and in all respects regular, but declined to act upon it because there was a defect in the power of attorney, it having been acknowledged by a Kentucky official and not by a commissioner of the State of Texas. In consequence of this fact, Moreman was unable to obtain the patent for the land, and left the papers with a Mr. Fergerson, in Austin, Texas, and returned to Kentucky., Before a new power of attorney ' could be executed the father of Chism died, and Moreman’s arrangements with him were thus terminated. Subsequently, on the request of the mother of Chism, Moreman wrote to Fergerson for the papers, arid they were returned in an envelope. Moreman handed' over this envelope as he received it at the post office, without examination, to Mrs. Chism. ■ There was also testimony tending to show that after this date the heirs of Chism sent the papers thus received (which are not very accurately identified) to Texas for the purpose of obtaining the’ land, and that the papers thus sent, whatever they were, were burned by accident.</p> <p>The déposition of Moreman was taken; annéxed to it was. a certified copy of the original certificate No. 990, issued to J. H. Chism. This was shown to him, and he was asked whether the original, of which it was a copy, was among the papers which were turned over to him in 1850 or 1851 by the father of J. H. Chism, and in connection with which his power of attorney was given. Mr. Moreman answered: . “I have examined the above copy, and should say that the original of which it is a copy was among the papers turned over to me by the father of J. H. Chism. The language seems familiar, and I recognize some of the terms, as having an honorable discharge, and being a single man. The original paper was folded twice, and the folds were somewhat frayed with handling, looking like an old paper; the writing was remarkably effeminate. I cannot say definitely whether the original paper was returned to the father or mother of J. H. Chism or not; the last time I ever saw them was in Austin, Texas, in 1850 or 1851, in. the month of May.” The witness then proceeded to state the facts connected with his employment, his journey to Texas, his going to the land office, and his failure because of the defect in his power of attorney.</p> <p>The defendant’s case was supported by the testimony of Baker, who said that he bought the certificate as the agent of one Bobinson, and that at the time the transfer was drawn the certificate was delivered to him by the seller. Describing the seller, he said: “ He represented that he had been serving in the Army, and I have an indistinct memory that I called hi's attention to a discrepancy or difference in' the spelling of. the name, and that the explanation was that some people spelled it as it was pronounced, according to the sound.” He then testified that the original transfer was lost, and that the witnesses whose names purported to be affixed to it and the officer before whom it purported to have been acknowledged were dead; and that Bobinson, the principal for whom he claimed to have acted .in buying the certificate, lived in .the State of New York, and was known to nobody in Texas, except himself and family. His testimony in regard to Bobinsbn was indefinite. He said that the man was alive some few years before and was in New York, but gave no address by which he might be found. He further testified that he had sold this certificate, along with others, as the agent of Bobinson, to J. De Cordova, and that De Cordova had resold it to him. That, as the owner oí this certificate, he had employed a man by the name of Steiner to apply for and enter land thereunder..</p>

Ozias Townsend, a citizen of the State of Missouri, brought his bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois on November 30, 1887-, against the St; Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Company, and the Sandoval Coal and Mining Company, corporations created under the laws of the State of Illinois, and Isaac Main, Lambert Noland, Frank Seymour, Charles Reinhardt, Jacob Lichty, Margaret E. Edwards, executrix of .Francis H.…

<p>certificate from the circuit court of appeals for the SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This case arose upon a certificate of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, based upon the following facts:</p> <p>The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, a corporation of Tennessee, becoming insolvent, a creditors’ bill was filed in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee by George F. Bosworth, a citizen of Massachusetts, and a judgment creditor of the company, setting forth the insolvency of the company, the wasting Of its assets, etc., and praying for a sale, of the property, the collection of its choses in action, the appointment of a receiver, and for an injunction. In pursuance of the prayer of this bill the appellee, Ewing, was appointed receiver of the company, ordered to take possession of its assets, and to manage and protect the same for the benefit of the creditors under orders from the court. All creditors were ordered to file their claims.</p> <p>Subsequently the receiver filed a petition stating that a large prbportion of the company’s assets consisted of promissory notes, amounting to about $225,000, given for land purchased from the company, upon which liens had been retained to secure their paymént. These notes were executed by 130 different persons and were for various amounts, many of them for less than $2000. The receiver petitioned for authority from the court to institute suits for the collection of such notes, stating that, in order to save costs and expense, he had been advised that it was proper, if it might be done, to bring in all the debtors by bill or petition and join them as defendants in one suit; that he was requested by the creditors to proceed in this manner; and that to sue the debtors separately would require more than one hundred suits with the enormous expense incident thereto.</p> <p>In compliance with this petition, the court made an order 'that the receiver be directed to institute suit by proper bill or petition in the pending case against all persons indebted to the defendant company, (the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company,) by note or account, as set forth in his petition.</p> <p>In pursuance of this order,. the receiver filed his bill in the Circuit Court against 130 persons, of whom thirty were alleged to be citizens of Tennessee, and the remainder citizens of other States, all of whom were joined as defendants, and the amounts alleged to be due from them, respectively, were in most cases less than $2000. ■ It was also alleged that special liens were retained in each case in the deed to the purchaser, tó secure the deferred payments of the. purchase money, and the court was asked to enforce such liens by sale of the lands, for the satisfaction of the balance of the purchase money due separately from each and all said defendants, .upon their respective notes.</p> <p>The resident defendants were personally served with subpoena, and an order of publication made against the non-resident defendants. No exception was taken to the form of the bill by demurrer or otherwise; and the defendants nearly all answered, denying their liability. The case was referred to a master, and on his report decrees were entered against those found to be indebted; such decrees being in a majority of instances for sums less than $2000. The lots were ordered to be sold to pay • the amounts so found due. Appeals from these decrees were duly taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and perfected by the appellants in this case.</p> <p>Upon this statement of facts, the Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following question to this court for its determination :</p> <p>“ Had the Circuit Court of the United States in a general creditor’s suit properly pending therein for the collection, ■ administration, and distribution of the assets of an insolvent corporation, the jurisdiction to hear and determine an ancillary .suit instituted in the same cause by its receiver in accordance with its order, against debtors of such corporation, so far as in said suit, the receiver claimed the right to recover from any one debtor a sum not exceeding $2000.”</p>

<p>In this case the United States Surveyors obviously surveyed the plaintiff’s lot only to a bayou which they called the Indian River, leaving a tract between the bayou and that river unsurveyed; 'and the plaintiff has no right to challenge the correctness of their action, or to claim that the bayou was not the Indian River or a proper water line on which to bound the lots.</p>

Held: in view of certain arrangements made between the two companies, (not then ratified by the State of Kansas, but expected to be, and, in fact, subsequently so' ratified,) that it was the intent of Congress simply to aid in the construction of one road, and that the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company was entitled to the full benefit of the three acts.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>.The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in the case of Bagnell et al. v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 450 , that Congress had the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of a patent issuing from the United States; that a patent carries the fee, and is the best title known to a court of law.’ Such is the settled doctrine of this court.” There may be a question whether the patent in this case was not something more than the “ just title ” needed in prescrip *69…

i The plaintiff in error, was charged before, a justice of the peace for the county of New London, in the town of Groton, State of Connecticut, with keeping a place in that town, on the 1st day of January, 1890, and on divers days subsequently, previous to the time of making the complaint, where it was reputed that intoxicating and spirituous liquors were kept for sale; and also of selling on the 1st day of January, 1890, and at divers days between that date and the time of…

<p>G,oods arriving at the port of New York August 7,' 1894, entered at the cus- ■ tom house and duties paid August 8, 1894, and the entry liquidated as entered at the custom house August 28, 1894, on which day the tariff act of August, 1894, became a law without the signature of the President, were subject to. duty under the act of October 1, 1890, and not to duty under the act of August 28, 1894.</p> <p>The provision in § 1 of the tariff act of 1894, which took effect August 28 of that year, that from and after the first day of August, 1894, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon articles imported from foreign countries the rates of duty prescribed by that act, does not apply to transactions completed when the act became a law.</p> <p>The third question from the Circuit Court of appeals is too general and nedd not bb answered.</p>

Held: however, the pleadings sufficient to permit of the examination and determination of the point on which its decision turned, and that conclusion involved no Federal question.

Held: is without jurisdiction ; and that it cannot be used to correct errors. Ordinarily a writ of habeas corpus will not lie where there is a remedy by Writ of error or appeal; but in rare and exceptional cases it may be issued although such remedy exists. *96 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Georae Kearney and Mr. Perry Alien for petitioner. Mr. Solicitor General, opposing. Me.

<p>An instruction on the trial of a person indicted for murder, whereby the verdict of guilty of murder or manslaughter turns alone upon an inquiry as to the way in which the killing was done, is held to be reversible error.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, brought in April, 1882, in the circuit court of Cabell County, in the State of West Virginia, by John B. Laidley against the Central Land Company of West Virginia, to recover a tract of land in that State. The material facts were as follows: . Both parties claimed title under Sarah H. Cl. Pennybacker.

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), was a United States Supreme Court case where the Court ruled that the recognition and enforceability of a foreign judgment rested on the "comity of nations," namely whether there would be any reciprocity and mutual recognition by the foreign jurisdiction from which the judgment was issued. Hilton established the fundamental basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States, remaining "the most detailed exposition of any American court" on this principle. It is also viewed as the quintessential statement of comity in international law, and is one of the earliest decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to assert that international law is part of U.S. law.

<p>In an action upon a foreign judgment, an answer admitting that “ certain attorneys entered, or undertook to enter,'the appearance of the defendant ” in the action in the foreign court; and alleging that the judgment was entered without his knowledge, in his absence, and without any hearing; but not alleging that the attorneys were not authorized to enter his appearance in that action, or that he appeared and answered under compulsion, or for any other purpose than to contest his personal liability, is insufficient to show that the foreign court had no jurisdiction of his person.</p> <p>Averments, in an answer to an action upon a foreign judgment, that it was “an irregular and void judgment,”'and “without any jurisdiction or authority on the part of the court to enter such a judgment upon the. facts and upon the pleadings,” are mere averments of legal conclusions, and are insufficient to impeach the judgment, without specifying the grounds upon which it is supposed to be irregular and void, or without jurisdiction or authority.</p> <p>To warrant the impeaching of a foreign judgment because procured by fraud, fraud must be distinctly alleged and charged.</p> <p>A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, upon regular proceedings and due notice or appearance, and not procured by fraud, in a foreign country, by the law of which, as in England and in Canada, a judgment of one of our own courts, under like circumstances, is held conclusive of the merits, is conclusive, as between the parties, in an action brought upon it in this country, as to all matters pleaded and which might have been tried in the foreign court.</p>

At October Term, 1889, this court decided a case of disputed boundary between the State of Indiana and the State of Kentucky. 136 U. S. 479.

The Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Minnesota Railway-Company was a corporation organized utfder the laws of the State of Iowa, and, in pursuance of its granted powers, had, prior to the litigation which brought the case here, constructed a main line and three branches known as “the Milwaukee Extension,” “ the Pacific Extension,” and “ the Muscatine Western.” It had at different times executed mortgages, one upon the main line, covering the railway, rolling stock, and…

Held: at which Dr. Richmond announced that, owing to certain claims being pressed, which the company could not pay, it was insolvent, and upon his recommendation a resolution was adopted directing him to execute an assignment of the property, effects, assets, and business of the company for the benefit rK its creditors.

Held: That McPherson had a right of appeal from .the decree excluding him from participation in the .distribution of the general, fund, Although he had accepted payment of his share of the special fund; (2) That the sum awarded -'to Mrs. Cochrane by the Choctaws was intended as a donation to her, and not as compensation to Cochrane, and that the judgment of the court below to that effect should be sustained; (3) Further…

Held: That when the Choctaws transferred the work from Black & Lamon to McICee, there was no intention on the part of anybody to ignore what had already been done ; (2) That Lamon, as representing the surviving partners of Black, Lamon & Company, was entitled to recover the reasonable value of their services from the date of the 'assignment by McPherson to the date of the McKee contract.

This case also was argued in connection with Gilfillan v. McKee, ante, 303. The bill was originally filed by John H. B. Latrobe, July 13, 1888, six days after the bill of Lamon and Black was filed, and for the same general purpose of sharing in the sum recovered by McKee, relying upon the trust contained in the contract of July 16, 1870, between the Choctaw Nation and McKee, in favor of persons who had rendered services theretofore in the. prosecution of said claipi.

This writ of error brought up a judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, which affirmed a judgment of the District Court .of Linn County in that State, declaring the defendant in error, who was the plaintiff in the suit, to be the owner of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section nineteen, township eighty-five, range eight, west of the fifth principal meridian.

This suit was brought by the United States against the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company, pursuant to the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, providing for the adjustment of land grants in aid of the construction of railroads, and for the forfeiture of unearned lands theretofore granted. 24 Stat. 556, c. 376.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED' STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: the liability to. pay the damages rested upon the whole property of the inhabitants, of the municipality, and might be enforced by writ of execution or warrant of distress, or by mandamus to compel the levy of a general tax.

Held: where an award had been'obtained under a treaty with Mexico and both parties claimed under the award, that the introduction of the treaty and the award merely as part of the history of the case did not in any way involve the validity of the treaty or its construction and that the writ of error could not be maintained. See Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 111 ; Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210 , 225.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The action was brought on behalf of the people of California to remove buildings and fences of the defendants from what was claimed to be a public park. The defendants were in possession of the land, under claim of title, and had been for many years.</p> <p>The complaint alleged that a certain piece of land (describing a tract four blocks in extent, including the part thereof here in dispute) “ was heretofore, to wit, on the eleventh day of March, a.d. 1858, by the lawful owner and proprietor thereof, lawfully dedicated to public use as a public square, by the name of ‘Lafayette Park,’ and such dedication accepted by the public, and then was and still is laid down upon the official map of said city and county as a public square as aforesaid: ” that the defendants had erected fences within said public square, which enclosed, and were the means of excluding plaintiffs from, a certain piece or parcel of said public square (describing the land in dispute), and that defendants had erected and maintaiüed a dwelling-house and other, permanent improvements within and upon the premises, which interfered with and hindered the use by the public of said public square, and which were accordingly public nuisances, and the prayer was that they be abated, etc. The defendants answered, denying that the land ever was dedicated; admitting their occupation of the six .fifty-vara lots .iii dispute, and their intention to keep out the public; and as special defences they pleaded three judgments ib bar and estoppel; One of the judgments so pleaded was against the people of the State of Oalifornia, and two of them was against the city and county of San- Francisco.' The actions in which those judgments'were made in each instance involved the same land and the same question of dedication as here in dispute; and the prevailing parties we];e these defendants or their predecessor in interest.</p> <p>The trial court decided that each of the two judgments against the city and county of San Francisco was, as a plea a bar and as evidence conclusive against the claim of dedication made by the plaintiffs in the, present action; and that the court was thereby precludéd from again inquiring into the question or claim of dedication madé by the plaintiffs in this action. That decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.</p> <p>To that judgment this writ of error was. sued out by the State; and the defendants moved to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that no Federal question was involved.- On behalf of the State of California it was. contended that a Federal question was involved, as follows: “ The Supreme Court of the State of California first decided that the land in controversy was in fact dedicated to the public, as alleged in the complaint, by the Tan Ness Ordinance, the act of the legislature of California, and the act of Congress of July 1, 1864, entitled ‘ An act to expedite the settlement of titles to land in California.’ It then decided that the dedication was annulled by the judgments given in the suits of S. W. Holladay v. The City and County of San Francisco, and of The City and County of San Francisco v. S. W. Holladay and others. To these two records the people of the State of California were strangers. The State never consented that' the city and county might submit the rights of the public to judgment in either of those actions. Hence, they claim, that those judgments, so far as the people are concerned, were given without due process of law.”</p>

This was an action to recover duties exacted by the collector of customs of the port of New York, and paid by the importers under protest in order to get their goods.

Held: That the agreement released the Washburn Company from claims for damages due at its date,-but received subsequent thereto, and from claims for royalties due on its own products, or products of its licensees sold prior to its date-; (2) That under the circumstances disclosed it was not open to the Thorn Company to claim that $10,000 was not a sufficient consideration for such release; (3) That the Thom Company, by…

This is an appeal on behalf of the United States from a decree of the Court of Private Land Claims, made on the 26th. day of September, 1892, in the matter of the claim for certain lands in Valencia County, New Mexico, commonly called the “ Cubero ” land grant.

This was a bill in equity, filed by the consolidated Electric Light Company against the McKeesport Light Company, to recover damages for the infringement of . letters patent No. 317,076, issued May 12, 1885, to the Electro-Dynamic Light Company, assignee of Sawyer and Man, for an electric light.

This was an application for leave tó file a petition for the rehearing of‘a case decided at October term, 1894, and reported in 158 U. S. 299, and of two other cases, argued with that case and decided in accordance with the decision in it. , The petition was as follows: “ And now comes the above named complainant, appellant, and respectfully petitions this honorable court to grant a rehearing in the three several above entitled causes, and for cause therefor says: “ I. It…

The plaintiff in error, Webber Isaacs, a Cherokee Indian, was indicted, with two others, for the murder of a white man in the Indian country. There were four counts in the indictment, two charging that the murdered man was Mike’ P. Cushing, and two that he was an unknown white man.

Shiver was tried upon an information filed in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama for cutting and removing two hundred pine trees from a quarter section of land in Monroe County, which he had entered as a homestead on January 26,1894.

Held: That the duty of sixty cents a pound was properly imposed, and that there was no error in the rulings of the trial court which arc set forth in the opinion of this court.

Held: overruling prior decisions, that the pleadings and procedure of *515 the territorial courts, as well as their respective jurisdictions, were intended by Congress to be left to the legislative action of the territorial assemblies and to the regulations which might be adopted by the courts themselves.

Held: is not assignable as •error. Moore v. United States, 150 U. S. 57 ; Holder v. United States, 150 U. S. 91 ; Blitz v. United States, 153 U. S. 308 . The remaining objection is to the action of the court in permitting the son of the deceased to testify. The homicide took place on June 12, 1894, and this boy was five years old on the 5th of July following.

Held: as to lands purchased from the United States, that after the full equitable title had passed and the government simply held the naked legal title as trustee for the purchaser, they became subject to state taxation. *531 We concur in these views.

Held: from acquiring jurisdiction. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. *541 131 , 181; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U. S. 394 ; Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132 ; Brown v. Massachusetts, 144 U. S. 573 ; Schuyler National Bank v. Bollong, 150 U. S. 85 ; Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 433 ; Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535 ; Morrison v. Watson, 154 U. S. 111 ; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180 .

Held: as between the grantee; of B. and the grantee of a railroad company to which the land had been conveyed by the State, that the title derived from B. must prevail. This was an action brought'by Charles A. Weeks against Coleman Bridgman in the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District of Minnesota under a statute of that State to determine adverse claims to vacant and unoccupied real estate.

Held: upon what was deemed the true construction of the statutes, that the right of removal was limited to cases in which it appeared from the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim that his cause of action was one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454 ; Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 102 .

Held: that the.instructions were manifestly correct, and that in giving the rule of- chief use, the principles by which it was to be ascertained were fully stated exactly in accordance with the law announced by this court in Magone v. Heller, 150 U. S. 70 .

The action below was brought to recover the amount of alleged excessive exactions imposed by the defendant, while collector of the port of New York, as duties upon 'two importations into the port of New York made by the plaintiffs in 1888, of two kinds of paper, the one coated, colored, and embossed to imitate leather; the other coated with flock to imitate velvet; which importations were classified by the collector as dutiable under Schedule M of the tariff act of March 3,…

Held: that the alleged title of H. was res judicata; that he was estopped from maintaining this suit; and that it was not open to him or his representative in this suit to question the authority of the attorney of H. in the proceedings in the state court. ; This was a bill in equity, filed by George H. Hilton, appellant’s .intestate, to cancel certain • deeds, and to establish the title of the complainant to an undivided'…

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED . STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That it is within the power of Congress to provide that one District Judge may temporarily discharge the duties of that office in another district; ("21 That whether existing statutes authorized the appointment'of the North Carolina District Judge to act as District Judge in South Carolina is immaterial; as, (3) He must be held to have been a judge defacto, if not dejure, 'and his actions, as such, so far as they…

Held: that the question whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was properly submitted to the jury for determination.

This was an action, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina, by George W. Folsom, against Township Ninety Six in the county of 'Abbeville and State of South Carolina, to recover the sum of $5190, the amount of coupons attached to bonds issued in behalf of that township in aid of the construction of a railroad ; and to eompel the levjr of a tax upon the property in the, township to pay these coupons.

Held: independently of the question of constitutionality, that, as between the lessor and' the lessee, it was the duty of the lessor to pay the tax; that the lessee having been compelled by law to make the payment to discharge an obligation of the lessor, the law implied a promise to repay; that the lessor having made no suggestion that the statute was unconstitutional, and no offer to indemnify the lessee, the lessee…

Held: that the ownership and title shown by S. were sufficient to entitle him to an additional farm homestead; but that the question of his residence on the land conveyed to him by his wife was one of fact, which the courts had no jurisdiction to reexamine, in the absence of' a clear showing that the decision was procured by fraud or imposition.

Held: and a majority of votes determined in favor of the incorporation, and the proceedings for such incorporation have been perfected, village officers chosen, and the corporation is in operation. By a supplemental complaint these facts were set up, and judgment demanded that all these acts be declared null and void.

This was an action brought by Stinchñeld against Gillis and others in the Superior Court of Tuolumne County, Cali- • fornia, to recover the value of certain gold alleged to have been talfen by defendants from the mining claim of plaintiff. Gillis, for many years, had held' and asserted ownership of a mining claim known as the Carrington, and had sold and conveyed by deed of grant, bargain and sale a portion of the ground to Stinchñeld.

This is an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, denying the petition of Theodore Lambert for a writ of habeas corpus.

George Goode, a letter-carrier,; was indicted and convicted in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts for embezzlement and theft from the mail. The indictment contained seven counts, the first three of which charged.a violation of Rev. Stat., § 5467, and the last four a violation of § 5469.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE MISSOURI.</p> <p>Frank Moore was indicted in the St. Louis Criminal Court for burglary in the first degree and larceny in a dwelling-house, on May 26, 1893. The indictment also charged that defendant “on the eleventh day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, at the city of St. Louis aforesaid, in the St. Louis Criminal Court, was duly convicted on his own confession of the offence of grand larceny, and in accordance with said conviction was duly sentenced by said court to an imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of three years, and was duly imprisoned in said penitentiary in accordance with said sentence, and that after his discharge from the penitentiary upon compliance with the sentence, he committed the said offences of burglary and larceny.” Being duly arraigned, he pleaded not guilty, but subsequently withdrew his plea, and filed a motion to quash the indictment for duplicity, and “ because section 3959, under which the said indictment purports to charge the defendant with a former conviction, is unconstitutional and illegal and void and in conflict with the Constitution of the United States and the State of Missouri.” The motion being overruled, he was again arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial, which resulted in a verdict, of guilty of burglary in the second degree, his punishment being fixed by the jury at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. A motion for a new trial was made for the following cause among others, “ because the court erred in overruling defendant’s motion to quash the indictment for the reason that it violated both the state and Federal Constitutions; ” and, that motion being overruled, Moore filed a motion in arrest of judgment upon various grounds, and among them, that burglary in the second degree was not included in the offence of burglary in the first degree, but was a separate and distinct offence; tha* the statute upon which the indictment was founded was “ unconstitutional and void, in that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and violates the ‘ bill of rights ’ in the constitution of Missouri in prescribing a second punishment for the same offence, and different punishment for different persons for committing the same offence ; ” that the indictment in charging the former conviction attacked defendant’s character when not in issue; and that the indictment failed to inform the defendant of the accusation against' him. The motion in arrest was overruled and Moore sentenced to the penitentiary for life in accordance with the verdict, whereupon he appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2, by which the judgment was affirmed. 121 Missouri 514. Moore afterwards moved for a rehearing upon the ground, among others, that he “ was acquitted by the jury of all and every charge against him in the indictment, and yet stands sentenced for an offence not named in the indictment, nor included in any offence described therein, and thus is deprived of his constitutional right of being prose? cuted under an indictment ■ informing him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; ” and also moved that the motion and cause be transferred to the court in banc. These motions were denied, and, thereafter, Moore moved the Supreme Court sitting in banc to set aside the judgment of Division No. 2, and to order that division to transfer-the causé to the court in banc for the reason that the cause involved a Federal question, or questions, raised by his motions to quash the indictment, for new trial, and in arrest of judgment. The Supreme Court in banc denied this motion, and also a second motion to the same effect. A writ of error from this court was subsequently allowed.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The consolidation of several indictments against different persons growing out of the same transaction, and the trial of all at the same time and by the same jury, if not excepted to at the time, cannot be objected to after verdict.</p> <p>The indictment in this case, iii every substantial particular, states an offence against the laws of the United States.</p> <p>A refusal to grant a new trial cannot be reviewed on writ of error.</p> <p>An instruction, on the trial of several defendants indicted separately for ■ offences growing out óf the same transaction, that, while they might find a verdict of guilty as to all the defendants, or find some guilty and some not guilty, they could not find a verdict as to some and disagree as to others, contains prejudicial error which may be taken advantage of by a defendant who is found guilty and convicted.</p>

Held: that if that assignment could be treated as a certificate, it came too laté, and, as there was nothing in the record prior to the expiration of the December term, to indicate any attempt or intention to file a certificate during that term, and there was no omission to enter anything which had actually been done at that term, the case did not come within the rule that permits an amendment of the record nunc pro tunc.

<p>ERROR to the circuit court of the united states for the SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>