¶1(Chancery.)
¶2The circuit courts have no power to sot aside their dberees in equity on motion, after the term at which they are rendered*
¶3Where M4R. a citizen of Kentucky, brought a suit in equity,in the circuit court of Kentucky,' aga:nsl C. C.. staled lo. be a citizen of Virginia, and E. J. & S. E., ivhhoutany dssignation of citizenship ; all the defendants appeared %nd answered ; and a decree was pronoun* cod for the plaintiff; it was held, that if a joint interest v**s ed inC.., C. and the other defendants,’the court had no jurisdiction over the cause. But that if distinct interest voted in C. C. so that substan-tial justice,(ho far ns he wa< concerncd,)could bo done without affecting the other defendants, the jurisdiction of Lhe court might be exercis e d cd as to him alone.
¶4Appeal from the circuit court for the district of Kentucky.
¶5*592John M‘Roberts, stated in the pleadings to be a citizen of the state of Kentucky, brought his suit in . . ,. - ■ equity, in the district court of Kentucky (said court then having by law the jurisdiction of a circuit court,) against. Charles Cameron, stated to be a-citizen of Virginia, and Ephraim Jackson, Samuel Emerson, and other parties named in the bill, whhout any designation of citizenship. The defendant Cameron urns not served with process, but appeared and answered the bill, as did, the other defendants. The cause was heard, and at the November term of said court, in 1804, a decree was pronounced far the plaintiff M‘Rbberts.
¶6In 1805, the defendant Cameron filed a bill of review, which is now pending, and at the May term of the circuit court, of 1811, moved the- court to set aside the decree,' and to dismiss the suit, because the want of jurisdiction appeared on the record; and upon'the allegation that the said J ,ksonr Emerson, and the other parties tp the bill, were) in fact, citizens of the state of Kentucky. On winch motion the following questions'arose:
¶7. 1st. Has the circuit court power and jurisdiction over a judgment or decree, so as to set the same aside after the term at which it was pronounced?
¶82d. If it has, could it be exercised after the lapse o five years ?
¶93d. Had the district court jurisdiction of the cause as to the defendant Camarón andtheothcc defendants. If notj hád th§ court jurisdiction as td tb$ defendant Camer.on alone ?
¶10*593Upon which questions the judges of the- circuit court being devided in opinion, the same were ordered to be certified to this court.
¶11The cause was argued at the last term by Mr.. JIÍ. J). Hardin,for the plaintiif, M’Roberts; no counsel appearing for the defendant.
¶12At the present term of this, court it was ordered to be certified to the circuit court for the district of Ken. tucky as follows, viz.
¶13Geetiexcate. This cause came on to be heard on the statement of facts contained in the record, and on the questions on which the opinions of the judges of the circuit court were opposed, and which were, therefore, at the request of one of the parties, adjourn1ed to this court, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this court doth order it to Tie certified to the circuit court of the línited States for the district of. Kentucky.
¶141st. That in this case the court had not power over its decree, so as to set the same aside on motion after the expiration of the term in which it was rendered.
¶152d. Consequently, such power cannot be exercised after the lapse of five years.
¶163d. If ¿ joint interest vested in. Cameron and the other defendants, the court had no jurisdiction over the cause. If a distinct interest vested in Cameron» so that substantial justice (so far as he was . in- ‘ *594tetested) could be done without affee'ing the other defendants,the jurisdiction of the court might be exercised as to him alone.