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160 F.2d 742

Docket No. 11270.

Fleming v. Fry

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided March 19, 1947.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1947-03-19

2 counsel of record

Relies on Reeves v. Beardall · Wright v. Gibson · Hanney v. Franklin Fire Ins.

Decided 1947-03-19

¶1*743George Moncharsh, Deputy Adm. for Enforcement, Milton Klein, Director, Litigation Division, Samuel Mermin, Chief, Sp. Lit. Branch, and Albert J. Rosenthal, Atty., OPA., all of Washington, D. C., William B. Wetherall, Regional Lit. Atty., OPA., of San Francisco, Cal., David O. Brown, Dist. Enf. Atty., OPA., of Phoenix, Ariz., for appellant.

¶2Norman S. Herring, of Douglas, Ariz., for appellees.

¶3Before MATHEWS, STEPHENS and ORR, Circuit Judges.

¶4MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.

¶5Chester Bowles, Price Administrator, brought an action against appellees, Raymond Fry, Marie E. Fry, Oliver Fry and Minnie Fry. The action was commenced by filing a complaint on February 28, 1945. An amended complaint was filed on June 2, 1945. The amended complaint was in 47 counts. Appellees moved to dismiss counts 1-43. As to count 1, no ruling appears to have been made on the motion. As to counts 2, 42 and 43, the motion was denied. As to counts 3-41, the motion was granted, and a judgment was entered dismissing said counts. From that judgment Administrator Bowles took this appeal.1

¶6The claims stated in counts 3-41 arose out of transactions which were separate and distinct from the transactions out of which the claims stated in the other counts arose. Hence the judgment dismissing counts 3-41 was a final decision, within the meaning of § 128(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 225(a), and was appealable.2

¶7As to counts 3-41, the grounds of appellees’ motion were that none of said counts was “based on a right of action given by the laws of Congress of the United States nor by the regulations of the Office of Price Administration,” and that the District Court had “no jurisdiction of the actions attempted to be brought in said [counts].”

¶8Counts 3-41 were based on the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 901-946. In substance and effect, each of said counts charged that appellees had violated § 4 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 904, by violating a regulation under § 2 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 902, namely, Rent Regulation for Housing (8 F.R. 14663), as amended. Each of said counts stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 205(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(a).3 Jurisdiction to grant such relief was vested in the District Court by § 205(c) of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §.925(c). Therefore, as to each of said counts, appellees' motion should have been denied.

¶9Judgment reversed.

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