Volume 162 — United States Reports

Held: That the intention of the two governments, as gathered from the words of the treaty, must control, and that the map to which the contracting parties referred is to be given the same effect as if it had been expressly made a part of the treaty; (2) But, looking at the entire instrument, it is clear that, while the parties took the Melish map, improved to 1818, as a basis for the final settlement of the question of…

Held: '(1) That the presumption was that the franchise included by the company in its return was a franchise which was not exempt under the laws of the United States, and that the board had acted upon, property within its jurisdiction; (2) That if the Board of Equalization had included what it had no authority to assess, the company might seek the remedies given under the law, to correct the assessment so far as such…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: *171 (1) That the covenants of the contract were mutual and dependent and subject to the rule that the party who insists upon performance from the other side must show a performance on his own part, while he who wishes to rescind a contract need only show non-performance or inability to perform by the other party; (2) That as between applicants and the State, while it seems from the course of decision in Texas that…

On October 18, 1889, the James and Mayer Buggy Company, a corporation of the State of Ohio, and doing business at Cincinnati, filed a complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission against the Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company, the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company and the Georgia Railroad Company, alleging that said defendants were common carriers “ under a common control, management-or arrangement for continuous carriage or shipment,” and…

This was an appeal from a decree of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirming a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, filed October 5, 1892.

Held: that the evidence was insufficient in law to warrant the conclusion that the United States took no title as against an unrecorded conveyance to McMillan.

Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283 (1896), was the first litigation of aboriginal title in the United States by a tribal plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the United States since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). It was the first such litigation by an indigenous plaintiff since Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857) and its companion case of New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble (1858). The New York courts held that the 1788 Phelps and Gorham Purchase did not violate the Nonintercourse Act, one of the provisions of which prohibits purchases of Indian lands without the approval of the federal government, and that (even if it did) the Seneca Nation of Indians was barred by the state statute of limitations from challenging the transfer of title. The U.S.

<p>ERBOE TO THE CIECUIT COUBT OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE DISTEICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That the inquiry as to the medium in which the bonds were payable, and, if in gold coin, the effect thereof, involved the right to enforce a contract according to the meaning of its terms as determined by the Constitution and laws of the United States, interpreted by the tribunal of last resort, and, therefore, raised questions of Federal right which justified the issue of the writ of error, and gave this court…

<p>On the trial of a person indicted for murder, although the evidence may appear to the court to be simply overwhelming to show that the • killing was in fact murder, and not manslaughter or.' an act performed in self defence, yet, so long as there is evidence relevant to the issue of manslaughter, its credibility and force are for the jury, and cannot.be matter of law for the decision of the court.</p> <p>A review of the evidence at the trial of the defendant (plaintiff in error) . in the court below shows that there was error in the refusal of the. court of the request of the defendant’s counsel to submit the question of manslaughter to the jury.</p>

This was a petition for fees, as commissioner of the Circuit Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The claim included a large number of items, but the only point in controversy before this court is, whether petitioner ■was entitled to fifteen cents for each jurat or certificate, appended to depositions taken by him as such commissioner. The total number of jurats so-appended was 238, and the total charge therefor was $35;70.

This was a bill in equity filed by the firm of Eechheimer, Groodkind & Co., against Justus Hollander, a judgment debtor, Samuel Bieber, his assignee, and a number of preferred creditors under such assignment, alleging that the assignment was fraudulent and void, and praying that Hollander might be required to disclose the amount of his indebtedness to each of his preferred creditors; the amount of goods purchased by him immediately prior to his failure, and the names of the…

This was an action similar to that of Great Western Telegraph Company v. Purdy, ante, 329, and was brought October 8, 1888, in the circuit court of Milwaukee county in the State of "Wisconsin, by the same plaintiff against George Burnham, and prosecuted against his executors, to recover the amount of an assessment alleged to be due under a contract of subscription in the same form as in that case, and under the decree of the circuit court of Cook County in the State of…

Held: as stated in the headnote, that a common day laborer in the employ of a railroad company, who, while working for the company under the. orders and direction of a section boss or foreman on a culvert on the line of the company’s road, receives an injury through the neglect, of a conductor and an- engineer in moving a particular passenger train upon the company’s road, is a fellow-servant of such engineer and of such…

Held: That the railroad company was not liable for negligence of its-servants on the freight train to give signals of its approach, as such negligence, if it existed, was the negligence of a co-servant of the plaintiff; (2) That any supposed negligence of the foreman in running the hand car at too high a rate of speed, was negligence of a co-employé of the company, and not of their common employer; (3) That if it should…

Held: that where title to land upon which the lumber was cut was in the State, severing the timber from the realty did not change the title. Its character was changed from realty to personalty, but its title was not affected. It continued as previously the property of the owner of the land and could be pursued wherever it was carried.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT. OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>Thk facts and the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a writ of error to the city court of Brooklyn, an inferior court of the State of New York. The action was brought to recover damages for an alleged unlawful ouster of the plaintiff from the possession of two market stands in the *Wallabout market in the city of Brooklyn, and to recover damages for the conversion of certain described personal property which was a part of said stands.

Lewis P. Kelsey and James K. Gillespie filed their second amended complaint in this case in the district court of the Third District of the Territory of Utah, December 18, 1888, against William J. Crowther, John T. Lynch and William Glasmann, alleging that on or about September 12, 1887, the defendant Orowther was seized in fee simple of a certain tract of land containing 40 acres, situate in the county of Salt Lake, Territory of Utah; that on that date the plaintiffs and…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action of ejectment brought August 12, 1887, in the district court of the Second Judicial District of the Territory of Arizona, county of Maricopa, by T- J. Bryan against M. W. Kales, to recover possession of a tract of land in that county containing 160 acres.

In his lifetime one Jonathan M. Bryan, who was the owner of the 160 acres of land in controversy in this action, being the N. E. \ of section 5, T. 1 N., R. 3 E., Gila and Salt River-meridian, executed and delivered his promissory note to M. W. Kales, February 23, 1883, for the sum of $2500, payable February 23, 1884, with interest at the rate of one and one half per cent a month.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZOFA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This case is here upon a writ of error sued out of the District Court of the United States .for the Southern District of California, wherein-the plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced for violation of Rev. Stat. § 3893, as amended by the act of Congress of September 26, 1888, c. 1093, § 2, 25 Stat. 496.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity by the appellees against Dashiell for the infringement of letters-patent No. 425,584, issued April 15,- 1890, to Samuel Seabury, a lieutenant in the United States Navy,- for an improvement in breech-loading cannon. In his specification the patentee made the following statement of his invention :</p> <p>“This improvement relates to breech-loading cannon in which a screw breech-block, which is withdrawn in a rearward direction, is employed, with a swing carrier or receiver hinged to one side of the breech of the gun, and into which the breech-block is withdrawn, and which serves as a guide for directing the breech-block into and from its seat in the.breech and as a support for the breech-block while out of the gun. In such a gun there are three movements necessary to open' the breech — namely, first, the turning of the breech-block to unlock it; second, the withdrawal of the breech-block backward into the receiver; and, third, the swing aside of the receiver with the breech-block in it. These three movements have hitherto been separately performed by hand, the breech-block having been first turned to unlock it by hand and then pulled by hand back into the receiver, and the receiver having been then swung aside by hand with the breech-' block in it to open the breech.</p> <p>“ The object of this improvement is to provide for the more rapid working, loading and firing of such breech-loading cannon by effecting all these movements in succession by a continuous movement of a single lever.”</p> <p>The plaintiff relied only upon the first claim of the patent, which reads as follows:</p> <p>“ 1. The combination, with a breechfioading cannon and a breech-block for the same, which is withdrawn in a rearward direction, of a breech-block carrier hinged to the breech, and a breech-block retractor hinged to the breech separate from said carrier to move independently of said carrier to draw the breech-block thereinto and push it therefrom, but' capable of moving the said carrier while the breech-block is therein, substantially as set forth.”</p> <p>The plaintiffs were Seabury, the patentee, and certain others, who were assignees of interests under the patent. The defendant was, when the suit was begun, an ensign ip. the United States Navy, and the infringing acts were admitted to have been done under his authority and procurement, under a contract between himself and the Navy Department, through which he was to be paid a stipulated sum for each gun manufactured, embodying the infringing device. For this device letters patent No. 468,331 had been issued to him February 9, 1892.</p> <p>Upon a hearing, upon pleadings and proofs, the Circuit-Court was of the opinion that the Seabury patent was valid, and the Dashiell patent an infringement thereon, and it entered a decree to that effect. 62 Fed. Rep. 584.</p> <p>On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court was of opinion that an injunction would prohibit the officers in charge of the navy yard from manufacturing guns for use upon the war vessels of the United States, and for that reason ought not to be granted. The bill of complaint also relied upon certain allegations of fraud which the court held were material to be proved, and were not sustained; and for those reasons it reversed the decree of the court below and dismissed the bill. 25 U. S. App. 227.</p> <p>Application was thereon made to this court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.</p>

Graver v. Faurot, (162 U.S. 435), is a case decided in 1896 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the issues of res judicata and fraud on the court. The Seventh Circuit had heard the case the preceding year but, like the district court that had previously heard it, was unable to decide which of two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases was controlling. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari to resolve the issue, on procedural grounds, the Seventh Circuit resolved the case itself. The case had arisen from an 1889 investment made by Graver in a company recommended by Faurot, a banker he was acquainted with. Represented to Graver as promising, the company was actually worthless.

Held: under the decisions of the Supreme Court, that the claim passed to the assignee, and that on his death it passed to his administrator. . ... “ And where the evidence has shown the bankrupt estate to be still unsettled, the court has held the legal title to be still vested in the assignee. “ In cases of incorporated companies no longer in existence, *456 the court has required only the decree of a court of competent…

Held: that if W. believed and had reasonable ground for the belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from Z. at the moment he fired, and would not have fired but for such belief, and if that belief, founded on reasonable ground, might in any view the jury could properly take of the circumstances surrounding the killing, have excused his act or reduced the crime from murder to manslaughter, then…

This was a petition by the executors of the will of the late Admiral David D. Porter,- who died February 13, 1891, to the special term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as. an orphans’ court, for the admission to probate of his will and of a codicil thereto. Upon citation to the next of kin; Elena Porter, a daughter of the testator, having become by marriage Elena Campbell, appeared and demanded full. proof of the execution of the will and codicil.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE supreme COURT OP THE STATE OP OREGON.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that, for purposes of jurisdiction, Alberty must be treated as a member of the Cherokee Nation, but not an Indian, and Duncan as a colored citizen of the United States, and that, for the purposes of this case, the court below had jurisdiction.

Held: that there was no error in the court’s ordering C.’s bill to be paid as a preferred claim, as the work had been commenced before the receivership and was done in good faith for the benefit of the company and the receivers, and as the building must either have been finished or the work already done become a total loss to the company; that it appeared to have been constructed for the accommodation of the officers of…

Held: that, having been thus officially attested, and approved, and committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Territory as an act passed by the territorial legislature, that act is to be taken as having been enacted in the mode required by law, and to be unimpeachable by recitals or omissions of recitals in the journals of legislative proceedings which are not required by the fundamental law of the Territory to be…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF' THE STATE OF' MISSISSIPPI.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error was indicted in .the Circuit Court of Washington county, Mississippi, for the crime of having, in that county and on the 12th day of December, 1892, killed and murdered one Stinson.</p> <p>When the case was called for trial the accused presented a petition for its removal to the Circuit Court of the. United States for the western division of the Southern District of Mississippi. The petition was verified by the oath of the-accused to the effect that the facts set forth in it were true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief, and was as follows:</p> <p>“ This petition respectfully shows unto this court that John Gibson, a citizen of said State and of the United States of America, is a negro of the African descent' and color black. That, under the constitution of the State of Mississippi, which was adopted in the constitutional convention in November, 1890, it prescribes that the qualification for- persons to serve as jurors in said State.shall be that the ability of said citizens, qualified electors of the county and State, male, being citizens thereof, not having [been] convicted of specified crimes, shall be able to read and write; but the legislature shall provide by law for procuring a list of persons so qualified to draw therefrom grand and petit jurors for each term of 'the Gircuit Court. Constitution of Mississippi, Sec. 264:. Section 2358 of thie-Code of Mississippi for 1892, adopted the 1st day of April, 1892, and in force at the time of the finding of the bill of indictment filed herein against relator, provides that at the first meeting of each year, or as soon as practicable thereafter, the board of supervisors shall make a list of persons to serve as jurors in the Circuit Court for the next two terms to be held more than thirty days afterwards, and as a guide in making the list they shall use the registration book of voters, and shall select and list the names of qualified persons of good intelligence, sound judgment and fair character, and shall take them, as nearly as it can conveniently from the several districts in proportion to the number of the qualified persons in each, excluding all who have served on the regular panel within two years, if there be not a deficiency of jurors. Relator states that under section 283 of the new constitution of Mississippi the indictment returned against him should have been by a jury of the grand inquest of the said county, under the laws of the code of said State, adopted in 1880, because the crime for which this indictment was returned is alleged to have been committed January, 1892, before the statute of 1892 took effect.</p> <p>“ Relator states that under the laws of said State, provided by the Code of 1880 thereof, the only qualifications required were as shown by sec. 1661 of said code, to wit, ‘ All male citizens of the United States and not being under the age of twenty-one years nor over the age of sixty years, and not having been convicted of any infamous crime, shall be qualified to serve as jurors within the county of their residence.’ Section 1664 of Code of 1880 also provides'that the board of supervisors of each county shall, at least twenty days before every term of the Circuit Court, select'twenty persons competent to serve as jurors in said county, to be taken, as nearly as conveniently may be, in equal numbers from each supervisor’s district of the county, who shall serve as grand jurors for the next ensuing term of said court.</p> <p>“Relator states that at the time the said grand jury of said county was elected, empanelled and charged by this court at the December, term, 1892, a great Federal [right] of his was abridged, viz., the civil right guaranteed to him under the Fourteenth' Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, particularly, to wit, no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the protection of the laws,</p> <p>“ Belator states that, on the 9th day of January, 1892, Bobert Stinson, a white man, was killed at Befuge plantation in the said county, and that he was accused of the homicide; that prosecution against him had been commenced before the adoption of the Code of 1892; that by reason of the great prejudice against him by the officers charged with the selection of the said jury of grand inquest for the said December term of the said Circuit Court, which officers so charged are all members of the white race, and the relator herein being a member of the black race — black in color. Although at the time of selecting the grand jurors for the said December term, 1892, there were in the five supervisor districts of the said county of Washington 7000 colored citizens competent for jury service of the county of Washington, State of Mississippi, and 1500 whites qualified to serve as jurors in said county, there had not been for a number of years any colored man ever summoned on the grand jury of said county court; and that the colored citizens were purposely, on account of their color, excluded from jury service by the officers of the law charged with the selection of said jurors. Belator states that by reason of the great prejudice against him in this matter that the said officers of the law charged with the selection of the said grand jurors for the December term, 1892, on account of his color, being that of a negro, black, and the deceased being that of a white man of the white race, in selecting persons to serve as grand jurors at said term, all colored men were purposely on account of their color excluded by said officers; and that the said grand jury did then and there; being all white men purposely selected on account' of their color, present the bjll of indictment against relator for the murder of Bobert Stinson aforesaid, on account of his color, and pray summons for witnesses to prove same! Belator avers that by reason of the great prejudice against him on account of his color, he could not secure a fair and impartial trial by an impartial petit jury of the county of "Washington, State aforesaid, and prays an opportunity to subpoena witnesses to proye the same, and, therefore, after hearing same, doth pray the' removal of his case from- this court to the United States Circuit Court for the western division of the Southern District of Mississippi, and that record hereof be properly certified to said court by an order from this court.”</p> <p>The petition for removal was denied, and the defendant .excepted to the action of the court.</p> <p>Thereupon the accused demanded that a special venire be summoned to' try his case. The regular jury box for the court having been produced for the purpose of drawing therefrom the special venire, the defendant-moved, “to quash said jury box,” upon the ground that it was illegal and had but few names therein. That motion was' sustained, and a writ of special venire facias was directed to be issued for summoning fifty good and lawful men and qualified jurors to appear on a named' day to serve as jurors in the cause. The sheriff was directed to serve on the defendant or his counsel a copy of the writ of venire facias, together with his return thereon, showing the names of the persons so summoned, and also a ' copy of the indictment. This order was executed, and the requisite nuinber of jurors having appeared, on a subsequent day of the- court the defendant moved to quash the special venire. The motion was overruled, the defendant taking an. exception. The accused then announced himself ready for trial. A jury was selected, the defendant pleaded not guilty, and the trial resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State states that this was the third trial of the defendant for the crime charged, each trial resulting in a verdict of guilty.</p> <p>A new trial was asked upon various grounds, one of which was that the court erred in overruling the defendant’s petition for the removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial; another, that it erred in not sustaining the motion to quash the special venire of fifty “ good and lawful” men to serve as special jurors. These points were insisted upon in the Supreme Court of Mississippi. But that court held that there was no error in overruling the motion to remove the case into the Federal Circuit Court. It also refused to disturb the verdict and judgment.</p> <p>The question in this case is, whether the plaintiff in error was indicted, tried and convicted in the state courts regularly, and in due course of law, as prescribed by the laws of the State of Mississippi and the Constitution and .laws of the United States.</p> <p>It is well settled in the law and practice of this court that in dealing with such a question, the record ' alone is to be looked to, in ascertaining the true issue. Before- we réfer to the record it is proper to inform the court that the claim which plaintiff in error sets up in asserting his right to the relief, by this proceeding is, that he, a citizen, and a person of color, was within the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi, by that State denied the equal protection of the laws thereof; that he was by the agents and officers of said State purposely discriminated against on account of his race, a negro, and his color.</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment reserves to the plaintiff in error the right to have been first duly and regularly indicted by a grand jury of Washington county duly elected, summoned, sworn and charged according to the law's of the State, without partiality to the race or color of said jurors and without prejudice to the accused on account of the offence charged or his race and color. It must be admitted that wherever these rights are asserted a constitutional right is asserted. At. the time of its adoption, the colored race had been recently emancipated from a condition of servitude, and made citizens of the States. It was apprehended that in some of the States of the Union, feelings of antipathy between the races would cause the dominant race by unfriendly legislation to abridge the rights of the other, and deny to them equal privileges and protection of the laws.. To guard the previously subjected race from the effect of discrimination these provisions are made a part o. the- fundamental law of the land, and their rights were plat ed under the protection of the Federal government. It was designed • to assure the colored race the enjoyment of all of ihe civil'rights that under the law are enjoyed, by white persons, and to give that race the protection of the Federal government in that enjoyment, when it should be denied by the States. Slaughter Rouse oases, 16 Wall. 67.</p> <p>Considering this authority we contend tbiat no other construction can be placed' upon such actions of the said jury officers of Washington county aforesaid as are complained of in the petition for removal, especially after having been brought to the judicial notice of the trial court, and by that court approved, than, that the discrimination complained of was the action of the State of Mississippi.-</p> <p>The accused filed his petition for the removal of his triail. from the circuit court of Washington county, State of Mississippi,. to the United States Circuit Court for the western division of the Southern District of Mississippi. It was charged-in that petition that the accused was purposely discriminated against on account of his race and color, by the exclusion from the grand jury which presented the indictment therein filed against him, of all members of his race, on account of their race and color. This exclusion complained of was charged to the officers of the said county who were charged under the laws with the duty of selecting, listing, summoning, empanelling and charging the said grand jury, and that the petit jury which was summoned to try the accused, was-a jury of white men, selected and. procured with the same gross irregularities as was the grand jury herein complained of, and for the same purposes.</p> <p>The accused duly swore to that petition upon knowledge and belief. The trial court heard the petition, and, without any resistance on part of the State, denied the same and .the accused was forced to trial.</p> <p>"Now then, the regular steps by way of appeal to the state ■ Supreme Court having been taken, and judgment of affirmance having been rendered by that court, the record stands in this court for ultimate review.</p> <p>The laws of the State of Mississippi regarding the selecting, listing and forming the grand jury of the county aforesaid,, cannot and are not complained of as the law; but the white race of the county of Washington entertaining suqh great, prejudice against the negro race, and especially the accused, which prejudice was charged in the petition for removal, and the said. officers of the law being all members of the white race, did, in their proceedings in the discharge of their duty in the said selection of jurors, wilfully and purposely turn from the well directed paths prescribed by the legislature of the State of Mississippi. Had they adhered to' the letter of the state- law the registration roll of the voters of the county should have been used by the Board of Supervisors of the county in listing the names of persons to serve as grand, jurors for said December term of said circuit court.</p> <p>The only qualifications required for jury service of any one-under the law are likewise required of persons to be qualified voters in said county and State. Then, assuming that the Board of Supervisors did regularly select and list the names of the jurors for that term of the court at which the indictment was presented, and certified the same according to law, in face of the fact that on the registration roll of voters at that time there were seven thousand negroes of the county duly qualified for jury service and enrolled upon the registration roll of voters of the county, and only fifteen hundred white persons of the county so qualified, and the number of names required by law having therefrom • been regularly drawn, delivered to the circuit clerk of said county by the clerk of the said Board of Supervisors, and by the circuit clerk aforesaid each name was copied on a separate slip of paper and regularly deposited in the jury box of the county, — we appeal to the reason of this court to know, if .under these conditions any result could have been attained other than a fair and equitable fisting of jurors for said term of court.</p> <p>With these steps regularly taken by the proper authorities,, followed up with the further requirements of the law, the names of the jurors listed, .certified and delivered to the circuit clerk of the county, who Copies the names on separate slips of paper and deposits the whole list of names delivered 'and deposited as aforesaid, the latv duly observed, there is no doubt in the minds of this court that some of those names drawn would have been those of negroes. Once in the “ jury box ” those names, in the course of the regular drawing of said jurors for the said term of fifty names for the first week, thirty names for the second week, thirty names for the third week, thirty names for the fourth week, thirty names for the fifth week and thirty names for the sixth week, making a total of two hundred names to have been dra'wn for that term of the circuit court at which the indictment was returned, could it be probable or reasonable to suppose that all the names so drawn, to the number of two hundred, would have by chance been all names of white men ? The accused charged, in the presence of the jury officers of the county, that because of the great prejudice prevailing against him among the white race, with which race the said jury officers were identified, which officers under the law were charged with the duty of forming the grand jury for said December term, they did purposely disregard the state law, and thereby did, with the intent so to do, select as such jurors for said December term an entire white jury, to the entire exclusion of all negroes of the county aforesaid, though legally qualified for such jury service: and that such exclusion by said officers, of the negroes, was purposely made on account of their race and color.</p> <p>We submit to the court,'that the charges so made by the accused were grave, and merited some apprehension on the part of those charged, and prompt investigation on the part of the trial court.</p> <p>The argument may be advanced,, that, as the. exclusion complained of is shown, upon the face of the petition for removal, to have' been the unauthorized acts of individuals acting in disregard of the laws and hence not binding on the State, the State -is not responsible for. the acts of persons in official positions, who act contrary to the rule prescribed by the constitution or laws thereof; and that, as the laws of the State are not complained of by the accused, no remedy lies : but such a position is in discord with the principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment, especially in the State where the negroes, duly qualified in one of its counties for jury service in the circuit courts of such county, number seven thousand, to the number of fifteen hundred whites so qualified; and where the race prejudice prevails as it does in Washington county, Mississippi. Such a State through its people in its organic law, or Legislature, may enact the finest kind of laws, and spread them upon its constitution or statutes, merely to avoid Federal interference; and yet permit its officers (who are of the white race, the dominant race) to try white persons touching their life, liberty and property, strictly in accordance with the laws of the State, and try negroes touching their same interests contrary to the laws; thus accomplishing in an indirect manner the very deprivation which the people of the United States sought to prohibit bjr the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are to look to the spirit of the law of the amendment, and thus it will be seen that there is no sound principle supporting the doctrine, so advanced by the defendant in error. It is well settled by the decisions of this court that when rights are granted to the Federal government by the people of the country, Federal jurisdiction thereof becomes positive; and the rights so reserved, stand out supreme, and forbid the slightest infraction on the'part-of any state authorities, whether by letter of the laws or by executive or judicial officers acting in their official capacities.. No State can violate thesé superior rules, with or without the consent of the person in whose case such reservation is shown upon' the face of the proceedings to exist. '</p> <p>In all trials there are certain duties to be performed by the court; and a certain degree of diligence must be exercised by the accused. The court is supposed to sit in judgment upon all matters of law arising during the progress of the trial. We do not insist that the court could have had judicial knowledge of any irregularity on the part of the officers of Washington county, touching the rights of the accused in the indictment in question, in the performance of their duties in that regard as complained of, until brought to its judicial notice. We respect the presumption of due regularity always attending the acts of officers when apparently regular upon the face of the proceedings, although the court might have-known-that there were seven thousand qualified jurors of the negro race in the county at the time of drawing said grand jury and only fifteen hundred whites so qualified under the-law, at the time the list of two hundred names was by the said jury officers drawn to accommodate the said December term of the said circuit court.; and that from the number summoned to appear at the first week of said term from which number the grand jury in question was drawn, sworn and charged, no negro was seen’upon said jury. In all this there is nothing to apprise the court judicially of any irregularity in the conduct of the said officers in the discharge of. their official duties, resulting in any discrimination against ■ .the accused; although the court did have judicial knowledge of the presentment on the indictment returned by the grand jury aforesaid, which the court judicially knew to have been apparently regularly empanelled for that term. Up to this stage of the proceedings the trial court, as a court, was not a. party to any such discrimination as charged. . It was the duty of the court to proceed regularly on with the trial;, but at the January term, 1895, when the accused was about to be put upon his trial under the said indictment, he attacked the regularity and validity of the said indictment; and while the Federal Constitution has prescribed no relief for one deprived of that equal protection of the laws of the State to the enjoyment of which the accused is by the Federal Constitution guaranteed, yet the remedy for such injury is. provided for by Congress, which has prescribed that such a denial in a state court entitles the accused to the removal of his trial from the state court, where such a right is denied, to the Federal court.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error filed his petition for removal and thus duly informed the court of such denial and discrimination, by presenting a series of clear and distinct charges against the jury officers of the county and officers of the court in the .presence and hearing of the parties charged, which we have hereinbefore particularized, and thereupon prayed the process of the court to compel the said officers to appear at the bar of the trial court, to be there examined under oath, touching the charges so made by him.</p> <p>Judging from the language of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in this case, even though the charges so made were seriously presented to the trial court, in all the legal formality and solemnity possible, that court of original jurisdiction owed the accused no consideration, because of the fact that after the petition for removal was disposed of, no.motion was made to .quash the indictment; but we will submit, that the motion to quash the indictment would not in any way hav.e emphasized the rights due the accused, as shown by the petition. The principles underlying this proposition are finally settled by this court in Neal v. Delaware, 103II. S. 370. “ While a colored citizen, party to a trial involving his life, liberty or. property, cannot claim, as matter of right, that his race shall have a representation on the jury, and while a mixed jury in a particular case is not within the meaning of the Constitution or always necessary to the equal protection of the laws; it is a right to which he is entitled, that in the selection of jurors to .pass upon his life, liberty or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race or discrimination against them because of their color.” See also /Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pety 539; United 'States v. Reese, 92 IT. S. 214.</p> <p>The accused lost no right; merely because he did not move the trial court to quash the indictment. It was the- duty of the court to have granted the petition for the removal, or of its own motion upon the facts charged and proven in the petition to have quashed the indictment, which latter action would have immediately divested all Federal jurisdiction and fully restored the jurisdiction of the state court. The question as to whether the petition for removal disclosed a case of denial of the constitutional right guaranteed him under the Fourteenth Amendment thereof is for this honorable court to answer by its judgment, if the acts of the officers of said county as charged in said petition constitute a denial on the part of the State in the manner prohibited by the said amendment. This honorable court so declared in Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 119, wherein Mr. Justice Harlan delivering the . opinion of this court among other things said: “ Again, it was declared that a denial upon the part of the officers of the State, charged with the duties in that regard of the right of a colored man, ‘ to a selection of grand and petit jurors without discrimination against his race because of their color, would be a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which the trial court was bound to redress. As said by us in Virginia .v. Hives, 100 U. S. 313, ‘ the court will correct the wrong, will quash the indictment or the panel, or, if not, the error will be corrected in a Superior Court, and ultimately in this court upon review.’ ”</p> <p>The Federal Constitution is a code of granted organic powers, and these powers so granted are intended by the grantors for the perpetual preservation of the superior State, which is inseparable and indissoluble. This court has proper jurisdiction over matters respecting such granted powers, and the relief sought by the petition for removal in this canse is among the rights enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. Having laid down the law involving a construction of the Federal Constitution, wherein such discrimination as charged in the petition for removal was declared to be a violation to the Fourteenth Amendment, that judgment, coming as it did from the highest court in the nation with full jurisdiction over the subject reviewed thereby, becomes of equal binding force on the actions of all inferior courts in the Nation, as if the words in which such judgment was written were expressed upon the face of the Federal Constitution, or in the Federal statutes. Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291. When the trial court of Mississippi failed to grant the petition for removal, as prayed for- in said petition, or to quash the indictment of its own motion; and the Supreme Court of the State declined to grant the proper relief, the State of Mississippi wilfully and intentionally violated the Constitution and law's of the United States, in discriminating against the plaintiff in error on the account of his race and color, and further by denying to him that equal protection of its laws to which he was entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States, for which it must account at the bar of this court.</p> <p>As to whether Mississippi as a State is responsible for the act of the jury officers, as charged' in the petition for removal, or whether the officers so charged are individually responsible, we contend that the doctrine ■ upon that point is clearly laid down in the language of this court in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, by Mr. Justice Strong.</p> <p>“ The State acts by its legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State ■or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a state government, deprives another of property, life or liberty without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State.. This must be'so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning.” See also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370.</p>

. The plaintiff in error, Charley Smith, was chaiged by indictment in the Circuit Court of Bolivar county, Mississippi, with having, on the 14th day of May, 1894, in that county, wilfully, feloniously and of malice aforethought killed and murdered one Wiley Nesby. Before arraignment the accused moved, upon grounds stated in writing, to quash the indictment.

<p>•The reservations granted by provision “ First ” in § 1 of the act of December 19, 1854, c. 7, 10 Stat; 598, “to provide for the extinguishment of the title of the Chippewa Indians to the lands owned and claimed by them,” etc., are limited to the territory ceded by the Indians, both as applied to Indians of pure blood, and to Indians of mixed blood.</p> <p>The scrip certificates, under which the defendant in error claims, were intended to be located only by half-breeds to whom they were issued, and patents were to be issued only to the persons named in those certificates ; and, consequently, the right to alienate the lands was not given until after the issue of the patents.</p> <p>The act of June 8,1872, c. 357,17 Stat. 340, “ to perfect certain land titles,” etc., was intended to permit a purchaser of such scrip certificates! who through them had acquired an invalid title to public land, to perfect that title by compliance with the terms of that statute.</p>

Wilson was convicted of the murder of one Thatch, both being white men and not Indians, on May 15, 1895, at the Creek Nation in the Indian country, and sentenced to be hanged. There was evidence tending to show that Thatch’s body was found in a creek near where Wilson and Thatch had camped together two weeks before, in a state of decomposition indicating that deceased had been dead for that length of time.

Held: that “ the record of a criminal case must state what will affirmatively show the offence, the steps without which the sentence cannot be good, and the sentence itself.” In' capital or other infamous crimes an arraignment has always been regarded as a matter of substance. “The arraignment of the prisoner,” Lord Coke said, “is to take order that he appear, and for the certainty of the person to hold up his hand, and…

<p>The statute of the State of Georgia of October 22, 1887, requiring every telegraph company with a line of wires, wholly or partly within that State, to receive dispatches, and, on payment of the usual charges, to transmit and deliver them with due diligence, under a penalty of one hundred dollars, is a valid exercise of the power of the State in relation to messages by telegraph from points outside of and directed to some point within the State.</p>

The various counts of the indictment in this case charged Francis A. Coffin, the plaintiff in error, Percival B. Coffin, and Albert S. Reed with having (in violation of section 5209 of the Revised Statutes) aided and abetted one Haughey, as president of the Indianapolis National Bank, in criminal misapplications of the moneys, funds and credits of that bank, and with having aided and abetted the making or 'causing to be made by Haughey of a false entry on the books of the…

Held: that the variance was immaterial. Conversations with a person took place in August, 1893. In December, 1893, he testified to them before the grand jury which found- the indictment in this case. On the trial of this case.his evidence before the grand jury was offered to refresh his memory as to those conversations.