Volume 163 — United States Reports

-ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP TNUTANA. This was a bill in equity, filed December 19, 1898, in the Circuit Court of the county of Marion and State of Indiana, by the Western Union Telegraph Company against Thomas Taggart,..the,auditor of that county, anc| Sterjliiig R. Holt, its treasurer, and against the auditors and treasurers of'other counties of Indiana, to restrain them from apportioning and collecting a tax assessed upon-the plaintiff by the board of tax…

Held: instead of being worth $200,000, would have been worth little or nothing, and we do not understand that a stockholder is under obligations, legal or moral, to sacrifice his personal interests in order to secure the welfare of the corporation of which he is a stockholder or to enable another stockholder to make gains and profits.

This was a claim by George E. Kirk as assignee of letters-patent No. 462,224, for a street letter-box, issued October 27, 1891, to Samuel Strong, upon an application filed therefor March 9, 1874. The original petition was filed October 27,1884, about ten years after the application for the patent was filed, and seven years before it was finally issued.

By the first article of the treaty of 1862, negotiated June 24, ratified July 16, and proclaimed July 28,12 Stat. 1237, it was provided that — “The Ottawa Indians of the United Bands of Blanchard’s Fork and of Boche de Bceuf, having become sufficiently advanced in civilization, and being desirous of becoming citizens of the United States, it is hereby agreed and stipulated that their organization and their relations with the United States, as an Indian tribe, shall be…

Held: that, as it was settled in the State that actual, uninterrupted and notorious possession, under claim of right, was sufficient without color of title, and that a void deed, accompanied with actual occupancy, was sufficient to set the statute of limitations in motion, the judgment could be sustained on the first point, which raised no Federal question, and that consequently this court was without jurisdiction.

This was a bill in equity, filed by Jobn. E. Cornell in the circuit court of Cook county in the State of Illinois, against Hetty H. R. Green, Julius White, trustee, and Benjamin E. Gallup, trustee, to redeem land in Chicago from two mortgages, and to set aside a decree of foreclosure thereof, and a sale and conveyance under that decree. The case was in substance as follows: .

Held: following in that particular State v. Zimmerman, 31 Kansas, 85, that, under section 326 of the Criminal Code, above cited, the court had no power to set aside a verdict of acquittal, and that it was equally powerless to set aside the verdict against the prosecutor, inasmuch as it was a part of the verdict of acquittal.

<p>PETITION EOB REHEARING.</p> <p>Two petitions for rehearing were received.</p>

Held: that there is nothing in this record which would authorize this court to convict the Supreme Court of Louisiana of error in that behalf. In October, 1891, in the Criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, an indictment for murder was found against one Jim Murray, alias Greasy Jim. On December 13, 1891, the accused was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was remanded for further proceedings.

<p>Without denying its power to pass upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of a Territory on a question of practice, in an equity case, this court is not inclined to do so unless it can perceive that injustice has been done.</p>

Held: expressing its views in an opinion by Chief Justice Horton, that chapter 109 of the Laws of Kansas of 1893 did not apply to contracts made before its passage, and that, if it did so apply, the law was void, as respects prior contracts, because it impaired their obligations.

Held: at the time, by a Circuit Justice and a Circuit Judge or a District Judge, or by the Circuit Judge and a District Judge, wherein the said judges certify as provided by law, that their opinions were opposed upon any question which occurred on the trial or hearing of the said suit or proceeding, may be reviewed and affirmed or reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, on writ of error or appeal, according to the…

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OP ALABAMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was a petition for a writ of mandamus, based upon the Revised Statutes of Illinois of 1889, c. 114, § 88, which is as follows: “Every railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to stop upon its arrival at each station, advertised by such corporation as a place for receiving and discharging passengers’ upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of time to receive and let off such passengers with safety: Provided, all regular passenger trains shall stop a…

Webster v. Daly, 163 U.S. 155 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over cases appealed from the circuit courts. The case was dismissed. This case was related to Brady v. Daly. They arose from the same set of copyright infringement disputes regarding Under the Gaslight by Augustin Daly. The United States abolished the circuit court system involved in Webster v. Daly in 1912. The modern analog is the district courts.

<p>This complaint being, in effect, a bill to quiet title as against an adverse claim, and the plaintiff having thus voluntarily invoiced the equity jurisdiction of the court, he is in no position to urge, on appeal, that his complaint should have been dismissed because of adequacy of remedy at law, and such an objection comes too late in the appellate tribunal.</p> <p>Where a case is one of equitable jurisdiction only, the trial court is not bound to submit issues of fact to a jury; and, if it does so, is at liberty to disregard the verdict and findings of the jury.</p> <p>By reason of his selection of this form of action, and his proceeding to a hearing and decree without objection, the contention of the appellant in respect of his deprivation of trial by jury comes too late.</p> <p>The act of March 3, 1881, c. 140, 21 Stat. 605, was not intended to require and does not require all suits under Eev. Stat. § 2326, to be actions at law and to be tried by a jury.</p>

The Singer Manufacturing Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey, filed its bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois against the June Manufacturing Company, an Illinois corporation.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: were valid. There was no subsequent legislative act impairing their obligation, and hence this court had no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court.

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court found that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a trial whenever a statute imposes a punishment of imprisonment at hard labor on an alien. A punishment of hard labor is not within Congress' plenary power, even if the alien is subject to deportation. The case began in 1892 when Wong Wing and three other Chinese nationals were arrested for unlawful presence in the United States, violating the Geary Act. A commissioner of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced the four men to 60 days imprisonment at hard labor, after which they would be deported to China. After the prisoners' petitions for writs of habeas corpus were denied, the Supreme Court granted cert.

Held: upon full consideration, that notwithstanding the passage of the Bowman and Tucker acts, a claim described in section 1063 of the Revised Statutes could be transmitted to the Court of Claims for “ final adjudication,” provided “ such claim be not barred by limitation, and be one of which, by reason of its subject-matter and character, that court could take judicial cognizance at the voluntary suit of the claimant.”…

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On October 5,1891, plaintiff in error filed his petition to recover from the defendant an aggregate alleged indebtedness, consisting of the following items: 1. The principal of two bonds for one thousand dollars each, issued by the defendant on January 18,1871, with interest from the date of maturity of the bonds (January 18,1886); 2.

This cause was determined in the court below upon a demurrer to the bill. The grounds of demurrer were: 1. That the bill did not set forth any case entitling the plaintiff to relief. 2. That the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction. It was adjudged that the bill did not state a ease within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and the question of jurisdiction alone has been certified. 51 Fed. Rep. 258.

<p>EEEOB TO THE SÜPBEME COÜBT OF THE TEEEXTOET OF UTAH.</p> <p>Tms writ of error brought up for review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, affirming a judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in that Territory in favor of the defendant in error, based upon the verdict of a jury against the Bio Grande Western Bail-way Company for the sum of $13,370.</p> <p>It is averred in the complaint'that on or about the 11th day of July, 1891, the plaintiff leak was engaged in his business of hauling ore to cars of the defendant situated on its track, and was travelling with his team of homes and wagon on a wagon road usually travelled, and provided by defendant to be travelled, in the business of the hauling of ores to its cars; that when he had reached the place or crossing where the wagon road crossed the railroad track, the defendant carelessly and negligently caused a train of cars to approach the crossing and then and there to pass rapidly over its track, and negligently and carelessly omitted its duty whilst approaching that crossing to give any signals or warning whatever of the approach of its cam or to stop or to slacken the speed thereof, by reason whereof the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, was unaware of their approach; that in consequence of this negligence and carelessness of defendant the train of cam struck the plaintiff and his homes and wagon and ovemet the wagon, whereby he was thrown with great force and violence upon the ground and underneath said wagon and cam, and thereby greatly bruised, crushed and maimed, insomuch that it became necessary to amputate, and the left leg of the plaintiff was amputated, inflicting upon him lasting and permanent bodily injuries, causing him great bodily pain and mental anguish, damaging him in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, and compelling him to lay out and expend for doctors’ medical attendance one hundred and five dollars.</p> <p>The complainant also asserted a claim for the value of his homes and wagon alleged to have been killed and destroyed by reason of the carelessness and negligence of the defendant company as above alleged.</p> <p>The answer puts in issue the allegations of the complaint and, in addition, states: “If the plaintiff sustained any injuries or damages whatsoever the same were caused and occasioned solely by reason and because of his own negligence and carelessness in driving into and remaining in a dangerous place, knowing of the danger, and in negligently and carelessly failing to observe the approach of the cars referred to in the complaint, when the means and opportunity of observation were open to him, and in not removing himself from the place of danger after he knew of the existence thereof and after he had been warned thereof, and not because or by reason of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the defendant, its officers, agents or servants.”</p> <p>The court, after stating that the action was not to recover damages in consequence of any other negligence than that described in the complaint, and that the negligence complained of was that the defendant carelessly and negligently caused its cars to approach the crossing, and failed to give any signal or warning whatever of their approach, or to stop or to slacken their- speed before the injury, said : “ The defendant in its answer denies the allegations of the. complaint and alleges that the plaintiff was also guilty of negligence that contributed to the injury, and it is for the gentlemen of the jury, in the light of all the evidence, after carefully considering it, to determine, first, whether the defendant was guilty of the negligence described in the complaint; second, if you should find that defendant -was guilty of the negligence described in the complaint, it is then your duty to consider and determine whether the plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence that contributed to the injury. In determining the question of negligence, both on the part of the plaintiff and defendant, you should consider all the circumstances under which the defendant caused the acts to be performed, as alleged in the complaint, and under which its agents or servants failed to act, if you find they did fail in such respect. You have a right to take into consideration the conditions surrounding the injury, the situation of the parties, the location of both the railroad tracks and the wagon road, if you believe there was a wagon road from the evidence, and their location with respect to each other, and the fact that the plaintiff was hauling ore, if you believe that he was (as to that, I presume, there is no dispute). You have a right to take into consideration the cars of the defendant and their situation and location upon the ore track. You have a right to take into consideration the crossing, as to whether the defendant placed the crossing there for the plaintiff and others to travel over and upon the wagonway, if you believe there was a wagon [way] on which persons usually travelled, and that the plaintiff at the time of the injury was travelling upon the wagonway. You have a right to take into consideration the fact that the train of cars, one of which struck plaintiff’s wagon (as to that, I presume, there is no dispute) — you have a right to take into consideration the fact that it came down grade without an engine attached to it, and then passed up a slight grade at the time it struck the plaintiff’s wagon, if [you] believe from the evidence that it did so pass down and up. It is your duty to take into consideration all of the evidence bearing upon the question of negligence, and, in the light of it all, you must determine whether the defendant was guilty of the negligence charged or whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury.”</p> <p>The defendant excepted to that portion of the above instruction in which the court said that the jury “ should consider all the circumstances under which the defendant caused the acts to be performed as alleged in the complaint.”</p> <p>The court properly instructed the jury in relation to the degree of care required at the hands of the defendant and its servants, as well as to their right to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. It further said: “ It is your duty to weigh the evidence carefully, candidly and impartially, and in so weighing it you should be careful to draw reasonable inferences, not to pick out any particular fact and give it undue weight, but you should give it such weight as you think it is entitled to as reasonable men looking at it impartially. You should consider the evidence all together. Where there is a conflict in the testimony you should reconcile it if you can upon any reasonable hypothesis. If you cannot reconcile their testimony, then you must determine whom you will believe. You are the sole judges of the facts. If you find the issues for the plaintiff you should consider the extent of the injury as it appears from the evidence, whether it is permanent or temporary. You have a right also to take into consideration, the physical pain and mental anguish caused by the injury and the extent which the plaintiff has been deprived of the capacity to earn a living or to accumulate money or other property. You have a right to take into consideration the injury to his property, the fact that his horse was killed, the injury to the wagon and the harness, if you believe from the evidence that they were injured, and, so considering all the evidence with respect to the injury of the plaintiff and his property as described in the complaint, you should give him such compensation as will remunerate him for the injury sustained. You must look at it in a pecuniary point of view, estimating his loss in money.”</p>

Held: that while the courts are not bound by this construction of the organization, the association has no right to complain if its certificate holders act upon such interpretation, and is not in a position to claim that the ruling was more liberal than the facts of the case or a proper construction of the rules would warrant; and that whether the ruling was right or wrong it established a course of business on the part…

<p>EREOS TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP GEORGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OE APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On March 20,1890, plaintiff in error commenced his action in the District Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota, to recover possession of certain islands situated in the Mississippi River and within the territorial limits of the city of Minneapolis. After answer and trial had in that court, which resulted in a judgment for the defendant, and which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court, this writ of error was sued out.

Held: *330 “ It is likewise settled law that, where the record discloses that if a question has been raised and decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States, another question, not Federal, has been also raised and decided against such party, and the decision of the latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal question, to sustain the…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was a petition by tbe district attorney for the District of California for certain fees for services rendered by direction of the Attorney General, in connection with various habeas corpus cases of Chinamen desiring to enter this country; the total amount of disallowances in this connection being in the vicinity of $7000.

<p>The District Court of Alaska is to be regarded as the Supreme Court of that Territory, within the meaning of the 15th section of the act of March 3,1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, and of the order of this court assigning Alaska to the Ninth Circuit; and the decree of the District Court of Alaska is subject to review by the Circuit Court of Appeals of that circuit.</p>

<p>In this case, while there was in form a separate judgment, in favor of each of the persons for whose benefit the action was brought, the statute of Texas creates a single liability on the part of the defendant, and contemplates but one action for the sole and exclusive benefit of the surviving husband, wife, children and parents of the persons whose death was caused in any of the specified modes.</p> <p>A decree or judgment by the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decree or judgment of a Circuit Court, without specifying the sum for which it is rendered, is a final decree or judgment, from which an appeal or writ of error will lie to this court.</p> <p>This case was onepeculiarly for the jury, under appropriate instructions from the court as to the principles of law by which they were to be guided in reaching a conclusion as to the liability of the railroad company for the death of its employé; and the positions taken to the contrary have no merit.</p> <p>The law presumes in the entire absence of evidence,that a railroad employé, in crossing the track of the railroad on foot at night to go .to his duty, looks and listens for coming trains before crossing.</p> <p>It is only when facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them, that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court.</p>

This was an action brought in the district court of the second judicial district of the Territory of Arizona in and for the county of Pima, by Bertha, widow of Thomas Tomlinson, against the Southern Pacific Company, a railroad corporation, under Title 36 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1887, entitled “ Injuries Resulting in Death.” The complaint alleged that, while Thomas Tomlinson was walking along a public passageway where it crossed the defendant’s railroad, the…

Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case, in which the court decided that the individual rights protections, which limit federal, and later, state governments, do not apply to tribal government. It reaffirmed earlier decisions, such as the 1831 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia case, that gave Indian tribes the status of "domestic dependent nations," the sovereignty of which is independent of the federal government.

Held: for one among other reasons, that the seller having been obligated to the warranty of the existence of the bonds at the time of the sale, and the bonds being void under the constitution, he was obliged to return the price. This implied obligation to warrant the existence of the claim at-the time of the sale has also been frequently recognized in a collateral way by the court of last resort of the State of Louisiana.

<p>PETITION FOE EEHEAEING.</p> <p>Petitions for rehearing. The case is stated in. the opinion.</p>

Held: the rest of the act would be valid even if the bounty provision were void. The question has been again presented to us in this case, and been very ably argued by counsel both for the government and the defendants in error. The question is one of the very gravest importance.

Held: That the plaintiff had a contingent dower interest in the mining claim, under the Montana statute, although none in the interest the United States retained in such mining lands prior to the locator becoming entitled to a patent therefor; but that by the granting of a patent by the United States to the defendant’s predecessor, the estate or interest in the lands called a mining claim ceased to exist, and the title to…

In the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas the defendant, plaintiff in error, was indicted, December 21, 1893, and subsequently tried, for feloniously embezzling certain money-order funds of the United States.

The complaint in this case was filed in the United States Court for the Indian Territory on March 17, 1890, and on the same day the clerk of that court issued the following summons: “United States of America,) Indian Territory. “ The President of the United States of America to the marshal of the Indian Territory: “You are commanded to summon George A. Eddy and H. C. Cross, receivers of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Pailway, a corporation, to answer, on the first day of the…

This was an action originally begun in the District Court for the Third Judicial District, for the county of Dona Ana, New Mexico, by the appellees, constituting the firm of lynch Bros., against the appellants, who are members of the firm of Grayson & Co., for loss and damage to a herd of cattle by a disease known as “ Texas cattle fever,” claimed to have been communicated to them by certain cattle owned by defendants, which had been shipped from infected districts in Texas,…

Held: That there being a conflict of testimony as to the condition of the frog, that question of fact was properly submitted to the jury; (2) That while the position of law taken by the company in this court cannot be disputed, it was not taken or considered on the trial, and is not open for consideration here; (3) That although the case is not entirely clear, this court is not prepared to hold, on the record, that there…

This was an action of ejectment brought by the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Kansas, and the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of Missouri, in the District Court of Labette County, Kansas, August 17,1887, against J. B. Cook and L. H. Printz, to recover possession of certain real estate situated in the city of Chetopa in that county, and described in the petition. Defendants filed a general denial.

<p>CERTIOBABI TO TEE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), is a United States Supreme Court case argued on March 11–12, 1896, and decided on May 25, 1896. The case concerned the right of the Bannock people to hunt on unoccupied land per an 1868 treaty with the U.S. The case was decided in favor of the state of Wyoming and set a precedent that state laws had precedence over Indian treaties, massively checking tribal sovereignty and giving the Supreme Court the right to determine Congress’s implicit intentions when signing Indian Treaties. The case influenced many twentieth century cases dealing with hunting rights, conservation, and state’s rights and the precedent it set wasn’t overturned until 2019 in Herrera v. Wyoming.

<p>The report of the commissioners appointed October 21, 1895, 159 U. S. 275, to run the disputed boundary line between Indiana and Kentucky, is confirmed.</p>

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was a landmark United States Supreme Court decision ruling that racial segregation laws did not violate the U.S. Constitution as long as the facilities for each race were equal in quality, a doctrine that came to be known as "separate but equal". The decision legitimized the many "Jim Crow laws" re-establishing racial segregation that had been passed in the American South after the end of the Reconstruction era in 1877. The underlying case began in 1892 when Homer Plessy, a mixed-race man, deliberately boarded a whites-only train car in New Orleans. By boarding the whites-only car, Plessy violated Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890, which required "equal, but separate" railroad accommodations for white and black passengers.

These were petitions in equity filed by the Chicago, Bock Island and Pacific Bailway Company against the Union Pacific Bailway Company and the Omaha and Bepublican Valley Bailway Company; and by the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Bail way Company against the Union Pacific Bail way Company in the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, January 2, 1891, to compel the specific performance of two contracts dated May 1, 1890, and April 30, 1890, respectively, and removed on…

Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that whether a Black Freedman was a member of the Choctaw Nation was a question of fact for the jury, and his non-Indian status may not be presumed.

Held: That the proceedings to revive the judgment were regular; (2) That as the assignee was a party to the proceedings, with his official rights protected, the judgment debtor could not set up that it was not competent for 6. IV. to originate the proceedings; (3) That no substantial reason was shown why B. should be relieved from the judgment.

This was a writ of error to an order of the General Terra of the Supreme Court, affirming an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Suffolk County, assessing an inheritance tax of $3964.23 upon the personal property of William W. Merriam, bequeathed by him to the United States.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

Held: that the verdict could not be disturbed on the ground that more than one offence was included in the same count of the indictment. Providing, or preparing the means of transportation for such a military expedition or enterprise as is referred to in Rev. Stat. § 5286, is one of the forms of provision or preparation therein denounced.

United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal conviction declared void on appeal does not count as a prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause. It was one of the earliest Supreme Court cases interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause.