Volume 166 — United States Reports

Held: as we have seen, that the words “foreign prince or state” did not embrace sections of án empire not recognized by the United States. In order to cover such cases, Congress resorted to additional legislation. It was not Supposed that the courts by any argument ab inconvenienti could so stretch the act as to cover such cases.

■CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOB THE SECOND CIRCUIT. This was a libel by Frederick W. Yanderbilt to recover possession of the steam yacht Conqueror, of which he was the owner, and which was alleged to be illegally detained by J. Sloat Fassett, then collector of customs for the District of New York.

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the dismissal of the writ of error by the Supreme Court of the State was justified by the abandonment of his case by the plaintiff in the writ. This was a writ of error to review an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia dismissing a writ of error from .that court which had been sued out to. reverse the conviction of the plaintiff in error for the murder of one Charles Carr.

This was a petition originally filed in the Civil District’ Court for the parish of Orleans by the Grand Lodge of the F. & A. Masons of the State of Louisiana, to enjoin the city of New Orleans from proceeding to sell, for the taxes of 1888, 1889 and 1890, certain property owned by the petitioner, and claimed to be exempt from taxation.

Held: That the company was chartered by the State of Kentucky to build and operate a bridge and the State could properly include the franchises it had granted in the valuation of the company’s property for taxation; (2) That the tax was not a tax on thé interstate business carried on over or by means of the bridge, because the bridge company did not transact such business; that business being carried on by the persons and…

This was a bill filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky'on behalf of the Adams Express Company to enjoin the collection and certification of taxes against it for the year 1895 under añ act of. Kentucky of November 11, 1892, entitled “An act relating to revenue and' taxation,” carried forward as chapter 108 of - the compilation of the Kentucky statutes of 1894, page 1291.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), was a ruling that determined the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required states to provide just compensation for seizing private property.

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>This was a petition, presented to this court oh January 4, 1897, for a writ. of mandamus to the Honorable George E. Sage, United States District Judge, sitting as a judge of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, to command him to execute a mandate of this court, and to set. aside orders made by him after receiving the mandate and inconsistent therewith. The case was as follows:</p> <p>Upon a bill in equity for the infringement of letters patent, an answer denying,paten table novelty and infringement, a general replication, and proofs taken and completed, the Circuit Court sustained the defence of want of novelty, and thereupon, on January 3,1891, entered a final decree dismissing the bill, for want of equity, with costs. Potts v. Greager, 44 Fed. Eep. 680.</p> <p>The plaintiff appealed to this court, which on January 7, 1895, held that the letters patent were valid, and had been infringed, and therefore, as appeared by its opinion and mandate, reversed the decree of the Circuit Court, and remanded the cause to that court for further proceedings in conformity with that opinion. 155 U. S. 597, 610.</p> <p>On February 26, 1895, the Circuit Court entered a decree, “ in conformity with the said mandate,” setting aside its former decree, and adjudging that the letters patent were valid and had been infringed, referring the cause to a master to take an account of profits, and awarding a perpetual injunction against the defendants. On July 16, 1895, the master filed his report and account of profits.</p> <p>Before any action of the Circuit Court upon the master’s report, the defendants, on November 29, 1895, filed a petition for a rehearing, for newly discovered' evidence affecting the novelty of the invention; and that court ordered notice to plaintiff to show cause on January 4, 1896, why that petition should not be granted. On that day, the plaintiff objected in writing to the consideration of the petition, “ on the grounds that this court is without jurisdiction or authority in the premises ; that the issues sought to be made' by said evidence are not properly before it; and that the proceedings are and have been irregular, and not according to law.” But the Circuit Court, on January 15, 1896, granted the petition for a rehearing, for reasons stated in its'opinion reported in .71 Fed. Rep. 574; and, after a hearing upon the new evidence, entered an order on December 21, 1896, by which, the court being of opinion that the letters patent were “ void for want of invention, in view of said new evidence, and that therefore the equities are with, the defendants, it is ordered that said petition stand as a supplemental answer, and that the replication as filed be considered as a replication thereto.” Its opinion upon entering that order is reported in 77 Fed. Rep. 454.</p> <p>All the decrees and orders of the Circuit Court, above mentioned, were made by Judge Sage.</p>

Held: as a conclusion of law, that the claimant was not entitled to recover, and dismissed the petition. The

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH.</p> <p>On June 3, 1892, the defendant in error commenced suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the Territory of Utah for the county of Weber upon a promissory note, of which the following is a copy:</p> <p>“ $6700. Salt Lake City, Utah, April 3, 1891..</p> <p>“ On or before the 23d day of April, 1892, without grace, for value received, we or either of us promise to pay to the order of Eichard Flint sixty-seven hundred dollars, negotiable and payable at Ogden, Utah, without defalcation or discount, with interest, at the rate of ten per cent per annum, from date until paid, both before and after judgment.</p> <p>“ Interest payable semi-annually.</p> <p>“ Alfred H. Nelson.</p> <p>“ Frank J. Cannon.</p> <p>“ A. H. Cannon^’</p> <p>The original answer denied that plaintiff was the owner or holder of the note, and alleged generally that it was made without consideration, and that plaintiff wrongfully obtained possession thereof. Subsequently an amendment was filed which stated that the plaintiff had been since about June 19, 1889, the holder and owner of two promissory notes signed by the defendants Nelson and Frank J. Cannon, amounting to $6700; that he offered to surrender those notes and waive all claim for interest if the makers would furnish him a new note signed by them' and their codefendant in this case, A. H. Cannon;' that in reliance upon such agreement the note sued upon was. signed and the plaintiff obtained possession of it upon a promise to return the old notes, which he had failed to do. This amended answer was met by, in substance, a general denial. Upon a trial before the court and a jury a verdict and judgment were returned and entered in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of the note and interest. This judgment was thereafter affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, 10 Utah, 261, to reverse which latter judgment of affirmance a writ of error was sued out from this court.</p>

Held: that, upon such writ, the entire case was before this court for examination. *281 Torts originating within the waters of a foreign power may be the subjects of a suit in a domestic court.

United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the Sherman Act (which was an antitrust measure that prohibited anticompetitive behavior in commerce) applied to the railroad industry, even though the U.S. Congress had enacted a comprehensive regime of regulations for that industry.

Held: That by the rule in England the “conditions” were notices, and nothing more; and that it could not be held as matter of law that, whether they were regulations for the conduct of business, or limitations upon common law obligations, they constituted any part of the contract; (2) That the rule was not otherwise in this country; (3) That on the evidence the court cannot co'nclude that the libellants should be held…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>An action was brought in the Circuit Court of- the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri by the city of St. Louis, seeking to recover from the Western Union Telegraph Company the sum of five dollars per annum per pole for 1509 telegraph poles which the defendant maintained on the streets of that city between July 1, 1884'and July 1,1887. The case was tried without a jury, and resulted, on June 17, 1889, in a judgment in favor of the defendant, the court holding that the burden imposed was a privilege or license tax, which the city had np authority to impose. A writ of error was sued out of this court, where it was held that the municipal charge in question was not in the nature of a privilege or license tax, but was a rental charge' for the permanent and exclusive appropriation of those spaces in the streets which are occupied by the telegraph poles. To the defence asserted by the telegraph company that by ordinance the city had contracted with defendant to permit the erection of these poles in consideration of the right of the city to occupy and use the top cross-arm of any pole for its own telegraph purposes, free of charge, it was replied by this court that there was nothing in the record to show that any of the poles were erected under or by virtue of the ordinance mentioned, and thjat, therefore, so far as the facts appeared there was simply a temporary matter of street regulation, ánd one subject to change at the pleasure of the city. But this court did not find it necessary to consider the matter of this ground of defence at length, as, on the new trial awarded, the facts in respect thereto could be more fully developed. It was further claimed by the telegraph company that the ordinance charging five dollars a pole per annum was unreasonable. But this court thought this question also should be passed for further investigation on the new trial. 148 U. S. 92.</p> <p>Thereafter, in January, 1894, the second trial was proceeded with, a jury being waived, and resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant. The present writ of error was then sued out from this court.</p>

Held: that the order of the District Court remanding him to custody was not erroneous. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 , followed to the point that the object of a writ of habeas corpus is to ascertain whether the prisoner applying for it can be legally detained in custody ; and if sufficient ground for his detention be shown, he is not to be discharged for defects in the original arrest or commitment.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the co-employés whose negligence was alleged to have caused the injury were fellow-servants of the plaintiff, and hence that the defendant was not liable for the injuries caused by that negligence. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Neill $. Field for plaintiff in error. *400 Mr. E: D. Kenna and Mr. Robert Dunlap for defendant in error. Me.

Held: that the Umbria was gravely at fa.ult in'the matter of speed, and that this fault was not lessened by the fact that passenger steamers carrying the mails run at full speed in a fog in order to pass the foggy belt.

<p>error to the circuit court of appeals for the' eighth circuit.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR 'TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia was duly authorized by § 6 of the act creating the court, as well as by § 6 as amended by the act of July 30, 1894, to make rules limiting the time of taking appeals to the - court from the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents; and there was , no restriction ón this power by reason of Rev. Stat. § 4894.</p>

The First' National Bank of the city of Aberdeen, State of "Washington, a banking corporation organized under the national banking laws of the United States, filed its complaint in the Superior Court of the said State, for the county of Chehalis, May 16, 189% against the county of Chehalis and J. M. Carter, as ex officio tax collector of the county, seeking to enjoin the defendants from levying upon the safes, time locks and other personal property of the complainant, for…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.</p> <p>The case is stated in tbe opinion.</p>

Held: That the action was properly brought in the name of the insured for the use of the insurers; (2) That payment by the insurer to the company did not bar the right of the latter to recover from the-United States; (3) That by recovering from the United States the company would be- come the trustee of the insurers, who were its equitable assignees; (I) That upon the facts found by the Court of Claims the action could be…

<p>original.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that such matters formed no part of the record, and were not adequate to create a Federal question, when no such question was decided below, and the record does not disclose that such issues were set up or claimed in any proper manner in the courts of the State. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Edmund Tauszhy for plaintiffs in error. Mr. T. G. Van Mess for defendant in error submitted on his brief. Me.

Held: that the plaintiff in error, by availing itself of the power conferred by the statute, and joining in the trial for the assessment of damages, was precluded from denying the validity of that provision which prescribes that fifty per cent shall be added to the amount of the verdict, as the plaintiff in error was at liberty to exercise the privilege or not, as it thought fit.

Held: “ except that, when it consists of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract ”; and the second provides that in an *501 action for the possession of “ a lot or parcel of land, situated in any city, town or village on the public lands,” the plaintiff is required to prove an actual enclosure of the whole lot, or the erection of a dwelling house…

<p>When letters patent are surrendered for the purpose of reissue, they continue valid until the reissue takes place, and if the reissue is refused they stand as if no application had been made.</p> <p>Whether, if the reissue be void, the patentee may fall back on his original patent, is not decided.</p>

The legislation of Indiana authorizes the annexation of contiguous territory to the limits of a city with or without the consent of the owner. The statutory provisions in respect thereto, found in 1 Horner’s An. Ed. Ind. Stat. 1896 are printed in the margin.1 The city of Hammond is situated in the county of Lake, and in 1893 it instituted proceedings to extend its limits over a large tract of contiguous territory, some of which at least was not laid off and platted into lots.

Held: That the driver of the horse car was guilty of negligence in attempting to cross the track of the steam railroad under the circumstances ; (2) That there was evidence to warrant the jury to find that the gateman was the servant of the steam railroad company, and .that that company was responsible for the results of his negligence; (3) That as no exception was taken to the charge respecting damages, no question upon…

In condemnation'proceedings instituted by the United States in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to obtain land for a post office site in the city of "Washington, a treasury draft for the sum of $17,000 was paid by the United States into the registry of that court on October 9, 1891, as compensation to the owner of a parcel of land designated in the proceedings as parcel 15, in square 323. •• Frederick L. Manson and Charles C. Duncanson both claimed, this fund,…

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. •</p> <p>This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus originally filed in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio.</p> <p>' The petitioner alleged that he was a citizen of the State of Ohio, and was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the marshal, under an order of the Circuit Court of the United States, made in a case pending in that court, wherein the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Kail way Company, a corporation of the State of Michigan, was complainant, and several railway companies, citizens of Ohio, as well as the Michigan Central Kailroad Company, a citizen of Michigan, were defendants.</p> <p>The bill in that case, which was annexed to the petition as an exhibit, averred-the complainant to be the owner of a line of railroad from Toledo, Ohio, northwesterly through the State of Michigan; that a large part of its business consisted in the transportation of freight cars from points in the States of Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin to points in Ohio and other States east thereof, and that it was engaged as a common carrier in a large amount of interstate commerce, which was regulated and controlled by the Interstate Commerce Act of Congress. The bill further averred that the defendants’ lines of railroad connected with those of complainant at or near Toledo, and that a large and important part of its business consisted in the interchange of freight cars between the defendant and complainant companies, and was subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act; that it was the duty of the defendant companies to afford reasonable and equal facilities for the- interchange of traffic, and to receive, forward and deliver freight cars in the ordinary transaction of business, without any discrimination; that the defendant companies, and their employ és, had given out and threatened that they would refuse to receive from complainant cars billed over its road for transportation by complainant to their destination, for the reason that the complainant -had employed as locomotive engineers in its service men who were not members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, “ an irresponsible voluntary association,” and that the locomotive engineers- in the employ of the defendant companies had refused to handle cars to be interchanged with the complainant’s road; notwithstanding that they continued to afford the other railroad companies full. and free facilities for the interchange of traffic, while refusing to transact such business with the complainant, thereby illegally discriminating against it.</p> <p>Upon the filing of this bill, and upon the application of the complainant, the Circuit Court issued an injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants and employés, enjoining them from refusing to afford and extend to the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railway Company the same facilities for an interchange of interstate business between the companies as were enjoyed by other railway companies, and from refusing to receive from the complainant company cars billed from points in one State to points in another State, which might be offered to the defendant companies by the complainant.</p> <p>The injunction was served upon the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, one of the defendants, one of whose employés was the appellant, James Lennon, a locomotive engineer, who had received notice of the injunction, and, still continuing in the service of the company, had refused to obey it.</p> <p>Thereupon the Lake Shore company applied to the court for an attachment against Lennon, and certain others of its engineers and firemen, setting forth that, with full knowledge of the injunction theretofore made, they had refused to obey the order of the court, and deserted -their locomotives and engines in the yard of the company, for the reason that Ann Arbor cars of freight were in the trains of such company, and that they had refused to haul such cars and perform their service for that reason.</p> <p>The persons named, including the petitioner Lennon, being served with an order to show cause, appeared in pursuance of such order in person and by counsel, and witnesses were examined as to théir knowledge of, and as to their violation of, the order. The court found that Lennon was guilty of contempt in disobeying the order of injunction, and imposed a fine of fifty dollars and costs. Toledo, Ann Arbor & North Michigan Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 746.</p> <p>Thereupon Lennon filed this petition, setting forth the above facts, and alleging that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction or lawful authority to arrest or proceed against him in manner as aforesaid, and that its order and judgment — whereby he was committed to the custody of the marshal — were without authority of law and void: (1) that such order was issued in a suit whereof the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, because the complainant .and one of the defendants, namely, the Michigan Central Railroad Company, were, at the time of the filing of the bill, and ever since have been, citizens of the same State, and that said suit did not arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; (2) that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner, because he was not a party to the suit, nor served with any subpoena notifying him of the same; had no notice of the application for the injunction, nor was served writh a copy thereof; nor had any notice whatever of the issuing of such injunction ; nor of its contents; (3) that the Circuit Court was also without jurisdiction to make the order, because- it was beyond the jurisdiction of a court of equity to compel the performance of a personal contract for service and to interfere, by mandatory injunction, with the contract between himself and the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company.</p> <p>Upon a hearing in the Circuit Court it was ordered that the petition be dismissed. ■ Lennon, after appealing to this court, which held it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, 150 U. S. 393, thereupon appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court, Lennon v. Lake Shore dee. Railway Co., 22 U. S. App. 561, whereupon petitioner applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari from this court.</p>

Held: That the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, although both parties were corporations and citizens of Indiana; (2) That the right of repeal reserved to the legislature in the act of 1861 was not delegated to the city government; (3) That the circumstances connected with the passage of the amended ordinance of April 7, 1880, operated to estop the city from denying that the charter was extended to thirty-seven years; (4)…

On the 7th day of December, 1880, First Lieutenant II. W. Howgate, Acting Signal Officer, U. S.' Army, sent in his resignation to the Adjutant General, at Washington, through the Acting Chief Signal' Officer. At that time there was in existence paragraph 2394, United .

<p>The act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, providing for the bringing of suits against the Government, known as the Tucker act, did not repeal so much of section 10G9 of the Eevised Statutes as provides “that the claims of married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons and persons beyond the' seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted, as aforesaid, within three years after the disability has ceased; but no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively.”</p>

Held: that the Circuit Court properly entertained jurisdiction.

Held: That the above applications were “ claims” within the meaning of the act of July 2, .1864, granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound on the Pacific coast by .the northern route, and excepting therefrom lands not “ free from preemption or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed, and. a plat thereof filed in the…

<p>It is the ordinary rule to accept the interpretation given to a statute by the courts of the country by which it was originally adopted; but the rule is not an absolute one to be followed under all circumstances. In this case the court accepts the construction given by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah to a statute of that Territory disqualifying certain persons as witnesses, rather than the construction placed upon a like statute by the Supreme Court of California, although the Utah statute was apparently taken from the statute of California.</p> <p>Equity will sometimes refuse relief where a shorter time than that prescribed by the statute of limitations has elapsed without suit. It ought always to do so where, as in this case, the delay in the assertion of rights is not adequately explained, and such circumstances have intervened in the condition of the adverse party as to render it unjust to him or to his estate that a court of equity should assist the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff, seeking the aid of equity, forbore for an unreasonably long time to assert his rights, and made no demand upon his adversary until disease had so far deprived the latter of his reason and faculties that he could not comprehend any matter of business submitted to him. His right to ask the aid of a court of equity was held to have been lost under the. peculiar circumstances of the case.</p>

Held: and that the interest of the defendants .therein be divested out of them and invested in said county of Butler, that all said pretended proceedings were null, void and of no effect whatever on account of the collusion of the parties thereto, and because the parties holding the title under said deed of trust in trust for the holders of the bonds of the said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company were not parties to said…

ORIGINAL. This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpxts, filed on leave, and a rule thereon entered, to which return was duly made. The petition alleges as follows: That petitioner is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the city of New York, in the State of New York, and that he is now restrained of his liberty by the marshal of the United States for the District of Columbia.

The appellee, being the plaintiff below, brought this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland, for the purpose of enjoining the city authorities from tearing up or interfering with the railroad track laid down by the Lake Roland Elevated Railroad Company on Lexington street, in the city of Baltimore.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>Under authority of chap. 737 of the laws of New York for 1873, (Laws N. Y. 1873, p. 1100), as amended in 1881 (Laws N. Y. 1881, chap. 321, p. 443), the plaintiff in error was organized as a water company. On September 15, 1881, it entered into a contract with the town of New Lots, by which it agreed to lay water pipes and mains in the streets of New Lots, and supply the town with water. The town, on the other hand, agreed to pay for hydrants to be furnished and supplied, as provided in the contract, at a specified rate per hydrant, the number of hydrants to be not less than 200. The term of the contract was twenty-five years. This, contract was modified on July 2, 1885, but the modification contains nothing material to this controversy.</p> <p>In 1886, by chap. 335 (Laws N. Y. 1886, p. 540), the town of New Lots was annexed to and merged in the city of Brooklyn, to be known thereafter as the 26th ward of said city.</p> <p>The fourth section of this act provided, among other things, that “ the amount annually payable by said town for water supplied to it under existing contracts between it and .the Long Island Water Supply Company, shall, after this act takes effect, during the terms of said contract, or until said city shall purchase or acquire the property of said water company, as in the next section provided, be levied and collected from the property situated and taxable within the territory hereby annexed, and such amount shall be paid to the said water company by said city as it falls due from time tó time under said contracts, and the said city of Brooklyn shall not distribute or furnish water for consumption or use within said territory, or lay any pipes or mains for the distribution or supply of water within said territory, until the expiration of the charter of said company or until the said city shall purchase or acquire the property of said company as in the next section provided.”</p> <p>By section 5 the city was given power to purchase or condemn the property of the company within two years, but did neither. In 1892 the legislature passed another act (Laws 1892, chap. 481, p. 960), authorizing the city of Brooklyn to condemn the property of the company, the first section of which is as follows:</p> <p>“ Section 1. The public interest requires the acquisition, by the city of Brooklyn, for the public use of the reservoir, wells, machinery, pipes, franchises and all other property of the Long Island Water Supply Company, and the said city of Brooklyn is hereby authorized to acquire the same for such use by condemnation, free of all liens and incumbrances whatsoever, provided that the proceedings herein, hereinafter and hereby authorized, shall be commenced within one year after the passage of this act.”</p> <p>Subsequent sections prescribed the procedure. Proceedings were had under this act. The commissioners appointed, as provided therein, valued the property of the company at §570,000, of which $370,000 was named as the value of the tangible property, and $200,000 that of the franchises, contracts and all other rights and property of whatsoever nature or kind of the company, including therein the contract between the town of New Lots and the company. The special term of the Supreme Court, on June 29, 1893, made an order vacating and setting aside this report and appointing new commissioners. The city of Brooklyn appealed to the general term of that court, which, on December 1, 1893, reversed the order of the special term and confirmed the report of the commissioners. The company then took an appeal to the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the decision of the general term, 143 N. T. 596, and remitted the record to the Supreme Court, which court, on December 4, 1894, entered final judgment in favor of the city-of Brooklyn, and thereupon this writ of error was sued out.</p>

This was an action originally instituted by Sentell in the civil district court for the Parish of Orleans, to recover the •value of a Newfoundland bitch, known as “ Countess Lona,” alleged to have been negligently killed by the railroad company. • The company answered, denying the allegation of negligence, and set up as a separate defence that plaintiff had not complied either with the requirements of the state law, or of the city ordinances, with respect to the keeping of…

<p>The judgments in these cases are reversed on the authority of American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, ante, 464.</p>

This was á case instituted in the Louisville Chancery Court by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company against • the city of Louisville by the filing of an agreed case under the following provisions of the Civil Code of Practice of the State of Kentucky: “ Sec. 637.