Volume 167 — United States Reports

Held: That the decree of sale of March 23, 1889, conferred upon Compton, in event that his claim should not be paid by the purchaser, the right to a decree of resale of the property situated in,Ohio and covered and affected by his lien; (2) That, in event of such sale, and in applying the proceeds thereof, Compton would be entitled to an account of the net earnings of the Ohio division over and above all operating…

Held: that the effect of the repealing act was to take away the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to proceed further in any case founded upon the repealed act; but that this court did not intimate by this decision that that court would not have jurisdiction to entertain and grant a motion on the part of the petitioner to reinstate the original judgment. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Edwin Forrest for petitioner.

Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a conviction of a man for making a speech on Boston Common in violation of an ordinance that forbade the making of a public address there without a permit from the mayor.

This was an action originally brought in a court of the State of Washington, and which was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington. The plaintiff in his complaint alleged that, on the 7th day of December, 1892, while in the employ of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company as a brakeman, he received personal injuries of a severe character occasioned by the negligence of the defendant company.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This action was commenced in the Superior Court of Spokane County, State of Washington, wherein William H. Ziegler, on October 5,1891, filed his complaint against the Spokane Falls and Northern Nailway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the Territory of Washington, seeking to recover the value of a certain piece of land taken by the company for its roadbed and right of way, and also to recover damages for the alleged diminution in value of the tract of land…

This was an action of forcible detainer brought September 17, 1894, by the Eastern Trust and Banking Company against Willis and Johnson, before a justice of the peace in and for the ..District of Columbia, to obtain possession of certain real estate in said District. The defendant filed a plea of title, whereupon the -case was certified to the Supreme Court of the District for trial. Rev. Stat. D. C. c. 19, §§ 677, 691.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the common council acted within its powers in changing the grade of the streets-in question, and that the railroad company had no legal right to complain of its action. The legislative power of a city may control and improve its streets, and a power to that effect, when duly exercised by ordinances, will override any license previously given, by which the control of a certain street has been surrendered.

<p>Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, followed, to the point that if, in extradition proceedings the committing magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the accused, and the offence charged is within the terms of the treaty of extradition, and the magistrate, in arriving at a decision to hold the accused, has before him competent legal evidence on which to exercise his judgment as to whether the facts are sufficient to establish the criminality of the accused for the purposes of extradition, such decision cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus.</p>

This case involves the construction of Rev. Stat. § 2323, which reads as follows: “ Where a tunnel is run for the development of a vein or lode, or for the discovery of mines, the owners of such tunnel shall have- the right of possession of all veins or lodes within 3000 feet from the face of such tunnel on the line thereof, not previously known to exist, discovered in such tunnel, to the same extent as if discovered from the surface; and locations on the line of such tunnel…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.</p> <p>On September 18, 1872, George C. Corning and Other citizens of the United States located a tunnel site. They diligently prosecuted the work of excavation, expending therein one hundred thousand dollars.</p> <p>On February 3, 1875, the Corning Tunnel Company, a corporation duly organized, was the owner of this tunnel location by sundry mesne ■ conveyances from the locators thereof, and said tunnel company, while prosecuting the work of excavation, cut and discovered within the tunnel and upon the line thereof, at a distance of 594 feet from its face, a vein of mineral-bearing rock in place, which was named the Bonanza lode, and on said February 3 it posted at the face of the tunnel a plain sign and notice, giving the name of said vein, the point of discovery within the tunnel, the general course of the vein from the point of discovery, and claiming 750 feet of said vein on each side of the line of the tunnel; this Bonanza lode did not appear upon the surface of the ground, and was not known to exist prior to its discovery by the Corning Tunnel Company, as above stated.</p> <p>On February 9, 1875, the tunnel company filed and caused to be recorded in the office of the clerk and recorder of the county of Boulder a location certificate of said Bonanza lode, giving the name of the lode so discovered and the company as the locator thereof, the point in the line of the tunnel at which the lode was discovered, and claiming seven hundred and fifty feet of the vein upon each side thereof; also stating the general course of the vein. The location certificate was. as follows:</p> <p>“ Territory of Colorado, ) County of Boulder. )</p> <p>“Know all men by these presents that we, the Corning: Tunnel Company, claim, by right of discovery and by right of location, 1500 feet, linear and horizontal measurement, on the Bonanza lode, along the vein thereof, with all its. dips, variations and angles, together with- the amount of surface necessary for working the same and allowed by law, 750 feet of said lode so located lying and being easterly of. the discovery on said lode and 750-feet being westerly of said discovery, said load being more particularly described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a point in the Corning tunnel 594 feet from the face of said tunnel and extending from said point 750 feet easterly and 750 feet westerly. The bearing of said lode is about north 78 degrees east. This.lode was discovered in the Corning tunnel and it is claimed under the provisions of section 4 of an act of' Congress approved May 10,1872, in Gold Hill mining district; said lode was discovered and was located on the 3d day of February, a.d. 1875.</p> <p>“(Signed) Frederick A. Squires, Pres..</p> <p>“ Daniel A. Robinson, Seo’y.”</p> <p>Subsequently the title to the tunnel and the lode passed to the defendant in error. After the discovery of said Bonanza lode the owners of the tunnel continuously and diligently prosecuted the work on the lode and expended each year thereon the sum of one hundred dollars. On July 10, 1886, more than eleven years after the discovery of the Bonanza lode, the plaintiff in error, Campbell, and one Cyrus Taylor, with full knowledge of the tunnel claim, and of the discovery and location of the Bonanza lode aforesaid, made a location of a certain lode, called by them the J. L. Sanderson lode. This location is on the same lode and vein as that described in. the Bonanza location, and the discovery cut by which it was discovered by Campbell and Taylor is within 200 feet of the tunnel line. Campbell and Taylor did everything required to be done by the statutes of the United States in discovering and marking the point of discovery of the Sanderson lode, and in marking the boundaries of the claim on the surface of the ground, and thereafter did the requisite annual labor thereon. Having made application for -a patent' the defendant in error filed an adverse claim and commenced a suit, as required by the statute. Rev. Stat. § 2326. This, after a trial in the District Court of Boulder County, Colorado, was taken to the Supreme Court of the State, and by that court a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant in error, on the ground that the proceedings in respect to. the tunnel, the discovery of the Bonanza lode and the location thereof, vested in him a title to that lode to the distance of 750 feet from the line of the tunnel. 18 Colorado, 510. To reverse which judgment Campbell sued out this writ of error.</p>

ORIGINAL. This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the release of the petitioner from the custody of the marshal of the Southern District of the Indian Territory, who now holds him under sentence of death for the crime of rape.

<p>P. and P., owners of three sugar plantations in Louisiana, leased the sugar-house on one of them with all its machinery, and such defined land in that plantation as might be found necessary for its use, to F. and F. for a term of years. The lessees agreed to buy during the term, and the lessors agreed to sell and deliver to them during that time, the sugar-cane grown on the three plantations. Elaborate provisions were made respecting the conduct of the business, and the manner of fixing from time to time the price of the cane. The thirteenth article was as follows: “The price of cane as above determined shall be paid as follows: Two and dollars per ton shall be paid every Monday, for the cane delivered during the preceding week, until the delivery is completed. The balance, if any, per ton,, shall operate as a lien and privilege to the full extent of such balance on the first bounty money received by the parties of the second part on sugar produced from cane ground at the Barbreck sugar-house, and the said parties of the second part covenant and agree to consecrate solely to the payment of such balance all bounty payments so received by them, until the whole of the said balance shall have been paid.” The twentieth article was as follows: “ The parties of the first part agree to keep all such books and records as are required by the United States Government in relation to the bounty, and to furnish to the parties of the second part all the details which may be necessary to enable them to effectuate their bounty rights.” The lessees, with the consent of the lessors, transferred their rights and their interests under the lease to a corporation which assumed their obligations thereunder. This corporation became involved and a receiver was appointed in an equity suit brought by the Burdon Company. The lessors intervened in this suit, claiming that their claim for the balance due on the purchase price, and also their claim for cane delivered to the lessees were secured by a lessor’s privilege, under Louisiana law, on the property of the lessees at the sugar-house, and the latter also by an equitable lien on any bounty that might thereafter be collected by the receiver. The Circuit Court decided that the intervenors were entitled to the lessor’s privilege, and to an equitable lien on the bounty. An appeal having been taken from this decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals certified the facts to this court and propounded the following questions: “First. It being shown that the cane sold by appellees, J. U. Payne & Company et als., to the Ferris Sugar Manufacturing Company, Limited, pursuant to the contract between the parties, was grown on lands not embraced within the limits of the premises leased to the Ferris Sugar Manufacturing Company,' Limited, are appellees, under the laws of Louisiana, considered in connection with the provisions of the contract, entitled to the lessor’s privilege to secure the payment of the purchase price of such cane? Second. Under the terms of the thirteenth article of the contract between the Paynes and the Ferrises, and to secure the payment of the price of the sugarcane sold and delivered under said contract, have the appellees H. M. Payne, J. U. Payne and the members of the firm of J. U. Payne & Company, an equitable lien upon the bounty money collected from the United States by the receiver in this suit? Third. If the second question shall be answered in the affirmative, can such equitable lien, under the laws of Louisiana, be so enforced in the present suit as to appropriate the bounty money to the payment of the claim of the Paynes, to the exclusion of the general creditors of the Ferris Sugar Manufacturing Company?” To these several questions the court now make answer as follows:</p> <p>(1) The first question is answered in the negative;</p> <p>(2) The second question is answered in the affirmative;</p> <p>(3) The third question is answered in the affirmative.</p>

Held: *150 (1) That under the circumstances the contract of insurance was to be interpreted according to English law; (2) That, if a ship be once in collision during the adventure, after the goods are on board, the insurers are, by the law of England, liable for a loss covered by the general words in the policy, although such loss is not the result of the original collision, and, but for the collision, would have been…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that “all bills for raisiúg revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bill?.”</p> <p>Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

Held: That the suit was-not one against the State within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States declaring that “the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State.” Whether a particular suit is one…

United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897), is an 1897 decision of the United States Supreme Court that held that the United States lacked standing to challenge the validity of its issued patents “on the mere ground of error of judgment” in issuing them. The United States had standing to seek to invalidate patents, however, on grounds of fraudulent procurement and also as a defense to a charge of patent infringement. The decision operated for many decades as a bar to government efforts to seek invalidation of patents that it considered spurious until the Supreme Court limited Bell Telephone, first to a limited extent in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., and then more broadly in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.

<p>The report of the commissioners for permanently marking the boundary line established between the States .of Indiana and Kentucky by the decree of May 18, 1896, 163 IT. S. 520, is approved by this court.</p>

Held: that the questions should have been allowed. The same .objections made, sustained below, and that court overruled here, as to drinking of the defendant, and as to what took place at the sailing of the sloop. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. F. D. Kelsey for plaintiff in error. Mr. Solicitor General for defendants in error.

<p>Under the laws of the Indies lands not actually allotted to settlers remained the property of the king, to be disposed of by him or by those on whom he might confer that power; and as, at the date of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, neither the municipalities nor the settlers within them, whose rights are the subject of controversy in these suits, could have demanded the legal title of the former Government, the Court of Private Land Claims was not empowered to pass the title to either,- but it is for the political department of the Government to deal with any equitable rights which may be involved.</p> <p>United States v. Santa Fe, 165 U. S. 175, involved the same considerations in its disposition as those presented on this record, and its reasoning and conclusions are to be taken as decisive here.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.</p> <p>This was a petition by the Rio Arriba Land and Cattle Company filed in the Court of Private Land Claims for the confirmation of what was commonly called the Cañón de Chama Grant, situated in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, and alleged to contain 472,763.95 acres.</p> <p>It appeared that in 1806 a petition was addressed to the governor of the Territory, Alencaster, as follows:</p> <p>“ I, Francisco Salazar, ensign in the militia of Abiquiu, together with my brothers (hermanos) and twenty-eight other poor and needy citizens, appear before your excellency (and state), that' I have examined a tract of land, unappropriated and unsettled, called the Chama River Cañón, situated about four leagues distant from this place, and for which we petition to your excellency in the name of the King and without injury to any third party, as we find ourselves without any land wherefrom to support ourselves, owing to the decease of our mother at the rancho off of which she supported us, and as the latter has this day been divided among nine heirs residing in other jurisdictions we find ourselves absolutely deprived of any place to plant and to enable us to pay tithes and first fruits.</p> <p>“ We therefore humbly ask and pray your excellency to heed this our petition, and we trust from the charitable heart of your excellency you will consider the same favorably, and we protest our petition not to be made in dissimulation and whatever be necessary, etc.”</p> <p>This petition was referred, July 6, 1806, by the governor to the alcalde in these words :</p> <p>“ The alcalde will report fully on this petition, giving the extent of the land in question, its boundaries, the proportion of irrigable land, and when he comes to say how many settlers it will accommodate and the application being made public he will report whether any damage may result to any of the surrounding settlers, either in regard to pasturage, water or watering places, and he will make personal examination respecting all these matters, to the end that action may be had in accordance with his report and subsequent questions avoided.” On July 14, 1806, thq alcalde made the following report:</p> <p>“I, Manuel Garcia de la Mora,.chief alcalde, in obedience to the foregoing decree, proceeded personally to visit and examine the spot (rio) called the Ohama Eiver canon, over all of which I passed with the greatest care and observation, as well the land itself as the places for taking out the heads of irrigating canals and the pastures and watering places, and I report that for pastures without fields and without any resulting damage there is one league from the last grant (that of the Martinezes) to the side on which the sun rises, and that thence to the western boundary, which divides the said Chama Eiver canon from the Gallina Eiver, there'are about two leagues, somewhat more or less, cultivable land, and the town being placed in the centre, the thirty-one families applying for it may be accommodated and land enough remain for the increase they may Jiave in the way of children and sons in law (hijos y liemos), and the section of the country is a very desirable one, and the settlers may therefore proceed with their buildings, and for the other two boundaries there is assigned them on the horth and on the south one league for pastures, for on these two sides no injury can result, as there is neither a settlement or grant now made or that might be made, and the heads of acequias along the length of the planting land there are five or six of them.</p> <p>“ "With all the foregoing I have fulfilled your excellency’s order. The same having been read faithfully and quite audibly to all the community, they replied that they had nothing to represent in regard to said petition, and that no one of them was injured, the land being uncultivated and unsettled, and the said canon is distant from Abiquiu about five leagues.”</p> <p>On August 1, 1806, Governor Alencaster dtecreed:</p> <p>“In pursuance of the foregoing report, that the said alcalde may proceed to the assignment of twenty-six lots of land capable of being planted with the equivalent of three cuartillas of wheat, one ditto or three' almudes of com, another three of beans, and of having erected on each of them a small house with a. garden, and of these lots two of them adjoining one another will.be assigned to the Ensign Francisco Salazar and the remaining twenty-four to the individuals who, upon report made by the said alcalde, may obtain my decree that they be assigned lands, the said assignments to be made in such manner that lands may remain unassigned equally on the four sides, ■or at least on two of them, so that new assignments- may be made in the future, and the lines bounding with the adjoining lands to be described in order that the rights to pastures and watering places may clearly appear; to the said parcel of lots held by the twenty-five settlers will be given the name ‘ San Joaquin del Rio de Chama”; and the said alcalde, having received the said twenty-four titles to settlers, will proceed to deliver and distribute, give possession, and make grant, in the name of His Majesty, to the twenty-four settlers aforesaid, and the said Ensign Salazar, being appointed justice and all the foregoing provisions being verified, the granting document will be remitted to me to be legalized as required, the proper duplicates (testimonios) to be given the parties interested and then the original to be returned, to be duly deposited among the archives of this office.”</p> <p>On March 1, 1808, the alcalde made this report:</p> <p>“ I, Manuel Garcia de la Mora, chief alcalde of the town of La Canada, proceeded to the rancho of San Joaquin, and in view of and in obedience to the foregoing decree of Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin del Real Alencaster, governor of this royal province, I, said chief alcalde, proceeded to the Chama River cañón, called the San Joaquin cañón, accompanied by the twenty-five settlers; and there appearing also fourteen other citizens without land, and his excellency having' given me verbal instructions to the effect that should other persons come forward to increase the settlement land should also be assigned to them with the same rights as the others enjoy, and all the settlers being assembled, I proceeded with the distribution of the land to them, as appears from the quantities of land they received, noted in the list and certified by me, and into the possession of' which I placed them, taking them by the hand and leading each settler over his own piece of land and placing him in possession in the name of the King, whom may God preserve; and they ran joyfully over the land, plucking up weeds and casting stones and shouting aloud ‘ Long live the King that protects and helps us! ’ with which they remain in possession, naming the town whose site I pointed out to them, San Joaquin del Rio de Chama, and with which I have executed the foregoing decree and all of which authenticated with two instrumental witnesses,, designating to the. settlers as boundaries — on the north, the Ceballa valley; on the south, the Capulín; on the east, the boundary .of the Martinezes; and on the west, the Little White hill, (segita blanca), for their pastures and watering places, and with a view to the coming of other settlers and the increase of families and descendants; all of which I signed with two instrumental witnesses and with the witnesses in my attendance, with whom I act by appointment for lack of a royal or public notary, there being none of any kind in this royal province ; to which I certify.”</p> <p>Then followed the specific distribution of so many varas to each duly authenticated.</p> <p>The record showed that these documents were produced from private hands, and it did not appear that they were ever returned to the governor to be legalized, or authority given for the execution of .the various testimonios, and the delivery thereof to the grantees, the original remaining in the office of the public record as directed by the governor in his decree of August 1, 1806 ; nor did it appear that these various testimonios-were issued and the original returned.</p> <p>In 1832, one Juan de Jesus de Chacon, for himself and Mateo Garcia and Antonio Duran, presented a petition to the governor, asking that all the privileges allowed by law be permitted them, stating that two or three years before the alcalde Ortiz had placed them in possession of lands on the Gallina . River; but that, the present alcalde, Gallego, was attempting to dispossess them “ in a manner most strange,” considering that the land had been given to petitioners by a competent judge, and that they had cultivated it for two consecutive years and raised all the crops within their means; and they applied to the governor that he would direct the alcalde to leave them at liberty to make such use as might appear proper of the lands lawfully belonging to them.</p> <p>On April 2, 1832, the governor, referred this petition to the asesor' general, the Licenciado Barreiro. On the same day Barreiro made his report, stating that he had previously notified the alcalde of Abiquiu that he could not pass upon the rights of the parties on a simple communication, and recommending that the petitioners form an expediente of the whole matter and then refer the case to him; also directing, in regard to the possession given by Alcalde Ortizj that nothing should be done until final adjudication, whereupon the governor made the following order:</p> <p>“ In order that the responsibility of the constitutional alcalde of Abiquiu may be covered, that the administration of justice may not experience delays prejudicial to the parties, and that the property may not be prejudiced, the said alcalde will proceed in conformity with the decision of the attorney general and will form an expediente of the whole and with new reference will decide as to what he may deem to be just, but in the meantime will respect the land in question, inasmuch as up to the present time the holders :of it are not agreed as to the nullity of their possession, and consequently it will form a part of their property, as in Such matters the regular formalities are indispensable, and without them the alcaldes cannot decide with the certainty required by the proper administration of justice.”</p> <p>On April 6, the alcalde Gallego reported that having examined the question between the parties he had directed that a suit of conciliation with two arbitrators named by the parties in litigation be brought in accordance with article No. 155; and he found that the alcalde not having carried out the will of Governor Alencaster by properly certifying the grant document and giving certified copies to the parties in interest and returning the original to the capital to be placed in the archives, for which omission and others, he adjudged the original possession not to be legal, and to be without right until confirmed by the governor. He also reported as to the action of alcalde Ortiz that it was not legal, possession having been given by him without the production of any document approved by the governor, or any approval or certification of petition, as is usual, nor the proper proceedings taken, which was the province of the most excellent territorial deputation, with report of the proper ayuntamiento on the petition; and that a new possession must be given.</p> <p>This report was returned by Barreiro, who required the. alcalde to make up an expediente as originally directed. The alcalde summoned the parties, and .their answers, replies and rejoinders were set forth at length. Salazar and his associates insisted that the possession of the lands at the Cañón de San Joaquin del Bio de Chama and the decree of Governor Alencaster were legal, but that the action of' the Alcalde Ortiz was wholly without right. -On these papers the asesor general made his report as follows:</p> <p>“ The statements of the parties having been examined, the question is made clear, and it appears that the possession given by the alcalde José Maria Ortiz is of no value because, even if he were an authority, he was not competent to give and partition lands, because this is an exclusive attribute of the territorial deputation.</p> <p>“ Under date of the 6th of February, I decided that with regard to the possession given by Ortiz that nothing should be done until I had resolved upon what I considered proper, but this was not in any way intended to approve the proceedings of the alcalde.</p> <p>“ Finally, I now say that the possession given at the Cañón de San Joaquin del Bio de Chama is legal because, even if there be any requisite lacking, it is not an essential requisite, but one of pure formality. With respect to the possession given, I am of the opinion that the alcalde Ortiz gave it without power and that it should be annulled, the right ■remaining with the parties aggrieved to petition the most excellent deputation to give them a good title, which will place' them legally in possession of the lands which they may desire to possess, with the remark that the annullment must not be understood to extend to the possession which. the children of the old settlers may hold, because these should come in for their part, as is expressed in the grant itself, but not others who are strangers.”</p> <p>On the 10th of May, 1832, Gallego made. a partition of lands among eighteen interested parties, assigning to them lots of land of fifty varas each, and of uncultivated land of one hundred varas each.</p> <p>The record did not show that the proceedings before the asesor general or his. action and opinion were returned to or in any way approved by the governor, or the territorial deputation; nor that the partition and assignment by the alcalde were ever reported and approved; nor under what authority he acted.</p> <p>There was considerable controversy as to the west boundary of the tract, but it was not contended that the proceedings of 1832 extended thé area of the lands intended to be granted by Governor Alencaster in 1806.</p> <p>Certain records of suits in 1880 and 1887 in the District Court of Arriba County, for the purpose of quieting the title and a partition of said lands, as between individual claimants, were set forth in the record.</p> <p>The Court of Private Land Claims confirmed petitioner’s claim to the extent of the lands lying in the Canon del Rio de Chama, which were first actually apportioned among the settlers, and no more; and the company appealed.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>This was an appeal from a decree of the Court of Appeals which affirmed a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, removing the appellant from the office of trustee under the will and codicil of his father, Dr. John Frederick May, of "Washington, in the District of Columbia, who died there May 1, 1891, leaving a widow, Sarah Maria, May, and six children, William- and Frederick and four daughters, all of age; a large estate, consisting mostly of real estate in the city of Washington; and a will- and codicil, both of which were duly admitted to probate.</p> <p>By the will, dated February 4, 1890, he devised- and bequeathed all his estate, real and personal, to his wife, and her heirs and assigns, upon the following trusts: 1st. That she should receive one third of the net annual income of his real estate during her life, one third of his personal property absolutely, and the use for her life of his dwelling-house in Washington. 2d.. That his estate should be kept intact and undivided while any of his children lived; and the rents and profits, with the exception of his wife’s thirds, be applied to the payment of his debts, and especially to the cancelling of any incumbrance or mortgage existing at the time of his death; and, after full payment and cancellation of such debts and incumbrances, be equally divided among his children. 3d. That any part of the estate might be sold by t.he trustee, if manifestly for the benefit of his heirs, and the proceeds reinvested in real estate, or in mortgages of a particular kind; and that such parts of the estate, as should at the time of his déath be subject to mortgages, might, upon the expiration of such mortgages, and if the trustee should be unable to pay or cancel them, be remortgaged. 4th. That, upon the death of any child leaving issue, its share of the rents and profits should go to its issue. The testator also gave his wife “ the power to appoint a trustee to succeed her should she deem it best at any time to do so ” ; appointed her executrix of his will; and directed that she should not be required to give bond as trustee or as executrix.</p> <p>On December 17, 1890, the testator gave William May a power of attorney to lease or rent his real estate in the city of Washington, to recover possession of the same, and to collect the rents thereof.</p> <p>The codicil was dated March 27, 1891, and, omitting the formal parts, was as follows:</p> <p>“ I hereby appoint my son, William May, cotrustee with my wife, Sarah Maria May, my said son and my wife to have and exercise the powers and authority in my said will mentioned and created,, except as hereinafter otherwise directed. It is my further wish, and I hereby will and direct, that my said son, William May, shall take charge of my real estate (except my present dwelling house, which shall be and remain in the exclusive charge of my wife during her life) and care for and manage the same for the best interests of my said estate, and-in accordance with the terms of my said will; and he shall collect the rents and income of my said real estate, and pay the lawful taxes and assessments, and other expenses thereon, and shall keep the same in good repair. It.is my will, and I so direct, that the taxes, insurance and repairs of my said dwelling-house shall be paid out of the general income of my other real estate.</p> <p>“ For the said service of my son, William May, in caring for and managing said estate, and for collecting the rents and paying the taxes and assessments, and other services, as hereinbefore directed, he shall and may retain from money so collected, as his compensation, a commission equal to five per .centum of the amount of money by him collected from said estate; and the said William May shall render to my said wife full and true accounts of the rents by him collected, and of the disbursements by him made in the execution of this trust, such accounts to be rendered each and every month, and shall be accompanied by the vouchers for such disbursements. After the death of my wife, said accounts shall be rendered to my other heirs. It is my will that no commission shall be paid to my wife, ás a trustee.</p> <p>“I hereby further will and.direct that, for good and sufficient cause, my other heirs, with the concurrence of my wife if she be living, shall have and they are hereby given the power, by their unanimous resolution, to remove my said son, William May, from his office as such trustee, and to appoint another person in his stead.</p> <p>“It is my wish that neither of my said trustees shall be. required to give a bond or other security in reference to the execution of the trusts created by my said will or this codicil.”</p> <p>On May 2, 1892, before the estate had been fully administered, William May, as “trustee of John Frederick May, deceased, and in his own right,” filed in the Supreme Court of the' District of Columbia a bill against his mother, brother and sisters, to obtain the instructions of the court as to the execution of the trust, and especially upon the effect of the omission of the will to dispose of the principal of the estate after the termination of the trust, and upon the question whether the widow was entitled to a full third of the income without allowing for or deducting the interest upon outstanding mortgages.</p> <p>On July 5, 1892, answers to the bill were filed in behalf of all the defendants; and on September 28, 1892, the plaintiff filed a general replication.</p> <p>On November 25, 1892, an instrument was drawn up, purporting to be a “ deed, declaration and resolution made ” by the four daughters and by Frederick May, and by the widow joining therein as evidence of her concurrence, reciting the clause of the codicil authorizing the removal of William May from his office as trustee and the appointment of another person in his stead; and further reciting that “ good and sufficient cause exists for the exercise of such power of removal and substitution, for a number of reasons,” some of which, without admitting it to be obligatory to state them, were stated to be that he had failed to render full and true accounts, as required by the codicil; that he made excessive and improper charges against the estate; and that “by his intolerably domineering and disagreeable manner in discussing the affairs of the trust with his cotrustee, displays of anger when questioned, and attempts to browbeat legitimate opposition and criticism, he has compelled said cotrustee to decline any direct, communication with him upon business matters, and she is obliged to employ an expert accountant to examine and report upon the monthly accounts of .said William May, and act as her representative in relation to the affairs of the trust.” The instrument concluded with the statement that therefore the four daughters and Frederick May, with the concurrence of the widow, “ have unanimously resolved, and do hereby resolve, that said William May be and he is hereby removed from his office as trustee or cotrustee under the said codicil and the will of said John Frederick May, deceased, and further that they, the declarants aforesaid, by their unanimous resolution, have appointed and do hereby appoint William H. Dennis, of Washington, D.. C., trustee in the stead of said William May, removed, to the fullest extent of the powers conferred by said first codicil.”'</p> <p>This instrument was signed and sealed by the widow and the four daughters in person, and by the widow as attorney in fact of Frederick May; and was acknowledged before a notary public on November 26, 1892, by the widow and two of the daughters, and on December 3, 1892, by the other two daughters. The widow, at that time, held'a power of attorney, executed July 2, 1891, by- Frederick May, then residing at 'Valparaiso in the Republic of Chili, appointing' her his attorney “ to do and perform any act or acts necessary to be done or performed to protect and care for ” his interest in the estate of his father.'</p> <p>William H. Dennis, by writing upon the resolution of removal, accepted the appointment made and the trust conferred thereby; and on December 29, 1892, wrote and sent' a letter to the plaintiff, enclosing a copy of the instrument, as well as a letter from the attorney of the defendants, requesting the plaintiff to turn over to Dennis the possession of all property of the testator in his possession or control, and all documents appertaining to-the estate.</p> <p>On January 3,. 1893, the plaintiff filed a petition in the cause, alleging that the widow and daughters, in undertaking to remove him from the office of trustee, and in making the resolution of removal, falsely and deceitfully pretended that the removal was for good and sufficient cause, and did not act with good faith, but from invidious motives; that they had no power to remove him, pending this suit, except upon application to the court; and that the signature of Frederick May by the widow as his attorney was nugatory and of no effect; specifically denying all the allegations of the resolution of removal; and praying for an injunction against the defendants .and Dennis from claiming, any right or doing any act under that resolution. On January 7, 1893, upon the plaintiff’s motion, Dennis was made a party defendant to the suit; and on January 24, 1893, a temporary injunction was granted as prayed for.</p> <p>On March 7,1893, the defendants, by leave given January 21, 1893, filed a cross bill, praying that the plaintiff be decreed to surrender possession of the real estate and all moneys and documents in his charge as cotrustee to Dennis as his successor, and to settle his final account.</p> <p>Frederick May, on May 8, 1893, executed and acknowledged before a notary public in the city of Washington a deed, ratifying, approving and confirming the acts of the widow in voting, for and executing in his behalf the resolution of removal, and also the filing of the prior answer and cross bill in his behalf; and on June 6, 1893, personally appeared in the cause, and, by leave of court, filed a supplemental answer to the like effect.-</p> <p>After a filing of an answer to the cross bill, and a general replication to that answer, and other motions and pleadings not material to be stated, much evidence was taken (the substance of which is stated in the opinion of this court) and the case was heard upon pleadings and proofs before the Supreme Court of the.District of Columbia; and that court, on July 31, 1894, entered a final decree, by which the injunction granted on the plaintiff’s petition was dissolved ; “ and it appearing to the court that the heirs of John Frederick May, deceased, other than said William May, with the concurrence of Sarah Maria May, widow of said deceased testator, proceeded rightfully and within the power conferred by the first codicil to the will of said testator in removing, by their unanimous resolution, dated November 25, 1892, for good and sufficient cause, said William May from his office as trustee or co-trustee named in first codicil, and in appointing the defendant William H. Dennis in his stead; and it further appearing to the court from the proofs that there existed good and sufficient cause why the said William May ought to have been removed from said office of cotrustee, more particularly on account of the discordant relations between him on one side and his cotrustee and all the beneficiaries of the trust except himself on the other side,” it was decreed that William May within twenty days surrender possession and control of the trust property in his hands, and all leases, papers and books pertaining to the trust, and all moneys of the trust estate, derived from the collection of rents or otherwise, to the widow and Dennis as cotrustees, and that all the powers and duties originally conferred upon him by the will and codicil be vested in them; that he be perpetually enjoined and restrained from acting as cotrustee, and from interfering with their possession and management of the trust property, “ without. prejudice, however, to the right of said William May to apply to this court as he may be advised, in his quality as a beneficiary interested in said trust” ; and that he render a full and final account of all his receipts and disbursements as cotrustee; and it was further adjudged that the widow (in addition to the other provisions for her benefit) was entitled to receive for life to her own use one third of the net income from the rents and profits ox the real estate, after deducting taxes, insurance and repairs, and without any deduction for interest paid or to be paid on debt's of the testator, or on any mortgages or incumbrances upon his estate.</p> <p>The plaintiff appealed to.the Court of.Appeals, which affirmed the decree, with costs, and afterwards denied a motion to,amend it so as to allow him his costs and counsel fees in the cause. 5 App. D. O. 552. Thereupon he appealed to this court</p>

Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the Appointments Clause. The question before the Court was whether the President had the power to remove a district attorney appointed to a four-year term. Beginning with the history of the Decision of 1789, the Court recounted how Vice-President John Adams cast the tie-breaking vote of the First Congress to "[settle] the question of constitutional power in favor of the President".

Held: That the claim of the receiver that the Keystone Bank was entitled to be paid $70,005.36 of credit, irrespective of the outstanding due bills which it had been expressly agreed between the parties were to be paid by way of set-off in the clearing, was without foundation; (2) That the Clearing House Association, having been in possession of the $28,808.10 as the fiduciary agent of the Keystone Bank without a lien or…

This action was commenced, in the Superior Court of the county of San Diego, State of California, against the California Savings Bank, and other defendants, including the plaintiff in error.

Held: considering the terms of the charter, that such property w;as not included in the exemption. In that case both the act of 1880, above referred to, and the act of 1874 were set up as conclusively establishing that the bank was not exempt from taxation at all.

Held: among other things, that a party who is in contempt for non-payment of costs in the suit, is not thereby prevented from moving for leave to defend it in forma pauperis. Chuck v. Cremer, 1 Coop. Ch. C. 205, was decided in 1846. A defendant having unsuccessfully sought to dissolve an injunction obtained ex parte, gave notice of motion by way of appeal.

This was an action commenced by the plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa to .recover of the defendant fifteen hundred and fifty dollars on account of alleged violations of the interstate commerce act. An amended and substituted petition was filed which, in five counts, stated plaintiff’s causes of action.

This case comes on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, and involves the validity of the statute of that State of date June 8, 1891, Laws Penn. 1891, p. 240, in respect to the taxation ,of national banks. The decision of that court was in favor of its validity, 168 Penn. St. 309. Sections 6 and 1 of the statute contain these provisions : “ Sec. 6.

This case comes on questions certified by the. Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit.

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

Section 2 of the interstate commerce act reads: “ That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this aet shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback or other device, charge, demand, collect or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be gendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this act, than it charges, demands, collects or receives from…

This was a bill in equity, originally filed by the United States in the Circuit Court for the District of Colorado, to compel the removal and abatement of a fence erected and maintained by the defendants, whereby about 20,000 acres of public lands were enclosed, and appropriated to the exclusive use and benefit of the defendants.

<p>The claimants have not made out their case by a fair preponderance of evidence, or such weight of testimony as is necessary to establish their title to this large tract of land.</p>

<p>Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declares “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation,” Congress may direct that, when part of a parcel of land is appropriated to the public use for a highway in the District of Columbia, the tribunal vested by law with the duty of assessing the compensation or damages due to the owner, whether for the value of the part taken, or for any injury to the rest, shall take into consideration, by way of lessening the whole or either part of the sum due him, any special and direct benefits, capable of present estimate and reasonable computation, caused by the establishment of the highway to the part not taken.</p> <p>By the Constitution of the United States, the estimate of the just compensation for property taken for the public use, under the right of eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury; but may be. entrusted to commissioners appointed by a court or by the executive, or to an inquest consisting of more or fewer men than an ordinary jury.</p> <p>Congress, in the exercise of the right of taxation in the District of Columbia, may direct that half of the amount of the compensation or damages awarded to the owners of lands appropriated to the public use for a highway shall be assessed and charged upon the District of Columbia, and the other half upon the lands benefited thereby within the District, in proportion to the benefit; and may commit the ascertainment of the lands to be assessed, and the apportionment of the benefits among them, to the same tribunal which assesses the compensation or damages.</p> <p>If the legislature, in taxing lands benefited by a highway, or other public improvement, makes provision for notice, by publication or otherwise, to' each owner of land, and for hearing him, at some stage of the proceedings, upon the question what proportion of the tax shall be assessed upon his land, his property is not taken without due process of law.</p> <p>The recording by public authority of a map of a proposed system of highways within certain territory, without restricting the use or improvement of lauds-before the commencement of proceedings for their condemnation for such highways, or limiting the damages to be awarded in such proceedings, does not of itself entitle the owners of lands to compensation or damages.</p> <p>An act of Congress, providing for the estimate of damages for taking lands for highways in the District of Columbia, and for the assessment of such damages, with interest, upon lands benefited by the highways, is not invalidated by a provision that the proceedings shall be void if Congress, after being six months in session, shall make no appropriation for the payment of the damages.</p> <p>The act of March 2, 1893, c. 197, entitled “ An act to provide for a permanent system of highways in that part of the District of Columbia lying outside of cities,” is constitutional and valid.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was á petition to the Superior Court of the county of Suffolk and State of Massachusetts, under section 17 of chapter 192 of the Public Statutes of Massachusetts (the material provisions of which are copied in the margin1) by the Atlantic Works, a corporation established by the laws of that State and having its usual place of business at Boston in that county, to enforce a lien upon the tugboat Glide, whose home port was Boston, for labor performed and materials…

This was an action of ejectment, brought September 20, 1892, in tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by Ezra J. Peck and Leo Simmons, trustees, against Christian Heurich, to recover land in the District of Columbia. The defendant pleaded the general issue.

The Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway Company, a corporation- of the State of Michigan, operates a railroad wholly within that State, running westwardly from Detroit to Grand Haven. In connection with eastern roads it is engaged in interstate commerce. Upon its line are the cities of Ionia and Grand Rapids, distant 124 and 157% miles from Detroit respectively.

Held: consistently with legal principles, that the abolition of the city government, as at first organized, because of some disregard, of law, and its reconstruction so as to include within its limits the public improvements for which bonds had been issued during the first organization, devolved upon the city so reorganized the obligations that would have attached to the origihal city if the State had continued to…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The St. Joseph and Grand Island Railroad Company, describing itself as a corporation created and subsisting under and by virtue of the laws of Kansas and Nebraska, and as a common carrier operating a railroad as a continuous line from the city of Grand Island, in the State of Nebraska, to the city of St. Joseph, in the State of Missouri, which railroad passes through Doniphan County, in the State of Kansas, filed, .in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, a bill of complaint against R. M. Steele, sheriff.of said Doniphan County, and a citizen of the State of Kansas, seeking to restrain the said Steele, as sheriff of Doniphan County, from levying upon and selling the complainant’s property situated in said county, for taxes assessed and levied against the same for the year 1892 by the assessing authorities of Doniphan County.</p> <p>The defendant answered; an agreed statement of facts was ■ filed; and, after argument, a decree was entered dismissing the bill at plaintiff’s costs. Thereupon an appeal was taken by the complainant to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where the decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed. 27 U. S. App. 436. The case was then brought to this court on appeal.</p>

These were suits brought by James C. Need, shipping commissioner of the United States at the port of New York, to. recover, respectively, the amount expended by him for rent of office and storage rooms for his official use from March 1, 1891, to April 1, 1893, and the amount of certain expenses which he incurred between July 1, 1886, and March 1, 1891, in maintaining his office and discharging his duties, including rent of the said rooms from April 1, 1890, to March 1, 1891.

Held: that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and that he held the legal title, evidenced by his patent, as trustee for those holding under E. *674 Robert G. Hedrick filed his petition in the Circuit Court of Adair County, Missouri, on October 14, 1890, against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad'Company, seeking to recover posséssion of the portion of the defendant company’s right of way which extended…

In May, 1892, Westel Willoughby filed a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against Brooke Mackall, the Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Samuel C. Wilson, trustee, and Leonard Mackall, trustee, and Oliver Thompson, trustee. The principal object of the bill was. to establish an alleged indebtedness of Brooke Mackall to the complainant and to charge such indebtedness on certain land situated in the city of Washington.

Held: An infant’s deed is voidable only, unless it appears upon its face to be to his prejudice, in which case it may be deemed void; and the infant is not estopped by his acts or declarations, or by his silence, during infancy, from asserting, on arriving at full age or within a reasonable time thereafter, the invalidity of such deed; (2) If the money borrowed by the infant had been expended by her otherwise than in the…

Held: That the act of July 1, 1862, as amended by the act of July 2, 1864, did not grant to the railroad company any lands which had been •sold, reserved or disposed of by the United States, nor impair any existing “ lawful claim,” at the time the line of railroad was “ definitely fixed.” (2) The act of I860 did not except from its operation lands within the exterior lines of the general route of the railroad, and which,…

Held: If the surveyor general misinterpreted the decree of confirmation, and made a survey which excluded from the surveyed' claim any of the lands within the lines given by that decree, it was within the power of the District Court to have its decree properly executed, and to that end to order a new survey; (2) While it may be true, in- some cases, that an action to recover possession of lands confirmed to a claimant…