¶1delivered the opinion of the court.
¶2Error is assigned to the action of the court in overruling the several objections to the first and second amended complaints.
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¶4The power to allow amendments is necessarily intrusted, in a large degree, to the discretion of the trial court, and should be liberally exercised in furtherance of justice. Code, *451see. 75. But when an application to amend is resisted it should not be granted, except upon good cause shown, and upon such terms as the justice of the particular case may require. Adequate terms should be enforced, not merely as a matter of justice to the parties, but to the end that there may be more diligence in the preparation of causes, and the public business thereby expedited. The rapidity with which lengthy pleadings and other court papers may be manufactured (not prepared) through the agency of stenographers and typewriters, has tended of late years to burden the records of the courts with many crude and cumbersome documents.
¶5As the court required plaintiff to pay two days’ attendance of all the witnesses in this case as a condition to filing the second amended complaint, we cannot say its discretion was not properly exercised as to the terms imposed. The objection on the ground of misjoinder is not so easily disposed of.
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¶7The plaintiff claims, among other things, that in May, 1888, ■ he was and for a long time prior thereto had been and still is the owner and in possession of a certain parcel of land in Garfield county, Colorado. That he first diverted and appropriated water from the Dry or West Fork of Elk Creek for the irrigation of said land and for domestic purposes at the date aforesaid and has continued so to do since said time. That he diverted the water from said stream and conveyed the same to his land by means of a certain ditch originally constructed upon the public domain.
¶8That while he was using said ditch for the purposes aforesaid in April, 1885, the dam which turned the water into the headgate of the ditch was washed away, and the channel of said stream was so cut out, lowered and otherwise changed *452that he was obliged to remove the headgate and extend the ditch, up said creek in order to secure a sufficient flow of water into said ditch.
¶9That between May, 1883, and April, 1885, the defendants Albert and George Saint had acquired certain lands above the land of plaintiff on said ditch and stream, and that the-ditch so used by plaintiff to .carry water to his premises extended across the lands of said Saint brothers. That plaintiff removed the headgate and extended the ditch across the pre'mises of the Saint brothers with their permission, without any objection or hindrance from them or either of them, and that he used the water so appropriated through said ditch for the years 1885,1886 and during the first part of the season of 1887, and until prevented by defendants herein from so. doing.
¶10That plaintiff gave the Saint brothers permission to conduct water through said ditch for the irrigation of their lands on condition that they would use said ditch only when the same was not being used by plaintiff.
¶11That the lands claimed and occupied by the Saint brothers are situate up said stream above the plaintiff’s land, and that after the appropriation of water through said ditch by plain-, tiff the defendants William and John Mansfield located, claimed and now occupy a certain tract of land lying up said stream and above the land claimed by the Saint brothers and above the headgate of said ditch.
¶12That plaintiff has a priority of appropriation of the waters of said natural stream for the irrigation of his said lands over each and all of the defendants, and that the waters of said stream are not sufficient for the use of plaintiff and defendants.
¶13. That the said four defendants above named, well knowing the,rights of plaintiff and disregarding the same, have diverted the water from said stream, stopped the flow thereof, and. are now diverting and stopping the flow thereof, so that the same cannot reach plaintiff’s premises to the great injury of' the plaintiff, etc. That irreparable injury will be done to *453plaintiff’s crops unless defendants be restrained, etc. Prayer for injunction, etc.
¶14It does not appear that the Saint brothers, or either of them, acted jointly or in concert with the Mansfield brothers, or either of them, in diverting the waters as charged. The Mansfield brothers diverted the water from the natural stream above plaintiff’s headgate for the purpose of irrigating lands there situate, while the Saint brothers diverted the water from the artificial stream or ditch for the irrigation of their own lands upon a claim of right to said ditch for that purpose.
¶15Upon the facts as above stated it is earnestly and ably contended by counsel for appellants that there is no joint liability on the part of defendants, even if plaintiff is entitled to the prior right over each and all of them to the use of the waters of the natural stream. Counsel do not cite authorities upon this point, though general language may readily be found in the text books and in judicial .opinions favoring the viewfor which they contend. Such is the purport of the opinion in Keyes v. Little York Gold Washing & Water Co., 53 Cala. 724. That case, however, is not altogether analogous to the present; the case of Hillman v. Newington, 57 Cala. 56, is more nearly analogous; but the decision in the latter case sustains the view that there is no misjoinder of parties in the present action. The latter case was decided inT880, and in concluding the opinion the court remarked: “ The case so far as we are advised is sui generis. No parallel ease is cited by either side.”
¶16In the case of The People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co., 66 Cala. 149, decided in 1884, it was said that the Keyes Case “ was practically overruled ” by the Hillman-Newington Case.
¶17Interference with the prior right of a party to the use of water for irrigation is unlike most private injuries for which relief may be had by injunction. • Priority of right to the use of water from a natural stream is a right peculiar in its nature. A party entitled to such priority, unless he can show that he is entitled to all the water of the natural stream, can*454not, in the nature of things, identify certain specific water as belonging to himself, while the same is running in the natural channel. Being entitled only to a certain quantity of the water, less than the whole, it is only after a proper diversion of such quantity into his own separate ditch or lateral that the prior appropriator can be said to have title, in kind, to the specific water thus diverted. Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Ir. Co., 10 Colo. 587, 588. So long as the prior appropriator is able to secure the full amount of water to which he is entitled, he will not be heard to complain that some other person or persons located higher up the stream are diverting its waters.
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¶19To illustrate: Let us suppose that the natural flow of water in the West Fork of Elk Creek is only 200 inches, and that plaintiff, as the prior appropriator, is entitled to 100 inches thereof. Mansfield, owning lands on said stream above plaintiff, diverts 100 inches of the water; Saint next below Mansfield, but still above plaintiff, diverts another 100 inches; thus it results that plaintiff is wholly deprived of *455the use of the water, though he is the actual prior appropriator thereof. To obtain redress, plaintiff commences his action by injunction against Mansfield. The action is resisted ; Mansfield shows that he leaves water enough in the natural stream for plaintiff; and, thus, plaintiff is defeated, unless he assumes the burden of proving that Mansfield’s appropriation is junior to Saint’s — a matter in which plaintiff has no interest. The same result follows if Saint be sued separately; and thus the party actually having the better right is prevented from maintaining it. To prevent a failure of justice in cases of this kind the prior appropriator cannot properly be required to assume any such risks or burdens. But he may bring and maintain an action jointly against all parties, junior in right to himself, whenever the result of their acts, either joint or several, deprives him of his better right to the use of the water, or substantially interferes therewith. He may thus secure protection to his own priority, and leave the several junior appropriators to settle their relative priorities among themselves.
¶20Upon plaintiff’s theory we have no hesitation in saying that there was no misjoinder of parties defendant. The theory of the Saint brothers that they were the owners of the ditch, and therefore entitled to control the same to the exclusion of plaintiff, must be regarded as involving a question of fact. The evidence upon such question was conflicting and the finding of the trial court thereon cannot properly be disturbed on this appeal.
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¶22It appears that the ditch was originally constructed through the unsurveyed public domain of the United States. It was constructed before any of the parties to this litigation owned any of the ranches now claimed by them respectively. The Saint brothers claimed the ditch by virtue of a purchase of the possessory title of the former occupants. This claim was controverted by plaintiff; and the issue being decided by the trial court, upon conflicting evidence, in favor of plaintiff, its decision will not be disturbed.
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¶24The court called a jury to try such specific questions of fact as might be submitted to them, reserving to itself the power to make its own findings upon consideration of the evidence and the verdict of the jury. This was correct practice, the case being one of equitable cognizance and triable by the court either with or without the aid of a jury under the statute. Code, section 173; 1 Thompson on Trial's, sec. 884; Abbott v. Monti, 3 Colo. 561; Hall v. Linn, 8 Colo. 267.
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¶29The judgment of the district court might have been affirmed, but for the fact that the court erred in determining the amount of plaintiff’s prior appropriation through the irrigating ditch in controversy. By his amended statement the plaintiff claimed the prior right to the use of one hundred inches of water from the Dry or West Fork of Elk Creek to be conveyed through said irrigating ditch. The jury made no findings as to the amount of this claim; the court, however, allowed the full amount of the plaintiff’s claim; but from the evidence in which there is little or no conflict, it is *458manifest that the plaintiff never actually applied to beneficial use more than sixty inches of water prior to the defendants’ appropriation. The judgment of the district court will, therefore, be reversed, with directions to that court to enter judgment awarding plaintiff a priority of appropriation as against the defendants for sixty inches of water from said West Fork of Elk Creek through said irrigating ditch.
¶30Reversed with directions.