Volume 171 — United States Reports

The questions in these three cases are the same, and they arise out of the selling of certain packagés of oleomargarine. The plaintiffs in error were indicted for and convicted of a violation of a statute of Pennsylvania prohibiting such sale. The act (No. 25) was passed'on the 21st of May, 1885, and is to be found in the volume of the laws of Pennsylvania for that year, page 22.

The case is stated in the opinion. It was argued with Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, ante, 1, by the same counsel for plaintiff in error.

The indictment under which the defendant (plaintiff in error) was tried contained fifteen counts.

This suit was brought by the plaintiff in error Harrison, against the defendant in error on the- 8th of February, 1895, in the Baltimore City Court to- recover the pum of $300,000 damages for the breach of a contract under seal for the sale of certain patent rights.

The plaintiff in error is a street railway company of the State of Michigan, organized for the purpose of owning and operating lines in the city of Detroit, and is the successor in interest of a similar corporation named the Detroit City Railway. The rights asserted by it arise from an ordinance of the common council of that city passed upon November 24, 1862.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This case is before' this court on questions certified by the Court of Appeals for "the-Eighth Circuit. The facts stated are as follows: The appellant is the owner in fee of the Del Monte Lode mining claim, located in the Sunnyside mining district, Mineral County, Colorado, for which- it holds a patent bearing date February 3, 1894, pursuant to an entry made at the local land office on February 27, 1893. The appellee is the owner of the Last Chance Lode mining claim, under patent dated July 5, 1894, based on an entry of March 1, 1894. The New York Lode mining claim, which is not owned by either of the parties, was patented on April 5, 1894, upon an entry of August 26, 1893. The relative situation of these claims, as well as the course and dip of the vein, which is the subject of controversy, is shown in the diagram on page 58.</p> <p>Both in location and patent the Del Monte claim is first in time, the New York second and the Last Chance third. When the owners of the Last Chance claim applied for their patent proceedings in adverse were instituted against them by the owners of the New York claim, and an action in support of such adverse was brought in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Colorado. This action terminated in favor of the owners of the New York and against the owners of the Last Chance, and awarded the territory in conflict between the two locations to the New York claim. The ground in conflict between the New York and Del Monte, except so much thereof as was also in conflict between the Del Monte and Last Chance locations, is included in the patent to the Del Monte claim. The New York secured a patent to all its territory, except that in conflict with the Del Monte, and the Last Chance in turn secured a patent to all of its territory, except that in conflict- with the New York, in which last-named patent was included the triangular surface conflict between tbe Del Monte and Last Chance, which, by agreement, was patented to-the latter. The Last Chance claim was located upon a vein, lode or ledgé of silver and lead bearing ore, which crosses its north end line and continues southerly from that point through the Last Chance location until it reaches the eastern side line of the New York, into which latter territory it enters, continuing thence southerly with a southeasterly course on the New York claim until it crosses its south end line. No part of the apex of the vein is embraced within the small triangular parcel of ground in the southwest corner of the Last Chance location which was patented to the Last Chance as aforesaid, and no part of the apex is within the surface boundaries of the Del Monte mining claim. The portion of the vein in controversy is that lying under the surface of the Del Monte claim and between two vertical planes, one drawn through the north end line of the Last Chance claim extending westerly, and the other parallel thereto and starting at the point where the vein leaves the Last Chance and enters the New York claim, as shown on the foregoing diagram. Upon these facts the following questions have been certified to us:</p> <p> </p> <p>“ 1. May any of the lines of a junior lode location be laid within, upon or across the .surface of a valid senior location for the purpose of defining for or securing to such junior location under-ground or extralateral rights not in conflict with any rights of the senior location?</p> <p>“2. Does the patent of the Last Chance Lode mining claim, which first describes the rectangular claim by metes and bounds and then excepts and excludes therefrom the premises previously granted to the New York Lode mining claim; convey to the patentee anything more than he would take by a grant specifically describing only the two irregular tracts which constitute the granted surface of the Last Chapee claim?</p> <p>“3. Is the easterly side of the New York Lode mining claim an ‘end line’ of the Last Chance Lode mining claim within the meaning, of sections 2320 and 2322 of the Devised Statutes of .the United States?</p> <p>“ 4. If the apex of a vein crosses one end line and one side line of a lode mining claim, as located thereon, can the locator of such vein follow it upon its dip beyond the vertical side line of his location?</p> <p>“ 5. On the facts presented by the record herein has the appellee the right to follow its vein downward beyond its west side line and under the surface of the premises of appellant?”</p>

The case was thus stated by the plaintiff in error in his brief. The plaintiff in error is the owner and in possession of the Black Bock lode mining claim situated in the Summit Yalley mining district in Silver Bow County, Montana. The defendants in error own two thirds interest, and the plaintiff in error one third interest in the Niagara lode mining claim situated in the same district and county.

In September, 1886, defendant in error commenced an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court of the State of Florida, for the county of Hillsborough, to recover possession of a tract of land described as follows: “ Lot eight (8) of section nineteen (19), township twenty-nine (29) south, of range nineteen (19) east, and lot seven (7) of section twenty-four (24), in township twenty-nine (29) south, of range eighteen (18) east, containing about forty and nineteen one-hundredths…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action brought by the United- States against the North American Commercial Company to recover the sum of $132,187.50, with interest, for rent reserved for the year ending April 1, 1894, under a so called lease, bearing date March 12,1890, made by the Secretary of the Treasury to the company, and for royalties upon seventy-five hundred fur seal skins taken and shipped by the company that, year in virtue of that instrument, and for the revenue tax of two dollars on…

The record in this case shows that in 1870 the Central Transportation Company, hereafter called the Central Company, was a corporation which had been in 1862 incorporated under the general manufacturing laws of the State of Pennsylvania.

On July 30, 1879, a contract for resurfacing with asphaltum certain streets in the- city of Washington was awarded to The Bailey-French Paving Company. The agreement was embodied in a writing signed on the one part by Davis W. Bailey as general agent of the company just named, and on the other part signed and sealed by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia. The price specified for the work aggregated a little less than $41,000.

<p>On error or appeal to the Supreme Court of a Territory, this court is without power to reexamine the facts, and is confined to determining whether the cburt below erred in the conclusions of law deduced by it from the facts by it found, and to reviewing errors committed as to the admission or rejection of testimony when the action of the court in this respect has been duly excepted to, and the right to attack the same preserved on the record.</p> <p>There is no error in the conclusions of law in this case: all the assignments of error, and the argument based thereon, rest on the assumption that the findings of fact certified by the court below are not conclusive, and that this court has the power, in order to pass upon the questions raised, to examine the weight of the evidence, and to disregard the facts as found.</p>

This case comes here on a certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The facts out of which the.question arise are as follows: On November 9,. 1895, the British steamship Irrawaddy, upon a voyage from Trinidad to New York, with cargo, stranded on the coast of New Jersey through the negligent navigation of her master.. Up to the time of stranding she was properly manned, equipped and supplied, and was seaworthy.

This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition of William Wheeler Hubbell, who, as patentee of an “ improvement in cartridges,” claimed that the United States had manufactured and used cartridges covered by his patent under an implied contract to pay a reasonable royalty therefor.

Held: that the company, when exporting these manufactured boxes, was not entitled to be allowed a drawback under Rev. Stat. §“3019.

On October 19, 1892, proceeding under section 8 of the act of March 3, .1891, c. 539, creating the -Court of Private Land Claims, 26 Stat. 854, the United States filed in that court a petition against Santiago Ainsa, administrator' of the estate of Frank Ely, deceased, and others, alleging that said administrator claimed to be the owner through mense conveyances óf a large tract of land in the Territory of Arizona, known as the Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita; that he had not…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF' PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in this cáse, that if the lands which are the subject of controversy belonged to the class of temporalities, it was clear that the treasurer of the department had no power to make a sale by his sole authority, whether the value exceeded five hundred dollars or not; and if the lands did not belong' to that class, nevertheless, there was the same want of power under the laws of Mexico in relation to the disposition of…

This was an action brought by Patrick R. Smith on the 28th day of December, 1891, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.

On December 3, 1891, tbe appellant filed in the Court of Private Land Claims his petition praying to have confirmed to him a certain tract of land situate in the county of Cochise, in the Territory of Arizona, known and designated as the San Rafael del Yalle grant. Subsequent proceedings resulted in a trial a.nd a decree in behalf of the government, dismissing the petition and adjudging petitioner’s claim and title invalid.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: ■ (1) That the extent of the rights passing under the act of 1866 was decided by this court in Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463 , viz.: that “ the right to follow the dip of the vein is bounded by the end lines of the claim; ” ;• (2) That that right stops at the end line of the lode location, terminated by vertical lines drawn downward; (3) That the original location and lode determined those end lines.

The New Orleans Pacific Railway Company became duly incorporated under the general laws of the State of Louisiana on June 29,1875. By Article I, of its charter, it was given corporate existence for the term twenty-five years from that date.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA.</p> <p>The case is stated in tbe opinion.</p>

Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898), also called The Maximum Freight Case, was an 1898 United States Supreme Court case. The Supreme Court voided a Nebraska railroad tariff law, declaring that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it takes property without the due process of law. The Court defined the constitutional limits of governmental power to set railroad and utility rates by stating that regulated industries have the right to a "fair return". The ruling was later overturned in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company (1944). The decision in Smyth v. Ames was unanimous and Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court in writing.

Held: That the act known as the “Civil Service Act” was constitutional. 2. .That Congress has not delegated to the President and tb,e Commission legislative powers. 3. That by rule 3, section 1, the internal revenue service has been placed under the Civil Service Act and rules made in pursuance of it. 4. That the plaintiffs in these actions are officers of the Government in the internal revenue service. 5.

<p>error to the .supreme court of THE STATE OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in most respects, for enemies. To the extent, then, of actual supremacy, however unlawfully gained, in all matters of government within its military lines, the power of the insurgent government cannot be questioned. That supremacy did not justify acts of hostility to the United States. How far it should excuse them must be left to the lawful government upon the reestablishment of its authority.

<p>The systém established by the State of West Virginia, under which lands liable to taxation .are forfeited to the State by reason of the owner not having them placed or caused to be placed, during five consecutive years, on the proper land books for taxation, ancl caused himself to be charged with .the taxes thereon, arid under which, on petition required to be filed by the representative of the State in the proper Circuit Court, such lands are sold for the benefit of the school fund, with liberty .to the owner, upon due notice of the’proceeding, to intervene by petition and secure a redemption of his lands from the- forfeiture declared "by paying the taxes and charges due upon them, is not inconsistent with the due process of law required by the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of the State.</p> <p>As neither the plaintiff nor those under whom he claims title availed themselves of the remedy provided by the statutes of West Virginia for removing the-forfeiture arising from the fact that, during the years 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887 and 1888, the lands in question were'not charged on the proper land books with the state taxes thereon for that period or any part théreof, the forfeiture of such lands to the State was not displaced or discharged, and the Circuit Court properly directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff was entitled to recover only on the strength of his own title. Whether the defendants had a good title or- not the plaintiff had no such interest in or claim to the lands as enabled him to maintain this action of ejectment.</p> <p>Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Virginia, 226, approved and- followed to the point that “In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and if it appear that the legal title is in another, whether that other be the defendant, the Commonwealth, or some third person, •it is sufficient to defeat the plaintiff. If it appears that the title has been forfeited to the Commonwealth for the non-payment of taxes, or other cause, and there is no evidence that it has been rédeemed by the owner, or resold, or regranted by the Commonwealth, the presumption is that the title is still outstanding in the Commonwealth.”</p>

<p>King v. Mullins, ante, 404, followed.</p>

This was an action sounding in tort, but styled a bill of complaint in equity, for an accounting and settlement of a trust by Richard P. Thomas, Robert R. Thompson and Robert A. Wilson. The action was instituted in the Superior Court of San Francisco by John Chetwood, Junior, for himself and as the representative of all the stockholders of the California National Bank, Avhich bank had failed and Avas at the time in the' hands of a receiver.

This was an intervening petition by Stateler in the case just decided, of the California National Bank v. Thomas (ante, 441), to obtain the possession of the sum of $27,500 paid to the plaintiff Chetwood by the defendants Thompson and Wilson in the settlement of the suit of Chetwood against them as co-defendants with Thomas.

Upon an appeal from a decree of the District Court of tbe United States for the Southern District of New York, dismissing a libel in admiralty by the American Sugar Refining Company against the steamship Gr. R. Booth, for damage to cargo (64 Fed. Rep. 878), the Circuit Court of: Appeals certified to this court the following statement of facts and question of law: “ On July 14, 1891, the steamship Gr.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The controversy in this case was between the executor and two creditors of Charles M. Briggs, and arose as follows: On April 18, 1862, during the war of the rebellion, Charles S. Morehead, of Kentucky, executed and delivered to his nephew, Charles M. Briggs, a bill of sale of cotton in Mississippi, in these terms: “For and in consideration of money loaned and advanced heretofore by C. M. Briggs, and further valuable consideration by way of suretyship for me by said Briggs, I…

Held: that, in order that the various properties represented by the stock and bonds should become valuable, it was necessary that the enterprises on which they were based should be carried through, and this required additional funds, to procure which the Trust Company consented to Garretson’s negotiations with Tod & Co. and the Debenture Company, and the pledging of the securities. *498 The presumption on the facts is…

Held: That upon comparing this agreement with the one set forth in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 , the similarity between them suggests that a similar result should be reached in the two cases, as the point now taken was urged in that case, and was then intentionally and necessarily decided ; (2) That so far as the establishment of rates and fares is concerned there is no substantial…

Held: that the situation of the yards, partly in Kansas and partly in Missouri, was a fact without any weight; that such business or occupation of the several members of the association was not interstate commerce, within the meaning of the act Of July 2, 1890, c. 647, “ to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies; ” and that that act does not cover, and was not intended to cover, such kind of…

Held: That this court is not called upon to decide whether the defendant» are or are not engaged in- interstate commerce, because if it be conceded they are so engaged, the agreement as evidenced by the by-laws is not one in restraint of that trade, nor is there any com- • bination to monopolize or attempt to monopolize such trade within the meaning of the act; (2) That, following the preceding case, in order to come…

The appellees recovered judgment in the district court, which was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, from'which an appeal has been taken to this court.

Cyeus A. Brown, plaintiff in error in case No. 249, was indicted in the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, charged with the crime of murder, which indictment was filed in the United States court for the Indian Territory, Northern District, sitting at Muscogee on the 10th day of December, a.d. 1896.

On March 29, 1886, the appellees, Doloritas Martin de Cordoba et ai., filed their bill in the district court of the county of Mora, fourth judicial district, Territory of New Mexico, to establish their rights as the children and heirs of one’ Frederick Metzger. After answer the case was referred to a master, who reported findings of fact and conclusions of law in-favor of the plaintiffs.

Held: “(1) That the new company was legally organized; that the various acts of the legislature of Maine, passed subsequently to the execution of the mortgage, did not impair the obligations of the contract contained in the mortgage, *647 but simply afforded a more convenient and quicker remedy for a violation of the agreement and for the foreclosure of the mortgage than existed at the time of its execution ” ; (2) the…

<p>error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine.</p>

This was a suit for specific performance brought by the Montana Mining Company against the St. Louis Mining and Milling Company of Montana and Charles Mayger in the district court of the First Judicial District of the State of Montana, in and for the county of Lewis and Clarke.' The complaint alleged that on March 7, a.d. 1884,. plaintiff’s predecessors in interest, Robinson, Huggins, Sterling, De Camp and Eddy, were the owners of, and in possession, and legally entitled io…

Held: in the case of People ex rel. Blackinton Co. v. Roberts, 4 Appellate Div. 388, that a New York corporation which carried on a manufacturing business in.another State was liable to this tax ; and this decision was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. 151 N. Y. 652 .