Volume 171 — Vermont Reports

<bold>1. Notice — Generally — Duty of Inquiry</bold> <block_quote> Because it is uncontroverted that dock existed on beach area at time defendants purchased property containing beach, defendants were on inquiry notice of interests of neighboring property owners, and defendants were therefore bound by terms of declaration of conditions, restrictions and uses relating to beach area and its improvements.</block_quote> <bold>2. Deeds — Validity — Good Faith Purchasers</bold> <block_quote> Trial court directly enforced, against defendants, neighboring property owners' right to use and enjoyment of beach area and improvements to defendants' property, since neither defendants nor their predecessor-in-title were bona fide purchasers without notice of neighboring property owners' interest.</block_quote> <bold>3. Notice — Generally — Duty of Inquiry</bold> <block_quote> Because defendants' predecessor-in-title was not a bona fide purchaser without notice, and because defendants diligent inquiry would have readily revealed neighboring property owners' interest in use and enjoyment of beach area and improvements on defendants' property, defendants were on notice of and subject to terms of declaration requiring their contribution of one-tenth of the annual budget for beach area and improvements.</block_quote>

<bold>1. Trial — Criminal Cases — Jury Instructions — Generally</bold> <block_quote> Where there is intoxication such as to negate requisite criminal intent, court should normally instruct jury that it may consider intoxication evidence as bearing on intent.</block_quote> <bold>2. Appeal and Error — Reversal — Error</bold> <block_quote> An error is not grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction if court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that result would have been the same in absence of error.</block_quote> <bold>3. Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Particular Cases</bold> <block_quote> Although evidence warranted a charge informing jury that it could consider defendant's intoxication as bearing on his intent to commit charged crimes, any error in failing to charge on intoxication was harmless, since defendant never suggested in argument or in testimony that he was so impaired that he could not<page_number>Page 240</page_number> have had requisite criminal intent; rather, his position was that he knew his intent and it was exactly the opposite of that charged by State.</block_quote> <bold>4. Criminal Law — Defenses — Intoxication</bold> <block_quote> Because there was extensive evidence that, despite his consumption of drugs and alcohol, defendant retained a capacity to plan, reason, and remember throughout night in question, defendant was not entitled to acquittal as a matter of law.</block_quote> <bold>5. Evidence — Expert testimony — Particular Subjects for Expert Testimony</bold> <block_quote> Expert evidence of rape trauma syndrome, and associated typical behavior of adult rape victims, is admissible to assist jury in evaluating evidence and to respond to defense claims that victim's behavior after alleged rape was inconsistent with claim that rape occurred.</block_quote> <bold>6. Evidence — Expert Testimony — Particular Cases</bold> <block_quote> Expert's testimony on rate of false reporting by rape victims was inadmissible, since jury could infer from testimony that almost no woman falsely claims to have been raped, and jury could convict defendant on that basis.</block_quote> <bold>7. Appeal and Error — Preservation of Questions — Timeliness</bold> <block_quote> A motion to strike evidence must ordinarily be made when grounds for it become apparent. V.R.E. 103(a)(1).</block_quote> <bold>8. Appeal and Error — Preservation of Questions — Timeliness</bold> <block_quote> Defendant's motion to strike expert's testimony was untimely where it was made the day following the testimony, and therefore defendant's challenge to admission of evidence was not properly preserved for appeal. V.R.E. 103(a)(1).</block_quote> <bold>9. Appeal and Error — Plain Error — Generally</bold> <block_quote> Plain error exists only in exceptional circumstances where failure to recognize it would result in a miscarriage of justice, or where error is so grave and serious that it strikes at the heart of defendant's constitutional rights. V.R.Cr.P. 52(b).</block_quote> <bold>10. Appeal and Error — Plain Error — Situations not Constituting</bold> <block_quote> Trial court's failure to exclude inadmissible expert testimony on rate of false reporting by rape victims did not cause a miscarriage of justice and therefore there was, no plain error requiring reversal of defendant's convictions of kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and lewd and lascivious behavior. V.R.Cr.P. 52(b).</block_quote> <bold>11. Appeal and Error — Preservation of Questions — Failure to Raise Below</bold> <block_quote> Defendant's objection to proportionality of sentences could not be raised for first time on appeal.</block_quote> <bold>12. Offenses — Kidnapping — Defenses</bold> <block_quote> Jury determination was required in order to invoke voluntary release defense of kidnapping statute, and because voluntary release was an affirmative defense, defendant had burden of proof to establish it. V.S.A. § 2405(b).</block_quote> <bold>13. Criminal Law — Judgment and Sentence — Factors for Consideration</bold> <block_quote> Because kidnapping defendant failed to make any use, at sentencing, of stipulation that he released victim voluntarily and unharmed, there was no error in trial court's failure to consider stipulation. <cross_reference>13 V.S.A. § 2405</cross_reference>(b).</block_quote>

<bold>1. Prisons — Inmates — Transfers</bold> <block_quote> Authority to enter into contract to transfer Vermont inmates to an out-of-state facility was well within the powers reasonably and necessarily implied by the fundamental obligation of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections to maintain prison safety and order, and the Commissioner's express and unfettered statutory authority to designate, assign and transfer inmates. <cross_reference>28 V.S.A. §§ 102</cross_reference>(b)(5), <cross_reference>102</cross_reference>(c)(6), 102(C)(17), 701(b).</block_quote> <bold>2. Prisons — Inmates — Transfers</bold> <block_quote> Transfer of Vermont inmates to out-of-state correctional facilities did not violate the Interstate Corrections Compact on the basis that, if the authority to transfer prisoners out of state were implicit in the Commissioner's other statutory powers, the Compact would simply not have been necessary. <cross_reference>28 V.S.A. §§ 1601</cross_reference>-<cross_reference>1621</cross_reference>.</block_quote> <bold>3. Prisons — Inmates — Transfers</bold> <block_quote> The Interstate Corrections Compact was enacted, not to validate interstate agreements, but to "provide for the mutual development and execution of . . . programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human and material resources." <cross_reference>28 V.S.A. § 1601</cross_reference>.</block_quote> <bold>4. Prisons — Inmates — Transfers</bold> <block_quote> Contracts with another state for the transfer of Vermont inmates did not violate the Interstate Corrections Compact on the basis that it delegated to the other state the right to designate the prison assignment of transferred inmates because, under the Compact, when prison officials of a party state determine that transfer of an inmate to another party state is necessary or desirable, "Said officials may direct that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state." <cross_reference>28 V.S.A. § 1604</cross_reference>(a).</block_quote> <bold>5. Prisons — Inmates — Transfers</bold> <block_quote> Out-of-state facilities' policy of limiting inmates to one adult visitor at a time does not violate a requirement of the Interstate Corrections Compact that "persons entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of any power in respect to any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact" because transferred inmates are subject ' to the disciplinary authority and rules of the receiving state. <cross_reference>28 V.S.A. § 1604</cross_reference>(i).</block_quote> <bold>6. Prisons — Inmates — Transfer</bold> <block_quote> The routine transfer of Vermont inmates to out-of-state correctional facilities does not violate the provision to the Vermont Constitution calling for "visible punishments." Vt. Const. ch. <cross_reference>II</cross_reference>, § <cross_reference>64</cross_reference>.</block_quote>