Volume 175 — New York Reports

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff’s action is to enjoin the continuance of a conspiracy on the part of certain wholesale druggists, its competitors, defendants herein and others, to injure, ruin and destroy its business, and specifically to enjoin the continuance of various acts being done in furtherance of that conspiracy.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The statute in question deprives the defendant corporation of liberty and property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws, and, therefore, is in conflict with the state and national constitutions. (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 395, 398; People v. Lochner, 73 App. Div. 120; People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y. 554; Com. v. H. Mfg.

<p>New York (City of)—Powers and Duties of Fire Commissioner of—When he Cannot Remove Chief of Fire Department — Appeal Involving Nothing but Question of Costs Cannot Be Entertained. While the fire commissioner of the city of New York has, under the charter, the general management and direction of the fire department and power to remove the officers and employees thereof upon charges mentioned in the charter, he has no power to interfere with the specific powers and duties conferred upon and vested in the chief of the fire department by the charter, and has no power to relieve him from his duties or remove him from his position because he refused to continue a vacation granted to him, upon his own request; but the Court of Appeals cannot entertain an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division reversing an order of the Special Term directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus be issued requiring the fire commissioner to reinstate such chief of the fire department in the office from which he was thus removed, where, subsequently to commencing the proceeding for a mandamus, he had been removed from office upon charges preferred under the charter and had been paid his salary in full up to the time of such removal, so that the only right involved in the appeal, or capable of enforcement therein, is his right to collect the costs.</p>

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The insurance moneys are “ primarily ” and not “ secondarily ” liable for the husband’s debts. (Smith v. Wyckoff, 11 Paige, 49; Stokes v. Amerman, 121 N. Y. 337; Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9; Barry v. E. L. A. Soc., 59 N. Y. 587; Wilson v. Lawrence, 76 N. Y. 585; Brummer v. Cohen, 86 N. Y. 11; Smillie v. Quinn, 90 N. Y. 492; Baron v. Brummer, 100 N. Y. 372; Frank v. M. L. Ins.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. It was error for the court to deny the defendant’s motion for nonsuit at the close of all of the evidence in the case. (Magee v. O. R. & N. Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 734; Pouilin v. C. P. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 197; Harrison v. Fink, 42 Fed.

The nature of the controversy and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Under the Hew York standard fire insurance policy the insurer is not liable for loss or damage to a building caused by explosion. (St. John v. A. M. F. & M. Ins. Co., 11 N. Y. 516; Briggs v. N. A. Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 446; Miller v. L. & L. F. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. App. 395; G. F. Ins. Co. v. Roost, 26 Ins. L. J. 699; U. L. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 340; Heuer v. N. W. Nat. Ins.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Each of the grandchildren of the testatrix took a vested remainder in one-third of her estate upon attaining majority. (Nelson v. Russell, 135 N. Y. 137; Matter of Brown, 154 N. Y. 313; Wilber v. Wilber, 165 N. Y. 451; Dougherty v. Thompson, 167 N. Y. 484; Colby v. Doty, 158 N. Y. 323.) The estate is not subject to open and let in afterborn grandchildren.

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered April 25, 1902, modifying and affirming as modified a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term. The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. The learned court below erred in dismissing the counterclaim -for damages arising from breach of the alleged warranty by sample, and erred in ■ excluding the evidence offered by the defendant on this point.

<p>1. Highways—Contracts by Commissioners Must Be Expressly Authorized by Statute. Commissioners of highways are not agents of the town, having the right to represent it and contract for it in real or supposed 'emergencies, and are without authority to make any contract binding upon the town unless it is specifically authorized by statute.</p> <p>2. Authorized Contract for Rebuilding Bridge — Invalidity of Independent Contract by Commissioners for Supervision of the Work — Highway Law (L. 1890, Ch. 568, §10). Where, under section 10 of the Highway Law (L. 1890, ch. 568), commissioners of highways have, with the consent of the town board, entered into a written contract for the rebuilding of a bridge at a cost exceeding §500, the fact that the section does not expressly prohibit it does not authorize them to enter into an independent contract for the supervision of the work, not in writing and without the consent of the town board, although its amount is less than §500. In order to charge the town such contract, whatever its amount, should have received the consent of the town board, have been reduced to writing and approved by the board.</p>

the Supreme Court, in the first judicial department, entered March 31, 1903, upon an order which affirmed an order of Special Term dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Section 66 of the Sanitary Code is unconstitutional.

Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered October 28, 1902, which affirmed an order of Special Term granting plaintiff’s application for leave to cross the defendant’s tracks at grade. The following questions were certified : 1.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered January 30, 1903, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered June 28, 1902, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict directed by the court and an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment entered June 27, 1902, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department overruling defendant’s exceptions ordered to be heard in the first instance by the Appellate Division and directing judgment for the plaintiff upon the verdict. »</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered March 17, 1902, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a decision of the court at a Trial Term without a jury.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered July 15, 1902, modifying and affirming as modified a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered December 27, 1901, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiffs entered, upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered April 23, 1902, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term and dismissing the complaint.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered January 13, 1902, which reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial and granted a new trial.</p>

<p>Motion for reargument. (See 174 N. Y. 230.)</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered August 6, 1902, modifying and affirming as modified a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered August 6, 1902, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.</p>

Appeal, hy permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered December 4, 1902, which affirmed an order of Special Term denying a motion to confirm the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment in the above-entitled proceeding. The following question was certified: “ Did the commissioners adopt an erroneous principle in making their assessment in this proceeding ? ”

Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered November 26,1902, which affirmed an order of Special Term denying a motion to confirm the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment in the above entitled proceeding. The following question was certified: “ Did the commissioners adopt an erroneous principle in making their assessment in this proceeding ? ”

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered July 29, 1902, which reversed an order of Special Term denying a motion to set aside an assessment of a special franchise against the relator for the year 1900.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, made December 5, 1902, which affirmed the proceedings of the defendant in removing the relator from the office of general inspector of water meters and dismissed a writ of certiorari to review the same.</p>