¶1dissenting.
¶2I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division, substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful opinion of Judge Weissbard. My colleagues in the majority agree with Judge Weissbard that the fact of revocation, standing alone, is inadmissible. Yet they hold that error in this case to be harmless. It is here that I part company from them.
¶3Because it was disembodied from any admissible fact, the only effect of the revocation evidence was to show defendant to be a bad person with an inclination toward criminality, to assure that all evidence in the case would be seen through that lens, and to suggest to the jury that another adjudicative body had declared defendant a menace on the road. Although it is conceivable that in some other case such pernicious evidence could be harmless, it was not so here. The error pervaded the trial as the prosecutor hammered home the revocation in the opening and closing statements, and used it to attack defendant’s credibility during his testimony. Poisoning the jury with predisposition evidence requires a new trial on all issues.
¶4I am troubled as well by the majority’s statement that “revocation introduced along with the reasons for that revocation may be probative of recklessness when the defendant again engages in unsafe conduct identical or similar to that which resulted in the revocation.” Ante at 547, 826 A.2d at 611-12. The overarching problem with that notion is that once the facts underlying a revocation are admitted, in general, the revocation can add nothing of relevance. Although the majority cites several out-of-state cases as support for a contrary conclusion, State v. Vowell, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982); United States v. O’Brien, 238 F.3d 822 (7th Cir.2001), I note, as did the Appellate Division, that those opinions contain no analysis that will withstand scrutiny. State v. Bakka, 350 N.J.Super. 43, 54, 794 A.2d 260 (2002). Yet the majority has subscribed to their conclusions and declared that when prior conduct that is the subject of a revocation is repeated, the revocation may serve as an “additional warning” to the defen*553dant of the risks his conduct poses to others. Ante at 547, 826 A.2d at 612. That is a breathtakingly broad notion.
¶5Indeed, I can conceive of only one limited situation in which a revocation, along with the facts underlying it, would be relevant as a warning. That is the ease in which a revocation bears on notice of incapacity to drive. Thus, for example, if a driver has had his license revoked for visual impairment, the revocation bears on the issue of whether he knew he was not competent to drive and chose to do so in the face of that risk. That scenario is substantially different from the run of the mill case involving a revocation for a motor vehicle violation that is nothing more than a punishment for a momentary lapse, and not a commentary on the defendant’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle. The majority’s broad counter-statement that declares the potential relevance of a class of evidence that should be excluded is insupportable. Except in the limited class of cases to which I have adverted, I would bar any evidence of revocation and require the state to prove the relevance of the underlying facts in every case.
¶6For all those reasons I dissent.
¶7Justice ALBIN joins in this dissent.
¶8For reversing — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI — 5.
¶9For affirming — Justices LONG and ALBIN — 2.